Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry
of Defence
RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE LETTER OF 11 NOVEMBEREVIDENCE
FROM THE PERMANENT SECRETARY AND FINANCE DIRECTOR (4 NOVEMBER
2008)
Q.1. More details about the "eschewed
costs exercises" referred to in Question 5. [Q 5]
This question is based on a misunderstanding
caused by a transcription error which we have sought to correct.
Sir Bill Jeffrey actually referred to a "should cost"
exercise. As he explained, we are looking to employ benchmarking
techniques more systematically in the future.
Q.2. Confirmation as to whether UK Armed Forces
will be in a position to undertake a large-scale deliberate intervention
before 2017. [Q 11]
The Department is undertaking work to develop
and cost a recuperation programme to restore full contingent capability
once operational commitments return to the level within Defence
Planning Assumptions. We plan to restore contingent capability
(albeit recognising lessons learnt from current operations) in
accordance with Departmental prioritiesbeginning with the
ability to conduct Small Scale operations and, at later dates,
more demanding Medium and Large Scale operations.
We simply do not know how long it will take
to restore a generic contingent capability in line with Defence
Planning Assumptions. Timescales will be heavily dependent on
the tempo of continuing operationsparticularly the level
of commitment in Afghanistan which is difficult to predict accurately.
But we are not currently planning to restore a Large Scale Deliberate
Intervention capability before 2017.
In the short term we continue to retain a very
limited contingent capability. However, were circumstances such
that we needed to commit a larger force before 2017 it would be
possible if we judged it a higher priority than support to current
operations and if we were prepared further to breach harmony.
Q.3. A copy of the MoD's detailed measurement
and delivery plans for its new DSO targets (please refer to p
11, paragraph 1.7 of the Performance of the MoD 2007-08, by the
NAO). [Qq 12-14]
In accordance with the Treasury requirement
the MoD published a document The MoD Departmental Strategic
Objectives 2008-092010-11 on the MoD internet website
on 25 February 2008. This document set out how we intended to
report against Departmental Strategic Objectives. The document
remains available at:
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/ModDepartmentalStategicObjectives200809201011.htm.
The Defence Plan 2008-12 (Cm 7385), published
in June 2008, also gives further detail on how the Department
is reporting against PSAs and DSOs. In addition, our response
to Question 12 of the Committee's prior written questions dealt
with the detailed reporting against DSO 1.1. and DSO 2.1.
Q.4. MoD's current estimate of Defence Inflation
and the MoD's current estimate of when this work will be completed.
[Qq 16-23]
The programme of work underway to develop a
robust measure of inflation for total defence expenditure will
produce publishable estimates for FY 07/08 and FY 08/09 by April
2010. For FY 09/10 we hope an estimate will be produced in September
2010; this cannot be produced earlier because data for some UK
and foreign indices is not published until September.
Amalgamation of these work-strands will lead
to a measure of inflation in the input costs of Defence (the goods
and services we purchase and the wages we pay). We cannot measure
changes in the output cost of Defence as we have no quantitative
measure of Defence outputs, but would expect inflation in Defence
output costs to be lower than that of input costs, thanks to efficiencies
and productivity improvements in delivering outputs. It is also
important not to confuse Defence Inflation with the escalation
in unit cost of defence equipment. The latter tends to run above
deflator inflation, because new generations of defence equipment
are much more capable, than their predecessor.
Constructing a measure of inflation for equipment
projects is a complex exercise. For example, most major equipment
projects have "variation of price" (VOP), clauses, relating
to a particular industry index or range of indices. Details of
VOP clauses are not stored centrally and appropriate details have
to be obtained for each contract separately. Each contract's VOP
arrangement is different. VOP clauses are a collection of formulae
that use a wide range of price indices and exchange rates.
A prototype database for storing contract VOP
details has been built. Processes for matching data to contracts
payment data and to price index data should be complete by December
2009.
Latest estimates, based upon 123 contracts which
we have been able to match to expenditure data, account for around
£2.5 billion annual expenditure. The average inflation rates
for these was 3.6% in the year 2006-07 to 2007-08. For the top
10 contracts the rate ranged from 1.7% to 5.3%.
Q.5. More details about how the new SPVA Chief
Executive intends to build up the level of satisfaction with the
JPA system. [Q 33]
A number of initiatives are currently being
taken forward. The JPA I-Expenses Interface Review seeks to identify
the potential options for improving the self service user's experience
of the Interface. 47 "usability" issues were raised
by the single Services ranging from simplifying the user guide,
providing additional help screens and simplifying the input for
Disturbance Allowance. 35 JPA system amendments are planned to
be delivered by August 2009 and 12 non-system (process and documentation)
changes will be completed in the same timescale. This will make
the i-expense package much easier to use. Further improvements,
will depend on simplifying allowance policy. This review has already
been commissioned by the Service Personnel Policy Branch.
Q.6. A breakdown of the £2.3 million
additional costs which have been incurred by SPVA as the result
of problems in implementing JPA and the reasons for those costs.
[Q 35]
The table below provides the detailed breakdown
of the £2.3 million of additional costs incurred by SPVA
as the result of problems encountered whilst implementing JPA:
Enquiry Centre Staff |
£1.795 million |
Business Process Organisation Finance Team |
£0.377 million |
Service Request Management Group Team | £0.095 million
|
Total | £2.267 million
|
| |
These additional staff costs were required to provide additional
support during the Army's transition to a fully self-service environment;
to respond to unforeseen problems in relation to the Department's
financial accounting requirements; and the creation of the Service
Requests Management Group, to provide a one-stop-shop query service
for customers.
Q.7. The number of data security accreditors currently
within the MoD and clarification as to whether these posts are
exempt from the streamlining/efficiency process? [Q 56]
We currently have 47 accreditors in Defence Security and
Safety Assurance (DSSA), fulfilling the central accreditation
role. Top Level Budgets and Front Line Commands have delegated
responsibility for self-accreditation of systems operating at
"Secret" level and below that are "stand alone"
with no connectivity to other MoD networks. A further six accreditors
work in these areas and have a functional responsibility to the
DSSA. All accreditors are located outside London HQ and have not
been included in the Streamlining exercise. We have a professional
development scheme for accreditors, completion of which lends
to a Recruitment and Retention allowance. We are acutely aware
of the seriousness of data losses and provision has been obtained
for an additional nine accreditors, for whom recruitment action
is in hand. This will raise the total number of accreditors to
62 in the MoD. In addition, MoD has established a Head of Profession
for accreditation and work is underway to establish a competence
framework consistent with that being prepared by the Cabinet Office.
Q.8. The disciplinary consequences for staff who have acted
negligently with data? Sir Edward Burton's report said that only
the most recent serious loss of data "appears to have led
to disciplinary proceedings" (p 2, para 7); and why disciplinary
action was not taken following other serious data loss incidents?
[Q 58]
MoD has always had processes in place to discipline staff
in cases of negligence. As part of the programme of activities
following the Burton Report a revised table of security breach
levels and resulting sanctions is being produced will be published
in due coursethe current draft follows. Both Military and
Civilian disciplinary procedures have been reviewed to ensure
that these revised procedures can be used within the existing
guidelines. As part of the Data Protection awareness campaign
it is intended to publish anonymous aggregated details of disciplinary
actions taken.
Decisions on whether to pursue disciplinary action in particular
cases rest with the line management chain and should be made in
the light of the available facts, including the extent to which
the loss may have been the result of individual or systemic failings.
Information about previous cases is not held centrally and it
is not possible to identify the reasons for decisions taken in
previous cases. The purpose of the revised table and fresh publicity
is to ensure individuals are aware of the consequences of any
breach and to remind line managers of the steps they should take
if members of their staff are responsible for such an incident.
Disciplinary action has been taken against a number of staff since
the recommendations of the Burton Report were accepted.
Breach Level | Example of Breach
| Disciplinary/administrative action procedures to be followed
|
Minor | (a) Loss of Restricted material/assets outside the MOD estate due to negligence.
(b) Transmitting Restricted material on unclassified systems due to negligence.
(c) Negligently leaving a secure cabinet open at cease of work or leaving documents/assets out overnight unsecured.
(d) Not wearing a pass or ID card in MOD premises when it is policy to do so.
(e) Loss of building pass/personal ID card (eg Form 90) due to negligence.
(f) Loss and/or compromise of personal data that does not impact significantly on the individual(s) concerned.
| Civilian personnel: Minor disciplinary procedures may apply. Any action taken is to be recorded on Human Resources Management System (HRMS).
RFA personnel: Minor disciplinary procedures may apply. Action to be recorded on personnel file.
MDP Officers: Minor breaches may be considered in the context of the Ministry of Defence Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004. (MDP(Conduct) 04 Regs.)
Service Personnel: Minor administrative action procedures may applyJSP 833. Depending on the circumstances, disciplinary action may be more appropriatehowever, minor administrative action and disciplinary action are mutually exclusive.
|
Major | (a) Loss of Confidential material/assets outside MOD establishments due to negligence.
(b) Wilful transmitting of Confidential material/assets at lower PM level or over unclassified/open systems.
(c) Removing Confidential material from MOD without authorisation (or unauthorised carriage from MOD site of Confidential PM material).
(d) Repeated minor security breaches (within a 12 month period)
(e) Removing an unencrypted laptop from MOD premises.
| Civilian personnel: Major disciplinary procedures apply. The DVA is to be informed and AIR (Aftercare Incident Report) raised. Action taken is to be recorded on HRMS.
RFA personnel: Major disciplinary procedures apply. Action to be recorded on personnel file. The DVA is to be informed and AIR (Aftercare Incident Report) raised.
MDP Officers: Major breaches are likely to be considered in the context of the MDP (Conduct) Regs 04.
Service Personnel: Major administrative action procedures may apply. Depending on the circumstances, disciplinary action through the single Service disciplinary procedures may be more appropriate. The DVA is to be informed and AIR raised. Where possible, action taken is to be recorded on JPA or in personnel records as appropriate.
|
Gross | (a) Loss of Secret and above material/assets outside MOD establishments due to negligence.
(b) Unauthorised or inappropriate carriage or transmission of Secret and above material at lower PM levels or on unclassified systems.
(c) Removing Secret and above material from official premises without proper authorisation and safeguarding.
(d) Leaving PM assets in a public place eg laptop together with token and password due to negligence.
(e) Loss and/or compromise of personal data that impacts significantly on the individual(s) concerned and/or has to be reported to the Information Commissioner.
| Civilian personnel: Major discipline procedures apply; the breach may constitute a Gross Misconduct Offence.
The DVA is to be informed and AIR raised/ suspension of clearances. Action, where taken, is to be recorded on HRMS.
RFA personnel: Major disciplinary procedures applythe breach may constitute a Gross Misconduct Offence The DVA is to be informed and AIR raised/suspension of clearances. Action, where taken, is to be recorded in personnel file.
MDP Officers: Gross breaches are likely to be considered in the context of the MDP (Conduct) Regs 04.
Service Personnel: Major administrative action procedures may apply. Depending on the circumstances, disciplinary action through the single Service disciplinary procedures may be more appropriate. The DVA is to be informed and AIR raised/suspension of clearances. Where possible, action taken is to be recorded on JPA or in personnel records as appropriate.
|
Q.9. Whether the MoD will brief the Committee about the MOD's performance against the equivalent DSO 1 next year? [Q 64]
| | |
We will provide external reporting against the new DSO1 throughout
the year in Quarterly reports and the target will receive appropriate
coverage in the Annual Report and Accounts next summer. Whether
the Committee requests a confidential briefing from the Department
is, of course, a matter for the Committee.
Q.10. Details of when the Committee can expect to receive
a note on the MOD's assessment of how to restore full capability
following current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. [Q 64]
The Committee will receive an oral briefing early in the
New Year.
Q.11. A list of the force elements where readiness has
been reduced. [Qq 90-92]
(Answer to be provided separately.)
Q.12. Up-to-date figures of the level of defence research
spending funded by the MoD over the last 15 years. [Q 125]
Research is essential for the delivery of battle-winning
military capability now and in the future. MoD's research spend
is published as a matter of public record, set out in the MoD's
annual statistical compendium, UK Defence Statistics, copies
of which are in the library of the House. As National Statistics,
the MOD R&D numbers are required to be collected under a set
of internationally agreed definitions known as Frascati guidelines.
These, amongst other things, require us to provide the widest
possible coverage of the R&D activity undertaken by the Department.
A detailed explanation on how the MoD R&D statistics are compiled
can by found in DASA Defence Statistics Bulletin No.6, a copy
of which is available in the Library of the House The most recently
published figures for net MoD research spending (as reported in
the year of spend) are:
INCLUSIVE OF NON RECOVERABLE VAT AT CURRENT PRICES (£
MILLION)
Year | 1991-92
| 1992-93 | 1993-94
| 1994-95 | 1995-96
| 1996-97 | 1997-98
| 1998-99 |
£ million | 466 |
513 | 654 | 665 |
676 | 672 | 564 |
560 |
Year | 1999-2000
| 2000-01 | 2001-02
| 2002-03 | 2003-04
| 2004-05 | 2005-06
| 2006-07 |
£ million | 552 |
566 | 557 | 515 |
524 | 639 | 598 |
632 |
Figures for 2007-08 are due to be published in September 2009.
Q.13. In the MoD's response to the Committee's Report on Recruiting and retaining Armed forces personnel, the MoD said that Financial Retention Initiatives were short-term measures which gave the MoD time to address the underlying non-remunerative issues. What are those underlying non-remunerative issues and how is the MoD addressing them?
| | | |
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The challenges facing the Services in recruiting and retaining
Armed Forces personnel cut across all aspects of military life
and they are kept under constant review. The single Services share
experiences and there is considerable cross pollination of ideas
and the overall "offer" to the Armed Forces, both financial
and non-financial, is reviewed and adjusted in response to experience
and changing circumstances.
The MoD's approach to securing sufficient, capable and motivated
Service personnel is set out in the Service Personnel Plan. This
encompasses a broad range of projects and links into the many
personnel initiatives that were articulated in the MoD's responses
to the Committee. These affect all aspects of military life from
initial recruitment, reducing wastage during New Entry training,
improving terms and conditions of service, providing better support
to families, improving single and families accommodation, through
to caring for our injured personnel and Veterans. The Nation's
Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their
Families and Veterans (Cm 7424), published in July 2008, also
articulates a wide range of new measures that will complement
existing provisions and both remove disadvantages imposed by service
life on our people and their families and address the circumstances
where service justifies special treatment.
Q.14. In the MoD's response to the Committee's Report on
Recruiting and retaining Armed forces personnel the MoD said that
Operational and Manning pinchpoints were "reported against
subjective criteria which since 2003 have become progressively
more rigorous." What are those subjective criteria and how
have they become more rigorous?
A Pinch Point trade becomes apparent when there is a shortfall,
or an anticipation of a shortfall, in qualified manpower. A shortfall
is caused either by too many people choosing to leave (Voluntary
Outflow) or insufficient numbers coming through the training process
(Gains to Trained Strength). It is the interpretation of the effect
that the shortfall will cause that determines whether it is included
on the register or not. The decision to include a trade on the
Pinch Point register is based on consideration of the operational
situation, manpower planning, the economic situation, trends,
national demographics and equipment enhancements. The process
through which these criteria are applied, primarily through single-Service
and Joint Pinch Point Working Groups, has become more rigorous
as the definition of Pinch Points has become more precise. For
example, the "Infantry" Pinch Point has now been refined
to "Infantry: Private-Lance Corporal", a smaller and
more distinct cohort. It is only these two ranks that needed to
be targeted as a Pinch Point with specific plans and resources
to alleviate the pressure. Greater clarity has allowed these resources
to be targeted to better effect.
Q.15. Whether the MoD expects the number of pinchpoint
trades to increase or decrease over 2008-09 period?
It is clearly our intention that current measures will have
a positive effect on key Pinch Points, some of which we would
hope to remove from the register as a result.
Q.16. Have the major changes to the structure of the infantry
had any impact on recruitment and retention?
The introduction of the Future Infantry Structure (FIS) was
primarily intended to create a more coherent force structure.
It was also intended to offer soldiers greater choice over where
they serve and in what role (for example, a typical regiment will
now contain battalions with different specialisms, such as Armoured
or Light Role, and offer a variety of geographical choices). FIS
aimed to create units that are better manned to deliver operational
requirements, and in part to reduce the pressure on personnel.
The implementation of FIS has recently been successfully completed
(some changes were only implemented in late 2006-07). There are
likely to be a small number of cases in which the implementation
of FIS has been a factor in an individual's career planning and
choices; however, the changes have not been raised as a factor
on welfare and attitude surveys for either serving soldiers or
potential recruits.
Q.17. To what extent will the temporary structural changes
made in the Army alleviate the stretch on personnel as a result
of the current operational tempo?
Temporary changes to the Army's force structure in order
to sustain current operations fall into four broad categories:
creation of new temporary structures to respond
to the particular needs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These include Brigade Headquarters (HQ 11 Bde and the creation
of temporary posts to make 104 Log Bde HQ deployable) and additional
Military Working Dogs Support Units;
using units in roles for which they are not formally
attributed (known as reroling) to increase the number of units
able to provide the capabilities most needed on operations. Examples
include reroling Royal Engineer General Support Squadrons to provide
Close Support, and reroling AS90 Batterys to operate the 105mm
Light Gun;
reroling of capability not currently required
on operations to crew Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) equipment.
This provides the Army with the flexibility to force generate
without adding unduly to the operational demand and ensures that
newly procured equipment is deployed on operations as soon as
reasonably possible. Examples include reroling High Velocity Missile
(HVM) Air Defence Missile Batterys to operate the Medium Unmanned
Air Vehicle UOR; and
using Force Elements in their secondary role as
Infantry, which has seen both Royal Artillery and RLC Pioneer
Corps sub-units used in the Infantry role in Iraq.
These structural changes are focused primarily on sustaining
current operations and have been made with the principle of reversibility
in mind.
In addition, the measures described above have eased some
of the pressure on personnel in areas such as the infantry and
a number of the key pinch points by increasing the Army's capacity
to generate the capabilities required for operations. While the
requirements of our current commitments mean that there remain
several areas where harmony guidelines are not being met, reroling
contributes to managing this impact while also providing those
capabilities most in need on the front line.
Q.18. What has the new Conflict Prevention Pool achieved
to date?
The new Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) is on course to deliver
against its annual goals across its eight strategies. It is currently
only half-way through its inaugural year and its first annual
report will provide full details of achievements over 2008-09.
Two examples of progress to date are:
The Africa Programme continues to support building
the capacity of the African Union (AU). The AU has recently shown
greater political will to become involved in mediationfor
example with the Government of Sudan on both Darfur and the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement.
The work under the CPP programme in Moldova, in
particular the Transnistrian Dialogues, continues to provide
the only confidence building measures that are working between
the Moldovan and the Transnistrian sides, and it has received
endorsement from the EU Special Representative.
Q.19. Has cooperation continued between the UK and the
Russian Federation in dealing with stockpiles of former Soviet
weapons following the events of the summer?
The UK and the Russian Federation have cooperated for several
years in making safe and secure the legacies of the Weapons of
Mass Destruction programmes of the Former Soviet Union. This includes
a programme of assistance with construction of a facility for
destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles at Shchuch'ye in the
Urals region. This programme is managed by the MoD and is due
to complete in 2009. It has not been affected by the events of
the summer.
Q.20. What evaluation have the MoD made of the impact of
the Stabilisation Aid Fund, and Conflict Prevention Pool money
before this, in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Evaluation of the impact of the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF)
is undertaken tri-departmentally with FCO and DFID (as was the
evaluation of the impact of the Conflict Prevention Pool before
it). The recent tri-departmental SAF review reported progress
as being on track in Iraq. Two examples are successful capacity
building, in the form of 5,000 Iraqi officers trained; and economic
initiatives supporting the securing of a £4bn investment
contract). There has been partial success in Afghanistan, where
there have been successes in the counter-narcotics programme,
the successful launch of a radio station and key infrastructure
developments. The full impact of SAF programming in support of
NSID goals will be reported at the end of its first year of operation.
Q.21. In what way did progress in the Balkans, Congo, Nepal,
and Nigeria fall short of expectations, and why was information
on this not included in the Annual Report?
Information was provided at Annex C of Volume II of the MoD
Annual Report and Accounts.
Q.22. As part of the Streamlining initiative, the Department
will no longer need office space at the Old War Office and St
George's Court. What will happen to these buildings?
The exit strategies for both St George's Court and the Old
War Office Building are currently being developed. The lease agreement
commits the MoD to St George's Court until 2017 at the earliest.
Options being explored include the transfer of the lease to a
third party and the renting of office space to third parties.
At present no decisions have been made. For Old War Office, consideration
is being given to disposal options and reuse within the central
Government Estate. No decisions have been made.
Q.23. What will be the impact of the implementation of
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the
Department's resource accounts?
The implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) is being undertaken in two tranches: Financial Instruments
and Foreign Exchange Accounting with effect from April 2008; and
remaining IFRS changes as adopted by HM Treasury with effect from
April 2009. The latter includes the requirement to produce shadow
IFRS-based accounts for 2008-09, by September 2009. Implementation
is progressing well and the NAO have already commenced their audit
of Financial Instruments. MoD is also on target to produce shadow
2008-09 accounts by 10 September 2009.
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
AND FOREIGN
EXCHANGE ACCOUNTING
(2008-09)
The only impact of the financial instrument standards is
in respect of foreign currency accounting:
The foreign exchange forward buy programme is
a derivative to be valued at fair value, creating a net financial
asset (£260 million) on the balance sheet as at 1 April 2008.
Subsequent movement in the valuation is through the Operating
Cost Statement.
Foreign currency transactions translated at the
spot rate rather than the forward purchase contract rate. This
will result in an increase or decrease in Capital DEL and Resource
DEL expenditure related to the particular transaction if the spot
rates vary from the forward purchase contract rate; offset centrally
by the movement in the derivative.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REPORTING STANDARDS
(2009-10)
The key changes to the Department's resource accounts are:
Service Concession Arrangements (accounting
for current Public Private Partnership (PPP)/Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) arrangements). Arrangements are assessed under International
Financial Reporting Interpretation Committee (IFRIC) note 12.
Initial assessments indicate that the majority of the current
off-balance sheet PFIs will become on-balance sheet resulting
in a significant increase in Departmental assets.
Employee Benefits. The Department will
be required to accrue for benefits earned but not taken eg untaken
leave at the balance sheet date. This is likely to result in a
significant balance sheet liability for the Department.
Lease-type arrangements. The Department
needs to identify any lease type arrangements arising from the
use of specific assets over which the Department can demonstrate
control. Arrangements meeting the criteria of IFRIC may be accounted
for as finance lease, resulting in an increase in Departmental
assets.
Despite the good progress achieved to date, the full impact
of changes have yet to be fully assessed and agreed with HMT and
the NAO. Consequently, MOD cannot at this stage provide a view
on the likely values. However, it is inevitable that changes to
foreign exchange accounting and service concession arrangements
will result in changes to the 2009-10 accounts.
RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE LETTER OF 18 NOVEMBEREVIDENCE
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE (12 NOVEMBER 2008)
Q.24. Figures quantifying the MOD's achievements against
its PSA targets. [Qq 141-142]
The terminology "partly met" was mandated by the
Treasury. It was designed to ensure consistency of reporting across
departments. Four PSA targets were recorded as "partly met"
in the summary section of the Annual Report and Accounts. In all
cases we provided further detail designed to allow a clearer view
about the actual achievement in the body of the report:
PSA target 2page 15, and Annex C
(See also Q21 above) This records that of the 12 sub-targets,
two were met, nine partly met and one not met. The nature of the
sub-targets, as indicated by the Secretary of State in his evidence,
were qualitative assessments made about regional stability issues,
many of which were outside the control of the MoD.
PSA target 4pages 20 and 65. The
targets were about qualitative assessments of the value of UK
contributions to NATO and EU issues.
PSA target 5page 21 and paragraphs
276 et seq. This records that five of 22 sub-targets were met.
In arithmetic terms this suggests a 23% achievement rate, but
this is not a particularly helpful way of viewing achievement
in such a complicated sub target set.
PSA target 6page 24 and paragraph
226 et seq. This records that one of three sub-targets
were met and suggests a 33% success rate.
It is difficult to see how we could assign a meaningful quantitative
indicators to any of these targets. To do so we should have to
give a weighting to each of the individual objectives and, ideally,
include an assessment of the level of achievement for those objectives
that were not met. Such judgements are likely to be subjective
and will not replace the written assessment in allowing a reader
to get a feel for what has been achieved in pursuit of the target.
Q.25. A full breakdown of the on-going costs attributed
to JPA. [Q 148]
As reported in the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency's
(SPVA) Annual Report and Accounts the contractual cost paid to
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) in FY 2007/08 was £68.9 million.
The cost for delivering the JPA service was £55.5 million.
This can be broken down as follows:
JPA Implementation | £1.5m
|
JPA Annual Target Price | £45.0m
|
JPA Change | £9.0m |
Total | £55.5m |
Other (non JPA related) | £13.4m
|
Total | £68.9m |
| |
The release of any other financial information (cost or estimate)
relating to the SPVA Interim Contract is inappropriate at this
time because the bids for the next contract are currently being
evaluated, and as such, this information is commercially sensitive.
Q.26. The MoD's assessment of the risks which may arise
from reducing the numbers of Defence Intelligence Staff
The DIS has some 4500 personnel, nearly 90% of whom are located
outside of the MOD Head Office. The remaining 600 DIS staff form
part of the MoD Head Office and will be reduced by 122. A further
70 will be relocated to Feltham; the majority of the reductions
will be in business and functional support areas, and the reduction
in analytical staff (some 50 posts) will be less that half of
the total reductions.
Planned moves of staff from the Old War Office Building to
more efficient open plan offices and new ways of working will
enable many of these reductions, but we have also decided that
certain lower priority tasks can receive less analytical attention.
These proposals have been the subject of extensive consultation
within the MOD and across the wider intelligence community. The
main potential risks of overstretch on analytical resources and
reduced organisational agility in responding to new requirements
are judged to be manageable through adoption of more flexible
tasking arrangements and better prioritisation of demands..
Q.27. Details of where the MoD's headcount efficiency targets
have been achievedfor both civilian staff and military
administration and support posts
A breakdown of civilian manpower reductions between April
2004 and April 2008 (the period covered for the purpose of the
SR04 efficiency targets) by budgetary area is given below. Please
note that due to rounding, the individual figures do not add up
to the total and comparisons between 2004 and 2008 are distorted
in some cases by transfers of responsibility between TLBs. These
reductions have been enabled by the Department's continuing efficiency
and change programmes, such as the Defence Logistics Transformation
Programme, the People Programme, Joint Personnel Administration
and TLB collocations and mergers.
CIVILIAN MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
Land (including AG and NI) | -3,100
|
Chief of Joint Operations | -110
|
Central and Defence Estates1 | +770
|
Science, Innovation and Technology | +200
|
Defence Equipment and Support | -6,720
|
Air Command | -3,000 |
Fleet | -1,340 |
Unallocated2 | +230 |
Royal Fleet Auxiliary | -40
|
DSTL | +210 |
Met Office | -120 |
Hydrographic Office | +90 |
Defence Support Group | -2,390
|
Non Operational Locally Employed Civilians |
-3,260 |
Net Total Reduction | -18,620
|
1 Defence Estates was part of the Central TLB in April 2004.
2 Staff who cannot be allocated to a particular TLB.
|
| |
A breakdown of the reduction in military and admin support
posts by enabling initiative is as follows:
MILITARY AND ADMIN SUPPORT POSTS
Closure of RAF Coltishall | -738
|
Merger of Royal Navy TLBs | -121
|
Merger of RAF TLBs | -229 |
Joint Personnel Administration | -588
|
Defence Logistics Transformation Programme |
-3,418 |
Closure of Army Technical Foundation College Arborfield
| -147 |
Fleet delivery training | -246
|
Total Reduction | -5,487 |
4 December 2008
|
|
|