Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
PROFESSOR MARGOT
LIGHT AND
MR JAMES
SHERR
24 FEBRUARY 2009
Q40 Mr Borrow: Do you think that
NATO should be resuming contact with Russia through the NATO-Russia
Council? Would that be in our interests to do so?
Professor Light: I think that
any forum in which we engage the Russians, particularly those
forums in which we have practical discussions on practical issues
and attempt to get practical co-operation, is useful, and that
is partly what the NATO-Russia Council was meant to do. So, yes,
I think we should resume talking to them there.
Mr Sherr: I agree with that answer,
but I think we need to be very sober in our expectations about
what that forum and this dialogue will achieve. One reason, in
my view, there was a lot of complacency in NATO about the expected
Russian reaction to the US missile defence programme, is that
it was thoroughly discussed inside the NATO-Russia Council with
Russian military specialists, a common language was developed,
none of the Russian representatives showed any misunderstanding
of the programme or any apprehension of threat, but there was
a complete cut-out between those people and that level of person
and the people making political decisions.
Q41 Mr Borrow: What message do you
think it sends to Russia in the sequence of events of cutting
the tie and then re-establishing relations through the Russia-NATO
Council? Does that show from the NATO point of view a position
of strength or is it simply a reasonable thing to do?
Professor Light: I think there
is no purpose to be served by going on refusing to deal with them
in the NATO-Russia Council. It was not a very effective response
in the first instance and one might argue that it should not have
taken place, that we should rather have used the NATO-Russia Council
in which to criticise Russia rather than to stop talking to them.
I think that the wrong message, if you like, has already been
sent and I do not think it is really going to matter if we start
talking to them again there.
Mr Sherr: I agree with that answer.
I would add, though, that the risk of misunderstanding would have
been considerably diminished had on the morrow of the beginning
of the Georgian war the entire NATO Council been convened. But
I would have never suspended meetings. It is absurd for members
of NATO, in my view, to call for cutting dialogue, when it is
perfectly obvious to the Russians and ourselves that other members
of NATO will not agree and that any such step will only be temporary
in nature.
Q42 Chairman: So the NATO Council
would have been convened. And what would it have said?
Mr Sherr: In view of the enormous
investment that NATO has made in Georgia, the issues that we have
identified there as being important, the mere convening of the
NATO Council would have sent a message that we regard this as
an extremely serious matter. Whatever was decided at the level
of foreign ministers who did convene a few weeks later, that message
could never have been as strong as that simple gesture which was
not taken.
Q43 Mr Hancock: Will further NATO
enlargement, if that is to happen, act as a detriment to international
security and stability, particularly around Russia itself?
Mr Sherr: I might well hold a
minority position. Yes, of course, there are dangers, and we have
seen them, in premature enlargement or giving the impression,
misleadingly, of hasty enlargement, because it has never been
NATO's policy to push enlargement. This has been from the beginning
a demand-driven process. The principal brake on the process has
been NATO. But I fear that we do not consider adequately what
the consequences would be in the region if we said, "Here
we are, and no further." What would the consequence be in
Russia if by that step we appeared to endorse their claim that
these countries, that we have deemed important to us in the past,
to which we even have some treaty commitments, are in their privileged
sphere of influence? What are the consequences in dealing with
the Russians or anyone else by suggesting that bullying and truculence
works? What would be the consequence in countries like Ukraine
and Georgia? They will not accept this quietly. We are dealing
with countries, as we have seen in the recent Georgian crisis,
which are not only greatly apprehensive but which have a capacity
for behaving very intemperately. Issues that we long ago thought
had been resolved, such as Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, are
now once again being discussed in Ukraine by ostensibly very reasonable
people. I myself think the surest way to create major conflict
in that region would be for us to close the door and accept Russia's
claims to it.
Professor Light: I take a very
different view. I would argue that it depends what you mean by
enlargement. If you mean Croatia, then probably there will not
be very serious consequences. I think if you mean Georgia and
Ukraine, there will be very serious consequences. Neither Georgia
nor Ukraine fulfil the criteria for membership of NATO. Ukraine,
because it has a dysfunctional political system and until it gets
more political stability and until there is a popular opinion
in favour of NATO membership (at the present it is 60% opposed),
I cannot see Ukraine as being eligible for membership. Similarly
with Georgia. Georgia has two territorial disputes, and it seems
to me that that by itself would render it ineligible for membership.
I get very anxious about the argument that we have to expand NATO
because Russia is opposed to NATO expansion and we cannot let
Russia tell us what to do. I think that we really need to sit
inside NATO and ask ourselves questions about what the consequences
would be, not just for division in NATO but for the effectiveness
of NATO, if it were to be enlarged to include those countries.
Q44 Mr Hancock: I was very interested
in your comment about the disfunctionality of the political structure
of NATO. That is mainly caused, is it not, by the anti-Russian
feeling that was brought into NATO, mainly from the former Soviet
bloc countries who are now members of NATO? They insist on punishing
Russia at every step for the crimes and the misdeeds of the Soviet
Administration, and they will use every step and every possible
way to connive together to undermine any negotiations and any
real agreements with Russia between Russia and NATO.
Professor Light: That is certainly
one of the Russian fears.
Q45 Mr Hancock: It happens. It is
a reality, is it not?
Professor Light: Certainly if
one charts the attitudes of Russia, not to NATO but to the European
Union, then it is absolutely clear that Russia was very favourably
inclined towards the enlargement of the European Union until that
moment when the Eastern European and Baltic States became Members,
because they believed that the East Europeans, particularly the
Poles and the Baltic states, would affect the EU's attitudes to
Russia. That has in fact happened, so Russian attitudes to the
EU are much less favourable now than they were. Since NATO in
itself is a far more emotive subject for Russians, most Russians
still see NATO as a Cold War Alliance that should have been put
to bed at the end of the Cold War, like the Warsaw Pact, and they
find it very difficult to see former allies now inside NATO.
Q46 Mr Hancock: In your opinion,
is the unity of the Alliance sustainable, in the light of the
divisions there are between Member States, particularly their
attitude towards Russia?
Professor Light: I think what
would really pull the Alliance apart would be the possibility
of Russia attacking a NATO member and Article 5 being invoked.
I think that that really would split NATO completely.
Q47 Chairman: That is intended to
be what is holding it together.
Professor Light: A Bulgarian diplomat
once told me that the only countries that will ever get into NATO
are countries that will not require NATO's defence. I sometimes
think that would it had remained like that.
Q48 Chairman: Mr Sherr, I noticed
you nodding through much of Professor Light's answer.
Mr Sherr: I was, but I wanted
to make a distinction. There is no reasonable person I know in
the Alliance, it was certainly the case for myself, who would
conceivably entertain inviting Ukraine or Georgia into membership,
even in the conditions that existed before August. I myself wrote
a memo to NATO before the Bucharest Summit saying, "This
is not the time for offering either a membership action plan."
The issue is simply: If and when those countries meet the criteria,
should the decision be made with regard to their merits or with
regard to Russia's declared interests? That is where I think there
is a disagreement within the mainstream part of the spectrum of
argument. Secondly, I have worked very closely with NATO over
the years. I think it would be a great mistake to understate the
extent to which NATO's thinking about Russia has been transformed.
One of the reasons why NATO was ill-prepared for what happened
in Georgia is that thinking inside the Alliance had been so transformed.
So many steps that we have seen of late have been completely ruled
out, that at a time when we should have been very concerned and
very much more engaged, we were essentially napping, and in Washington
they were napping as well. I just must add that, even a week before
all this began in Georgia, when it was clear to every expert that
this was a profoundly dangerous situation, high level co-ordination
in Washington existed on only two subjects: Afghanistan and Iraq.
Everything else was at the level of the bureaucracy and there
was a complete cut-out between what they were discussing and what
the decision-makers were thinking about. If we were all still
in a Cold War mindset, our hapless performance would have been
inconceivable over the past couple of years.
Q49 Mr Jenkin: In the question of
NATO expansion, are there any issues of principle which should
concern us, or is it just about practicality and ifs and buts?
Surely there is a founding issue of principle, which is that NATO
seeks to advance democracy, rule of law and fundamental freedoms,
and in the fullness of time it is in our interests, in our long-term
interests, that these should all be extended to as many countries
as possible. The rest is timing, but there is an issue of principle
involved, is there not?
Professor Light: I think it is
a matter for debate whether NATO is primarily a defence alliance
or an institution for advancing democracy. I would have said that
it is first and foremost a defence alliance. That is the first
thing. The second thing is that it is all very well to say it
is a matter of principle, but I do think that from time to time
we might try and put ourselves in the seat of someone who would
be a neighbour to this enlargement. You only have to ask yourself
how would the United States feel if Mexico were to join an alliance
perceived to be hostile, though the alliance itself declared itself
not to be hostile, to understand a little bit of what the thinking
is in the Kremlin. And it does not seem to me to be such shocking
thinking.
Mr Sherr: I would express it in
the following terms: NATO stands or falls on the basis of collective
capacity, shared interest and common values—all three. Principle
is an essential part of the answer; it cannot be the whole answer.
Countries do not have a right to join NATO. They must contribute
to what makes NATO NATO, both in terms of values and interests
and also in terms of capacity. I have argued for a long time that
the time for Ukraine to join NATO is the time at which its membership
will strengthen both the security of Ukraine and the security
of NATO. I fully agree with Professor Light that we are very far
from that point at the moment. But when we reach that point where
we decide such a step with regard to a particular country is in
its security interests and our own, then principle would be part
of that calculation. I also think that if we turn our back on
our principles, the divisions we face in the Alliance today, which
does now contain, since the Cold War, nine new members, would
be nothing compared to what we faced then and it would be questionable
whether NATO could continue.
Q50 Mr Jenkin: Perhaps I could ask
the concomitant question: Should we recognise that Russia has
legitimate spheres of influence?
Mr Sherr: No.
Q51 Mr Jenkin: Should we desist from
antagonising Russia by interfering with their spheres of influence?
Mr Sherr: We should recognise
that Russia has interests, just as we have interests. NATO, for
example, has never expressed a view about whether the Russian
Black Sea Fleet should stay in Sevastopol. When we have discussed
this with Ukrainians, we have said, "As long as you are happy
with it, as long as it is there on a transparent basis, as long
as it does not threaten security, from NATO's point of view it
could stay there until 2050 as far as we are concerned."
Yes, Russia has interests as far as where forces might be based.
We need to have a concrete discussion with the Russians, which
we have not had, about: "What are you exactly afraid of?
What would threaten you and why?" We have done this before.
We did this between Bush Snr and Gorbachev when Germany was being
reunited, when the Cold War system ended. But to recognise spheres
of influence, to go back to this pre-1914 concept, is something
which would not only be unprincipled, it would have very serious
and I think very swift practical consequences, both in that part
of the world and in our part of the world.
Q52 Chairman: Professor Light, do
you want to add anything?
Professor Light: I think recognising
a sphere of influence is not what one should or would do but understanding
that there is an area in which a country feels that its security
or its interests are at stake. It is a different thing, and, yes,
I think we should understand why Ukraine is a more sensitive country
for Russia than Mongolia.
Q53 Chairman: That is interesting
because both Ukraine and Mongolia are surely integral to Russia's
future. Possibly Mongolia will be of greater interest in 20 or
30 years time than Ukraine will be.
Professor Light: It does not have
the historical baggage that Ukraine has and that the western border
has.
Mr Sherr: There is an old expression
in Russia: St Petersburg is the brain, Moscow is the heart, Kyiv
is the mother of Russia.
Q54 Chairman: Where does Mongolia
come into this?
Mr Sherr: It does not.
Professor Light: It is the stepsister.
Mr Sherr: There are areas of the
former Soviet Union which are important simply for geopolitical
reasons. Where I think Professor Light and I agree is that Ukraine
is of vital importance to Russia for reasons of identity and for
reasons of sentiment; nevertheless, Ukraine is also important
to Ukraine for reasons of identity and sentiment, and so there
is an extremely serious problem. I have sat in a room where a
senior Russian said to a number of Ukrainians, "You must
understand that for me, as a Russian, Ukraine is part of my identity."
I think you can imagine what the reaction was. Neither of us would
pretend this is a simple matter to deal with, because there are
different identities and readings of history involved here.
Q55 Chairman: Is Russia really concerned
about ballistic missile defence? If so, why?
Mr Sherr: Yes. The answer depends
upon whom you speak to. Forgive me if you have not seen what I
have written about this. May I just say that I apologise to the
Committee for the fact that my submission was very late. I hope
the fact that it is comprehensive will compensate for that. As
I did state in the submission, the Russian military is, even by
our standards, a worst-case thinking military, and it also attaches
enormous weight to deception. Therefore, the fact that a system
is not apparently designed to achieve something means nothing.
Their concern is that these systems, however inappropriate their
capabilities for threatening Russia, are the precursors to something
that will threaten Russia. Secondly this is an emotional issue
for many in the political leadership because we are talking about
advanced military systems being positioned in an area that until
recently had been the Warsaw Pact. There is a manipulative issue
involved here as well because the Czechs and the Poles have expended
real political capital in agreeing to this decision, and if the
Russians could persuade the Americans over the heads of their
allies to get rid of it, it undermines their confidence even further,
and this is something I would suggest they would wish to do.
Professor Light: I completely
agree. As I wrote in my submission, I think it is not so much
intention that militaries think about but capability. The belief
that these two deployments are the first in a whole series of
deployments which will in the end encircle Russia and will require
of Russia that it begins to build up the number of missiles it
has so that it can overwhelm the ballistic missile defence—the
belief therefore that this is a trigger for an arms race—is
quite seriously held, even by people who do not think that these
initial deployments do threaten Russian security. If you remember
the Star Wars, the effect of SDI, I think there is in Russia also
this fear that there is a technology gap, and that working on
this anti ballistic missile defence is likely to increase the
technology gap that already exists between Russia and Western
defence systems and that it is going to grow at exponential rates.
My real fear is that by the time we know whether BMD works or
not, it will already have undermined European security so that
it will not serve as anything that will bolster European security.
Q56 Chairman: You believe that rather
than contribute to European security it will undermine it.
Professor Light: Yes.
Q57 Chairman: Why exactly?
Professor Light: Because I think
that by the time we know whether it works or not it has the potential
of already having undermined Russian-Western relations, contributing,
once the economy starts improving, to an arms build-up in Russia,
and getting us back into a spiralling arms race.
Q58 Chairman: Mr Sherr?
Mr Sherr: The culpability of the
Americans, in my view, over this is not that anyone for a second
thought of this in an anti Russian context; it is that they did
not think about Russia at all. This is a fundamental problem we
have, because the Russians assume that we are central to their
calculations even when we are not thinking about them at all.
This is where I think our deepest problems lie. The senior Russian
military have been deaf to argument about this issue as to many
others. For them NATO is by definition an anti Russian alliance.
To say that it has changed is like saying that a lion has become
a vegetarian. They absolutely cannot take it seriously. There
is a whole range of issues that matter to us profoundly where
we find that it is simply not possible to have a discussion because
they already know.
Q59 Mr Borrow: Are you saying that
this is a US problem rather than a NATO problem, that US foreign
policy and military focus is so much away from the European context
that Russia just is not in the frame at all, whereas perhaps the
rest of NATO, that is European based, does take a greater recognition
of the Russian position?
Mr Sherr: I was not intending
to say that. This originated as a US decision and it is part of
a US global system. In the whole diversity of states that belong
to NATO, obviously amongst many—not all—there is much
more sensitivity and understanding of the Russian dimension. Within
the United States there are departments of government and experts
who are also deeply sensitive to that dimension, but they were
not making the decision. Donald Rumsfeld's defence department
was making this decision.
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