Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-179)
MS OKSANA
ANTONENKO
24 MARCH 2009
Q160 Mr Jenkin: You said something
very interesting, and maybe it is important for us to understand
Russia in these terms; that it is not that they regard the CIS
states as a direct threat; it is just that what they represent
is a threat to Russia's existence in that if Georgia becomes a
modern democratic state right on the border of Russia, that in
itself threatens the nature of the Russian oligarchy and the rather
retro regime that exists in Russia, just by being a good advertisement
for a liberal democracy. Would you agree with that? Is that why
they want to maintain an influence over these CIS states?
Ms Antonenko: Certainly within
Russia, particularly the current government, sees the so-called
coloured revolutions as a direct threat to Russia; there is no
doubt about that, and that has been very much the factor that
shaped the perceptions of the West in the late Putin Administration
and now even during Medvedev's time in office. Equally, Russia
does not view the so-called democratic coloured revolutions in
Georgia and Ukraine as a grass-roots democratic processes but
they rather view it as a crude American intervention to change
the regimes in those countries and to install what the Russians
see as anti-Russian regimes. At the time of the Rose Revolution
in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in my view that
is a completely wrong assessment, and it was indeed an attempt
by the population in those countries to bring about more democratic
governance. The problem in both Ukraine and Georgia is that since
that time there has been a very substantial deterioration, in
my view, of the democratic processes in those countries. In Georgia
this is particularly true, with a number of very fundamental democratic
principles such as independent judiciary, such as balance of power,
existence of opposition, freedom of media, being violated. As
long as the West simply presents Georgia in those terms, as a
kind of beacon of democracy still today, I think Russians will
be more and more convinced in their minds that it is not a true
democratic process; it is just a Western ploy. If the West and
the European Union in particular is doing a lot in that area,
and genuinely engages with Georgia in bringing about democratic
change, I do not see what Russia can do in terms of affecting
the fundamental democratic transformation in Georgia, if that
takes place. We have the precedent of other countries in the post
Soviet area trying to move closer to democracy, and some countries
being more able to slowly develop a kind of competitive, pluralistic
system. That has not actually affected Russia's relations with
those countries. If there is a genuine democratic process I do
not think that Russia sees it as a threat.
Q161 Mr Jenkins: You have partly
answered the question I had in mind when you said that Russia
requires some degree of stability in those countries on its border,
and rightly so. But, some of the actions that Russia have taken
and some of the utterances they have made, have tended to crate
instability in the very areas where they want stability, in the
very countries. Is their greatest goal at the moment stability,
or influence in those countries, and does it see the fact that
it is losing influence in those countries as in itself an act
of instability within those countries?
Ms Antonenko: I think in the minds
of Russian policy-makers the two things, stability and influence,
come hand in hand. There is a genuine belief—and we have
heard that repeatedly articulated by President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin—that Russia views regional stability being
dependent on Russia being able to play the key role in the region.
Of course, the first real experiment we are having in terms of
changing the paradigm is post-August Georgia, where we now see
the European Union being very much engaged on the ground in Georgia,
and Russia is almost completely absent. It is totally absent of
course now in terms of its relations with Georgia, either in the
economic sphere where it is still enforcing a blockade in Georgia,
or politically. There are no pro-Russian forces in the Georgian
Government in opposition now. In this sort of situation, the presence
of the European Union is acknowledged by Russia as a stabilising
force. We will see how that is going to develop. If for the next
five years or more we have a situation where Russia and the European
Union slowly establish a modus vivendi in the region—and
the new initiative that has just been announced, the Eastern Partnership
Initiative, is very interesting in that regard because it creates
not only bilateral relationships between the EU and those countries,
but also a multilateral forum where all those countries together
with the European Union sit around the same table with Russia
being absent from that. It is a very interesting experiment in
that sense. I see real promise of Russia slowly being able to
review its attitudes, and acknowledge, as it did after August,
that there could be other stabilising forces in the region. As
far as Central Asia is concerned, similarly we see a changing
pattern. In the last 10 years Russia has moved from claiming to
be a sole guarantor stability and predominant player to engaging
in a real sharing of influence and power with China, through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in which the role of China
in Central Asia has grown substantially, while Russia's own influence
in Central Asia, both economic, political, and increasingly in
the security sphere, has been declining. Again, that has not produced
a conflict; rather it has produced a new type of relationship
with China, which is complex, but Russia's acknowledgement that
it is no longer the sole player and acceptance. For example, at
the end of August, I was in Tajikistan during the time of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. None of the SCO countries
have recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
despite the substantial pressure which was put on them by Russia.
They all stood behind China in articulating this position to Russia,
and yet since that time there has not been any crisis, either
within the SCO itself or in relations between Russia and Central
Asian states. Here again Russia is willing to accept that it is
not a sole player.
Q162 Robert Key: Please could we
turn to the question of Article 5 guarantees, to which you have
drawn attention in your memorandum! Should NATO have explicit
contingency plans for the possibility of Russian military action
against NATO members such as Estonia?
Ms Antonenko: I think so, yes.
I am sure that the August war has raised many fears and concerns,
very legitimate ones, in my view, among the countries that have
a very difficult history with the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire.
I think they have a very legitimate right to be reassured; otherwise
the credibility of the NATO Alliance will very much be put in
doubt. The question is, what is the best way to reassure them?
There have been a number of proposals on the table. In my view,
the strategy you are suggesting is the right one; it is to have
credible contingency planning and greater investment in the development
of infrastructure and facilities and capacities within those countries,
including protecting them against cyber attacks. However, I do
not think that to create a standing force assigned for territorial
defence purposes is the right way to go, because this will send
a wrong signal and may not be seen as credible, given that NATO
countries are obviously busy with other commitments, including
in Afghanistan. Maintaining a substantial force separately assigned
to territorial defence may not be their first priority. However,
in my view, contingency planning is extremely important.
Q163 Robert Key: Do you think that
the Secretary of State for Defence was wrong in what he said in
Krakow on 19 February, when he called for an allied solidarity
force of 3000 personnel?
Ms Antonenko: I do not know whether
he was wrong. In my view, it is a commitment that will be too
difficult for NATO now to implement, given the other pressures
that exist within the Alliance, particularly with regard to the
mission in Afghanistan and the new requirements for this mission
with the new US Administration committing more troops and expecting
the Allies to commit more troops. In addition, if this force is
de facto seen as a way to protect Estonia or Poland against
Russia, in my view 3000 men is not a credible scale of the force.
The contingency planning which involves all elements of NATO policy
and its toolbox of instruments is that NATO has a more credible
reassurance.
Q164 Robert Key: Estonia has told
us that it would like to see a high-profile by NATO and its forces
as a deterrent in Baltic, for example air policing: do you think
that would be seen by the Russians as provocative?
Ms Antonenko: We need to be mindful
of the way Russia views NATO commitments. At the time of the first
NATO enlargement, when NATO signed the Founding Act with Russia
there, was a very clear pledge on behalf of NATO not to deploy
new permanent infrastructure bases in new member states. It is
very important to see how that pledge can be in principle be observed,
because of course with the absence now of the CFE treaty—in
the future we may see a revival of the CFE, although I doubt that—it
is important that we have a clear commitments both on the part
of NATO and hopefully on the part of Russia which are observed.
At the same time, there is still enough room within these commitments
for a highly symbolic and visible reassurances for Estonia and
other countries, which need to be put in place.
Q165 Robert Key: The cyber attacks
on Estonia in 2007 were very, very effective. I think they were
the only occasion on which one state has intervened in another
state in this way. One of the problems appears to be that the
law of armed conflict clearly does not apply, and there is no
other international law in this area: is that something that the
international community should be concerned about?
Ms Antonenko: Yes, I think so.
It is certainly understood that any future war will involve the
very important dimension of cyber security, and that is something
for which NATO needs to develop a consensus regarding policy and
instruments to address this threat. On one hand, it can be addressed
through a new treaty or it could be included as an agenda item
in the new discussions with Russia, either in the Russia NATO
Council or within the discussion of the Medvedev proposals on
the new European Security Treaty, to discuss the obligations the
countries have not to use such kind of attacks to achieve their
vital security interests.
Chairman: There were significant cyber
attacks on Georgia shortly before August 7th.
Q166 Robert Key: Yes indeed, but
Georgia has a small sector of information technology, whereas
Estonia is the most wired country in the European Union, and depends
almost wholly on their system not only for government but for
civilian interaction. Can I ask finally about the impact of climate
change on the northern shores of both North America and the Russian
Federation? We have been told that Russia is focusing once again
on trade routes across the north of Canada and the Arctic shores.
Does this have the potential or seeds for new confrontation between
North America and the Russian Federation in the Arctic?
Ms Antonenko: There are two views
on that. One view is that it has a lot of potential for confrontation
because it is an area potentially rich in natural resources and
occupying strategic location, but it has not been regulated through
multilateral mechanisms. Each country at the moment is trying
to implement unilateral policies and that can potentially lead
to conflict. At the same time, I personally think that it is also
an area of opportunity for cooperation. If there is one area where
NATO and Russia in the long run would have a common interest in
avoiding conflict, because if a conflict starts it would have
a huge impact on the security both of Russia and the main NATO
countries, it is the Arctic. If we need to develop a new agenda
in which cooperative security mechanisms can be applied and developed
within a multilateral forum, this is, in my view, the most important
opportunity. I hope we will take that on, because I cannot imagine
that NATO and Russia will be content with a view of developing
just a unilateral military posture in that area.
Q167 Mr Hancock: In your very interesting
memorandum to us you suggest that it is high time somebody should
start to re-boot the NATO/Russia relationship. How would you suggest
that can be best achieved, and who has to start that process?
Ms Antonenko: If one summarises
the argument, the strategy we used before the August war, in building
relations with Russia, was counter-productive because, in my view,
it was based on false assumptions and expectations on both sides.
On the NATO side, the assumption was that the more meetings and
working groups and committees they had, the more approximation
and rapprochement we have with Russia to develop common threat
perceptions and capabilities. On the Russian side the perception
was that the Russia NATO Council is a kind of back-door membership
to NATO. In both cases that was wrong, and there was a huge disappointment
in the relationship, even before August. As a result, even before
August, starting from last year, the bilateral programme of activities
for Russia—NATO military cooperation had been almost suspended
and there was no plan of action approved. I think now we should
use the pause in the relationship after the August conflict not
only to send a signal to Russia, which was the right thing to
do—that "business as usual" could not be pursued
with Russia until it implemented its commitments regarding the
consequences of the August war—but at the same time to re-think
strategically how we approach the relationship with Russia. There
is no doubt in mind that it is very much in NATO's interests to
have a productive and constructive relationship with Russia, and
to avoid by all means possible a new confrontation and overcome
mistrust shaped by Cold War attitudes. In my view, in regard to
the new strategy the motto should be "the less the better"
in a way. We should stop thinking about creating a multitude of
instruments, committees and meetings, but instead focus on the
few very clearly targeted areas, where Russia and NATO clearly
share common interests, and where they can develop not just dialogue
but common actions. The Arctic is clearly one of those areas.
The second area is Afghanistan, where NATO and Russia have a common
interest in seeing Afghanistan stabilised.
Chairman: We will come on to that.
Q168 Mr Hancock: Your answer really
begs the question. Do you believe that Western leaders really
understand Russian diplomacy and what Russia is seeking? Do they
have a clear vision of what Russia wants for itself and how it
sees itself?
Ms Antonenko: I think the West
is very much divided on this, and it is no secret. Some countries
within NATO and the EU see Russia very much as a member of the
Euro/Atlantic community, which needs to be brought closer and
possibly integrated in some way. Other members of NATO see Russia
as a new threat. We discussed about the need to reassure some
of the new member states of NATO who feel threatened after the
August events. In my view, it will continue to be a challenge
to bridge this divide. The only way we can achieve that is to
focus on the narrow window of opportunity where there is a consensus
within NATO on those areas that have to be addressed, like cyber
security and the Arctic, or Afghanistan and arms control. Slowly
through that interaction we can build a new type of relationship,
which will help to bridge the divide with the West and over time
change Russia's attitudes. It is very important to note that when
Medvedev became President, all the statements that came out from
Russia clearly prioritised a relationship with the West. There
is almost no appetite in Russia now either for a so-called new
cold war or confrontation with the West, or moving away from the
West towards China. We have seen repeatedly, even after the August
events, Russia's attempts to position itself as a member of the
Euro/Atlantic community. Of course, it wants to position itself
within that on its own terms, and of course we need to have a
very long conversation with Russia about the consensus model for
engagement and cooperation. We have to remember that in 1975,
when the first Helsinki process was negotiated, it took six years
and 4,600 different proposals were discussed. If we are now embarking
on a new project, in my view it is a window of opportunity to
start reshaping relations with Russia in Europe.
Q169 Mr Hancock: Do you see a divergence
of opinion now coming from the President, as opposed to the Prime
Minister, and is there a shift of power from the Russian White
House back to the Kremlin; or is Russia's foreign policy still
very much in the Prime Minister?
Ms Antonenko: I think Russian
foreign policy is an area where the President is increasingly
playing an important role. Domestic policy is somewhat harder
to judge.
Q170 Mr Hancock: Is he making the
policy or following it?
Ms Antonenko: I think he is making
the policy too. Clearly, the August events have been a very shocking
development for the Russian President, who came to power and articulating
this pro-Western agenda, and the August war represented a setback.
But after the August war we have seen re-emergence of Russia's
emphasis on multilateralism, on creating a new relationship with
the West, and on international law. In my view such priorities
do not exist in Putin's view of the world, which is very much
based around realpolitik, rivalry and competition and making Russia
prevail in this rivalry. Whether at the end of the day President
Medvedev can implement changes in Russia's domestic and foreign
policy which are necessary for Russia to be brought into the Euro/Atlantic
as an equal partner is uncertain and yet to be seen.
Q171 Mr Hancock: What could or should
NATO do to positively allay Russia's fears about what their objectives
are? Do you think NATO has clear objectives, or do you think they
are so vague they could be misrepresented or misinterpreted by
anyone?
Ms Antonenko: They are not vague.
As I said, the members of NATO are divided, and often times Russia
tends to pick up the views of the individual NATO members and
interpret them, when it suits it, as NATO policy, and in other
ways not to interpret it as NATO policy. For example, is missile
defence a NATO policy or just a US policy? There has been a shift:
Russia saw NATO policy, and it is now increasingly presented as
just a US policy. NATO enlargement is another very painful issue
of course, which will remain very painful; but not only the August
events but the domestic situation both in Georgia and Ukraine
have made it less likely that this issue will be on the agenda
in the foreseeable future, and therefore it offers us room for
discussions with Russia where those most difficult issues are
not on the agenda. If we shift from that divisive agenda over
NATO enlargement, missile defence and other issues, to a more
cooperative agenda, including Afghanistan, the Arctic and other
issues, we can achieve much more in terms of bringing Russia into
the process. There are people in Russia and in the political establishment
who see the relationship with NATO developing in a positive direction
and want to support that. Nobody wants to see confrontation with
NATO because clearly Russia is not going to win from that.
Q172 Mr Jenkin: It is a fantasy,
is it not, that NATO is a threat to Russia? It is a complete fantasy,
and we should be quite robust about telling them so, should we
not? We are not a threat. We do not want to threaten Russia.
Ms Antonenko: The perception of
threat often times is very subjective.
Q173 Mr Jenkin: They use that, do
they not, as sand in the face of Western diplomacy to try to disrupt
what else we are doing, and get themselves more cards to play?
It is disruptive, is it not?
Ms Antonenko: There is a part
of the Russian political elite and policy-making community that
genuinely believes that NATO is a threat, and this is because
they have a profound mistrust of what NATO officials say; they
do not tend to listen to their statements which Russians dismiss
it as NATO's attempts to mislead Russia. They look at NATO military
capabilities, and they see that these have increased after the
end of the Cold War and after the enlargement, while Russia's
own military capabilities have declined. Given that they are not
members of NATO and do not make decisions within NATO, they conclude
that NATO is a threat.
Q174 Mr Jenkin: You described two
views: that Russia is becoming a threat to us; and that we should
include them in the Euro/Atlantic area. Is it possible to hold
both views, is it not? But the way they behave is sometimes threatening—cyber
attacks, over-reaction in Georgia—that is aggressive, threatening
behaviour; but on the other hand it is reported that George Robinson
invited Putin to consider joining NATO. Should that not be our
long-term objective? It was suggested to us by an albeit minority
party when we visited Moscow. Should that not be the long-term
objective? Should we not welcome Russia as a member of the Western
democratic family of nations, to put them round the table on an
equal basis, rather than allowing themselves to isolate themselves?
Would that not demonstrate that we are genuinely friendly?
Ms Antonenko: You are right that
it is possible to hold both views to see if some elements of Russia's
behaviour as threatening, and at the same time to be committed
to bringing Russia into some new Europe/Atlantic security system,
which will discourage Russia from behaving in a threatening way.
That is possible, and therefore I personally think it is completely
legitimate to reassure the Baltic States and other NATO members,
while at the same time pursuing a dialogue with Russia. On the
question of whether it is wise to offer Russia membership, we
have to remember that all Russian leaders have at one time or
the other, expressed tentative aspirations to join NATO. We heard
that from Gorbachev, from Yeltsin, and from Putin in 2000. President
Medvedev is the only one who has not said it so explicitly. That
is something that is more a theoretical than practical question
at the moment. Just saying that is not going to add confidence.
We need to see it as a long-term process, that some time in the
future Russia could join NATO. That will require NATO to transform
itself fundamentally.
Q175 Mr Jenkin: And Russia to transform
itself fundamentally!
Ms Antonenko: Yes, Russia too,
of course—Russia even more so, absolutely. What I mean is
that, in the meantime, it is important to build on these proposals
from Medvedev to create a Euro/Atlantic security community, loosely
defined, in which certain principles are agreed ideally in a,
legally binding document. That will be very difficult.
Q176 Mr Jenkin: Values!
Ms Antonenko: Values, of course—principles
and values in my view are the same thing; that you treat your
neighbours in a certain way; you avoid using force unless it is
the last resort and has legitimate mandate from the UN. You again
have a commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity of
states, et cetera. There is a whole set of issues that need to
be agreed, including arms control, transparency, et cetera. In
my view, this is a realistic prospect to agree on a new document
on European Security which can help to overcome mistrust and create
incentives for Russia to cooperate with Euro-Atlantic community
on regional and global security issues, rather than talking about
Russia being a member of NATO, which is very, very theoretical
proposition.
Chairman: And Afghanistan, which we need
to come on to now.
Q177 Mrs Moon: It is very interesting—you
talked about the rivalry and competition that goes on between
Russia and Europe, but you also talked about the need for cooperative
security. Your last description of going forward was almost the
Shanghai Cooperation Agreement that was taken with China and neighbours
there. How much, in terms of Afghanistan, is it in Russia's interests
for NATO to be as committed as it is, and is that also the basis
of some new relationship between NATO and Russia perhaps?
Ms Antonenko: There is clearly
a shared interest in Afghanistan. Russia does not want to see
NATO fail in Afghanistan and the radical Islamic forces again
coming to power and threatening both the immediate region and
global security. In that sense, Russia is interested to see NATO
remaining in Afghanistan and reinforcing its presence. There is
a growing scepticism in Russia whether military presence on the
ground is contributing to stabilisation of Afghanistan in the
long run. There is a growing perception not only in Russia but
increasingly in Central Asia that the NATO's current strategy
is part of the problem not part of the solution in the long run
in Afghanistan. We have seen Taliban and radical elements of the
insurgency are gaining momentum in Afghanistan. The most important
threat that Russia feels immediately from Afghanistan is drug-trafficking.
The volume of drug-trafficking from Afghanistan has not increased
under the Taliban but it expanded substantially during the period
of the NATO presence there. Thirdly, there is very little regional
involvement by states that are potentially the most threatened
by instability in Afghanistan but which also have a lot to contribute
in terms of their historic and ethnic links and experience. Russia
sees itself also as part of that regional grouping, which needs
to be involved bilaterally or through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation or the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation).
Russia has been offering a dialogue for almost four years between
CSTO and NATO on Afghanistan. The CSTO is a regional security
grouping, including Central Asian states except Turkmenistan,
as well as Belarus and Armenia. It has been increasingly involved
in Afghanistan, including in the areas of training police, broader
security and training and supplying the Afghan National Army.
On the NATO side, because of the Bush Administration, there has
been a complete unwillingness to have that kind of dialogue develop.
I understand that the Obama Administration will reconsider that,
and there have already been various signals coming out of Washington
that they might accept a dialogue. It will be preferable for them
to establish the NATO/SCO and NATO/CSTO dialogue rather than just
working with Russia bilaterally, because involving other Central
Asian states as well as China will be more productive, as they
have more to contribute to stabilising Afghanistan, rather than
only speaking to Russia.
Q178 Mrs Moon: In terms of bilateral
relationships with Russia, is it unhelpful at the moment that
some NATO states are to make bilateral agreements in relation
to the transport of equipment to Afghanistan? Rather than lots
and lots of bilaterals, should there be a clear agreement of cooperation
with Russia set out for NATO generally in regard to equipment?
Ms Antonenko: There has been a
Russia/NATO agreement signed in Bucharest, and that has been observed
ever since that time, including through the times post August
when the relationship has been difficult or suspended; Russia
has still implemented its part of the bargain in terms of allowing
the non-military cargo to go through. In terms of the NATO-wide
strategy on the northern supply route, I think it will be better
if it is articulated within NATO. Of course, some NATO countries,
including particularly the United States and Germany, feel that
it would be easier for them to sign bilateral agreements, and
they have no time to wait, in a sense, for the NATO consensus
to emerge and for NATO and Russia to negotiate the agreement.
They feel they can do it better bilaterally. Germany and Russia,
for example, already have that sort of agreement. In the longer
run it will be useful. For example, NATO has a special forum (NATO
plus Central Asia plus Afghanistan dialogue) where it meets with
all Central Asian states together to discuss Afghanistan. It will
be useful to bring Russia into that, and within that forum to
start discussing a more comprehensive agreement on all supply
routes because we need a number of them, not only for non-military
but also military supplies.
Chairman: A very quick final question
from Mr Brian Jenkins, and a very quick answer, please because
we need to get on!
Q179 Mr Jenkins: You feel that Russia
and China can sit down and do a deal. Is this because Russia sees
China as a legitimate entity because it has a border with Russia,
and it sees NATO however as being merely an American puppet in
Europe, therefore, because it has no border, and it sees the European
Union as having more efficacy because it has a border? Does that
work into Russia's concept at all?
Ms Antonenko: It is a difficult
question to give a quick answer! The quick answer is that China
has been very, very clever in the way it approached Russia in
the post-Soviet space; it always gave very reassuring messages,
acknowledging Russia's role et cetera, while behind the scenes
and slowly building its own presence in the region. In the case
of NATO we have the reverse situation where a lot of ambitions
were articulated straight away, even before the real influence
and real presence was established; so we had a very negative dynamic,
which then influenced the real cooperation. The other dynamic
in regard to China was more productive, when Russia and China
solved border disputes together; it helped the Central Asians
to slowly build on that confidence. That has happened, and it
is totally the opposite in the case of NATO enlargement where
trust has been deteriorating over the past decade.
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