Examination of Witnesses (Questions 181-199)
MR DENIS
CORBOY AND
SIR ANDREW
WOOD
24 MARCH 2009
Q181 Chairman: Would you like to introduce
yourselves, please?
Sir Andrew Wood: My name is Andrew
Wood. I used to be, at the end of the last century, the British
Ambassador in Moscow, and since then I have returned to Moscow
a great deal mostly on commercial business. I am also a member
of Chatham House.
Mr Corboy: I am Denis Corboy,
and for the last five years I have been Director of the Caucasus
Policy Institute, King's College, London. From 1994 to 1999 I
was the EU Commission representative in Georgia and Armenia. I
went back to Georgia again in 2002 as an envoy of the European
Commission, so my focus has been on the Caucasus and in recent
times particularly Georgia.
Q182 Chairman: Can I begin by asking
you, Sir Andrew—and thank you for your memorandum, which
was very helpful indeed—you said: "Russia and NATO
often appear to exist in parallel worlds, we do not have a dialogue
in depth so much as the two entities talking and engaging in shouting
past each other." Do you think the Russian leaders misunderstand
Western diplomacy and that perhaps Western diplomats misunderstand
Russia? If you do think that, what are the consequences?
Sir Andrew Wood: I think the Russians
are particularly good at setting an agenda. They are particularly
good at tactics. They are not necessarily quite so good at strategy.
The Russian foreign policy establishment is quite a small one,
and it tends to lag behind real events. The attitude within Russia
towards the West in general, to NATO in particular, and especially
the United States, is part of the defining mechanism by which
Russians recognise themselves as Russians. That leads to automatic—what
to us are total distortions. Mr Jenkin rightly said during the
previous witness's very articulate (if I may say so) presentation
that it is a fantasy that NATO is aggressive. It is a fantasy
that grips a lot of people within Russia, however. At the moment
I think there are the beginnings of a differentiation within Russia
as to the attitude towards NATO. I referred in my memorandum,
perhaps rather briefly, to the process of military reform that
is going on. The essential thrust of that is that the Russian
military should be shrunk dramatically. There is a very logical
case for that. It is not necessarily a case that suits those in
charge of the Russian armed forces at present, who make a very
nice thing in various ways out of being a major conscript force,
but it is a logic that is there. It will, in my view, be a leading
indicator for future Russian foreign policy attitudes whether
or not the process of reform into a more strategic, focused force
continues. On the Western side, I was recently in Berlin at a
seminar for British and German participants. As I say, it is no
secret that the attitudes within Germany towards Russia and the
attitudes within Britain towards Russia are—not across the
board but in general there is a different axle. That gives Russia
the opportunity to both regard NATO as a sort of generalised threat,
and to pick and choose among the countries with which it has dialogue—this
is a whole group of countries—27. It knows very well that
there is a huge variety of attitudes towards it. It actually has
a great deal of diplomatic manoeuvre within NATO and affecting
NATO.
Mr Corboy: I think that Russia
misinterprets NATO's actions quite wilfully. I have often asked
the question, and if we look at the reasons for that there is
a deep sense of grievance. Russians will often tell you that they
have a sense of betrayal because they believe, I think wrongly,
that Secretary of State Baker gave a commitment that there would
be no major NATO extension. I do not believe that commitment was
given because it does not make any logic, when you look at the
unification of Germany; they have this deep-seated belief that
they have been betrayed. This is very much a backdrop to trying
to get things back on an even keel, because I am very convinced
that there is no better alternative than to treat Russia as a
partner. We have to work in that direction, no matter how difficult
and whatever aspect of this we are looking at.
Sir Andrew Wood: I agree with
the last sentiment, but I would just like to remark that, first
of all I was in Washington at the time and there was no such commitment
given; second, even if there had been, it would have been a commitment
to the Soviet Union and not to Russia. Russia regards itself in
every possible way as the successor to the Soviet Union, and therefore
what Mr Corboy said is perfectly true about the way that many
Russians think; but, nonetheless, it is a bit of a false perspective.
Q183 Chairman: If the mythology has
grown up within Russia, it is an issue that has to be dealt with.
Sir Andrew Wood: Absolutely.
Q184 Mr Crausby: It is the same question
I asked to Ms Antonenko on the question of Ukraine. What is the
likelihood of Russia using military force in Ukraine in the short
term or long term?
Mr Corboy: I would agree with
what Ms Antonenko said. I do not see this as a real danger. I
do not think it is in Russia's interest to have a conflict with
Ukraine. It is not, in my opinion, the next flashpoint. If there
is a next flashpoint, it is probably in Georgia—and you
will probably come on to that—but I do not rate it. I would
not consider it.
Q185 Mr Crausby: You do not see any
problems in the Crimea?
Mr Corboy: Yes, it is very hard
to know how this would play out. It is a very specific situation
where the population of the Crimea—I know a number of them
are receiving Russian passports. The political situation of Ukraine
is not stable, and it could play into all of that, but I do not
really see military intervention by Russia in Ukraine. I believe
that if settlement is not reached about Sevastopol that Russia
has other alternatives now in Abkhazia to have its naval base
there.
Q186 Mr Crausby: Do you have a view
on the outcome of the negotiations on Sevastopol base and do you
expect that a deal will be done?
Mr Corboy: I do not think we know
what the Ukrainians are going to put on the table; we have to
wait and see.
Q187 Mr Crausby: You do not believe
that will cause any problems in the sense that Russia has alternatives?
Mr Corboy: I really do not see—I
have a feeling that there will be a settlement here. It depends.
There are so many ifs and buts and so many unknowns about what
is going to happen with Ukrainian politics. It is very hard at
this point in time to know. I agree with what was said earlier
on, that it will need at least a five-year run-in to 2017 before
the lease runs out.
Q188 Mr Crausby: You would expect
negotiations to be imminent!
Mr Corboy: They should start in
the next couple of years, I would say. The political situation
in Ukraine is not such that that is on the agenda immediately.
Q189 Chairman: We heard what Ms Antonenko
said about the building of the port in Abkhazia. Do you think
that was a factor that came into the events of August of last
year?
Mr Corboy: Yes, I tend to believe,
having looked at much of the evidence—and there is very
conflicting evidence about the August war—I tend to be one
of those who have come to the conclusion that after the Bucharest
summit that Russia had started to make preparations for what happened
in the August war. The evidence of this that struck me as important
was the change in the equipment provided to the peace-keepers
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The training exercises that took
place in the north Caucasus—
Q190 Chairman: That was an annual
event, was it not, that training exercise?
Mr Corboy: I am informed that
the training was a rehearsal for having to move into South Ossetia.
There was the movement of the Russian navy to the Black Sea where
they were made ready, poised to act, and the landing of 4,000
naval troops in Abkhazia within 24 hours of war breaking out.
There again, the Russian view is that the 7 August attack on Tskhinvali
was provocation and they were reacting. The evidence is on both
sides, but I think that there is very little doubt that Russia
was preparing for such an eventuality. It now has achieved some
of its objectives. It has established military bases in south
Caucasus; it will have naval bases in Abkhazia; but it has not
effected a regime change in Tbilisi, which was one of its major
objectives. Among the people commentating on these things, some
are saying that the next flashpoint would be in regard to what
happens at the end of April or May of this year because of unfinished
business. They believe that elements in Moscow feel that this
should put a stop to any Caucasian country ever joining NATO.
They see a danger that if something is not done now that is the
way it would still go. I do not accept this argument for one reason.
They misinterpret the EU monitors. The presence of EU monitors
is very different from the presence of OSCE or UNOMIG monitors
for this reason. For Russia to take action in Georgia this year
would mean a confrontation with the EU, and the EU is a very different
animal as far as they are concerned. It is their largest customer.
They want good relations with the EU and they would not be prepared
to face EU sanctions. I think the danger of another war this summer
has been grossly exaggerated.
Q191 Chairman: We now have two months
to see whether you are right!
Sir Andrew Wood: Can I comment
on that and Mr Crausby's question? Basically, I do not think they
give a toss about the EU and they keep demonstrating it in almost
any context that is presented. They should but they do not. They
have no faith the EU would ever stick together and present a united
front for very long. On a historical record that is pretty much
accurate, I would have thought. I agree that the chances of a
further direct intervention in Georgia now are a bit limited,
but possible. I also agree that that is a more of a danger than
a direct military intervention in Ukraine, which for all sorts
of reasons a lot would have to go wrong before anything like that
happened. The Sevastopol question is so far into the political
distance for Russia and the Ukraine that it is not an immediate
flashpoint in that sense. In the attitude both to Ukraine and
to Georgia, there is a very long-standing and deep-rooted assumption
by the present ruling people in Moscow that they have a right
to dictate what goes on in those countries. I note Prime Minister
Putin's reaction to an investment conference in Ukraine yesterday,
which was attended by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the new Commissioner
for External Relations, in which the proposal was that we should
work together with Ukraine to improve and modernise the pipelines.
Putin said that this is absolutely not serious: "It seems
to me that the document about which we are talking is at minimum
ill-considered and unprofessional because to discuss such issues
without the basic supplier is simply not serious." That seems
to me very indicative of an attitude. There is in principle no
reason whatsoever why Ukraine and the EU should not cooperate
to make better pipelines. Ukraine is an independent country and
we are entitled to have relations with it as we wish; but in Russian
eyes that is an emotional shock, including because they would
like to have control over Ukrainian pipelines. I think that is
a far more serious threat than military intervention. As I said,
a lot would have to go wrong before that.
Q192 Chairman: Thank you. I note
that Mr Corby is nodding.
Mr Corboy: To some extent, yes.
Q193 Mr Hancock: Could I ask you
a similar question to the one I asked before about the balance
of power in Russia and where the clear political lead is coming
from now. Is it coming from the President at Kremlin or is it
coming from Mr Putin at the White House? Is there a divergence
now which could cause some sort of instability in their attitude
to foreign policy?
Sir Andrew Wood: Personally, I
think there is a potential for instability, and that there is
a bit of a different attitude, but it is one that is also tactically
useful. There is a little bit of the soft cop/hard cop about it.
Prime Minister Putin's personal political style has often been
to put off a decision and to let debate and suppositions develop
and subsequently to take his own decision. I do not believe, and
more to the purpose, nobody of influence that I have met recently
in Russia believes, that anyone except Putin is in charge. If
you pose the theoretical question: "Could Putin be dismissed?
It is the President's right to appoint his own Prime Minister"
the answer is clearly, "No, that is just not going to happen"—absent
some huge popular outcry against Putin, which, again, is not on
the cards. You could perhaps describe the Russian Government as
a frozen conflict. We are all familiar with that sort of sensation,
it is not untypical of any country, but, nonetheless, it is particularly,
because in logic, the President holds the power, in practice he
cannot exercise it.
Q194 Mr Hancock: If it is not going
to be in Georgia, do you see that Russia's willingness to lend
quite substantial sums to Armenia as a ratcheting-up of the conflict
in Nagorno-Karabakh? Do you think Russia would be supportive of
Armenia taking action in that field as being a potential bigger
threat than Georgia?
Sir Andrew Wood: I would defer
to Mr Corboy but I would be surprised if that were the case.
Mr Corboy: I would think that
Russia is supporting Armenia. It is its strongest ally in the
Caucusus. The signs are that there is progress being made with
regard to Nagorno-Karabakh and I think Russia is generally wanting
to see a solution there. I do not see it as taking sides. They
certainly do not want to see greater hostilities with regard to
NK.
Q195 Mr Hancock: It is Bernard's
point—he made it earlier and he does it very well—that
nobody could seriously contemplate NATO presenting any real threat
to the interests of Russia. Can they?
Sir Andrew Wood: I think you can,
if you suppose that Russia has, as it has repeatedly said, a right
to a privileged sphere of interest from which outsiders must exclude
themselves. There is this recent business about the Ukraine pipelines.
The Russian Energy Minister talks about the integration of Ukraine
into the legal sphere of the European system as far as energy
is concerned. That, to them, is illegitimate. To us it is perfectly
normal, in principle—I mean, we know the Russians do not
like it, but there is nothing objectionable in principle about
it. Similarly they, I think, would see it as in the nature of
a threat if Belarus suddenly became a more liberal place and if
the EU, let alone NATO, began to establish closer relationships
with the East European, former Soviet states. That just makes
them feel uneasy. I find, anyway, that in a discussion with Russia
about the potential for instability within Russia which is there,
they quickly go to an apocalyptic situation where all the various
bits of it drop off. One can understand the North Caucusus is
a particularly dangerous and unstable place from that point of
view, but they start to fantasise about the Chinese taking over
the Far East and so on and so forth, so this fear of a country
breaking up is very real. That extends to a feeling that a cause
of that could be a loss of their right, as they see it, to control
former Soviet states—with the exception of the Baltics,
which sort of do not count.
Q196 Mr Hancock: Do you share that
view?
Mr Corboy: Yes. It is the psyche
that one is looking at here, this issue of the privileged sphere
of influence which has been mentioned by President Medvedev on
a number occasions. Again this weekend at the Brussels forum we
saw Mr Lavrov saying that the EU Eastern Partnership was a sphere
of influence. I think there is an important distinction to be
drawn here. When a sovereign country enters into a voluntary alliance
or a voluntary agreement which it does for its own reasons and
its own interests, there is very big difference from a sphere
of influence being claimed by a country over another sovereign
country which does not want that sphere of influence to be carried
out. I do not know if you have seen Mr Lavrov's remarks this weekend
at the Brussels Forum, but they do not seem to get this distinction.
It is a fundamental one, I think.
Q197 Mr Hancock: Going back to what
you were saying, that it is very easy for Russia not to take the
EU as seriously as they ought to, because they know they can always
pick countries offering bilateral agreements and what-have-you
and they have been very successful in doing that. Is it not also
in Russia's interests to keep the divergence of opinion within
NATO, the questions of missile defence and enlargement? So they
will always put at the top of the agenda, because it automatically
starts with NATO being in a difficult position. They are behind
the black ball immediately. Russia will always start the negotiations
with NATO and their discussions with NATO by raising those two
issues first, so they keep the Alliance split apart. We heard
earlier that it would be good if we could find common things to
talk about with Russia, but Russia does not want that to happen
because it suits them, does it not, surely, to keep NATO in this
situation where they are divided on the two key issues that will
always be at the top of the Russian agenda.
Sir Andrew Wood: Absolutely. Add
into the mix that they have a particular animus towards the United
States—which is presently a little bit tested because it
is difficult for them to ignore the fact that President Obama
is more appealing to world opinion than his predecessor was, but
I do not really think that it is likely to be a significantly
different relationship between the United States and Russia for
the foreseeable future.
Q198 Mr Hancock: Really there is
very little that NATO can do to change that situation, is there?
Sir Andrew Wood: No, I think Oksana
was right, in that we should look for areas in which we can talk.
Obviously it is true that we want to engage with Russia, but engagement
and containment are not opposites. Actually there are areas where
we do not agree with Russia, and they have no qualms in pointing
out where they think we are doing wrong, so I do not see any reason
why we should not perhaps return the favour.
Q199 Chairman: Mr Corboy, you were
nodding at that.
Mr Corboy: I would add one thing.
I think the United States pressing the reset button is of very
considerable significance because it is changing the mood language,
it is changing the atmosphere of even the language. I have just
been in Washington talking to many different people and I sense
a totally different approach to looking at relations with Russia.
There is a sense, certainly on the US side, that it is time to
prioritise your interests while at the same time not compromising
principles. When you look at the prioritising of these interests,
the first one is nuclear proliferation. When you look at the order
of magnitude of these problems—and we can also come to Afghanistan
and all the other places and other issues, but just to take one
example of the nuclear proliferation issue and Iran—imagine
a nuclear Iran with Russian protection. This sort of situation,
if we do not develop this partnership with Russia, it is a horror
story to talk about it but it is not something that is totally
impossible, and it would have implications not just for the Middle
East, which are terrifying, but could have enormous international
and worldwide implications. I think it behoves the UK and the
West in general to prioritise our interests. I am not denying
that we should keep principles, which are extremely important,
but another priority must be to have Russia in support in regard
to stabilising Afghanistan. That clearly must be a priority. A
third is defeating terrorism. We also need—I think this
is a strong European feeling—to ensure an energy security
agreement with Russia for Europe. These are very important priorities,
along with other interests which the reset button, I think, has
brought us to a new place—and a better place in my submission.
Sir Andrew Wood: I suppose setting
the reset button was inevitable and correct. You can isolate areas
where it would be good to co-operate and we should try, but I
am not sure that Russia will recognise its strategic interest
in behaving as we would wish towards Iran. It has not been particularly
helpful so far really. The Russians are usually much better at
saying why something is not possible than when coming forward
then with anything very positive about it. They do have an interest
but it is a question of whether they think it is worth acting
on now.
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