Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240-259)
21 APRIL 2009 RT
HON BARONESS
TAYLOR OF
BOLTON, GROUP
CAPTAIN MALCOLM
CRAYFORD, MS
GLORIA CRAIG,
RT HON
CAROLINE FLINT
MP, MR NICK
PICKARD AND
MR JUSTIN
MCKENZIE
SMITH
Q240 Chairman: Since we are starting
half an hour earlier than we normally do, let us aim to finish
by about 12 o'clock. We have a number of witnesses and each of
them does not have to answer every question. Perhaps you would
introduce your teams.
Caroline Flint: On my right is
Mr Justin McKenzie Smith, Deputy Director of RUSCCAD at the FCO,
and on my extreme right is Mr Nick Pickard, Head of Security Policy
Group at the FCO.
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: I have
with me Group Captain Malcolm Crayford, sometimes called "Ginge",
Deputy Head Security Co-operation, and Gloria Craig, Director
of International Security Policy.
Q241 Chairman: Perhaps I may begin
by asking about the issue of spheres of interest. In our inquiry
so far, it has appeared that Russia would be keen on maintaining
privileged interests in countries which were formerly members
of the Soviet Union, if they considered them to be their "near
abroad" over which they should have greater power than over
other countries. Is that legitimate?
Caroline Flint: We do not accept
that Russia per se has spheres of influence or interests in the
way they would see it. We accept that they have legitimate interests
in a number of the countries that once formed part of the Soviet
Union. However, insofar as "spheres of influence or interests"
somehow suggests that they have some sort of high authority to
influence what those countries may want to do in relation to NATO
and the EU we do not accept that. I give the example of the Eastern
Partnership which the EU supports. We recognise that for some
of the matters that partnership might look at, for example energy,
there is a potential opportunity for joint co-operation also with
Russia, but we do not accept that there is some sort of post-Soviet
space that Russia above anyone else should dominate or occupy
in terms of what those countries may or may not want to do in
future for their security or economic interests.
Q242 Chairman: Do you think Russia
understands the notion that these countries should be entitled
to their own sovereignty?
Caroline Flint: Russia is concerned
and defensive about why these countries might want to work with
NATO or the EU. In many respects in our discussions, it is about
trying to allay some of those concerns. We believe that in relation
to both organisations a number of the countries that have become
members of them have contributed to greater stability in Europe.
That is a plus not only for countries that were already in the
European Union or NATO but also for Russia. We do not believe
that these countries, which vary enormously in terms of what they
want to do, should be seen as a threat. We see Russia as a very
important partner, bilaterally, but also within the organisations
of which we are part. Part of it is about a better sense of partnership
and trying to find some way to deal with what is evident, that
is, a certain amount of distrust of the present relationship and
attitudes to NATO, the EU and so forth.
Q243 Chairman: But that is what you
would like to persuade Russia of. How are you doing it?
Caroline Flint: It will always
be work in progress; I do not think it will ever be particularly
easy, but that is why we have to find mutual interests, whether
in terms of the economy or stability. There are maters on which
clearly we want to engage with Russia, but at the same time, despite
that multilateral and bilateral co-operation, there are matters
on which we do not agree, and of which we don't have the same
common ground, and Georgia is an example of that, where not only
ourselves but other countries and organisations, have had to say
that we don't accept Russia's actions in regards to that.
Q244 Chairman: We will come to those
matters on which we agree and disagree and to Georgia. I want
to press you not on what British policy is towards those countries
but whether Russia understands what you have just said. You have
been talking in terms of what we hope they will see, but do they
see it?
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: In
recent speeches President Medvedev has talked about the primacy
of international law and issues of that kind. He is trying to
persuade us that there is scope to look again at a European security
architecture. I think it is incumbent on all of us at the different
levels that Caroline Flint has been talking about to remind him
that if international law has the status which he claims he must
understand all of the ramifications of it. There is a slight dislocation
in terms of what Russia wants to sign up to and its belief in
the principles of international law and yet it clearly breaches
them on other occasions. We must show that difference in attitude
and ensure that in all the discussions held at different levels
that point is brought home to them, and that they cannot proclaim
a belief in international law and flout it at the same time.
Q245 Chairman: What would be your
answer to the suggestion that Russia does not really give the
right to its near neighbours to their own independent sovereignty?
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: I think
it is a question of dislocation. In theory they would say they
respect international law but in practice, as we saw in Georgia,
clearly they did not and took several steps that were incredibly
difficult from the point of view of anybody who accepts international
law. It is a question of getting the right levels of engagement.
We have to talk to the Russians and discuss things with them but
we must repeatedly make clear what the ground rules are. It will
not surprise you to know that we talked about this amongst ourselves
earlier. We thought that in the 15 years after the end of the
Cold War—it took a little time for that to settle—we
in Britain, the EU and NATO were having discussions with Russia
about the future as a partner, that they accepted the principles
of international law and we were talking the same language. The
credibility of Russia in terms of that partnership has been severely
dented by events in Georgia. That dislocation is something that
we must work through. We are pretty clear about the damage that
has been done. I am not convinced that as a whole the Russians
are clear about it, but I suspect that within Russia there are
people who see things in different ways. There will be internal
tensions and not just one view.
Q246 Mr Crausby: The former Prime
Minister, Tony Blair, told the House in 2007 that, "A close
relationship between Europe and Russia is important", but
he went on to say that it was sustainable only if it was based
on shared values. The evidence we have heard on our visits to
Estonia, Georgia and Russia is that many people believe the existing
regime in Russia does not share many of our values. That certainly
appears to be going in the wrong direction. Is it possible for
the West to engage in the way it had hoped on the basis of shared
values?
Caroline Flint: Russia does sign
up to a number of international agreements in which we are meant
to share values, so as a starting point as an important country
they have on the surface signed up to them, whether it is the
United Nations or various treaties. The problem arises when they
take actions that go against the very obligations with which they
have agreed. Part of the reason we look to continue to engage
with Russia on a number of different fronts is that we recognise
it has an important influence not only in terms of Europe but
globally. There are a number of areas in which we can seek co-operation,
but the reality is that there are some areas where we do not.
Therefore, the relationship is not always straightforward. I do
not believe there is an easy solution to it, but part of what
we endeavour to do is to counter some of the concerns and distrust
that clearly exist within Russian circles about our motivations
or interests whether from a NATO or EU perspective. Later this
year there will be further discussions on the proposals by President
Medvedev about European security architecture. Those will be interesting
in the sense that we are open to holding those discussions, but
we must also recognise—again, this is where values come
into it—that we would have disagreements, first that somehow
organisations like NATO or OSCE are not up to the tasks that they
currently perform. We think they are. Importantly, we also believe
that when you talk about security you cannot consider just the
hard security issues but also human rights, economic and geopolitical
issues. I am afraid that the last two are areas that the Russians
have not wanted to include as part of the discussion. It is not
easy, but engagement is important and within that there must also
be constructive criticism. We have to be clear about the standpoints
and values in which we believe.
Q247 Mr Crausby: Do you accept that
effectively things have changed and they do not share many of
our values? Which values do you think they do not share with the
West?
Caroline Flint: It is quite a
difficult issue. In many respects the Russians might say they
do share values around stability and peace; they want an economic
connection to the EU and as a partner whose economy has grown
and grown. For 15 years after the end of the Cold War we worked
with Russia as a partner, but the incident involving Georgia last
summer abruptly indicated how by their actions they went against
the very principles and international obligations to which they
had signed up. That is why they have found themselves isolated
not only in terms of NATO and the European Union but also the
OSCE. They isolated themselves because the members of those organisations
and others did not feel that the Russians were abiding by the
values to which they had signed up by the disproportionate action
they took in relation to Georgia.
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: When
one asks if it is possible to engage it begs the question: what
are the consequences of not engaging? There are many areas that
make it essential we engage. Issues such as democracy, human rights
and good governance underpin all of the agreements that we have
entered into and should have underpinned all the agreements that
the Russians entered into. Sometimes their interpretation of some
of those issues is not the same as ours. I know that a number
of Members of the Committee visited Estonia where there are shared
interests but not shared values. That is one of the themes they
often put forward. That cannot mean that you just do not engage
because there are so many important issues, be it energy, climate
change or stability. We cannot fail to engage; it is a question
of how we make sure we have the right kind of engagement at both
bilateral and multilateral level.
Q248 Mr Jenkins: I always have a
problem with regard to shared values. Am I right in thinking that
after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Russia was in a weakened
position, we made certain promises to them, which we did not deliver
on and extracted the maximum penalties with regard to any contracts
we entered into? We marched NATO right up to their border and
threatened them with the force of NATO. Therefore, we do have
a shared value, that strength is all that matters in this world?
Caroline Flint: Stop me if I am
going in the wrong direction, but if we are referring to the enlargement
of NATO and how that is perceived clearly that has become a greater
issue in the past year. As an organisation NATO does not have
a policy of enlargement per se, but there is an opportunity for
individual countries who wish to join NATO to do so. In doing
so they have to meet a number of conditions before they are accepted.
I think that is a difference. If you are coming from the perspective
that NATO has a policy of enlargement, which may be the Russian
perspective, that will affect your view of the Organisation, but
that is not the case. If you look at the results of countries
joining NATO in more recent times it has offered greater stability
rather than less stability for the Alliance as a whole but also
for those countries too, whether in terms of governance, human
rights and the requirement to abide by international law, and
in that respect it has been only a force for good.
Q249 Chairman: Is it really possible
to say that NATO does not have a policy of enlargement given the
Statement at Bucharest that Georgia will become a member of NATO?
Caroline Flint: In a sense that
is subject to the caveat that there is no reason for Georgia not
to become a member of NATO, but it must still undergo a number
of different changes and reforms to meet the conditions to join
NATO. It is not a green light to say that it can join regardless.
They have applied to join and in principle they can become members
of NATO but they must meet all the conditions.
Q250 Chairman: There is a difference
between saying Georgia will become a member of NATO and there
is no reason in principle why it should not become a member of
NATO.
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: Yes,
but there is an essential difference between trying to recruit
Georgia as a member of NATO and responding to Georgia's desire
to be a member. NATO has an open approach to countries that want
to apply to join; it does not actively recruit members.
Q251 Mr Holloway: Mr McKenzie Smith,
you have spent time living in Russia. How do the Russians feel
about a country right on their doorstep joining the EU and NATO?
Mr McKenzie Smith: That is an
interesting question. There are probably lots of different levels
of Russian feeling as there are here. On an official level I would
make a slight distinction between those two institutions. The
European Union is seen as a neighbouring organisation that does
not have the mythology or history of threat that NATO does in
Russian minds. During the Soviet era, NATO was regarded as a direct
threat to the soviet and Russian people. My impression is that
that perception has not really changed. As both Ministers have
said, part of the challenge for us is to try to change that perception
within Russia, to demonstrate that NATO does not represent a direct
threat and that the interest of NATO lies in working with Russia
in partnership to achieve stability and security in Europe.
Q252 Mr Hamilton: I had the opportunity
of being in the Soviet Union some time ago and then going back.
The mindset is exactly the same. When we talk of negotiation and
discussion between Europe and Russia are we not talking of two
different things? Germany's interests are not Britain's interests;
Italy's interest are not Britain's interests, and France's interests
are most definitely not Britain's interests. Is it not the case
that the Russians talk with one voice and deal with Europe on
a patchwork basis? They are taking us on one at a time. How difficult
is it for you as Minister for Europe to go and talk to the Soviet
Union knowing full well that you are not talking for Europe but
part of Europe, and how easy is it for them to divide and rule?
Caroline Flint: As a UK European
minister there are bilateral issues in which we would want to
engage with Russia in terms of the UK economy, trade and so forth.
There is a whole number of bilateral issues, whether it is the
British Council or other matters, that we take up with our Russian
counterparts. You are right to point out that within the European
Union there are different nuances in particular countries. They
have different relationships, histories and legacies with Russia.
To go back to Georgia and the action taken in August of last year,
regardless of some of those different levels of relationship and
views the European Union did come together in condemning that
action.
Q253 Mr Hamilton: Some of them were
quieter than others.
Caroline Flint: That may be so,
but the fact is that there was a united position and the ceasefire
proposals are still the backdrop to the Geneva talks that are
under way and on which there is unity across the European Union.
When you have 27 Member States it is difficult to get unity whether
you are dealing with Russia or anybody else, but I believe that
on this occasion people felt that Russia went beyond what was
expected of a country the size and importance of Russia in terms
of its international obligations. I do not think that it will
necessarily always be easy, but it is something that we must deal
with. In terms of the European Union and the partnership and co-operation
agreement and in terms of NATO and the NATO-Russian Council discussions
in those areas will still be affected by the backdrop of Russia's
actions last year. How those discussions will progress will be
affected by what Russia does as well as what it says it will do.
Having said that, none of us wants an atmosphere of distrust and
we want to work to reduce it.
Q254 Mr Borrow: I want to move on
to the violation of UK and NATO airspace. It was reported in The
Times in July 2007 that two Russian bombers had attempted
to violate UK airspace. How many similar attempts were made in
2008?
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: There
has been a lot of misreporting on this issue. People need to remember
that NATO airspace is all NATO territory plus 12 miles around
a coastline. The problem is not specifically that it is considered
as a military threat but that there are safety and air traffic
control issues. As I understand it, civil air traffic control
relies on secondary radar and getting signals back from aircraft
to stations. The flights coming from Russia are often without
flight plans and pass through the busiest air routes and that
could cause difficulties and concern. They can be tracked from
an MoD point of view but not necessarily easily from the point
of view of civil aviation. That is where the difficulty lies.
The Ministry for Transport is particularly involved in this. Alarming
headlines appear in the press despite the fact that when they
contact the MoD they are told a different story, but that is the
press for you and it is what you learn to expect. Therefore, the
problem is really one of air safety and problems for civil aviation.
I do not know whether my colleague Group Captain Crayford with
his hands-on experience wants to add anything.
Group Captain Crayford: That is
entirely right. Back in August 2007 the then President, Putin,
announced the resumption of long-range aviation flights as much
for symbolism in terms of domestic and international consumption,
if you like that Russia was back. From August to December 2007,
the RAF launched its Quick Reaction Alert Force on 15 occasions
to intercept Russian military aircraft approaching or entering
NATO's Air Policing Area. One must remember that they are unidentified
at that stage. In 2008, the RAF launched on 11 occasions[1];
and so far in 2009 the RAF has launched three times, of which
the latest occurred last Tuesday when aircraft circumnavigated
Iceland. The flights do not pose a threat to the UK; they are
flying in international airspace but, as the Minister says, we
are concerned on flight safety grounds as these aircraft cut across
some of the busiest air routes in the world. Whilst we intercept
them with RAF aircraft, the UK's air defence system can track
Russian aircraft throughout and we liaise with our civil air traffic
control counterparts in terms of safety. It is that issue with
which we are concerned, not any military threat from what is,
if you like, symbolism that Russia is back.
Q255 Mr Borrow: There has been a suggestion
that those aircraft movements were part of military action by
Russia against NATO and were more of a probing exercise.
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: I think
it is seen more as a demonstration of presence for internal and
to a certain extent external consumption, not as a threat.
Q256 Mr Borrow: Some people have
expressed surprise at how little reaction there has been by the
UK Government concerning those flying exercises. They are not
the sorts of things one would expect to happen between friendly
states. Whilst there may be legitimate reasons to have aircraft
movements one would normally let one's close friends know what
one was planning in this situation.
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: There
are no flight plans and that is our real concern rather than seeing
them as a threat. We have the opportunity to do exercises ourselves
and we respond in that situation when there is an unidentified
flying mission, but I think the situation is very much as we see
it. We do not see it as a threat. If they are in international
airspace that is legitimate.
Group Captain Crayford: These
(Russian military aircraft) are infringing the rules and procedures
laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and
it is within that body that these are being addressed.
Q257 Mr Borrow: Would it be possible
for the Ministry to inform Parliament on a regular basis of any
similar exercises or movements in future?
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: Obviously,
if Members table PQs we answer them correctly, but we are not
withholding information. It is not always considered to be sufficiently
significant to have a written statement or something of that kind,
but if there is a desire for information it is not classified.
Q258 Mr Borrow: Given that earlier
the press have on occasions misinterpreted certain movements,
would it not be better for the Ministry to issue a statement rather
than that reporters should hear something on the grapevine and
run with the story?
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: I think
reporters will run with the story. We did correct the story and
they still ran with it.
Q259 Chairman: There was a request
made by The Sun under the Freedom of Information
Act about the number of Russian incursions between July and December
2007, was there not?
Baroness Taylor of Bolton: I do
not recall; we get so many.
1 Following the evidence session, the Ministry of
Defence confirmed that the correct figure is 10. Back
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