House of Commons - Russia: a new confrontation?

Russia: a new confrontation? - Defence Committee Contents

7 Global security

188. Russia is a major player on the world stage. Its influence over world affairs has a significant effect on international security. It is a member of the UN Security Council; it has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world and thereby a critical role in securing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as a vital role in responding to the global economic crisis.

189. Russia has a complex relationship with the West. The triangle formed by its pattern of bilateral relations with the United States and with China is also of particular interest, as it will have a crucial effect on the climate for international cooperation. Russia has perceived itself to have been unjustly ignored in this triangle of major powers in the last two decades, especially in terms of its relations with the United States. As Professor Margot Light put it: "I think the single most important Russian foreign policy aim is to be taken as seriously by the United States as Russia takes the United States."[308] Our witnesses felt there was some justification for this underlying Russian resentment at the way the US and other western powers had dealt with Russia over a number of issues.[309] On the other hand, Russia is also an Asian power both within its own territory and in its relations with the new republics that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. As Martin McCauley told us:

Central Asia is between Russia and China [...] Central Asia has no intention of becoming subservient to Moscow, nor would China, in fact really favour that [...] China is economically and politically attempting to pull Central Asia towards itself."[310]

This triangle of relationships has a critical effect on global politics but also risks excluding a European voice from major involvement in strategic issues.[311]

190. President Obama's stated desire to 'reset' US-Russian relations appeared to signal a new start in their relations. Denis Corboy told us that President Obama's approach was significant, as it had changed the atmosphere of the debate.[312] However, despite the positive rhetoric, a number of contentious issues continue to divide Moscow and Washington, including how to deal with Iran and the US's Ballistic Missile Defence plans. A strong bilateral relationship between the US and Russia is vital for global security. Yet it is also important for European security that this relationship does not come at the expense of the NATO-Russian relationship.

191. China—the third component in Russia's triangle of relations—is of growing importance in shaping the future dynamic of international relations because of its economic and military power. Its increasing population may also be a cause of concern to Russia in the future as people in the over-populated areas of China migrate to eastern Russia. Oksana Antonenko told us that Russia has acknowledged that it is "no longer the sole player".[313] She pointed out that Russia had continued to work within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation despite the refusal of all other members to support Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[314] Martin McCauley argued that in the long term he would "see China winning that relationship" between China and Russia over Central Asia.[315]

192. The legacy of past disagreements between Russia and the West influences current relations. Yet engagement is marked by positive areas of cooperation as well as tension. Russia is actively engaging with the United States in developing a new arms control treaty. Russia has also cooperated closely with NATO on several practical areas that have been explored in the previous chapter. Yet the likelihood of Russia cooperating on arms control will undoubtedly be influenced by other factors. Areas of particular disagreement between Russia and the West have been the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence and the issue of how to deal with Iran.

Cooperation: Arms Control

193. Russia has been cooperating with the US in reaching a new agreement on nuclear arms control to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) that expires on 5 December 2009. START I commits the US and Russia to reducing their nuclear warheads. In April 2009 the US and Russian Presidents announced new talks on a treaty to replace START I. Russia and the United States have directed their negotiators to report on progress achieved in working out the new agreement by July 2009.[316]

194. Russian cooperation on arms control is vital for any international progress on non-proliferation. Reaching a new agreement would represent significant progress in overcoming the legacy of disagreements on international arms control issues, in particular disagreement on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In December 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty—despite no provision for suspending participation being allowed in the treaty terms. The treaty was drawn up at the end of the Cold War, signed in 1990, to limit equipment holdings and to enable exchanges of detailed information about conventional forces among State Parties. The FCO stated, "NATO allies and the Russian Federation have been at loggerheads over the CFE regime for most of the last ten years".[317] Russia's key recent complaint has been that the Treaty's system of bloc-based limitations on military equipment had become unbalanced. Since the Treaty was signed, NATO had extended its membership and the treaty does not cover these new countries.[318] A further problem is that NATO allies refused to ratify the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty as it argued that Russia has refused to honour its CFE commitments to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Many have argued that the treaty is outdated and needs replacing. Oksana Antonenko stated:

The CFE Treaty seems to be dead, and there is a danger that arms control more generally has been discredited. It is up to NATO to get the ball rolling on reviving the treaty or negotiating new confidence-building and transparency mechanisms to replace it.[319]

195. The Foreign Affairs Committee in its Report, Global Security: Non-Proliferation, recommended, "that the Government should offer every assistance to facilitate a speedy and productive conclusion to the negotiations" on a treaty to replace START I.[320]We welcome the US-Russian negotiations on a nuclear arms reduction treaty to succeed START I. We support the recommendation made by the Foreign Affairs Committee in its Report, Global Security: Non-Proliferation, that the Government should offer every assistance to facilitate a speedy and productive conclusion to the negotiations on a treaty to replace START I. We ask the Government, in its response to our Report, to set out what steps it has taken to facilitate an agreement.

Challenges for international cooperation

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

196. One of the key sources of tension between Russia and the US has been Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). The US claims BMD will enhance global security; in contrast, Russia argues that BMD is a threat to its security. The current US plans for the deployment of an integrated, multi-layered BMD capability were announced by the Bush administration in December 2002. The intention of the system is to defend the US and its allies from ballistic missile attack at any point during the three phases of the incoming missile's trajectory, and against all types of ranges of ballistic missiles.[321] Originally, the US plans were for BMD to protect only the USA from attack. When these plans were extended to cover its allies, the need to establish a third interceptor site outside the continental US was identified. Poland has agreed to host the deployment of 10 missile defence interceptors and the Czech Republic a radar station.

197. The Russian leadership is strongly opposed to the deployment of BMD assets in Poland and the Czech Republic. In February 2007, President Putin hinted that if the US was to go ahead with its plans then Russia might respond by pulling out of the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). On 5 November 2008, President Medvedev announced that it would deploy Iskander short-range surface-to-surface missile systems to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad in order to neutralise 'if necessary' the BMD system being deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic—although Russia has since reined back from this.[322]

198. Partly because of Russia's reaction, some European states have questioned whether BMD will enhance security. President Sarkozy said, in November 2008, that the planned deployment "would bring nothing to security in Europe. It would complicate things".[323] Some of our witnesses also expressed misgivings about BMD. Professor Margot Light said:

My real fear is that by the time we know whether BMD works or not, it will already have undermined European security so that it will not serve as anything that will bolster European security.[324]

199. It is unclear whether President Obama will go ahead with BMD. During the presidential election campaign, President Obama expressed scepticism over the cost and technological feasibility of the programme: "Missile defence requires far more rigorous testing to ensure that it is cost-effective and, most importantly, will work […]".[325] On 6 April 2009, the US Defense Secretary announced $1.4 billion cuts in the defence budget that may affect the speed and pace of European elements of the US's BMD plans. The Washington Post reported that the US Administration wants to see whether Russia can be brought into the programme.[326]

200. President Obama faces difficult choices on whether to go ahead with BMD as originally planned; modify plans to try to accommodate Russia; or abandon BMD completely. All choices have merits and associated risks. Going ahead with the BMD proposals risks antagonising Russia for a system reliant on unproven technology. Abandoning BMD plans may risk being interpreted by Russia and others that the US has given in to Russian demands.

201. The FCO outlined the Government's position on BMD:

We remain supportive of a system which counters the growing threat from states of concern. Going forward it will be important for Russia and the US to work together in this area and for NATO to remain engaged.[327]

Baroness Taylor told us:

if we do not have ballistic missile defence there is vulnerability. If you remove that vulnerability by removing the potential of others to threaten Europe and the United States that is very welcome, but the guarantees would need to be very significant.[328]

202. The Foreign Affairs Committee reached the following conclusion in its recent Report, Global Security: Non-Proliferation:

We are not convinced that, as they are currently envisaged and under current circumstances, the United States' planned ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland represent a net gain for European security. We conclude that if the deployments are carried out in the face of opposition from Russia, this could be highly detrimental to NATO's overall security interests. We reaffirm our 2007 recommendation that BMD in Europe should be developed, if at all, as a joint system between the US, NATO and Russia.^.[329]

203. We are not convinced that European security will be enhanced by the United States' planned ballistic missile defence (BMD) system as currently envisaged. If the US decides to press ahead with its BMD plans, we recommend that the Government seek ways to involve Russia in its development.

IRAN

204. Russia has held a different position from that of most Western countries on the extent to which Iran presents a threat to global security and on how best to conduct relations with it. Many Western states are deeply concerned about the threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons. There have been five UN Security Council resolutions on this issue, which called on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment until confidence was restored in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Iran has failed to comply with these resolutions and continues to assert its right to develop its nuclear programme without interference. A further concern is that if Iran develops nuclear weapons this may prompt other regional powers to follow suit. Russia publicly shares the West's concerns about Iran; President Medvedev has stated that Russia does not want to see the development of Iranian nuclear weapons capability. This was also a clear message during our visit to Moscow.

205. The extent to which Russia has leverage over Iran is contested. Alexander Khramchikhin, a researcher with the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, argued that Russia actually has little leverage. In contrast, others such as the Commission on US Policy towards Russia concluded that Russian cooperation "could contribute substantially to a successful outcome".[330] Russia's influence over Iran is based in particular on its export of arms to Iran, its membership of the UN Security Council and its relationship in helping Iran develop its civil nuclear capability. Russia is a key arms exporter to Iran: in March 2009, Russian news agencies reported that Russia had signed a contract to sell S-300 air-defence missiles to Iran—although the Kremlin denied this. The US wants Russia to back out of this contract as the weapons would protect Iran's nuclear facilities.[331] Russia has also assisted Iran with the construction of its nuclear reactor at Bushehr and the provision of uranium to power the plant.

206. As well as the issue of whether Russia is able to exert significant influence over Iran, there is the crucial issue of whether Russia is willing to do so. Russia's role in condemning North Korea's launch of a long-range rocket, in May 2009, could be seen as a positive indication of Russia's potential to cooperate with the West on Iran. Professor Margot Light, in evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested that Russia preferred an approach of engagement with Iran rather than punitive measures, such as sanctions.[332]

207. A further issue is the reported claim that President Medvedev is seeking a trade-off with the US—cooperation on Iran in exchange for abandoning BMD. President Obama indicated in a private letter to President Medvedev that there would be less need for BMD if the threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons could be diminished, which has been interpreted as a willingness to negotiate on this issue.[333] Forthcoming US decisions on Ballistic Missile Defence are likely to have a profound effect on Russia's willingness to cooperate on Iran.

208. Russia has an important bilateral relationship with Iran and thereby has a vital role in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. We call on the Government to encourage Russia to persuade Iran to comply with its nuclear obligations.

308 Q 64 Back

309 Qq 58-59 Back

310 Q 145 Back

311 Q 64 Back

312 Q 199 Back

313 Q 161 Back

314 Q 161 Back

315 Q 145 Back

316 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Obama and President Medvedev, 1 April 2009, www.america.gov Back

317 Ev 128 Back

318 Ev 128 Back

319 Ev 150 Back