Conclusions and recommendations
Russia's foreign policy
1. Russia
has been hit hard by the global economic downturn. It is too early
to judge how this will affect Russia's foreign policy. Russia's
low level of democracy may make it more likely to be assertive
in its foreign policy than would be the case with a Western liberal
democratic state that faced similar economic difficulties. (Paragraph
23)
2. The West needs
to engage with Russia to develop cooperation, yet the absence
of shared values makes this difficult. Witnesses identified many
areas where cooperation was desirable based on mutual national
interests. NATO, the EU and the UK Government need a pragmatic
and hard-headed approach to their engagement with Russia to achieve
the best results. (Paragraph 27)
Russia's military capability and posture
3. We
welcome Russia's military reform programme that will modernise
and professionalise its Armed Forces. It provides an opportunity
for Russia to increase the interoperability of its Armed Forces
and thereby the possibility for increased joint operations with
NATO forces, whilst also improving the conditions of its rank
and file soldiers. The UK military is experienced in implementing
reforms. The Ministry of Defence should offer support to Russia
in implementing its reform programme. (Paragraph 43)
4. Russia's unauthorised
flights into international airspace, including the UK's flight
information region, do not pose a direct security threat to NATO
or the UK; nevertheless, they are not the actions of a friendly
nation and risk escalating tension. A further issue is that Russia's
actions threaten the safety of civil flights and risk leading
to serious accidents; Russia should not be making such flights
without informing the appropriate authorities. The Government
should take a more robust approach in making clear to Russia that
its continued secret incursions by military aircraft into international
airspace near to the UK is not acceptable behaviour. The Government
should call on NATO to ensure that it monitors and assesses the
threat posed by unauthorised Russian military flights into NATO
and international airspace near to NATO's territorial perimeter.
(Paragraph 49)
5. It is understandable
that some of Russia's neighbouring states should feel concerned
about the possibility of Russian military action against them
given Russia's actions in Georgia. Russia has proved that it is
quite capable of using military force if it chooses. Russia does
not, however, need to use conventional force to achieve its objectives;
it has political and economic tools at its disposal to influence
its neighbouring states. (Paragraph 52)
6. In contrast to
the level of threat Russia poses to some of its neighbouring states,
Russia does not currently pose a direct threat to UK homeland
security, nor is likely to do so in the near future. Although
it is hard to conceive of a scenario in which Russia would threaten
UK homeland security, Russia threatens the national interests
of the UK through its attempts to establish a sphere of influence
over other former Soviet States. It is in the UK's national interest
to have stable democratic and independent states in Eastern Europe
as this enhances European security. Russia's behaviour risks undermining
this and thereby working against our own national interests. (Paragraph
53)
The Georgia conflict
7. We
welcome the EU's investigation into the causes of the Georgian-Russian
conflict. Understanding the history and causes of the conflict
is a prerequisite to achieving peace in the region. While awaiting
the EU's forthcoming report that should provide a more detailed
assessment of the causes of the conflict, we conclude that:
- Responsibility for the conflict
was shared, in differing measures, by all parties. Both Russia
and Georgia share responsibility for the humanitarian consequences
of the conflict that have left hundreds dead and thousands displaced
from their homes.
- Russia provoked Georgia through its actions over
many years. Russian provocation included fuelling separatism in
the region through the distribution of passports in the breakaway
Georgian territories, building up its military forces in the region
and through its recognition of the separatist territories in Spring
2008.
- President Saakashvili's decision to launch an
offensive on 7 August was politically reckless. Russia reacted
swiftly to remove Georgian forces from South Ossetia. Russia also
acted with disproportionate and illegal use of force by encroaching
deep into Georgian territory, far beyond the conflict area. (Paragraph
74)
8. There
was a collective international failure at a political level to
read the warning signs of an escalating conflict. The UK Government
has stated its commitment to securing peace in Georgia. Ministers
need to learn from history, and should carefully monitor intelligence
on the situation in the Caucasus, to ensure that any future outbreak
of conflict in the region does not come as a surprise. (Paragraph
75)
9. Russia is failing
to honour its ceasefire commitments under the agreements of 12
August and 8 September 2008. We recommend that the UK Government
send a strong message to Russia that it needs to withdraw its
military forces to its pre-conflict positions as previously agreed.
(Paragraph 81)
10. We regret that
the UN and OSCE monitoring missions have been forced to close.
Their closure increases the vital importance of the EU monitoring
mission in Georgia and the need for its mandate to be strengthened
as well as extended. The EU monitoring mission has a vital role
in acting as a deterrent to further military action and promoting
stability. The UK Government should increase its diplomatic efforts
to secure an extension in time and strengthening of the EU monitoring
mission in Georgia, including enabling the mission to have full
access to the disputed territories. (Paragraph 89)
11. Russia has breached
internationally accepted principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity by unilaterally recognising the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The prospect of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
returning under the sovereign control of Georgia in the near future
appears slight while the Russian military presence remains in
these territories. It is vital for international security that
NATO, EU and the UK Government remain resolute in their commitment
to Georgia's sovereignty and international law. The international
community has a vital role in securing stability and peace in
the region. UK Ministers should press for the EU, UN and OSCE
to secure a lasting peace settlement in the disputed territories.
(Paragraph 93)
Russia and NATO
12. We
welcome the resumption of formal engagement between NATO and Russia
on the NATO-Russia Council. Engagement provides a platform for
progress in building trust and cooperation. This should not, however,
be at the cost of abandoning a commitment to the territorial integrity
of Georgia. NATO should continue to make clear to Russia that
its actions in Georgia were disproportionate and that it should
honour its ceasefire commitments in Georgia. (Paragraph 99)
13. For the NATO-Russia
Council to be effective in building trust between NATO and Russia
there needs to be an honest dialogue on areas of disagreement
as well as agreement. The UK Government should encourage the NRC
to be used as a forum to discuss difficult and strategic issues—such
as NATO enlargement, Georgia, and human rights—as well as
issues where cooperation is more likely. (Paragraph 101)
14. Arctic security
is an issue of growing strategic importance as sea routes are
opened up as a result of climate change. NATO has a critical role
to play in securing Russian cooperation or at least minimising
tensions over the territory. (Paragraph 104)
15. There are many
opportunities for NATO to pursue cooperation with Russia for mutual
benefit. The full potential of the NATO-Russia Council will not
be realised until it takes strategic decisions on the priority
areas for cooperation. In relation to these areas of potential
cooperation, the NATO-Russia Council should focus its efforts
on key strategic areas where there is a consensus within NATO
and realistic prospects for success: these areas could include
arms control, the Arctic and Afghanistan. We recommend that the
UK Government identify and communicate within NATO what its priority
areas are for cooperation with Russia. (Paragraph 106)
16. The Government
should work within NATO to secure an agreement with Russia on
the transit of NATO military goods through Russian territory to
ISAF forces in Afghanistan. We acknowledge that the UK currently
relies on a southern transit route to supply its Armed Forces,
yet it has a vital interest in ensuring the effectiveness of the
entire coalition mission in Afghanistan. The Alliance's effectiveness
would be enhanced by accessing an alternative supply route for
its military goods other than through Pakistan. (Paragraph 111)
17. Russia should
not have a veto over NATO membership. The costs of NATO closing
the door on further enlargement are as great as the costs of premature
enlargement. (Paragraph 122)
18. Acceptance of
new NATO members should continue to be performance-based; if a
country meets the criteria for membership, and can demonstrate
that it is able to contribute to the security of existing NATO
members it should be permitted to join. We believe it is essential
that NATO's open door policy is maintained on this basis. Ending
it is not in the interests of NATO or of European stability as
a whole. Signalling that the Alliance has reached its outer limits,
or ruling out further expansion, would consign those countries
left outside NATO to an uncertain future, potentially creating
instability on the Alliance's Eastern fringes. Perpetuating this
instability is not in the interests of any member of the NATO
Alliance. (Paragraph 123)
19. Georgia's unresolved
territorial disputes considerably complicate NATO's decision-making
on whether to grant Georgia membership or not. On the one hand,
Georgia's membership may strengthen democracy and stability within
the country and possibly beyond. On the other hand, its unresolved
territorial disputes could risk NATO becoming embroiled in a direct
conflict with Russia. While Georgia is working towards meeting
the performance criteria for membership this issue can be avoided.
But it can not be avoided indefinitely. At some point in the future,
NATO will need to make a difficult decision on whether to grant
Georgia membership in light of the harsh reality of the situation
on the ground. It is vital that NATO does not allow Russia to
dictate this decision; yet it is also vital that NATO considers
the possible consequences arising from allowing a country to join
while it has unresolved territorial disputes which it is in Russia's
interests to perpetuate in the short term. (Paragraph 127)
20. If NATO does grant
Georgia membership it should do so to the whole of Georgia's sovereign
territory, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To do otherwise
would be to recognise Russia's actions in those parts of Georgia
as having some legitimacy. This is a very serious issue to which
we do not have an answer. Yet the international community must
work to address it to produce an answer and, in doing so, reduce
the tension between Georgia, Russia and NATO. This will be achievable
only with a recognition by Russia that its long-term interests
lie in stable and harmonious relations in the South Caucasus region,
rather than a relationship of threats and domination. (Paragraph
128)
21. For Ukraine to
have a realistic chance of joining NATO, it not only needs to
meet the performance criteria for membership, but it needs also
to demonstrate that its public are supportive of its membership.
(Paragraph 129)
22. NATO needs to
ensure that a continued commitment to mutual protection—Article
5—is at the heart of the new NATO Strategic Concept. NATO's
global role is vital, given the shared challenges its Member States
face. Yet this should not come at the expense of the Alliance's
commitment towards mutual defence. (Paragraph 133)
23. Central and Eastern
European NATO members are understandably concerned about their
security. Countries such as Estonia have proved to be valuable
allies, particularly in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and it
is right that we reassure them about their security. NATO should
take steps to reassure Central and Eastern European NATO members
that their security is of vital importance to the Alliance. (Paragraph
134)
24. NATO should update
its contingency plans for responding to an armed attack on its
members, including ensuring that these plans cover the eventuality
of attack on Baltic Member States, and setting out NATO's planned
military response. (Paragraph 137)
25. We believe that
NATO's decision to enhance the remit of the NATO Response Force,
rather than creating new structures, is sensible. It is vital
that the NATO Response Force is able to reassure Central and Eastern
European Member States. NATO should maintain a visible military
presence in the Baltic States, including through the use of air-policing
and conducting exercises in the region. (Paragraph 139)
26. The UK, alongside
many other countries, faces an increasing threat of cyberattack.
Cybersecurity is an issue of increasing significance for the UK
and NATO as society becomes increasingly dependent on information
and communication technology. The cyberattacks on Estonia and
Georgia demonstrate the importance of the UK and NATO developing
robust resilience. (Paragraph 151)
27. We welcome the
Government's publication of a National Cybersecurity Strategy
and the establishment of new offices to coordinate and implement
cybersecurity measures. Despite information from the MoD, we are
still not clear what the exact role and contribution of the MoD
is towards national cybersecurity. In the Government's response
to our Report, we recommend the Government to set out more clearly
the MoD's current and future work in relation to national cybersecurity.
The MoD should also ensure that the importance of cybersecurity
is reflected within its planning and resource allocation. (Paragraph
152)
28. Given the importance
that the Government now attaches to national cybersecurity, we
call on it to explain its decision not to sponsor the NATO Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence. The UK Government should urge NATO
to recognise the security challenge posed by electronic warfare
in NATO's new Strategic Concept. NATO should give cybersecurity
higher priority within its planning to reflect the growing threat
that this poses to its members. NATO should ensure that the work
of the Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is fully supported,
including financially. (Paragraph 153)
European security and Russia
29. We
welcome the resumption of a dialogue between the EU and Russia
on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Yet the Government's
position, that the 'pace and tone' of negotiations on a new PCA
will be informed by Russia's fulfilment of its obligations under
the ceasefire agreements in Georgia, does not provide sufficient
clarity on the Government's position. The Government should make
a clear public statement that it will not sign up to a new Partnership
and Cooperation agreement unless Russia honours its ceasefire
commitments. (Paragraph 158)
30. We note the concern
expressed by witnesses about Russia's motives in proposing a new
European security architecture. We are not convinced that there
is a need for such a new architecture, which may undermine the
primacy of NATO's security role. Nevertheless, engagement with
Russia on this matter is necessary to understand their security
concerns. The current proposals are vague; Russia needs to come
forward with further details of its proposals to enable a meaningful
dialogue to take place. The UK Government should maintain its
willingness to engage with Russia on this issue, but should make
clear that it will not commit to an agreement that overrides existing
commitments to NATO and human rights. We support the OSCE's role
in taking forward initial discussions on the new security architecture.
(Paragraph 166)
European energy security and Russia
31. Regardless
of the causes of the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, it is clear that
it has damaged the reputations of both countries as reliable suppliers.
The threat and reality of Russia cutting off energy supply demonstrates
the need for the EU to reduce its energy dependency on Russia
and diversify energy supply. (Paragraph 176)
32. It is too early
to judge what the long-term effect of the global economic crisis
will be on future EU energy demand. Yet the EU needs to press
ahead in diversifying its energy supply to ensure that it is not
vulnerable to supply disputes (Paragraph 178)
33. The UK Government
should work within the EU to pursue a united approach to energy
security and the prioritisation of developing the Nabucco pipeline.
(Paragraph 184)
34. In our view NATO
should have a role in energy issues but it should not play a leading
role; this is more appropriately a matter for the EU. Nevertheless,
energy is an issue that it is legitimate for NATO to be concerned
about because there are significant security implications arising
from the possibility of disputes between countries over energy
supplies and the potential for states to use their military assets
to defend pipelines. The Government should work within NATO to
develop an approach on energy issues that focuses on the security
aspects of the energy agenda. (Paragraph 187)
Global security
35. A
strong bilateral relationship between the US and Russia is vital
for global security. Yet it is also important for European security
that this relationship does not come at the expense of the NATO-Russian
relationship. (Paragraph 190)
36. We welcome the
US-Russian negotiations on a nuclear arms reduction treaty to
succeed START I. We support the recommendation made by the Foreign
Affairs Committee in its Report, Global Security: Non-Proliferation,
that the Government should offer every assistance to facilitate
a speedy and productive conclusion to the negotiations on a treaty
to replace START I. We ask the Government, in its response to
our Report, to set out what steps it has taken to facilitate an
agreement. (Paragraph 195)
37. We are not convinced
that European security will be enhanced by the United States'
planned ballistic missile defence (BMD) system as currently envisaged.
If the US decides to press ahead with its BMD plans, we recommend
that the Government seek ways to involve Russia in its development.
(Paragraph 203)
38. Russia has an
important bilateral relationship with Iran and thereby has a vital
role in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. We call
on the Government to encourage Russia to persuade Iran to comply
with its nuclear obligations. (Paragraph 208)
Conclusion
39. Although
Russia does not pose a military threat to NATO as an Alliance,
some Central and Eastern European NATO Member States are understandably
concerned about the military threat that Russia poses to them
individually, given Russia's actions in Georgia. It is important
they are reassured. (Paragraph 211)
40. It is in NATO's
interests to continue to support the territorial integrity of
Georgia. If Russia believes it has carte blanche to disregard
international law there is an increased risk of other countries
suffering the same fate as Georgia. The credibility of NATO as
a military alliance is based on its ability to provide mutual
defence to its Member States, as outlined in Article 5. NATO's
new Strategic Concept should contain a renewed commitment to Article
5 as well as ensuring that NATO is militarily capable of acting
inside and outside of NATO boundaries. NATO is strongest when
its Member States are united; the UK Government should work within
NATO to ensure that this is achieved. (Paragraph 212)
41. It is right that
NATO, the EU and the UK Government engage with Russia both on
areas of cooperation and areas of disagreement. Russia has much
to gain from positioning itself firmly within the community of
nations. Engagement is important to build trust and avoid a new
confrontation arising between Russia and the West. The Government
should adopt a hard-headed approach to engagement with Russia,
based on the reality of Russia's foreign policy rather than abstract
and misleading notions of shared values. (Paragraph 213)
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