Memorandum from Martin McCauley
INTRODUCTION
Before examining Russia's relations with NATO and
the implications for Great Britain it would be useful to look
at the distribution of power in Russia today.
1. The Putin regime exhibits some similarities
with the former Soviet and Tsarist regimes. What is striking is
the super-centralised state. Decision making is conducted by Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitry Medvedev and a small
group of officials. The way they reach decisions is opaque and
difficult to decipher. The rationale is the self-preservation
of this elite in power.
2. There is an ongoing struggle for influence
among these officials over Putin. As the economy fails, some will
argue that there is a western conspiracy to weaken Russia. Putin,
who has a limited understanding of economics, will find it more
and more difficult to decide on appropriate policies in the present
crisis.
3. The present distribution of power has
been called "semi-presidentialism". This refers to the
fact that while Dmitry Medvedev is President he does not have
the power of Vladimir Putin when he was President between 2000 and
2008. Medvedev appears to concentrate mainly on legal affairs
and the fight against corruption. The real power rests with Vladimir
Putin who is responsible for foreign, security and economic affairs.
However some Russian observers would argue that Putin is the front
man for the Yeltsin "family"—a group consisting
of Yeltsin family members, officials and oligarchs—which
handpicked Putin as President in 2000. In this analysis, Putin
is not a free agent but is there to defend the interests of the
"family". The Medvedev-Putin tandem is not an example
of dual power or a diarchy: Medvedev is the junior in the relationship.
Despite what some observers originally feared (particularly in
the UK), this relationship has not weakened the Russian state.
In fact, it can be argued, it has strengthened existing power
relations.
4. Medvedev is the softer face of Kremlin
power. He appears more conciliatory and open to dialogue.
How is it that a small coterie in the Kremlin
has acquired the right to take all key decisions?
5. When Vladimir Putin became President
of Russia in 2000, he had several goals to pursue. He was fearful
that Russia could fragment as the Soviet Union had done in 1991.
As an outsider in Moscow—he was from St Petersburg—he
brought with him a team which was dominated by members from that
city. As he had never been elected to a major public office, he
had no political support base on which he could rely. His background
was in the security services, the KGB and the FSB. It was almost
inevitable that former security officials would play a major role
in his administration.
6. His first task was to gain control of
the media. Two media magnates, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky,
were quickly sent into exile and their empires acquired by the
state.
7. The FSB, other security agencies and
military personnel now play a major role in the upper echelons
of the state administration (they are collectively known as the
siloviki or strong ones). Putin trusts uniformed personnel.
Something like 6,000 FSB officers occupy state positions and military
generals are often found as governors, presidential envoys and
so on. The military has prevented the development of civilian
military experts by simply denying them access to information.
This is a "need to know" system, bearing comparison
with the Soviet model.
8. Whereas the Duma under Yeltsin attempted
to rein in the military and security services, the present parliament,
in the words of a Russian critic, is a "puppet show".
9. Another favoured group under Putin is
the bureaucracy. The astonishing fact is that there are now more
bureaucrats in Russia than under the communists. Putin has secured
their loyalty by generous payments and perks. Officials can use
their positions to extract bribes from the population and in this
way greatly augment their disposable income.
10. Putin has been a lucky politician. The
explosion of oil and commodity prices during this decade has made
possible the development of a "Putin model" of governance.
11. One estimate is that the oil bonanza
has brought in an extra $1.3 trillion (Russian GDP last year was
about $1.8 trillion). About $700 billion of this was held in the
Central Bank of Russia, stabilisation and wealth funds. The rest
could be spent on priming the "Putin model".
12. Since oil was the main source of the
new wealth, the state had to gain control over it. The confiscation
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Yukos—the most efficient oil company
in Russia at the time—was part of this campaign.
13. The Kremlin exerts political influence
over key sectors of the economy, such as the oil sector, by keeping
everything centralised. It does this by appointing senior officials,
many of them members of the presidential administration, to chair
the boards of directors of key companies. The Kremlin tentacles
reach everywhere. A recent example of this was the appointment,
in December 2008, of Alexander Voloshin, head of the presidential
administration from 1999 to 2003, as chair of Norilsk Nickel.
These company directors report on a regular basis to Putin and
the presidential administration. It goes without saying that these
high officials are chosen not for their managerial expertise but
for their loyalty to the Putin Team.
14. The presidential administration is roughly
equivalent to the Party Central Committee Secretariat during the
communist regime. Its departments parallel all government ministries
and agencies. Hence it can be regarded as a parallel government.
15. Another reason for the state control
of the oil industry was that much of it was in Siberia. If Moscow
owned the wells Siberia could not think of becoming semi-independent
of Moscow.
16. Petrodollars have promoted the emergence
of a new, well to do business middle class. It has integrated
into the world economy and now has business interests worldwide.
It is a major source of legitimacy for the "Putin model".
Most of these businessmen are involved in state-owned or state-influenced
enterprises. In other words, they are tied to the Kremlin.
17. Some of the new business middle class
refer to the present system as "authoritarian liberalism"
or "managed democracy". The aim is to restore order
to the chaotic market of the 1990s. Hence one can say it is a
semi-market economy. The present economic downturn has revealed
that the government lacks the skills to manage successfully this
new semi-market economy.
What are the components of the "Putin model"?
— A super-centralised state softened now
by semi-presidentialism
— A constrained, semi-market economy
— A very limited role for the population,
the intelligentsia and the business community in political decision
making; their role is mainly to legitimise the existing system
— The emasculation of civil society
— The neutering of the Duma, Council of
the Federation and other representative bodies
— The elimination of real politics and
its replacement by virtual politics
— The abandonment of the election of governors
and their nomination by Moscow
— An expanding bureaucracy and security
apparatus
— The toleration of corruption as officials
use their office for private gain
Social protests could always be resolved by
throwing money at the problem.
18. The population and the intelligentsia
were bought off with rising living standards. This is a major
reason why there is no meaningful political and intellectual opposition
to the "Putin model".
The above is the domestic face of the "Putin
model". What is its foreign aspect?
19. Putin's foreign policy was based on
two premises:
— The flow of petrodollars would last forever
— America was in decline and, by extension,
NATO was in decline
20. The "Putin model" is authoritarian.
Its core is anti-Americanism. This is because it detests the US
concept of liberal democracy, which Russia views as suffused with
"imperial" ambitions and exported to the rest of the
world; civil society and a liberal market economy. Anti-Americanism
stems from Moscow's perception that Washington engages in double
standards. It preaches the rule of law and democracy while sowing
chaos throughout the world. The fear is that American values could
lead to the breakup of the Russian state. This, in Putin's perception,
almost happened in the 1990s.Russia has developed a semi-market
economy which acts as a barrier to the penetration of American
capital and, indirectly, influence.
When once pressed about how long the "Putin
model" would last, Putin replied: "15-20 years".
21. The "Putin model" has developed
"managed democracy" or "liberal authoritarianism"
which means that the Putin Team tries to take all key decisions.
It manages a semi-market economy dominated by state companies.
Businessmen operate under the watchful eye of the presidential
administration and the FSB. If a company is viewed as operating
against the interests of the Kremlin, the tax inspectorate is
loosed upon it and it is soon brought into line.
22. As previously mentioned, political-economic
power is heavily centralised. The trend of appointing top officials
to be chairs of strategically important companies began under
Putin. Initially the key factor was to ensure the growth of these
key industrial sectors but it is now to prevent the collapse of
the economy. This trend is set to continue in the present economic
downturn.
23. Abroad it talks of "sovereign democracy".
This is an attempt to protect Russian against foreign influence.
The new business class is used to spread Russian influence abroad
and to legitimise the regime. The myth has to be maintained abroad
that Russia is a great power. This leads to self-censorship and
is one of the reasons why Russia has been so slow to react to
the world economic downturn. The argument, articulated by Putin,
was, until recently, that Russia was so strong that it would not
be affected, like America and others, by the credit crunch.
24. The argument is that Russia has special
security needs. President Dmitry Medvedev has spoken of a "zone
of privileged influence". He has declined to specify what
he means by this. Presumably it means the former republics of
the Soviet Union. No foreign power is to encroach on it. Hence
Ukraine and Georgia are of special significance for Moscow. Under
no circumstances is NATO to be permitted to draw these two states
into its alliance.
25. Medvedev has also claimed the right
for Moscow to intervene in neighbouring states to protect the
rights of ethnic Russian and Russian speakers belonging to other
ethnic groups. He has even talked about using force to change
borders in certain circumstances. Here he is reiterating arguments
first advanced by Putin.
26. Putin was Prime Minister when Russia
launched its second war in Chechnya in 1999. That bloody conflict
lasted several years and sowed the seeds of the present security
problems in the North Caucasus. The ruthlessness displayed during
the Chechen campaign is one of the marks of the "Putin model".
THE CURRENT
AND FUTURE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND
NATO, AND BETWEEN
NATO MEMBERS, INCLUDING
EXAMINING AREAS
OF TENSION
AND COOPERATION
27. As pointed out above, Russia regards
NATO as an enemy. It is a cloak for the spreading of American
influence and power.
28. The "Putin model" has shallow
roots in the Russian population, no loyal institutions to defend
it and the United Russia party—the ruling party—may
prove of little use in a crisis. The new business middle class
is a source of support but economic collapse, as in 1998, would
wipe out many members of this group.
29. The liberal democratic model is an alternative
for a small part of Russia's intelligentsia. The Putin Team has
to ensure that its appeal is restricted to a small part of the
intelligentsia.
30. Given the above, it is not surprising
that Putin (the real master in Russia) is relentlessly negative
about the United States and all it stands for. A recent example
was Davos where he blamed the financial crisis on America. As
one Russian commentator put it sarcastically, Putin's speech would
have been fine had it been delivered by any other statesman! Russia's
economic performance since August 2008 has been poor and
the rouble has been one of the three worst performing currencies
in the world. It is falling almost daily at present.
31. Putin is aware that political and military
power is based on economic power. The flood of petrodollars after
2002 made it possible to design a new strategic architecture.
The core of this was to exclude the American military and NATO
from the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moscow would like
to have included the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe.
However most of them were already in NATO.
32. Moscow's strategy is to weaken and gradually
exclude the Unites States from European security. It argues that
Europe does not need NATO any more. Its security can be looked
after by a pan-European security organisation. Naturally, Russia
would be a leading member of this club. It follows that it could
not take any decision which Russia regarded as inimical to its
interests.
THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE
WAR IN
GEORGIA IN
AUGUST 2008
33. Russia won the war but its equipment
was often inferior to that of the Georgian army. This led to a
radical rethink about the Russian military. Putin, during his
period as President between 2000 and 2008, often talked about
military reform. However he achieved very little due to the opposition
of the top military brass. Georgia revealed that Russia had to
modernise its armed forces.
34. In October 2008, Defence Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov—his detractors delight in pointing out that he
is a former furniture salesman and tax inspector without any military
expertise—announced a fundamental shakeup of the military.
About 300,000 officers and warrant officers are to go in
the next three years. About 150,000 will stay but will have
to adjust to a quite different military service.
35. Promises have been made to provide housing
for retired officers but Putin has conceded that his cannot be
done in Moscow and St Petersburg because of the high cost of property
there. Retired officers will have to accept housing in cheaper
regions. However the opportunity of employment there will be limited,
given the present recession.
36. Retired officers took to the streets
of Moscow in December 2008 to protest against the reform.
Generals and admirals with full chests of medals were arrested.
The Ministry of Defence has now backtracked and
said the reform will be delayed by up to six months.
37. One of the reasons for the rethink was
the refusal of police units in the Russian Far East to use force
against demonstrators in Khabarovsk and other Siberian cities.
It is worth noting that no police units anywhere in Siberia were
willing to use force against protestors. Units had to be brought
in from Moscow to manhandle the crowds.
38. The Moscow demonstrators were dealt
with by drafting in provincial units. Moscow units were deemed
too unreliable.
39. The Kremlin might have to call on the
military if police units were not willing to use force against
protesters. Given that many officers will be forced to retire
because of the military reforms, they may be reluctant to use
force against the population. One can envisage a rerun of the
situation in August 1991 when military units declined to
fire on Russian demonstrators.
40. The recent report by the IISS on Russia's
military capabilities reveals Russia has lost much of its military
might over the last 20 years.
FUTURE OF
RUSSIA AND
NATO RELATIONS
41. It all depends on the Obama administration.
The main priority for Washington is the domestic American economy.
Defence spending will be closely examined to see where savings
can be made.
42. Russia's economic situation is worsening
by the day. Even the Russian Minister of Finance is talking about
Russia becoming a borrower next year. Some Russian economists
expect Russia to be bankrupt before the end of 2009. Hence the
grandiose defence plans to modernise Russian weapons have had
to be scaled back.
43. Russia will attempt to make a virtue
out of necessity. It is offering cooperation if NATO treats it
as an equal, apologises for past mistakes, drops the anti-missile
scheme in Poland and the Czech Republic, abandons plans to make
Ukraine and Georgia members and stays away from it "zone
of privileged interests". Quite a shopping list!
44. Russia's bargaining hand is becoming
weaker by the day. NATO does not need to make any concessions
to Russia at present.
DIFFERENCES WITHIN
NATO
45. There is a tension between "Old"
Europe and "New" Europe in NATO. The east Europeans
see Russia as a threat. "Old" Europe, in the main, does
not share this perception.
46. A major player in the "Old"
Europe team is Germany. It does not see Russia as a threat but
as an opportunity.
47. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the present
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the SPD's candidate for
Chancellor in this year's general elections. He has already begun
his electoral campaign by addressing an open letter to President
Obama about NATO-Russia relations. He sees President Medvedev
as a man untouched by the "Cold War" mentality. He omits
all mention in his letter to Vladimir Putin.
48. He proposes a new security architecture
for Europe which will supersede NATO. However "NATO will
be needed in the future too", he remarks, but on a new basis
of "common security of East and West, from Vancouver to Vladivostok".
This appears to go beyond the idea of a pan-European security
organisation.
49. Steinmeier, in contrast to his Chancellor,
Angela Merkel, is keen to start negotiations on this new strategic
partnership with Russia.
50. As Steinmeier presented the SPD take
on security, Joschka Fischer,did the same for the Greens. Fischer
was German Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2005. His article
is entitled: "Russia in NATO: Finding Russia's Place in Europe".
He argues that the West needs Russia's cooperation to address
conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North
Korea and global challenges such as energy security and climate
change. The price to pay would be an enhanced role for Russia
within NATO, "including the prospect of full membership".
51. An SPD-Green coalition government is
a real prospect in Germany after the upcoming elections. This
would exacerbate divisions within NATO and weaken the alliance.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE
NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL
52. It has been in abeyance since the conflict
in Georgia in August 2008. Unofficial contact has been re-established
but it is expected that full relations will be resumed after the
Munich conference this month.
53. Dmitry Rogozin, who was a leading nationalist
politician before becoming Russia's permanent representative to
NATO, never misses an opportunity to attack NATO and the West.
54. It was noticeable that Moscow was very
subdued in its criticism of Israel's actions in Gaza. This was
presumably because it wanted to protect its burgeoning military
cooperation with Tel Aviv. The only discordant voice was Rogozin
who lambasted NATO for double standards. He compared NATO's sharp
condemnation of excessive force in Georgia with NATO's silence
on Gaza.
55. The Council could become an important
forum for debating cooperation. Russia will set preconditions.
These will include the abandonment of the anti-missile shield
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia is declining economically
and this will make it more amenable to compromise.
THE IMPLICATIONS
OF RECENT
TENSIONS WITH
RUSSIA FOR
UK SECURITY
56. The Alexander Litvinenko-Andrei Lugavoi
affair has soured Russian-British relations. Lugavoi is now a
member of the Duma and cannot be extradited. A compromise needs
to be reached. One suggestion would be to allow the affair to
be quietly forgotten.
(i) South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia has now
lost these territories. The only way they could come back under
the control of Tbilisi would be the total collapse of Russia and
its fragmentation into many small states. This is unlikely to
happen.
Russia would like to bring Georgia back into
the "Russian fold". This means it could consider attempting
to occupy the whole of Georgia.
The Armenian minority in Georgia is very poor
and feel disadvantaged. A pretext could be manufactured whereby
they call on Russia to protect them.
The main risk is to Ukraine. Ethnic Russians
make up a majority of the population of Crimea. Sevastopol, the
main Russian naval base on the Black Sea, is in Crimea. Occupying
Crimea would, therefore, have naval advantages as well.
Eastern Ukraine, bordering on Russia, also has
a majority of ethnic Russians.
Moldova is a divided state and Russia's influence
there is already substantial.
The risks of Russia intervening militarily will
be discussed below.
(ii) Ballistic Missile Defence
NATO regards the anti-missile defence system
in Poland and the Czech Republic as a "substantial contribution"
to protecting its allies against long range ballistic missiles.
Moscow regards the system as having an "anti-Russian potential".
If missiles were fired they would reach Moscow "in four minutes
after take-off and are so precise that they can hit the window
of our President's office in the Kremlin". Such is the graphic
opinion of Dmitry Rogozin. For this reason, a strong Russia would
never agree to the deployment.
In order to counter the missile defence, Russia
announced it would deploy Iskander SS26 missiles in Kaliningrad
oblast (the former German East Prussia) which borders Poland and
Lithuania which are NATO countries.
The Russian military claim that the SS26 has
a range of 500 km and is very accurate and cannot be shot
down by any missile defence. They are at present deployed in the
North Caucasus and were used in the war against Georgia. However
some of them proved inaccurate and hit residential areas. Hence
the missile is still being tested. This means there are, in reality,
no Iskanders to deploy in Kaliningrad oblast.
President Medvedev and President Obama are expected
to have their first meeting at the G20 group of countries
in London in April. The Russian President would like to abandon
the deployment of SS26s in return for the Americans not installing
a ballistic missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic.
This would be a very good deal for Moscow since it has no Iskanders
to deploy.
As mentioned above Russia will fight tooth and
nail to prevent Ukraine and Georgia becoming NATO members. The
same applied to other states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and the
Central Asian states.
These states may become members of the European
Union but when it comes to a military alliance, Russia perceives
the spread of NATO as a cancer which could be terminal for it.
(iv) Russia's Suspension of Participation in
the CFE Treaty
The CFE Treaty was judged as restricting the
deployment of Russian armour in the south and in the North Caucasus.
This condition had to be removed to permit Russia to fight successfully
in Georgia.
Russia always threatens to retarget its missiles
on Europe if it finds that its interests are being ignored. Moscow
was annoyed that the United States and NATO were not willing to
give sufficient weight to Russian objections to the expansion
of NATO in eastern Europe. It feels that the West does not treat
Russia as an equal or great power.
THE CURRENT
AND FUTURE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RUSSIA, THE
UK AND EU
57. Current political relations between
Russia and the UK are frosty but economic relations are thriving.
There are many small and medium sized companies (SMEs) involved
in trade and consultancy. Many young Russians work for a time
in London to gain experience and then return to Russia. They are
members of the new Russian business middle class.
58. The economic downturn threatens this
relationship. If the Russian state faces bankruptcy—a rerun
of 1998—these promising developments may be nipped in the
bud.
59. Vladimir Putin was a little more conciliatory
at Davos but this was based on his perception that Russia is becoming
economically weaker. Russia may use up its currency reserves by
the summer. It might then approach the IMF for some emergency
loans.
Hence the weaker Russia becomes the more amenable
it will become to compromises on defence.
60. Social unrest is likely in Russia if
large scale unemployment becomes a reality. The Russian budget
is already in deficit and an oil price of $70 a barrel is
needed to balance it. The Central Bank of Russia cannot continue
bailing out companies and defending the rouble forever. Food is
becoming much more expensive—Russia imports about half of
its food—and a major factor in the demise of the Gorbachev
regime was its inability to provision the country.
61. The 2009 Russian budget is based
on oil at $41 a barrel and a 5% deficit is expected. If the
oil price drops to $30 or lower some Russian commentators
think that mass social unrest will become inevitable. A price
of $10 might presage doom for the regime.
In other words, the Putin Team will not be able
to spend its way out of trouble this time.
There is a possibility that the Putin Team will
be swept away in the wave of protests.
62. In order to stay in office a government
needs the support of its security services. It is debatable if
the military would now fully support the Putin Team given the
disquiet over military reform. It might not be willing to shoot
at Russian demonstrators. There are hints that middle level FSB
officers are unhappy with the present state of affairs. In other
words the Putin Team cannot rely on the security services carrying
out orders to use force against demonstrators.
63. There is another scenario. The Putin
Team may become so desperate that it might provoke a conflict
in Georgia and Crimea in order to unify the nation behind them.
64. As mentioned above there is a doubt
that the military would obey orders to launch offensives in Georgia
and Crimea.
65. The US-Georgia Charter on Strategic
Partnership, signed in Washington on 9 January 2009, will
give the Russian military pause for thought. The US and Georgia
have "shared values and common interests" and these
are of a "vital" character.
66. This presumably implies that the US
would come to Georgia's aid if attacked by Russia. At present
the Russian military are no match for the US military.
CONCLUSION
67. The present situation in Russia is reminiscent,
in some ways, of the late Gorbachev years. If the economy collapses
it will have a ripple effect throughout the world. British banks
are exposed to Russian debt. London will need skilful diplomacy
to recover some of this debt.
68. There is however a weakness at the heart
of the Putin regime. In the long term, Moscow's perception is
that Obama's emphasis on an ethical foreign policy is not good
for Russia. Britain here can play an important role behind the
scenes. Skilful diplomacy is needed to help Russia emerge from
the mess the Putin Team is in. Britain can act as a bridge between
Russia and the West. This could result in great advantages for
Britain.
69. Diplomacy is aided by the business intelligence
consultancies and the SMEs which are playing a vital role in meshing
the two countries together. Their numbers have expanded greatly
since the economic meltdown in Russia in 1998. They are in regular
contact with Russia and are poised to play an even greater role
in the future.
70. Foreign policy in Russia is elaborated
by the Kremlin's foreign policy team and Putin's people. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs plays a secondary role. It is worth stressing
that foreign policy is made by the Putin Team and not by Sergei
Lavrov, the Foreign Minister. Some Russian commentators see him
merely as an errand boy for the Putin Team.
71. In this regard it would be useful to
establish links to members of the presidential administration
(which includes the Kremlin's foreign policy team) and regard
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ambassador in London as
secondary figures.
72. It is important to stress that the presidential
administration views Britain as the United States' aircraft carrier
in Europe. In order to overcome this perception, London could
stress that Britain is becoming much more independent in its thinking.
Hillary Clinton may speak of "the special relationship"
but it is Obama who will decide foreign policy. The experiences
of his relatives in Kenya during the Mau-Mau era may be reflected
in his attitude to Britain. He may prefer a closer relationship
with Germany and France.
73. The point can be made that Russia and
Britain are natural allies. London can point to the mutually beneficial
economic ties which already exist and argue that mutual political
ties would be a natural development.
74. The presidential administration contains
a strongly anti-western element. It perceives the British media
to be anti-Russian. The b te noir is Boris Berezovsky. Putin regards
him as a personal enemy. Berezovsky has made some inflammatory
statements about regime change in Russia.
75. The Berezovsky problem has to be addressed.
Perhaps he could be encouraged to desist from making provocative
statements which can only harm British-Russian relations.
76. It will be interesting to read the Evening
Standard's coverage of Russian affairs now that Alexander
Lebedev is the owner. He already owns part of Novaya Gazeta,
the only independent newspaper left in Moscow. It is critical
of the Putin regime.
77. The point can be made to the presidential
administration that Russia's PR image in Britain and the West
needs to be improved - to put it mildly. London can advise and
help here.
78. The security situation in Ingushetia
is causing grave concern. Some commentators even envisage it developing
into a civil war. Britain could offer to share intelligence about
Muslim extremists operating throughout the whole of the North
Caucasus. Moscow would appreciate that.
79. During this time of weakness, there
are those around Putin who are trying to gain advantage for themselves.
One tactic would be to tell him that there are enemies everywhere
whose aim is to overthrow him. London can point out to Putin that
it will not permit its territory to be used by dissident groups
to engage in subversive acts against him. This is a very important
point and would send the right signal to Moscow.
80. At this time of tension no move should
be undertaken which could be perceived as provocative by Moscow.
81. Relations between Russia and the EU
will improve rapidly if the Obama administration can agree a deal
on the anti-missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.
This will defuse tensions in the short term, at least.
82. The present Czech government is likely
to remain Euro-Atlanticist as is the President who is a Eurosceptic.
He favours an Anglo-American version of political and economic
conservatism.
83. Energy security will remain a problem
as long as the Putin Team remain in office. They have made quite
clear by their actions that energy will be used as a political
weapon.
84. It is worth mentioning the main pipelines
here and Russia's pipeline politics.
85. Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, wishes
to reduce the flow of gas through Ukraine and Poland to eastern
and western Europe. It proposes building two new pipelines to
ensure this:
86. Nord Stream: a joint venture with German
and Dutch companies will carry gas from northern Russia under
the Baltic Sea to Germany and beyond.
87. South Stream: to bring Central Asian
gas (most gas that flows through Ukraine to the rest of Europe
is now Central Asian gas) under the Black Sea to the Balkans and
beyond.
88. The EU would like to weaken dependency
on Russian gas and has proposed a pipeline, called Nabucco, to
bring Central Asian, Middle East and Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey.
The problem is that at present there is not enough gas to fill
the pipeline. Gazprom signed a contract with Uzbekistan last month
which gives it almost total control over Uzbek gas exports.
89. Germany favours Nord Stream and is cool
about Nabucco. Berlin wishes to increase its dependency on Russian
gas while EU policy is to decrease dependency.
90. If Radek Sikorski, the present Polish
Minister of Defence becomes the next NATO secretary general, the
alliance will be in the hands of an experienced official who knows
and understands the Russians. NATO, in order to remain relevant,
needs to resist German calls for a new security architecture in
Europe which would sideline it.
91. Berlin places its own special relationship
with Moscow ahead of the interests of the NATO alliance.
92. This said, it was good to hear that
Germany turned down a closer partnership with Russia. Apparently
Gazprom offered Germany the right to distribute all its gas in
Europe. Berlin would then have dominated the European gas industry.
In return, Germany had to downgrade its relations with the United
States. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, turned the lucrative
offer down. She preferred the Atlantic alliance to a new Eastern
alliance.
93. If the next German government is formed
by the SPD and Greens, a renewed offer by Gazprom might prove
irresistible.
94. The conclusion is that the weaker the
Putin Team becomes, the better the outlook for improved British
political relations with Moscow. Putin could become more dictatorial
as the economy weakens. Internal political conflicts would, however,
weaken him. He could end up like Gorbachev in 1991. His writ,
he complained, only extended to the door of his office.
95. A more diplomatic and malleable Russian
leader than Putin would be a step forward.
9 February 2009
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