Memorandum from the Embassy of Latvia
in London
The current and future relationship between Russia
and NATO, and between NATO members, including examining areas
of tension and cooperation
1. Latvia supports pragmatic rules based
relations with Russia and calls upon its engagement in the existing
international security framework. Currently, relations between
Russia and NATO are uneasy. On the one hand NATO is perceived
as a threat in Russia, on the other hand there are set of issues
where both sides are interested to cooperate. As a result we see
an anti-Western rhetoric and condemnation of NATO in Russia and
at the same time NATO-Russia projects are ongoing, which are mostly
unknown to the general Russian public. Unfortunately, we see an
increase in anti-NATO rhetoric.
2. Events in Georgia have displayed Russia's
current policies, where Russia has walked away from the principles
of the Founding Act and Rome Declaration on which the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC) is based. Therefore the notion of rules based relations
is important when considering a return to the formal NATO-Russia
dialogue.
3. While considering the current and prospective
security situation in Europe, NATO, as well as the EU need clearly
defined goals vis-a"-vis Russia. Strategies based
upon interests of these two organisations and their member states
would send a strong signal to Russia.
The effectiveness of the NATO-Russia Council,
for instance in increasing cooperation on nuclear and counter-terrorism
initiatives
4. We still feel that the NRC has its merits
as a valuable format, where we can discuss our differences and
cooperate on areas where interests converge. In this context Latvia
fully subscribes to the measured and phased approach, which was
agreed by NATO. We do see mutual interest in working together
in the area of counter-terrorism, which includes co-operation
on Afghanistan. We hope that pragmatic relations between NATO
and Russia are possible, in which case those activities with mutual
interest will be supported.
5. In the light of Russia's proposals of
the new security architecture in Europe, we see there are existing
formats, where co-operation with Russia could be evolved, namely,
the UN, the OSCE, and the NRC. Due to lack of common strategic
interests as well as practical difficulties in implementing defined
goals, we see NRC format as underused.
The implications of recent tensions with Russia
for UK security, including:
— the Russian-Georgian territorial
dispute over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the implications of
this for countries neighbouring Russia with significant ethnic
Russian populations;
6. We believe that events in Georgia can
be linked to the previous policies pursued by Russia. In his address
at the session of the OSCE Ministerial Council (4-5 December 2008),
the Latvian Foreign Minister Mr Ma"ris Riekstins emphasised:
"the way in which resolution of the conflict in Georgia is
pursued will influence our view on the future security in Europe.
What is required is implementation of the existing commitments
rather than new process of setting new norms." Minister also
stressed, that "the military conflict in August (2008) between
two participating (OSCE) States has put in question the commitments
that are at the core of the Helsinki Final Act. [...] These developments
are unacceptable and have rightly been strongly condemned by the
international community."
— the US's proposed ballistic missile
defence system and Russia's planned deployment of missiles in
the Baltic;
7. The agreements between the US and the
Czech Republic and Poland in our opinion are positive steps. It
is a considerable investment for the protection of NATO territory
and against the threats caused by ballistic missiles. We consider
that positioning of the elements of the missile defence system
in Poland and the Czech Republic corresponds to Russia's interests
as well. In the meantime, Russia's announcement to deploy its
missiles in Kaliningrad does not contribute to the international
and regional security and stability. This rhetoric also does not
improve security dialogue between Russia, the US and its European
partners. Despite the fact that Russia recently has announced
the halting of the "Iskander" missile deployment to
Kaliningrad, which should be considered as a positive development,
one can not exclude that at some point Russia could return to
the previous rhetoric.
8. We believe that the NATO Membership Action
Plan (MAP) was the best instrument in our preparation for NATO
membership. Therefore we support Georgia and Ukraine in joining
the MAP process. However, in the context of NATO decisions of
December 2008, we see that further talks about the MAP are not
productive as this issue appears to be over politicized. It should
be remembered that MAP process does not constitute an automatic
accession to the Alliance. In the meantime NATO-Ukraine Commission
and NATO-Georgia Commission, as well as the implementation of
Ukraine's and Georgia's Annual National Programmes provide adequate
opportunities to prepare both countries for NATO membership.
— Russia's suspension of its participation
in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the prospect
of its missiles being retargeted towards European locations.
9. Latvia considers the CFE as an important
instrument of the conventional armament control. The unilateral
suspension of Russian participation in the CFE and the military
conflict in Georgia illustrate fundamental violation of the OSCE
principles.
10. The Russian proposal of new security
architecture in Europe is seeking to "renegotiate" the
current European security arrangements. However, Russian proposals
are based upon the same principles, which form a backbone of the
Helsinki Final Act. Therefore we do not see the merit in replacing
one architecture with another, where both are based on the same
principles.
— The current and future relationship
between Russia, the UK, and EU, and the implications for the UK
Government's foreign and defence policy in response to Russia's
current foreign policy and practice, particularly in light of
the recent Georgian conflict.
11. We agree with the assessment that the
military conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation,
its settlement, involvement of the international community and
the evaluation of relations with Russia caused a major upheaval
in the perception of European security policy.
12. In accordance with its foreign policy
goals, Russia is aiming at a new bilateral approach with European
countries, which is based upon economic considerations, while
influencing political positions of countries when discussing important
European security policy issues. In this regard, a common European
approach towards Russia would be a prerequisite for implementing
European security interests.
10 February 2009
| 
