Russia: a new confrontation? - Defence Committee Contents

Memorandum from Professor Yury Fedorov

SUMMARY

The war on Georgia, the decision to deploy Iskander missiles in response to potential American BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic, the second "gas war" on Ukraine, and at last, intrigues against American air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, resulted in close the base down were most recent manifestations of increasingly aggressive style of Russia's foreign policy. By now areas tensions and collisions in Russia's relationship with NATO and most of NATO member-countries are much broader than areas of actual or possible cooperation.

AFGHANISTAN

  1.  Russia believes that the USA and NATO will not be able to stabilize the military and political situation in Afghanistan. However, until American and NATO forces are in Afghanistan Taliban and al-Qaeda groups do not present substantial threat to the Central Asia regimes.

  2.  Moscow is interested in American and NATO long-term and large-scale involvement in Afghanistan. It will severely limit American and NATO's strategic capabilities in other regions, including areas of Russian "privileged interests".

  3.  Given the current situation in the Khyber Pass Moscow is ready to provide NATO and the USA transit to Afghanistan via its territory demonstrating thus that it holds the key to at least one of baselines of American and NATO forces.

MANAS AIR-BASE

  4.  Pressing American air-base out of Kyrgyzstan Moscow demonstrated that Russia had effective levers of influence upon the Central Asian states.

  5.  Russians signalled that American activity in Central Asia should be coordinated with and approved by Moscow; and that America and NATO should not have air-bases in the region.

  6.  Moscow likes to enforce NATO to establish direct contacts with the CSTO and to recognize it officially with a view to improve the image and prestige the CSTO among the post-Soviet states.

CENTRAL ASIA

  7.  Central Asia is seen in Moscow as a theatre of rivalry between Russia and the West.

  8.  Russian military are concerned with a possibility of stationing American and/or some European states' battle aviation in Central Asia capable of striking targets in the depth of Russian territory.

  9.  Moscow insists that Western transit to Afghanistan via Central Asia is to be under strict Russian control and Western military contingents servicing that transit are to be minimal in numbers and have no heavy armaments.

  10.  Russian gas industry growingly depends on Central Asian gas reserves. In 2010 Russia's ability to meet its gas export targets will critically depend on the import of gas from Central Asia.

IRAN

  11.  Russia's position towards Iran's nuclear program may be characterized as "three no": no to Iran's nuclear weapons; no to "military option"; and no to political resolution of the issue.

  12.  Russians believe that in the latter case Moscow will lose strong lever of bargaining with the West, and that "westernization"' of Iran will create for Central Asia a kind of a "window to the West", providing the attractive prospect of exports of Central Asian energy resources to global markets via the Mediterranean, Turkey or, if necessary, to the southern seas.

COOPERATION IN NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

  13.  Mainly the cooperation between Russia and Western states in those areas includes consultations, joint conferences and seminars; some exchange in information and intelligence, mainly on bilateral basis; development of joint lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations; sometimes joint investigation of cases of terrorism and proliferation of nuclear and dual-purpose materials. Those are important yet not critical activities in development of effective international cooperation in non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

  14.  Russia's practical cooperation with the West in the principal cases of nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea) and counter-terrorism (Afghanistan) is far from truly constructive and effective.

NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL

  15.  This is mostly forum for regular exchanges of information, consultations, joint threat assessments, and high-level dialogue in areas of common interest. Some projects are of practical importance yet they are really far from core security issues in relations between Russia and NATO.

  16.  Main function of the NATO-Russia council is symbolic: it evidences that that both NATO and Russia are interested to demonstrate their ability to work together if they wish to.

  17.  The only exception of serious practical impotence for NATO is Russia's consent to facilitate transit though the Russian territory of non military freight in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

THE WAR ON GEORGIA

  18.  The opinion that the war on Georgia resulted in Russia's military victory and political failure is partly true. No regime change happened in Georgia. Russia did not establish its control over the BTC pipeline. Its international standing was seriously damaged.

  19.  Russian military bases are appearing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This strengthens Russian ability to threaten Georgia with a new offensive against its main economic and political centres.

  20.  The war on Georgia diminished prospects of Ukraine and Georgian attendance to NATO. Thus Moscow was able to achieve, though not in full, some of its principal strategic aims.

  21.  The Western reaction to the war on Georgia was considered in Moscow as a signal that use of force against the Post-Soviet countries would not trigger crisis in relations with the West fraught with substantial losses to Russia.

  22.  Some former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Ukraine) are concerned about growing possibility of Russian use of force. They cannot but think about strengthening their security by development strategic relations with the West. However, there are no chances that they may gain Western security guarantees. This makes new armed conflicts in the Post-Soviet space, above all between Russia and Ukraine, increasingly probable.

RUSSO-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

  23.  In 2007 Ukraine warned that the agreement on stationing Russian navy in Sevastopol would not be extended. The Kremlin signalled that it did not consider a withdrawal of the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol as a practical option for Russia.

  24.  Building new naval base is a very expensive, laborious and lengthy process. Instead of speeding up construction of a new naval base in Novorossiysk the Kremlin thinks about building of a fleet of aircraft carriers, which is extremely expensive.

  25.  It confirms that Moscow has decided not to evacuate its fleet from Sevastopol. To enforce Ukraine to prolong Russian naval presence in Sevastopol beyond 2017 or annex Sevastopol Russia may stir up disturbances in Crimea with a view to get pretext for military intervention.

NEW RUSSIAN MISSILES IN THE BALTICS

  26.  Deployment of Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region may ignite a new missile crisis in Europe. If Russia stations this "first-strike weapon" in Kaliningrad, Europe will be divided into "two zones of different security", serious security risk for the countries that are within their battle range will emerge, and European and transatlantic unity will be challenged. The only response to appearance of Iskanders in Kaliningrad that may offset threat to Europe' security by military means would be reinforcement of American forces in Europe including intermediate range missiles.

  27.  As Moscow clarifies that the Iskanders will be deployed if only the United States goes ahead with their plans for BMD in Europe, some European countries may demand that the United States refuses from this project. If the Obama administration stops the project it will engender serious doubts about reliability of American security guarantees; will be a severe blow for NATO; and will diminish Europe's capacity to resist Russian blackmail. The Russian military will obtain a proof that military pressure on Europe is a powerful instrument of achieving foreign policy goals.

  28.  If the USA, Poland and the Czech Republic go ahead with deployment of the "third site" Russia will deploy the Iskanders in Kaliningrad and Europe will become increasingly divided about what the response to the Russian missiles should be. Some European nations will accuse America, Poland and the Czech Republic of undermining European security. There is no guarantee that NATO will reach a unanimous decision on how to react. As a result, Russia will have new missiles in Kaliningrad while the possibility of the deployment of intermediate-range U.S. missiles will remain relatively low.

  29.  Potential deployment of Russian missiles in Kaliningrad area does not threaten the UK military security directly, as those missiles, even the medium range Iskander-K, can hardly reach targets at the British territory. However, any rise of controversies between NATO members weakens European and transatlantic solidarity and thus is seriously detrimental to the UK security interests.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

  30.  Ukrainian and/or Georgian membership in NATO is seen in Moscow as a fundamental foreign policy failure. Traditionally minded elites in Russia consider Ukraine's and Georgia's joining NATO as a real threat to Russia's military security. Other sections of Russian foreign policy and defense establishment fear responsibility for a looming strategic defeat if Ukraine and/or Georgia become NATO members. If it turns out that an issue which Moscow sees as a vital one for Russia is decided contrary to Russia's demands it will be perceived by Russian establishment as personal failure of a few top figures. This will be used by groups within Russian bureaucracy, who are striving for radical increase of defense budget and suppression of political opposition.

  31.  In this light, it could be expedient for NATO member states to implement a flexible policy towards NATO eastward expansion and use a prospect of NATO further enlargement as a weighty bargaining chip in relations with Russia.

RUSSIA'S SUSPENSION OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

  32.  Russian arguments supporting the "suspension" of the CFE Treaty are either futile, or based on arbitrary interpretation of some clauses of the Treaty, or have little in common with the actual strategic situation in Europe. No exceptional strategic circumstances justifying Russian "suspension" of the CFE Treaty have emerged in a few years after Russia has ratified the adapted CFE Treaty in 2004; and practically all Russian concerns may be obviated by implementation of the adapted Treaty.

  33.  "Suspension" of the CFE Treaty does not threaten military security of the NATO member states. Russian conventional forces are degrading and their numbers are much lower than it was allowed by the Treaty.

  34.  As for Russia, by destroying the only legal instrument preventing hypothetical concentration of NATO's forces nearby its borders, Moscow demonstrated that is not very much worried about balance of land-force armaments between Russia and NATO.

  35.  The "suspension" of the CFE Treaty was most probably an element of a Russian strategy of escalation challenging Europe and the USA with a dilemma: either to spur Moscow's ambitions or to face a risk of an escalating confrontation with Russia.

ZIGZAGS OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE WAR ON GEORGIA

  36.  Since the war on Georgia Moscow's foreign policy was a mix of hostile and conciliatory jesters towards the West. In October 2008 the Kremlin signalled that it looked for normalization its relations with the West. Yet on 5 November 2008 Medvedev announced his "countermeasures" to the American plans for BMD in Europe.

  37.  This jester was partly successful. Some European leaders made it clear that they would prefer making deal with Russia rather than performing a sort of "neo-containment" policy fraught with a new missile crisis. In the mid-November 2008 the EU agreed to resume talks on the new Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation with Russia.

  38.  However, in late November 2008 the Russian Defence Minister announced that "dragging Georgia into" NATO may provoke "much more severe conflict than the August events" and at about the same time Putin has outlined his vision of new security architecture in Europe. His words were deciphered as "four no": "no NATO in the CIS countries; no American bases in the CIS countries; no any support of anti-Russian regimes in the CIS countries; and no ABM deployment nearby Russian borders. During December 2008 Putin portrayed America as the main cause of the economic crisis.

  39.  Since January 2009 Russia toned down its foreign policy rhetoric, demonstrated its readiness for cooperation with the West, including transit to Afghanistan etc.

  40.  Perhaps, by the end of the 2008 the Kremlin has realized that economic crisis in Russia would be deep and protracted, and fraught with mass protests and even political disturbances. Russian leaders might conclude that a combination of economic and social troubles inside the country with confrontation with the West would be too dangerous for the regime. Yet at the same time it can be implementation of a "stick and carrot" tactics. In fact, it was correction of rhetoric rather than practice of Russian foreign policy. Russian pressure upon Kyrgyzstan to expel the American air-base in Manas reinforced by promise of substantial economic aid to this country demonstrated that the anti-Western orientation of Russian foreign policy is its permanent characteristic.

CONCEPTS AND INTERESTS BEHIND RUSSIA' FOREIGN POLICY

  41.  Moscow's foreign policy results from interplay of pressure groups within top circles that have partly common yet partly opposing views and interests related to the country's international behaviour. In the second half of this decade two basic schools of strategic thought became consolidated in Russian elites.

  42.  The first school of strategic thought asserts that Russia has restored its muscle and pretends to be a forceful and in many cases decisive voice on international issues. It considers a restoration of the Empire as Russia's history-making mission. Russia's domination in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe is considered as a precondition that must be satisfied if preferred positions for Russian business.

  43.  It also presumes that nowadays the West's potency deteriorates because of Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran; instability in Pakistan; differences between the USA and Europe and also between so called "Old" and "New" Europe; and since the end of 2007 due to escalating financial and economic crisis. Russia should reach a new "Yalta-type" agreement with the West by using use "stick and carrot" policy before the emerged "window of opportunity" closes.

  44.  Those views are typical of cliques involved into economic relations with the outside world, primarily associated with export oriented and raw materials branches of the economy. They share neo-imperialist feelings yet are not interested in intense military-political opposition with the West. The latter will result in principal redistribution of the national wealth in favour of the military and defence industry at the expense of export branches, and as well in intrusive governmental control over economy.

  45.  The second school of strategic thought realizes that Russia is turning into a petro-state suffering from defects typical of such states, including lack of motivations for technological modernization; that Russian conventional forces are far behind American armed forces and those of leading European states; and that Russia is not able to take advantage of the "revolution in military affairs" which is of crucial importance for fighting efficiency of armed forces.

  46.  In order to reverse the dangerous trends this school of thought insists that export revenues should be re-channelled into defence sector. To justify a transition to mobilized economy it needs "controlled confrontation" with the West yet not real military confrontation because Russia is not able to win a conventional war with the USA and NATO, and that nuclear war will be suicidal for the country.

LONGER-TERM TRAJECTORIES IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST

(a)   Making a "deal" with Russia

  47.  By a "deal" between Russia and the West Moscow hopes to achieve some of its basic goals: prevention of further NATO's eastward expansion, retaining its naval base in Sevastopol beyond 2017, and even America's refusal from BMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic.

  48.  This will be the West's strategic defeat. Moscow will definitely perceive such a deal as a practical proof of the West's military and political weakness. This will encourage Russia to undertake next steps, aimed at transformation of Central Europe into de facto "neutral belt" between Russia and NATO. It is not clear what can be Western "reward" as Moscow will hardly meet Western needs regarding Iran and Afghanistan, which are of special importance for the USA and Europe.

(b)   Sanctions against Russia

  49.  In the current context Western states would like to avoid crisis in relations with Russia. It will add one more difficult problem to the already long list of strategic challenges: climate change, financial crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iranian nuclear problem et cetera. Yet the West may be enforced to apply punitive sanctions upon Russia if Moscow undertakes new large-scale aggressive actions, for instance, annexes the Crimean peninsula.

  50.  Imposing sanctions upon Russia will most probably results in a new Cold War type opposition between Russia and the West. Russian advocates of mobilized economy will interpret sanctions as a proof of its theory of West's irremovable hostility to Russia to justify principal, few times more, rise of defence budget and then transition to mobilized economy.

(c)   A new Cold war

  51.  Under the "Cold war scenario" Russia deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in Kaliningrad and perhaps in Byelorussia; withdraws from the INF Treaty; undertakes aggressive actions against Ukraine, Georgia, and against oil pipelines coming through Georgia; cuts off NATO's transit to Afghanistan; and hampers Western efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Escalating military-political confrontation with the West will result in a new arms race and a number of crises, including a new missile crisis.

  52.  Russia will not be able to win a new Cold War. The burden of military programs needed to counteracting to the West will be greater than in the USSR. In Russia we will see growing political influence of the "party of war"; transition to mobilized economy; fall of the standard of living; a rapid growth of popular dissatisfaction; and essential changes in economic and political systems which will be strongly resisted by groups in the elite and society which are flourishing in the export-orient sectors of economy.

  53.  In the aggregate it will result in a deep political crisis in Russia which in turn may evolve either into a democratic "colour" revolution, or into establishment of fascist military dictatorship, or into disintegration of the country. But before such crisis results in a democratic revolution, if it ever happens, Moscow may cause a few dangerous conflicts. A military-political confrontation with Russia enfeebles Western capacity to deal with other hot international issues. Also, a disintegration of the second world nuclear power and the largest supplier of energy to Europe, which is Russia, will be a serious challenge to Europe.

(d)   Russia's return to normality

  54.  Russia's "return to normality" includes constructive cooperation with the West in resolving Iran's nuclear program, practical support of operation in Afghanistan, and search of solution of Abkhaz and Ossetian issues acceptable to Georgia. This is most welcome and optimal trajectory yet its realization is quite improbable at the moment as for this Moscow should recognize a failure of its current strategy and minimize political influence of the "party of war". This may happen if only Russia is confronted by an economic catastrophe and vitally needs large-scale economic assistance from the West.

CONCLUSION

  55.  There are weighty reasons why Russia's will continue its current policy. The latter is increasingly created by traditional Soviet motivations: morbid suspiciousness; an imperial syndrome; attempts to play the US off against Europe; the desire to preserve Central and Eastern Europe as zones of probable expansion, et cetera. The war in the Caucasus proves that Russian international behaviour for the most part is decided by circles, which wittingly provokes Russia's defiant and aggressive international behaviour with a view to restore a mobilized economy and its privilege status in the political system.

  56.  At the moment and in the foreseeable future Russia will not be able to create direct military threat to the UK in addition to the one caused by Russian strategic nuclear weapons. However, under the worst case scenario Russia may produce substantial military threat to Central and Eastern Europe, damage European and transatlantic solidarity in security areas, hamper NATO and the USA operation in Afghanistan, and minimize European chances to build alternative oil and gas transport corridors from Central Asia via the South Caucasus.

  57.  In this light the UK, other European states and the United States face the dilemma: to take a strong position of the containment of the current ambitions of Moscow, or to recognize its right to its own sphere of influence. Being faced with Russian challenge the West should find the right balance between cooperation, containment and deterrence. The Kremlin should be convinced, by deeds not words, that aggression and blackmail do not yield fruits it wishes to get. Russian "stick and carrot" policy should be counteracted by the Western "stick and carrot" policy.

MAIN TEXT

I.  THE CURRENT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO, AND BETWEEN NATO MEMBERS, INCLUDING EXAMINING AREAS OF TENSION AND COOPERATION

I-1  Introductory notes

  Since the middle of this decade Moscow demonstrated increasingly opinionated, aggressive against neighboring countries, and hostile to the West style of its foreign policy. The war on Georgia, the decision to deploy Iskander missiles in response to potential American BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic, the second "gas war" on Ukraine, and at last, intrigues against American air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, resulted in Kyrgyz decision to close the base were most recent and most impressive manifestations of this trend.

  The war on Georgia was a watershed in Russia's policy. As the former adviser to the president of Russia, Andrei Illarionov, wrote it was:

(a) the first massive use of the military forces by Russia or the former Soviet Union outside its borders since the Soviet Union's intervention against Afghanistan in 1978;

(b) The first intervention against an independent country in Europe since the Soviet Union's intervention against Czechoslovakia in 1968;

(c) The first intervention against an independent country in Europe that led to unilateral changes in internationally recognized borders in Europe since the late 1930s and early 1940s. i

  At the same time, the Kremlin, now and again, resorts to a conciliatory tone towards the West, offers cooperation on energy security and disarmament. Since end of the 2008 Russian diplomats and politicians intensified their efforts to demonstrate Russia's wish to restore relations with the West damaged by Russian attack on Georgia. Putin's speech in Davos portrayed Russia as reliable partner prone to cooperative relationship. The address of Putin's deputy, Sergey Ivanov, to the last Munich Security Conference, although tough in essence, was tuned in a non-confrontational manner.

  Russian behaviour sparks debates about Russia and its policy. The variety of views about Russian behaviour may all be reduced to three different basic ideas:

(a) Aggressiveness and anti-Western stance results from systemic characteristics of Russia today. In particular, Russian elites and society are gravely poisoned by morbid mental syndromes, including jingoist enthusiasm and inability to assess realistically both Russian posture in the world system and trends of global developments. Motivated by illusions while being world second nuclear power and the main supplier of energy to Europe Russia is increasingly dangerous international actor. The West should develop and implement an effective neo-containment strategy towards it.

(b) Russia is not hopeless as yet; it is possible and expedient to reach a modus vivendi with the Kremlin. Its use of force against Georgia was "disproportionately strong" and "unjustified", but the war itself was essentially local incident caused by Georgia's recklessness. Russia is more important partner for the USA and Europe than any other post-Soviet state. The West has no muscle and willpower to influence the Kremlin's policy; and thus it should make a deal with Russia.

(c) Due to degradation of Russian armed forces and transformation of the country into a petro-state Russia is progressively weak international actor and thus can not inflict substantial damage to the Western strategic interests. Therefore the West can pay relatively little attention to Russian threats and focus mainly at assurance energy supplies from Russia.

  The latter point of view does not take into account two circumstances:

(a) Russia's conventional armed forces are declining; therefore Moscow increasingly relies on nuclear weapons. In case of hypothetical conflict this results in reduction of the nuclear threshold.

(b) The war on Georgia confirmed that Russia may initiate an armed conflict in the Post-Soviet space and/or nearby it that may involve the USA and some European states. Appearance of American war ships in the Black Sea carrying humanitarian aid and long-range cruise missiles convinced Russians to stop advance towards Tbilisi in August 2008. Yet it also demonstrated that the Post-Soviet space may turn into a theatre of armed clashes between Russian and Western forces.

I-2  Areas of tensions and cooperation

  By now areas tensions and collisions in Russia's relationship with NATO and most of NATO member-countries are much broader than areas of actual or possible cooperation.

I-2-1  Afghanistan

  Speaking in Tashkent on January 23, 2009 President Medvedev announced that Moscow was ready to cooperate with the US and NATO over Afghanistan, welcomed US plans to review American policy in Afghanistan, voiced his hope that "the new US administration will have greater success than the previous one in resolving the Afghanistan issue".ii He also said Russia would work with NATO on transit routes for the delivery of non-military goods into Afghanistan. This may be seen as a signal that Moscow is rethinking its hostile attitude towards the USA and NATO and is ready open a new page in Russia-US relationship, especially having in mind that Taliban, if it wins in Afghanistan, will seriously threaten Russian interests in Central Asia and in the North Caucasus. At the same time Moscow succeeded in "buying the US out"' of air-base in Manas by promising 2 billion US dollars loan to the Kyrgyz government.

  Most probably Moscow is interested not in American and NATO success in Afghanistan but in their long-term and large-scale involvement there. At the same time it attempts to demonstrate that it holds a key to American and NATO transit to Afghanistan. The logic of Russian behaviour may be following:

(a) The Kremlin understands that committing increasing number of U.S. troops to the operation in Afghanistan that is planned by the Obama administration and maintaining NATO's presence there will severely limit American and NATO's strategic capabilities in other regions, including the Black Sea region, the Caspian, Ukraine and other areas of Russian "privileged interests";

(b) Given the current situation in the Khyber Pass Moscow is ready to provide NATO and the USA non-military transit to Afghanistan via its territory. Probably, Russia may provide military transit too as a part of a broader deal with NATO and the USA with a view to:

(b-1)  prevent a hypothetical withdrawal of American and European troops from Afghanistan;

(b-2)  increase the US and NATO dependence on Russian transit route;

(b-3)  prevent development of a new alternative route; and

(b-4)  gain some American concessions regarding Ukraine's and Georgia's NATO membership, American ABM in Europe etc.

(c) Russian military and foreign policy agencies believe that a military build-up in Afghanistan will not be able to stabilize the military and political situation there; and that the West will not reach its aims in that country. However, until American and NATO forces are in Afghanistan Taliban and al-Qaeda groups have no chance win and thus do not present substantial threat to the Central Asia regimes.

(d) Pressing American air-base out of Kyrgyzstan was a typical manifestation of Russia's "stick and carrot" policy, its stick component this time. Moscow demonstrated to the Obama administration that Russia has effective levers of influence upon the Central Asian states that are playing important role in supply growing American military operation in Afghanistan. Russian signalled that American activity in Central Asia should be coordinated with and approved by Moscow; and that America and NATO may transport their non-military goods (and in case of making a deal with Russia military supplies too) but should not have air-bases in the region. Also, Moscow likes to enforce NATO to establish direct contacts with the CSTO and recognize it officially with a view to improve the image and prestige the CSTO among the post-Soviet states.

  In this light Moscow is and will be doing its best to prevent:

(a) Hypothetical reconfiguration of the Western presence in and around Afghanistan which may include withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan combined with strengthening of Western efforts and presence in the Central Asian states and Pakistan in order to barrier a spread of Islamist terrorism and extremism from Afghanistan, which could be simpler and far cheaper than waging expensive and, as Moscow believes, hopeless military operation in Afghanistan itself;

(b) Establishment of new transit route between Europe and Afghanistan via the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the Caspian and Central Asia.

I-2-2  Central Asia

  Central Asia is and most probably will be seen in Moscow rather as a theatre of rivalry and competition than that of cooperation between Russia and the some Western states, the USA above all, NATO and the EU. Main drivers of Russian approach are:

(a) Russian military are concerned with a possibility of stationing in Central Asia American and/or some European states' battle aviation capable of striking some strategic targets in the depth of Russian territory, including bases of strategic nuclear forces in Siberia. Basically, they insist on pressing American and other NATO nations' forces and facilities out of Central Asia. They insists that Western transit to Afghanistan via Central Asia is to be under strict Russian control and Western military contingents servicing that transit are to be minimal in numbers and have no heavy armaments.

(b) Russian gas industry is extremely interested in Central Asian gas reserves. In 2010 Russia's ability to meet its gas export targets will critically depend on the import of gas from Central Asia, without which its gas export capacity will be only about 180 bcm, that is, 70 bcm less than Russia has exported in 2006. In this light, the use of Central Asian and Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources to compensate for the emerging crisis in its own oil and gas industry is gaining fundamental significance for Russia, which is looking particularly closely at Turkmenistan's gas resources. Russian military and security chiefs consider Central Asia and the Caspian as a theatre of a future war over resources that may turn into a nuclear conflict.

(c) Russian diplomats (at least most of them), politicians and "ideologists" (like Karaganov, Markov, Pavlovsky, Pushkov etc) believe that control over Central Asia and the Caspian is among key factors and preconditions of a restoration of Russia's "greatness".

I-2-3  Iran

  Briefly Russia's position towards Iran nuclear program may be characterized as "three no":

(a) No to Iran's nuclear weapons. Once Iran possesses nuclear weapons one may expect its aggressive expansion aimed at dominating neighbouring regions in the Gulf zone yet also in the Caspian and perhaps in Central Asia. Russia does not tolerate Iranian infiltration into areas which it sees as strategically important, both economically and military. Also, Russian military are concerned with a prospect of a few Russian cities in the southern part of the country to be within the battle range of Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles. At last the likelihood of "military option" that is highly unwelcome by Russians grows in proportion as Iran approaches the point at which it can manufacture nuclear weapons.

(b) No to "military option". Israeli top circles and society see nuclear Iran, rightly or wrongly, as an existential threat, which can be eliminated by destruction of its nuclear assets by a preventive strike. Yet in case of an Israeli attack against Iran the USA will hardly be able to remain aloof. Israeli forces are able to accomplish a "nuclear castration"—destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities and missile pads by a series of precise air attacks. Yet they will not wipe out Iran's capacity to retaliate. If the Iranian nuclear facilities were destroyed, Tehran would immediately respond by "asymmetrical means" against the USA, Europe, and possibly Russia. Thus it is necessary not merely to destroy Iran's nuclear and missile facilities but also to paralyse the country's political and military governance by massive air and missile strikes on all crucial governmental, military and security-related targets and communication lines. Such mission can be performed by American forces only. The most probable outcomes of such a war would be either total chaos in Iran or a division of the country along ethnic lines, with annexation of non-Persian ethnic areas by neighbouring states. The first case would see a hotbed of Shi'ite extremism and terrorism emerges near to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The second might see Azerbaijan uniting with Azeri-populated areas of northern Iran to create a powerful Azerbaijani state in the Caspian region, maintaining close links with Turkey and the United States. For Russia, both of those options, especially the latter, are highly unwanted.

(c) No to political resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Theoretically, Iran may halt its nuclear programme in the context of a general reformulation its relationship with the West, which might include massive Western investment in the Iranian economy, security guarantees, and recognition of Iran as the West's principal partner in the Islamic world. As of the moment of writing such an outcome does not look likely; yet it may happen, if more moderate elements supersede the current extremist Iranian leadership. For the Central Asian and Caspian states, as well as for the West, this prospect would be highly preferable; for Russia it is unacceptable. Russian top circles believe if that's the case Moscow will lose one of its strong lever of bargaining with the West, and that "westernization" of Iran will mean an inevitable and unambiguous turn of the whole of Central Asia towards the West. If Iran is loyal to the West, it will create for Central Asia a kind of a "window to the West", providing the attractive prospect of free exports of Central Asian energy resources to global markets via the Mediterranean, Turkey or, if necessary, to the southern seas.

  Seen in this light, Moscow's vetoes on effective sanctions being introduced against Tehran may be motivated by concerns that such sanctions might in the long term result in a political solution of the problem, and in the short term close off the possibility for Russia to supply Iran with arms and pursue further cooperation in the nuclear field. Also, Moscow might consider that Iran creates a bigger headache for the United States and Israel than for Russia, offering Russia scope for manipulating these concerns and for positioning itself as an intermediary between the United States and Iran—although neither country accepts Russia in such a capacity.

I-2-4  War on Georgia (see below)

I-2-5  NATO enlargement (see below)

I-2-6  US BMD in Central-Eastern Europe (see below)

I-2-7  CFE-Treaty (see below)

I-2-8  Cooperation in non-proliferation and counter-terrorism

  Russia participates in the IAEA, some other international organizations and initiatives under the auspice of the UN aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. It joined the core group of founding states of the Proliferation Security Initiative1[1] Mainly the cooperation between Russia and Western states in those areas includes consultations, joint conferences and seminars; some exchange in information and intelligence, mainly on bilateral basis; development of joint lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations; sometimes joint investigation of cases of terrorism and proliferation of nuclear and dual-purpose materials. Those are important activities yet not critical in development of effective international cooperation in non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Also, Russia's practical cooperation with the West in the most important, principal cases of nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea) and counter-terrorism (Afghanistan) is far from truly constructive and effective. At last, information appears from time to time that Russian scientific institutions and industrial enterprises are involved in illegal supply of technologies and/or materials needed for Iranian and North Korean nuclear and missile programs. One can hardly believe that such supplies are can be implemented without formal or rather informal permission of Russian government.

II.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL, FOR INSTANCE IN INCREASING COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR AND COUNTER-TERRORISM INITIATIVES

  Basically, NATO-Russia Council is forum for regular exchanges of information, consultations, joint threat assessments, and high-level dialogue in areas of common interest. In addition, right up till the start of the war on Georgia NATO member-states and Russia cooperated in few practical projects:

(a) Since September 2006 Russian war ships participated in Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean;

(b) In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council Pilot Project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, Russia hosted facility for training of mid-level officers from Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries. This project was implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime;

(c) Preparation for joint search and rescue operations at sea;

(d) Development of a Political-military guidance towards enhanced interoperability between forces of Russia and NATO nations;

(e) A NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre for discharged Russian military personnel that was established in Moscow in 2002;

(f) Assessment of the possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO allies and Russia. Three command post exercises have been held in 2004, 2005 and in 2006. A Computer Assisted Exercise took place in Germany in January 2008; and

(g) The Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which aims to foster cooperation between the members of the NATO-Russia council on airspace surveillance and air traffic management in order to enhance transparency, predictability and collective capabilities to fight against terrorist air threats. Full operational capability was planned for the end of 2008. The CAI capability is initially being implemented between Norway, Poland, Turkey and Russia.

  Those projects are of some practical importance yet they are really far from core security issues in relations between Russia and NATO. They evidence that that both NOATO and Russia are interested to demonstrate their ability to work together if they wish to. The only exception that is of serious practical impotence for NATO is Russia's consent to facilitate transit though the Russian territory of non military freight from NATO, NATO members and non-NATO ISAF contributors in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TENSIONS WITH RUSSIA FOR UK SECURITY, INCLUDING:

III-1.   The Russian-Georgian territorial dispute over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the implications of this for countries neighbouring Russia with significant ethnic Russian populations.

  III-1-1  The widely spread opinion that the war on Georgia resulted in Russia's military victory and political failure is partly true:

(a) No regime change happened in Georgia. Even if Saakashvili is forced to retire the next Georgian leader will not be a pro-Russian figure as there are no pro-Russian politicians in Georgia today and no personage of that sort will appear in years ahead.

(b) Russia did not established its military control over the BTC oil pipeline;

  Also, Russia's international standing was seriously damaged. Russia fell into isolation regarding recognition of the two Georgian breakaway territories. Instead of discussing whether Russia is a problem or opportunity the international community is debating how dangerous Russia is. Russia's status of the G8 member was questioned. Even the closest Russian allies, Byelorussia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, forbore from recognition of those two quasi-states, at least at the moment if writing. China, often mentioned as Russian strategic partner, dissociate itself from Russian policy in South Caucasus in a pointed manner.

  At the same time:

(a) Russian military bases are appearing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This strengthens Russian ability to threaten Georgia with a new offensive against its main economic and political centres including Tbilisi. Russia is able now to seize Tbilisi and some other main Georgian centres in a result of a "blitzkrieg" before the West is able to undertake more or less effective political (or military) measures to stop Russian assault.

(b) The war on Georgia diminished prospects of Ukraine and Georgian attendance to NATO. Thus Moscow was able to achieve, though not in full, one of its principal strategic aims.

(c) The attack on Georgia was not retributed by the West in proper way. In a less than half a year since Russian aggression some Western institutions and a few leading Western countries are ready to `press the reset button' and to work together with Russia (if, of course, Moscow agrees to cooperate). Basically, the Western reaction to the war on Georgia is considered in Moscow as a signal that use of force against the Post-Soviet countries will not trigger a serious long-term crisis in relations with the West fraught with substantial strategic losses to Russia.

  III-1-2  As a consequence of the war on Georgia former Soviet republics are concerned about growing possibility of Russian use of military force. Kazakhstan's leaders are thinking whether a similar thing may happen to the areas in the north of Kazakhstan that are largely populated by Slavs. Baku immediately recall that its border with Russia runs along lands populated by Lezgins, who have been from time to time contemplating unification with Russia's Lezgins from across the border. Hotbed of tensions and opposition between Russia and Ukraine is emerging in the Black Sea region.

  Those and some other new independent states cannot but think about strengthening their security by development strategic relations with the West. However, there are no prospects that they may gain substantial Western security guarantees. This makes new armed conflicts in the Post-Soviet space, above all between Russia and Ukraine, increasingly probable.

  III-1-3  The Russo-Ukrainian agreements of May 28, 1997 gave Russia the right to keep its warships in Sevastopol for a period of 20 years. These agreements will be automatically extended for another five years unless any party not later than a year before their term is due to expire notifies the other party of the termination of the agreements. In 2007 Ukraine warned that the agreement would not be extended and suggested starting a discussion on the schedule for the withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol. The Kremlin signalled that it did not consider a withdrawal of the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol as a practical option for Russia.

  Common sense demands that Russia starts negotiations about the fleet's withdrawal as soon as possible and immediately starts building new bases for it since this is a very expensive, laborious and lengthy process. If that is not done, then the fleet will be relocated to poorly prepared bases. The later the establishment of Russia's future main naval base near Novorossiysk begins, the more probably it is that the only thing built in time will be just the harbour. And the fleet will for a long time lose its combat readiness since the latter is largely depends on the huge set of coastal facilities including airfields, command posts, communications stations, warehouses, barracks, accommodation for officers, hydrographical infrastructure, and many other things.

  However, instead of speeding up construction of a new naval base in Novorossiysk the Kremlin thinks about building of a fleet of aircraft carriers, which is extremely expensive. It confirms, although indirectly, that Moscow has already decided that it would not evacuate its fleet from Sevastopol. To enforce Ukraine to prolong Russian naval presence in Sevastopol beyond 2017 or annex Sevastopol Russia may stir up discontent and disturbances in the Crimea with a view to provoke harsh measures of the Ukrainian government against pro-Russian groups and to get thus pretext for military intervention. By unleashing the intrusion into Georgia Moscow to Kyiv that Russia has enough resources and political will to enforce Ukraine to refuse from its plans regarding Sevastopol naval base.

  III-1-4  Thus, a prospect of new conflicts between Russia and new independent states, above all between Russia and Ukraine, is emerging. This will challenge Europe and the USA with really difficult dilemma: either to oppose Russia effectively or "swallow" such behaviour. Tough reaction will trigger an acute crisis in Europe's relations with Russia, which European nations definitely would like to avoid. Yet if the West does not react strongly, Moscow will perceive it as incentive to new aggressive actions in the Post-Soviet space. Those actions do not threat security of European states directly yet will damage European plans to obtain new routes of energy supplies from Central Asia and the Caspian bypassing Russia including the Nabucco project.

III-2  The US's proposed ballistic missile defence system and Russia's planned deployment of missiles in the Baltic

  III-2-1  Addressing the Munich Security Conference in February 2009 Russia's First Deputy Prime-minister, Sergey Ivanov, said "The potential US missile defence European site is not just a dozen of anti-ballistic missiles and a radar. It is a part of the US strategic infrastructure aimed at deterring Russia's nuclear missile potential".iii Yet Russian officials were not able to explain in an intelligible way why exactly American missile defence in Europe threatens Russian security.

  The group of Russian and American missile experts with worldwide reputation, including General Vladimir Dvorkin, the former head of Russian military research institute specialized in missile issues, have concluded "Even if the United States expands the system, say, by increasing the number of interceptors, it would not be able to neutralize the retaliatory capability of the Russian missile force... The location of the radar in the Czech Republic would not allow it to see missiles launched from any of the Russian test sites used for launches of sea-based or land-based ballistic missiles. The curvature of the Earth completely prevents this. Thus the radar cannot be used to gather intelligence on Russian missiles... Overall, the European system in the configuration that is proposed by the United States today cannot present a significant direct threat to the Russian strategic force".iv

  III-2-2  Moscow alleges that there is no Iranian missile threat to Europe. Yet the IAEA assessed in September 2008 that Iran had 3 000 operational centrifuges to enrich uranium and additional 3,000 of such machines were assembling.v 3,000 centrifuges of the type Iran has are able to produce during the year highly enriched uranium enough to manufacture one or two nuclear bombs. Thus since the decision to produce enough highly enriched uranium is made Iran needs approximately 6—12 months to fabricate nuclear explosive for its first nuclear weapon. vi

  Iran has developed and recently flight-tested the 1,300 km-range a single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile, Shahab-3, capable of reaching Israel. Of greater importance is that it obtained a space launch capability. The latter means that Iran can manufacture a ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads at distance of two—three thousand kilometres, or more depending on a weight of nuclear warhead.

  III-2-3  Despite experts' conclusions Moscow claims that American ABM in Central Europe will threaten Russian security. In November 2008 the Kremlin staked on further escalation of tensions and announced his decision to:

(a) abstain from the plans to decommission three missile regiments of a missile division deployed in Kozelsk from combat readiness and to disband the division by 2010;[2]

(b) deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system that are planned to install; and

(c) carry out electronic jamming of the new installations of the US missile defence system from Kaliningrad. vii

  The refusal from decommissioning of 46 old Russian ICBMs SS-19 stationed near Kozelsk is rather of symbolic then of military importance. It can neither change significantly military balance in Europe, nor stop decline of the Russian strategic rocket forces and their lagging behind American strategic assets. This move might be undertaken in order to demonstrate Russia's resoluteness and toughen its stance on the eve of possible Russian-American talks on strategic weapons. Some Russian experts believe that it virtually impossible to jam the ABM radar planned to be installed in the Czech Republic by means of electronic warfare.

  III-2-4  Deployment of Iskanders in the Kaliningrad region may ignite a new missile crisis in Europe. Russian mass-media made it known that up to five missile brigades equipped with Iskander missiles are planned to be stationed in the Kaliningrad region. viii There are three modifications of Iskander missile:[3]

(a) Iskander-E, also known as SS-26 Stone, is a ballistic missile of battle range of about 280 kilometres and payload of about 480 kilograms designed mainly for export.[4] Deployment of Iskander-E in Kaliningrad is pointless as they can strike neither future launching pads of interceptors in Poland, nor radar in the Czech Republic.

(b) Iskander-M, a ballistic missile of the battle range up to 500 kilometres or more. ix If deployed in the Kaliningrad region 120 those missiles are able to strike targets all over Poland but can reach almost no target at the territory of the Czech Republic.[5] From military point of view this will be of limited rationality as interceptors launchers in Poland will be "hard targets" while radar in the Czech Republic will be "soft target"; and destruction of radar will make the whole ABM site in Europe incapable.

(c) Iskander-K, cruise missile also known as R-500. On 27 May 27 2007 Russian military have tested it with a range of about 400 kilometres.x However, information appeared that this missile could be of battle range up to 2 000 kilometres, as it is an upgrade modification of former Soviet land-based cruise missile RK-55, also known as CSS-X-4 Slingshot, deployed in the begging of 1980s and destroyed in accordance with the INF Treaty. xi

  Being deployed in the Kaliningrad region 360 cruise missile Iskander-K will threaten all countries of Central Europe, Scandinavia, the Baltic states, Ukraine and some other.[6] Their testing and production, not to mention deployment, will be a definite violation of the INF Treaty. Also, Russia will have either to prove that Iskander-M's battle range can not exceed 500 kilometres, which is really difficult from technical point of view, or withdraw from the INF Treaty as the latter forbids development, production and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles of 500 kilometres and more battle range.

  III-2-5  Russian missiles in Kaliningrad will be a "first-strike weapon". It is senseless to use then in any kind of a response strike against the BMD components after interceptors are launched. Besides, stationing of 100-120 Iskander-Ms, not to mention 350-360 Iskander-Ks, will by far exceed a number of weapons required for destruction of ten interceptor launchers and one radar. It means that by deployment those missiles in the Kaliningrad region Russian military pursue much more ambitious and dangerous objects.

  If Russia stations Iskander-M and Iskander-K missiles in Kaliningrad Europe will be divided into "two zones of different security". This will create serious security risk for the countries that are within battle range of Russian missiles and challenge European and transatlantic unity. The only response to appearance of Iskanders in Kaliningrad that may offset threat to Europe' security by military means would be reinforcement of American forces in Europe including intermediate range missiles. Thus, if Russia deploys its new nuclear missiles nearby its western borders it most probably will trigger a new crisis in Europe similar to the missile crisis of the 1970-80s.

  III-2-6  Soon after Medvedev's November 5 announcement, Moscow clarified that the Iskanders will be deployed only if the United States goes ahead with their plans for an ABM system in Europe. That was a smart move.

  Fearing a new missile crisis, European countries (but not all) may demand that the United States abandon stationing radar in the Czech Republic and 10 interceptor missiles in Poland. If the Obama's administration refuses from this project, it engenders serious doubts about reliability of American security guarantees to Europe, which will diminish Europe's capacity to resist Russian blackmail. That would be a severe blow for NATO, and stoke up the differences between the United States and Europe, as well as between the countries of "New" and "Old" Europe. Russia will have achieved its strategic purpose, and the Russian military will have obtained serious proof that military pressure on Europe is a powerful instrument of achieving foreign policy goals.

  If the USA, Poland and the Czech Republic go ahead with deployment of the third site of the ABM defence Russia will deploy the Iskanders in Kaliningrad and Europe will become increasingly divided about what the response to the Russian missiles should be. Some European nations will accuse America, Poland and the Czech Republic of being irresponsible and undermining European security. There is no guarantee that NATO will reach a unanimous decision on how to react. As a result, Russia will have new missiles in Kaliningrad while the possibility of the deployment of intermediate-range US missiles will remain relatively low.

  Potential deployment of Russian missiles in Kaliningrad area does not threaten the UK military security directly, as those missiles, even the medium range Iskander-K, can hardly reach targets at the British territory. However, any rise of controversies between NATO members weakens European and transatlantic solidarity and thus is detrimental to the UK security interests.

II-3  NATO enlargement

  Ukrainian and/or Georgian membership in NATO is seen in Moscow as a fundamental foreign policy failure. Traditionally minded members of the political and military elite in Russia who still see NATO as a material emanation of "the world evil" and a source of constant military threat to Russia consider Ukraine's and Georgia's joining NATO as a real threat to Russia's military security. They imagine US, German, Ukrainian, and Georgian tank forces and theatre strike aviation deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian borders and threatening Russian strategic defense and economic facilities. Russian military are especially worried that if Ukraine joins NATO Russian strategic posture will be drastically damaged.

  Other sections of Russian foreign policy and defense establishment fear responsibility for a looming strategic defeat if Ukraine and/or Georgia become NATO members. For the past several years Russia's top political circles have had the aspiration of having Russian position and interests—as the current ruling circles see them—taken into account when any important issues of world politics are decided. In fact, that was the main message of Vladimir Putin's well-known Munich speech in February 2007. However if it turns out that an issue which Moscow sees as a vital one for Russia is decided contrary to Russia's numerous statements and demands it will be perceived by Russian establishment as personal failure of a few top figures. It will be used by some groups within Russian bureaucracy, above all by those who are striving for radical increase of defense budget and suppression of political opposition.

  In this light, it could be expedient for NATO member states to implement a flexible policy and use a prospect of NATO further enlargement as a weighty bargaining chip in relations with Russia:

(a) To refrain from designation of concrete dates of Ukraine and Georgian admittance to NATO, yet at the same time in no case provide any grounds to believe that NATO may refuse from further eastward expansion. This may help to avoid a risk of Russia's violent reaction to NATO enlargement and at the same time to keep a prospect of such enlargement as a lever of pressure upon Moscow;

(b) To make it clear that in case if there is a risk of a new Russian aggression against Georgia, or Russia's encroachment on the Crimea peninsula is growing, or in case of any other Russian actions that may strongly detriment Western security interests NATO may attend those countries in a speedy manner.

III-4  Russia's suspension of its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the prospect of its missiles being retargeted towards European locations

  On 12 December 2007 Russia "suspended" participation in the CFE Treaty until NATO member states ratify its modified variant, "the adapted CFE Treaty", and accept conditions "necessary for restoring the viability of the CFE Treaty".[7] This was the gross violation of the Treaty as it has no suspension clause. Moscow justifies "suspending" of the Treaty by "exceptional circumstances that affect the security of the Russian Federation".xii

  III-4-1  Moscow accused NATO of making ratification of the adapted Treaty conditional upon Russia's complying with commitments to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova it assumed in Istanbul in 1999. By the end 2007 ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty was blocked by Russia's refusal to:

(a) Settle the issue of Russian military base in Gudauta, Abkhazia. Georgia wished Russian forces to be withdrawn from there while Moscow insisted that the base was used by Russian "peace-keepers" in Abkhazia. After Russian de-facto occupation of Abkhazia this issue is definitely unsolvable.

(b) Withdraw its troops from the Transdniestrian region of Moldova.

  Moscow insisted that:

(a) The Istanbul obligations are of political character and do not carry legal force;

(b) Russian obligations relating to the CFE Treaty have been fulfilled; and

(c) Russia's commitment to withdraw troops from Moldova do not include any rigid timetable.

  Those arguments are beneath criticism. The Istanbul Summit Declaration signed by Russia has established the exact deadline of withdrawal of the Russian troops from Moldova.[8] The CFE Treaty and its adapted variant, both ratified by Russia, stipulated that foreign troops can only be present on the territory of a state party to the Treaty on condition of explicit consent of the latter.[9] It means that Russia in a legally binding way agreed that it stationed troops on the territory of other CFE Treaty states only given the clearly-stated agreement of the latter. Moldova and Georgia definitely disagreed with the presence of Russian troops. Political character of an obligation does not exempt the state that has assumed it from the need to fulfil it.

  Moscow also justifies retaining its force in Transdniestria by the need to protect stores of Russian ammunitions there and by obstacles to withdrawal of those ammunitions thrown up by the Tiraspol regime. It means that solution to a problem of strategic importance to Russia depends on the position of a small and nasty separatist clique. This hardly suits Russia's great power ambitions.

  III-4-2  The Kremlin announced that Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic failed "to make the necessary changes in the composition of group of states party to the Treaty on the accession of these countries to NATO". This led to the "exceeding of the TLE limits by parties to the CFE Treaty that belong to NATO". In this light Russia demands reduction of the TLE of NATO countries "in order to compensate for the widening of the NATO alliance".

  This demand is based on equating a "group of states parties to the CFE Treaty" with a military alliance. However membership in an alliance was not qualified by the Treaty as a necessary condition of membership in a "group of states parties to the Treaty". The preamble to the Treaty says "that they (the state parties to the Treaty—Yu.F.) have the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance". At last, if Russian interpretation of the relationship between a "group of states" and a military alliance is correct, then Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the three South Caucasian states are to be regarded as members of a military alliance, which they are not.

  III-4-3 The principal question is not whether NATO expansion should automatically result in changes in the groups of states or not, but whether the military balance in Europe is so much threatening to Russia that it needs to withdraw from the CFE Treaty.

  After two rounds of expansion NATO member states, taken together, have an advantage over Russia in conventional armaments. However, due to massive military build-down actual amounts of the TLE of the NATO member states are visibly smaller than NATO's quotas on the TLE established in 1990.

  The TLE for Russia and NATO countries (as of January 1, 2005, since 2005 the data on TLE provided by the states-parties to the Treaty were not published) xiii

	Russia			NATO
	1992 ceilings	2005 holdings	1990 ceilings	2005 total holdings	2005 holdings nearby Russia (a)
Battle tanks	6,350	5,088	20,000	15,313	6,622
ACV	11,280	9,671	30,000	27,433	10,055
Artillery	6,315	6,061	20,000	16,296	7,074
Attack helicopters	855	484	2,000	1,361	530
Combat aircrafts	3,416	2,152	6,810	4,322	1,292

(a)   The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Turkey and the US troops in Europe. The accession of Baltic States to NATO has not significantly changed the balance of forces between Russia and NATO.

  Beside, a comparison of armed forces of all NATO member states and Russia would only make sense if all troops of all NATO member state in Europe are deployed at Russia's borders if a conflict arises. Yet one cannot imagine that all NATO forces could be transported to region of a hypothetical conflict, such as the Caucasus or the South Baltic region. Thus it would only make some sense to compare the actual armed forces of Russia and those of the NATO member states located in relative proximity to Russian territory plus the US troops in Germany and Turkey.

  In regions geographically close to Russia NATO member states hold by 10-20% more of heavy ground-force armaments than Russia; the numbers of attack helicopters are approximately equal while Russia has definite advantage in combat aircrafts. In such conditions, hypothetical offensive operations by NATO against Russia are meaningless.

  III-4-4  Justifying "suspension" of the CFE Treaty Moscow insists that accession of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to NATO has radically changed the military balance in the Baltic region, which "has adverse effects on Russia's ability to implement its political commitments to military containment in the north-western part of the Russian Federation". The Kremlin demands from the three newly independent Baltic States to "return to the negotiating table" and join the CFE Treaty with a view to eliminate a zone in "which there are no restrictions on the deployment of conventional forces, including other countries' forces".

  The three Baltic States did not join the CFE Treaty. Thus there are no legal restrictions on deployment of foreign troops on their territories. Yet practically, the accession of the Baltic States to NATO did not change the balance of forces in the Baltic region whatsoever. Only four battle aircrafts of the NATO countries are stationed there on a permanent basis. The military personnel of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armed forces together is less than 24,000; three of those countries have about 250 armoured combat vehicles and 550 artillery pieces; no one of them possess combat aircrafts or attack helicopters; the three Latvian tanks, obsolete T-55s, are only good for training purposes. xiv This minimal military potential can not have "adverse effect on Russian ability" to implement military containment nearby the Baltic region.

  Demanding of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to join the CFE Treaty Moscow misses that this Treaty does not envisage the expansion of membership. Only the states that signed the Treaty in 1990 or their assignees may be parties to it. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia do not have this opportunity as no one of them is assignee to the former USSR. They cannot "return to the negotiating table" simply because they never were at such table. In its turn, the adapted CFE Treaty has the clause of accepting new members. Thus if it enters into force the three newly independent Baltic States will accede to it as they have officially declared. Therefore if Russia wanted to limit deployment of foreign troops in the Baltic States, it should accelerate the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty but not destroy it.

  III-4-5  Moscow includes into the list of "exceptional circumstances", which mean extraordinary threats to its military security, the deployment of American forces in Bulgaria and Romania. Actually, due to large-scale reorganization of US forces abroad most of 70,000 American military personnel stationed in Europe would be moved to the USA while about 5,000 American armed forces personnel would be stationing in Bulgaria and Romania.[10] In this light Russian "concerns" about American troops in Bulgaria and Romania were manifestations of either paranoid mentality or, what is more probable, cynical capitalizing on insufficient factual knowledge among general public. 5,000 or even 6,000 American soldiers stationed more than two thousand kilometres away from Russian borders and separated from Russia by a vast territory of Ukraine can not present any threat to Russia's security.

  III-4-6  The adapted CFE Treaty retains sub-limits on the TLE in the flank zone for Russia and Ukraine.[11] Russia demanded of abolishing those restrictions. This was hardly possible. The establishment of the flank zone resulted mainly from Turkey's and Norway's striving to limit Soviet, then Russian, capacity to concentrate troops nearby their borders. However, in May 1996 NATO member states agreed to alter the geographical demarcation of the flank zone in Russia. As a result the military capabilities of Russia, including capabilities in the South, have grown significantly.

  The TLE ceilings for Russian active units in the flank zone: xv

	Battle tanks	Armoured combat vehicles	Artillery
The CFE Treaty	700	580	1,280
The adapted CFE Treaty	1,300	2,140	1,680

  As a rule Russia explained its aversion of flank restrictions by a need to accumulate large force in the North Caucasus due to a threat of massive extremist activities there. The North Caucasus is unstable in fact. Yet regular land-force units with a lot of tanks, artillery and other heavy armaments are useless in combating urban guerrillas and are of little use in fighting small and mobile partisan groups in a mountain terrace. But military build up in the North Caucasus that became possible after "suspension" of the CFE Treaty was a part of preparation for attack on Georgia.

  III-4-7  Russian arguments supporting the "suspension" of the CFE Treaty were either futile (like the claim that the three Baltic States are to return to the negotiating table), or based on arbitrary interpretation of some clauses of the Treaty, or have little in common with the actual strategic situation in Europe. No exceptional strategic circumstances justifying Russian "suspension" of the CFE Treaty have emerged in a few years after Russia has ratified the adapted CFE Treaty in 2004; and practically all Russian concerns may be obviated by implementation of the adapted Treaty.

  "Suspension" of the CFE Treaty does not threaten military security of the NATO member states. Russian conventional forces are degrading and their numbers are much lower than it was allowed by the Treaty.

  It seems also that Moscow is not very much worried about balance of land-force armaments nearby Russia's borders. Creating a massive grouping of NATO ground forces having a few thousand tanks nearby Russian borders, say in the Baltic region, is highly unlikely scenario. Nowadays, the key component of military balance is an ability to deploy long-range precise delivery platforms (land and sea based cruise missiles, strike aviation et cetera) able to carry of conventional weapons against accurately chosen targets. In this light the "suspension" was rather a signal that Russia was losing patience. It was thus an element of a Russian strategy of escalation challenging Europe and the USA with a dilemma: either to spur Moscow's ambitions or to face a risk of an escalating confrontation with Russia.

IV.  THE CURRENT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA, THE UK, AND EU, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIA'S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY AND PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT GEORGIAN CONFLICT

IV-1  Zigzags of Russia's foreign policy

  Since the war on Georgia Moscow's foreign policy was a mix of hostile and conciliatory jesters towards the West. In October 2008 the Kremlin withdrew its force from so called "security zones" in Georgia proper and signalled that it looked for normalization its relations with the West. It reduced a bit the tensions in Russia's relationship with the West, engendered by the Russian attack on Georgia. Yet at the same time Moscow continued to seek regime change in Georgia, pressed for imposing a ban on arms supplies to Georgia, refused to cancel recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and sent two strategic bombers to Venezuela with the only possible aim to demonstrate its readiness to military confrontation with the USA.

  In the beginning of November 2008 the Kremlin intensified pressure upon the West. On 5 November 2008 Medvedev announced the "countermeasures" to the American plans for ABM in Europe. That was a clear challenge not only to the just elected American president but also to Europe, a substantial part of which would be within the battle range of new Russian missiles. It seemed that this jester was partly successful. Some European leaders made it clear that they would prefer making deal with Russia rather than performing a sort of "neo-containment" policy fraught with a new missile crisis. At the EU-Russia summit in Nice in the mid-November 2008 the EU agreed to resume talks on the new Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation between Russia and the EU. Medvedev and Sarkozy also agreed that new security architecture in Europe should be negotiated and established. What is more, President Sarkozy of France has said that deployment of American ABM "will add nothing to (European—Yu.F.) security but only complicate the situation".xvi

  Just after the EU-Russia summit Medvedev gave an assuaging speech to the members of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC on 16 November 2008. He explained that he delivered his speech of defiant anti-American tune on 5 November simply because he "absolutely forgot about the political event that was to take place on this day" (sic!). And also he has said that Russia "will take no action (deploy no missiles in Kaliningrad—Yu.F.) unless America takes the first step" in stationing ABM facilities in Europe. xvii

  Medvedev's appeasing gestures have been accompanied by new threatening statements made by high rank Russian officials. In late November 2008 the Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has announced that "dragging Georgia into" NATO may provoke "much more severe conflict than the August events".xviii At about the same time, on 24 November 2008 the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has outlined his vision of new security architecture in Europe having said that this architecture should:

(a) "guarantee that one nation's security is not ensured at the expense of another's security;

(b) prevent any country, military union or coalition from taking any actions that could weaken common security and unity;

(c) prevent development and expansion of military unions from harming other parties in the agreement; and

(d) stipulate basic parameters of control over armaments, including the fundamental principle of reasonable sufficiency and cooperation formats to fight proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, terrorism and organised crime".xix

  Dmitry Trenin, well informed Russian analyst close to the Kremlin, has deciphered these principles as "four no", in fact as four basic conditions of stabilization of the Russia-West relationship: "no NATO in the CIS countries; no American bases in the CIS countries; no any support of "anti-Russian regimes in the CIS countries; and no ABM deployment nearby Russian borders".xx During the whole December 2008 Russian authorities including Putin himself were using harsh words for the USA portraying American policy as the main cause of the economic crisis "that infected the economies of practically all major countries of the world".

  At the end of 2008 Medvedev has visited Venezuela, Cuba and some other Latin American countries; and Russian navy exercised with Venezuelan counterpart. This journey and naval manoeuvres demonstrated weakness rather than strength of Russia, especially lack of serious allies. Yet at the same time it was a clear manifestation of anti-Western orientation of its international policy.

  Since January 2009 Russia toned down its foreign policy rhetoric, demonstrated its readiness for cooperation with the West in energy matters, transit to Afghanistan etc. Russian military hinted that the plans to base Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad region may be "suspended" (yet not cancelled) as the USA was not "pushing ahead" with the ABM system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

  Some believe that this zigzag may be caused by severe economic crisis in Russia resulted from global recession yet mainly from the radical drop of oil prices. By the end of the 2008 the Kremlin has realized that economic crisis in Russia would be deep and protracted, and fraught with mass protests and even political disturbances. Therefore Russian leaders might conclude that a combination of economic and social troubles inside the country with confrontation with the West would be too dangerous for the regime.

  Yet at the same time it can be implementation of a "stick and carrot" tactics. In fact, it was correction of rhetoric rather than practice of Russian foreign policy. Russian pressure upon Kyrgyzstan to expel the American air-base in Manas reinforced by promise of substantial economic aid to this country demonstrated that the anti-Western orientation of Russian foreign policy is its permanent characteristic.

  It seems that the recent Russian proposal about new European security architecture was an attempt to formulate, although in a quite vague way, such deal or a part of it. Within this intellectual framework the war on Georgia was (at least it can be seen so) not only an attempt to change the strategic landscape in the South Caucasus and prevent Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO, yet also a test of Western ability to deter Russian use of force in the post-Soviet space with a view to "cut the first slice of salami" that was Georgia.

IV-2  Concepts and interests behind Russias foreign policy

  Many Russia-watchers, yet not all, believe that Moscow's foreign policy results not so much from maximization of national security or other value as from interplay of pressure groups within political, bureaucratic and business top circles, security apparatuses and military command, competing for control over alluring segments of economy, flows of financial assets, and influence on making governmental decisions including those about foreign policy. Those groups have partly common yet partly opposing views and interests related to the country's international behaviour. General evolution and tactical zigzags of Russia's policy reflects, directly and indirectly, changing balance of influence between those domestic actors and their coalitions at each moment of time.

  In the second half of this decade two basic schools of strategic thought became consolidated in Russian political, bureaucratic, military and academic milieus. Each of them produced specific set of strategic stances and ideas of Russia's relations with the West and is associated with two particular parts of Russian elite.

  IV-2-1  The first one asserts that a time of retreat and decline typical of Yeltsin's era was over; that Russia has "risen from knees" and restored its muscle. As the world second nuclear weapon state and an "energy superpower" it pretends to be a forceful and in many cases decisive voice on international issues above all in the areas close to Russia. This megalomaniac vision is combined with a kind of paranoid syndrome. The West, many in Moscow believe, especially the USA, is afraid of a new powerful Russia and is doing its best to hinder its rebirth because of Western immutable intolerance to a "strong Russia". President Medvedev said in September 2008 "Today Russia competes increasingly confidently in the economic, political and military spheres. And we must frankly acknowledge that many are not pleased with this development. Perhaps some forces in the world would like to see us remain weak, and to see our country develop according to laws dictated from outside".xxi

  This school of thought considers authoritarianism as the only political regime proper to Russia, and a restoration of the Empire as its history-making mission. Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova and the South Caucasus are seen as "strategic belt" dividing Russia and NATO and, in a case of military conflict with the latter as a theatre of armed hostilities beyond Russian territory. Russia's domination in the former Soviet Union and in former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe is considered as a precondition that must be satisfied if preferred positions for Russian business, above all energy supplying companies, in Europe are to be achieved and secured. Control over energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian is vitally important for Russia, they say, as those resources are necessary to compensate coming fall of oil and gas production in Russia. Russia's policy towards new independent states should be based on a "salami-slice strategy".

  It also presumes that nowadays the West's potency deteriorates because of Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran; instability in Pakistan; differences between the USA and Europe and also between so called "Old" and "New" Europe; and since the end of 2007 due to escalating financial and economic crisis. Political correctness, disposition to a soft power rather than use of military force, considering human rights as high value typical of Europe today are seen in Moscow as signals of decadence. Two-three years ago the Kremlin concluded that the international situation was favourable for Russia; and it should seize the propitious opportunity and reformulate its relationship with the West before the emerged "window of opportunity" closes.

  The adherents of this concept insist that Russia should use "stick and carrot" policy with a view to reach a new "Yalta-type" agreement with the West. The latter should stop criticism of Russian domestic developments and support of democratic circles in the country and admit:

(a) Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space;

(b) Use of Russian military force within the former Soviet Union; and

(c) Strong political influence in areas of Europe nearby the former Soviet Union.

  Partly this strategic concept results from political mentality dominating in influential circles of Russian top echelons. Those views are typical of cliques in Russian top echelon deeply involved into economic relations with the outside world, primarily associated with export oriented and raw materials branches of the economy. They share neo-imperialist feelings yet are not interested in intense military-political opposition with the West. The latter will result in principal redistribution of the national wealth in favour of the military and defence industry at the expense of export branches, and as well in intrusive governmental control over economy. Some experts believe that president Medvedev belonged to this part of Russian elites at the very beginning of tenure.

  Combination of megalomania and paranoia creates a mechanism leading Russian foreign policy down a blind alley. The bottom line is that inadequate evaluations of Russia together with Moscow's great-power ambitions lead to the advancement of admittedly unattainable aims. The inevitable failures are explained not as due to Kremlin's own errors, but to the hostile intrigues of the West. This distorts perception of international realities even further and aggravates the suspiciousness towards the outside world. The inability to attain stated strategic goals is perceived as a threat that had to be counteracted, by military means if necessary.

  IV-2-2  Despite official rhetoric that the country has been restored to grandeur, the other school of strategic thought realizes that Russia is turning—or has turned already—into a petro-state suffering from defects typical of such states, including lack of motivations for technological modernization. The advocates of this strategic concept, mainly from security sector, can not but understand that Russian conventional forces are far behind American armed forces and those of leading European states, that Russia is not able to take advantage of the "revolution in military affairs". They are worried about progressive degradation of Russia's military science and industry, and declining ability to develop and introduce new high technologies which are of crucial importance for fighting efficiency of armed forces. In August 2008 the Russian Ministry of defence has published a few principal fragments of "The concept of development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation up to 2030". This document said that the most dangerous threat to Russia's security is a growing gap between threats coming from the West and Russia's ability to offset them because of "increasing technological and military-technical superiority of leading foreign countries over Russia that allows them to develop means of armed struggle of the next generations and equip their armed forces with those means in a mass manner".xxii

  In this light there is a growing feeling among a part of Russian elites, especially those associated with the security sector and high-tech branches, that in order to prevent the final crash of Russian high-technology industries and to repair military science and industry the country should return to a mobilized economy, radically increase defence expenditures, including investments into defence R&D. The draft of a new Russian official security concept developed by the Security council headed by Nikolay Patrushev, the former chef of the Russian secret police and Putin's close associate, announces the main threat to national economic security is the economic model oriented at export of raw materials, which is "especially vulnerable due to its accessibility to foreign capital and corruptibility".xxiii In order to reverse the dangerous trends in Russian economy, they say, export revenues should be re-channelled into defence sector. Besides other things this will restore the privilege status that high military command, masters of the defence industry, and chefs of the security organizations enjoyed in the former Soviet Union and will allow them to control larger amount of the budget money.

  To justify a transition to mobilized economy heads of the Russian security sector together with governmental officials, politicians and academics associated with them, are seeking after "controlled confrontation" with the West yet not after real military confrontation. They understand quite well that Russia is not able to win a conventional war with the USA and NATO, and that nuclear war will be suicidal for the country.

  However, they attempt to provoke Western behaviour that may be construed as violation of Russian legitimate interests and a military threat to the Russian state with in order to convince Russian society that a new militarization of the country is the only way of its survival. For those groups the war on Georgia was not so much a regional affair as an attempt to create a new confrontational situation in Russia's relationship with the West.

  Yet if the West does not respond to Russian aggressiveness in the Post-Soviet apace in defiant behaviour regarding "New Europe" in a proper way, this group interprets this as a confirmation that the West is weak and that Russian tactics of tough pressure, blackmail and "salami' slicing" is effective and should be continued, and that Russian army and defence industry should be strengthened by new large financial investments.

IV-3  Longer-term trajectories

  IV-3-1  One of possible trajectories of Russia's relations with the West engendered by a `deal' between Russia and the West. If so, Russia achieves some of its basic goals—prevention of further NATO's eastward expansion, retaining its naval base in Sevastopol beyond 2017, and even America's refusal from ABM deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. This will be the West's strategic defeat:

(a) the Kremlin capitalizes upon its armed aggression against Georgia, which is hardly acceptable from moral point of view;

(b) Moscow will definitely perceive the West's consent to such a deal as a practical proof of its military weakness and lack of political will to oppose Russia's further expansion. Most probably, Western weakness will encourage Russian top echelons to undertake next steps, aimed at transformation of Central Europe into de facto "neutral belt" between Russia et cetera; and

(c) it is not clear what can be Western "reward" for acceptance of Russian demands. As it was mentioned before Moscow will hardly meet Western needs regarding Iran and Afghanistan, which are of special importance for the USA and Europe.

  If a hypothetical deal with Russia includes the US refusal from the ABM in Europe it will have dramatic consequences for European security. Many in Europe will perceived it as practical evidence that the US is not a reliable ally and being under Russia's pressure may break its word. Doubts of American security guarantees may result in deep structural changes in Europe's security arrangements unpredictable in details at the moment. In fact, the arrangements in Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 had not prevented the first Cold War, or the Munich agreement of September 1938 had not prevented the Second World War.

  IV-3-2  In the current context most of Western states would like to avoid escalating crisis in relations with Russia as it will add one more difficult problem to the already long list of strategic challenges to the community of democratic nations (financial crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iranian nuclear problem). One can not exclude that the West will be enforced to apply punitive sanctions upon Russia if Moscow undertakes new aggressive actions, for instance, annexes the Crimean peninsula. Sanctions may include reduction of economic relations, refusal of political dialog and semi-isolation, expulsion from the G8 and some other international bodies, and introduction of severe restrictions on export of high-technologies especially those that are of dual-use et cetera. Imposing sanctions upon Russia will most probably results in a new Cold War type opposition between Russia and the West. Russian "party of war" will interpret sanctions as a proof of its theory of West's irremovable hostility to Russia to justify principal, few times more, rise of defence budget and then transition to mobilized economy.

  IV-3-3  Under the "Cold war scenario" Russia deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in Kaliningrad and perhaps in Byelorussia; withdraws from the INF Treaty; undertakes aggressive actions against Ukraine, Georgia, and against oil pipelines coming through Georgia; cuts off NATO's transit to Afghanistan; and hampers Western efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Escalating military-political confrontation with the West will result in a new arms race and a number of crises, including a new missile crisis.

  Russia will not be able to win a new Cold War. The Soviet Union has lost the first Cold War and collapsed largely because it was unable to sustain the burden of the arms race. The Russian economy, poisoned by petro-dollars, and based on its own dimensions, significantly gives way to the Soviet variant. The burden of military programs needed to counteracting to the West will be greater than in the USSR. In Russia we will see growing political influence of the "party of war"; transition to mobilized economy; fall of the standard of living; a rapid growth of popular dissatisfaction; and essential changes in economic and political systems which will be strongly resisted by groups in the elite and society which are flourishing in the export-orient sectors of economy.

  In the aggregate it will result in a deep political crisis in Russia which in turn may evolve either into a democratic "colour" revolution, or into establishment of fascist military dictatorship, or into disintegration of the country. But before such crisis results in a democratic revolution, if it ever happens, Moscow may cause of a few dangerous conflicts. A military-political confrontation with Russia enfeebles Western capacity to deal with other hot issues like Iran nuclear ambitions, for instance. Also, a disintegration of the second world nuclear power and the largest supplier of energy to Europe, which is Russia, will be a serious challenge to Europe.

  IV-3-4  At last, one can not exclude Russia's "return to normality", which includes constructive cooperation with the West in resolving Iran's nuclear program, practical support operation in Afghanistan, and search of solution of Abkhaz and Ossetian issues acceptable to Georgia. This is most welcome and optimal trajectory yet its realization is quite improbable at the moment as for this Moscow should recognize a failure of its current strategy and minimize political influence of the "party of war". This may happen if only Russia is confronted by an economic catastrophe and vitally needs large-scale economic assistance from the West.

CONCLUSION

  There are weighty reasons why Russia's will continue its current policy. The latter is increasingly created by traditional Soviet motivations: morbid suspiciousness; an imperial syndrome; attempts to play the US off against Europe; the desire to preserve Central and Eastern Europe as zones of probable expansion, et cetera. The war in the Caucasus proves that Russian international behaviour for the most part is decided by circles, which wittingly provokes Russia's defiant and aggressive international behaviour with a view to restore a mobilized economy and its privilege status in the political system.

  At the moment and in the foreseeable future Russia will not be able to create direct military threat to the UK in addition to the one caused by Russian strategic nuclear weapons. However, under the worst case scenario Russia may produce substantial military threat to Central and Eastern Europe, damage European and transatlantic solidarity in security areas, hamper NATO and the USA operation in Afghanistan, and minimize European chances to build alternative oil and gas transport corridors from Central Asia via the South Caucasus.

  The UK, other European states and the United States face the dilemma: to take a strong position of the containment of the current ambitions of Moscow, or to recognize its right to its own sphere of influence. Being faced with Russian challenge the West should find the right balance between cooperation, containment and deterrence. The Kremlin should be convinced, by deeds not words, that aggression and blackmail do not yield fruits it wishes to get. Russian `stick and carrot' policy should be counteracted by the Western "stick and carrot" policy.

11 February 2009

REFERENCES

i  Andrei Illarionov, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, `Another Look at the August War', Center for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute, 9 December 2008).

ii  http://www.president.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/01/23/1604_type63377type63380_211999.shtml

iii  http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen= &sprache=en&id=232&

iv  Vladimir Dvorkin, George Lewis, Pavel Podvig, Theodore Postol "Missile Defense in Europe: Dangers and Opportunities".—"Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye".— September 28, 2007. English version can be found at: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/09/missile_defense_in_europe_dang.shtml

v  "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran".—Report by the Director General.—IAEA.— GOV/2008/38.—15 September 2008.—??. 1, 2

vi  David Albright "Iran's nuclear program: status and uncertainties".—Testimony before Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives.—March 15, 2007.—http://www.isis-online.org/publications/AlbrightTestimony15March2007.pdf

vii  Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.—November 5, 2008.—http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type82917type127286_208836.shtml

viii  http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20081107/154604752.html

ix  http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20081106/154533253.html

x  Ibidem.

xi  http://www.militaryparitet.com/html/data/ic_news/42/

xii  In this paper Russian allegations and demands are set forth as they were formulated by the official Information on the Decree "On Suspending the Russian Federation's Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements" published in English by the website of the President of Russia on July 14, 2007.—http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs /2007/07/137851.shtml

xiii  Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Article IV, para 1; http://first.sipri.org/dan/cfe_country_list.php?year=2005

xiv  "The Military Balance, 2008".—IISS.—Routledge.—2008.—Pp 117-118, 135-137.

xv  According to note (1) to the Protocol on territorial ceilings for conventional armaments and equipment, limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

xvi  http://www.president.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/11/14/2100_type63377type63380 type82634_209203.shtml

xvii  http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/16/0934_type82914type84779_209276.shtml

xviii  http://www.izvestia.ru/news/news192523

xix  http://premier.gov.ru/eng/points/82/

xx  http://www.svobodanews.ru/Article/2008/11/28/20081128185141033.html

xxi  President Dmitry Medvedev "Speech at the ceremony for officers who have been newly appointed to senior command positions and who have received high (special) ranks".—September 30, 2008.—http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/30/1359_type82912type 82913 _207068.shtml

xxii  "Minoboroni vibralo voennyu ugrozu" (The Ministry of Defence has decided about military threat).—Kommersant".—Augast 4, 2008. -http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx? Docs ID =1007705

xxiii  Vladimir Soloviev, `Otechestvo v gosbezopasnosti' (The Fatherland embraced by the state security), Kommersant, December 25, 2008, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?Fromsearch =1c28742a-1b84-4b1f-8245-0fa6290531ab&docsid =1099153

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1   The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was put forward by US President George W Bush in May 2003. The PSI is aimed at identifying, preventing and suppressing the illicit trade in, and the cross-border movement of WMD-related materials and their delivery vehicles, including the black market for such materials. Back

2   The Kozelsk division had 60 UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 missiles in 1991, when the START Treaty was signed. Removal of missiles began in 2007 and by July 2008 only 46 missiles were still in their silos. Most likely the Rocket Forces would use the Kozelsk silos to deploy about 30 so called "dry" missiles SS-19 that Russia received from Ukraine and which could stay in service until 2020-30.-http://russianforces.org/blog/2008/11/changes_in_the_kozelsk_divisio.shtml Back

3   Iskander is Russian code-word for the system consisting of: the transporter-erector-launcher loaded with two missiles Iskander-E or Iskander-M, or with six cruise missiles Iskander-K; the transporter loader; the mission preparation station to process intelligence data, converting it to target data fed to the missile's navigation system; command and staff vehicle; maintenance vehicle and life support vehicle. Back

4   The Missile Technology Control Regime forbids export missiles of battle range more than 300 kilometres and payload more than 500 kilograms. Back

5   According to the IISS each of those Russian brigade equipped with Iskanders will have 12 launchers per brigade. See: "The Military Balance, 2008".-IISS.-2008.-p 213. Back

6   Russian mass-media reported that each Iskander launcher is fully loaded with six cruise missiles Iskander-K. See: Mikhail Barabanov "Tzena voprosa" (The cost of issue).-"Kommersant".-7 November 2008.-http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID= 1052937&ThemesID=431 Back

7   The CFE Treaty divided Europe into four geographical zones, in each equal limits were established for the treaty limited equipment (TLE) belonging to the states, which at the moment of signing were members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During the 1990s the total number of weapons on the continent was reduced by more than one half. Regular exchanges of detailed information on armed forces and on-site inspections made it impossible to prepare for major surprise offensives unnoticed. This made military situation predictable and thus much more stable then before. Essential modification of the CFE Treaty has become necessary as the demise of the Warsaw Pact made the very principle of equivalency between two groups of states meaningless. The Agreement on adaptation of the CFE Treaty was signed in Istanbul in 1999. Instead of zonal limits it established national and territorial ceilings for each state party. National ceiling limits the TLE belonging to a country, while the territorial ceiling limits the total numbers of land force TLE stationed on this country's territory. Thus land force armaments held by foreign troops in this state are limited by difference between its national and territorial ceilings. This was the principal distinction as against the CFE Treaty, which merely demands that the total numbers of armaments owned by a group of states in a particular zone should not exceed certain ceilings. For the NATO member states bordering with Russia the national and territorial ceilings coincide. Hence, the balance of conventional armaments between Russia and NATO will be retained, which is certainly in the interests of Russia. Strangely enough that by "suspending" participation in the CFE Treaty the Kremlin destroys by its own hands the only legally binding instrument limiting NATO's troops nearby Russian borders. Back

8   The Declaration says "We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willingness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, within their respective abilities, by the agreed deadline". Article 19, Istanbul Summit Declaration. In: The Istanbul Documents 1999, p 53. Back

9   Para 5, Article IV of the CFE Treaty says: "no State Party stations conventional armed forces on the territory of another State Party without the agreement of that State Party". Article II of the Agreement of Adaptation stipulates "Conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party in the categories limited by the Treaty shall only be present on the territory of another State Party in conformity with international law, the explicit consent of the host State Party, or a relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Explicit consent must be provided in advance, and must continue to be in effect". See: Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In: The Istanbul Documents 1999, p 131. Back

10   About ,2500 American servicemen are to be deployed in Bulgaria and about 2,300-in Romania. The troops are deployed on a rotational principle. Back

11   There are sub-limits for tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in the Russian Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts with exclusion of some areas in both of them. In Ukraine, there are sub-limits for land TLE in the Odessa oblast. Back

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Prepared 10 July 2009