Memorandum from Dr Alex Pravda
RUSSIA: CRISES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
1. At first glance, the two international
crises involving Moscow over the last seven months seem to highlight
the confrontational assertiveness that has coloured Russia's stance
towards the West over the last two years.
2. The conflict with Georgia last August
saw Moscow saw violate territorial sovereignty with massive armed
force, showing scant regard for international opinion. The energy
standoff with Ukraine at the beginning of this year seemed to
confirm that Moscow was prepared to use coercive economic leverage,
regardless of the possible damage to its reputation as a reliable
supplier.
3. Russia's forcefulness in both crises
was grist to the mill of those who contend we are in the early
stages of a new Cold War. The term is analytically inaccurate
because it implies that Moscow is pursuing an ideologically based
strategy of confrontation.
4. On closer inspection, both crises showed
Moscow responding with a pragmatic policy mix that reflected tactical
improvisation more often than well-planned strategy. Alongside
the decisions to use coercive means came internal debate and doubts
about the material and reputational costs of pursuing Russian
military and economic security goals in a forceful and defiant
manner.
5. Concerns about the costs of forceful
defiance have grown in recent months as Moscow has come to appreciate
the degree of its entanglement in the global economic crisis.
Initial complacency has given way to anxiety about the real economy
suffering deeper and more prolonged damage than most from the
impact of financial turmoil and plummeting energy prices.
6. The global crisis has brought home to
Moscow the thickness of the financial and economic ties that bind
Russia to the West, and the unfavourable asymmetry of the interpendence
they create. It is not just the business tycoons, hugely indebted
to Western institutions, whose fortunes are enmeshed with those
of the global economy. The international crisis, through its effects
on employment and confidence, is straining the high levels of
popular support for the Putinist regime—now represented
by the Putin/Medvedev tandem—based on its delivery of order
and growing economic prosperity.
7. Even though the likelihood of seriously
disruptive protest remains low, the authorities seem anxious about
the capacity of the political system to cope in economically unstable
times. The economic crisis has intensified differences between
authoritarians and liberalizers—between those in the political
elite who want to respond to current strains by consolidating
the electoral authoritarianism Putin has fashioned, and those
who want to see some political easing, a greater role for civil
society and a more attentive and accountable executive. Advocates
of liberalizing institutional reform remain in the minority though
the leadership might try a mixture of tight administrative controls,
welfare moves and some atmospheric political easing to prevent
economic discontent producing social instability.
8. The debate about choices on the domestic
front overlaps with and parallels longer-run discussions within
the elite about the right balance for Moscow to strike in its
foreign policy between strategies of self-insulation and partial
integration with the West. Getting the balance right has long
posed a dilemma for a leadership anxious to insulate the regime
from it considers security threats and unwanted foreign influence,
without overly blocking the international flows essential to the
economic modernization without which Russia cannot achieve and
sustain the Great Power status it considers to be its entitlement.
9. In the two years preceding the impact
of the global crisis it appeared that the advocates of self-insulation
(the "insulationists") gained the upper hand. As the
economic crisis has begun to bite, so the balance has shifted
in favour of arguments highlighting the benefits of partial integration
(full integration is not on anyone's agenda). State stability
and strength now has greater need of cooperative engagement with
the West, above all on refashioning the international economic
system. That does not mean that Moscow will refrain from responding
forcefully to direct challenges to its positions in the "near
abroad". The Kremlin is, however, likely to take more seriously
the costs of defiant moves, such as the unilateral recognition
of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
10. Similarly, in the midst of economic
turmoil, the disadvantages of the generally negative stance taken
by Moscow on EU and NATO enlargement seem to loom increasingly
large. Moscow is keen to change its image as a nay-sayer. Willingness
to re-engage is now the order of the day, as is evident from Russian
responses on non-proliferation, strategic arms negotiations and
the resumption of normal business with NATO.
11. Signs of a general wish to shift Russian
foreign policy into more positive gear emerged soon after Medvedev's
assumption of the presidency. It was reflected in the proposal
launched in June 2008 for a European Security Treaty, a Helsinki
2. The scheme is typical of Russian initiatives—a visionary
framework with little if any content. The Kremlin expects Western
interlocutors to help provide substance through dialogue by taking
what Medvedev has called a "creative approach".
12. The lack of specifics has produced widespread
scepticism about the proposal in the West. So has Moscow's talk
of the need to overcome bloc institutions and stop the development
of military alliances that would threaten the unity of a common
European security space. These are seen as clear bids to counter
the enlargement of NATO and undermine the vitality of the alliance.
13. Yet to reject any engagement and dialogue
about moving towards a new European Security treaty or agreement
would be counterproductive. It would supply the "insulationists"
with political ammunition and help support their claims that the
West remains intent on containment and Russia's security can best
be ensured by means of vigorous counter-containment of EU and
NATO enlargement in the former Soviet space.
14. Agreeing to high-level exploration of
the proposal—the position adopted by the OSCE—seems
to open up useful opportunities.
— The process of exploring the various
strands or baskets of this project would in itself help create
a more favourable climate for improving the operation of the mechanisms
linking Russia and NATO.
— The prospect of overarching pan-European
security arrangements might make it easier for states like Georgia
to accept the postponement of NATO membership, an approach that
in the short and mid-term would aid regional stability and security.
Movement towards a common European security space would make it
easier to take Ukraine's membership of NATO off the agenda, something
that would be a relief to the majority of Ukrainians.
— Exploration of Moscow's European security
proposal would provide the West with an opportunity to impress
on the Russians the need for the process to be a genuinely multilateral
one. We should counter the strong Russian habit to try and fix
key issues through bilateral deals with major powers, taking advantages
of differences among them and by-passing the smaller East European
states which Moscow typically considers hostile to its interests.
15. Engagement in the process of creating
a pan-European security space might also prove useful in reaching
better understanding on a number of substantive issues which separate
Russia and the West. These include:
— The claim by Russia to be entitled to
"privileged interests" in its immediate neighbourhood
(the "near abroad"). Moscow's declared objective to
create a common space without exclusive military alliances, could
be used to counter Russian claims to spheres of interest. Working
towards the eventual removal of divisive alliance structures would
open up more space for the alignment of states on the basis of
security, economic and political shared interests.
— The Russian proposal, sometimes called
Helsinki 2, is couched in terms hostile to discussion of pan-European
human rights; Moscow specifically seeks to rule out transnational
diffusion of norms. In any dialogue we should resist attempts
to use the principle of state sovereignty to erect national barriers
in the area of human rights.
— Use the dialogue about wider European
security to clarify understanding and strengthen compliance relating
to state sovereignty and the general observance of international
law, principles by which Moscow sets such public store in theory
yet often ignores in practice. This is not only important but
politically appropriate, given Putin and especially Medvedev's
stated commitment to international law, and to the rule of law
in general.
— Discussions on legal norms and regulatory
practices are likely to be the most effective way in which to
make headway on political values and human rights. A Russian leadership
which intones its concern to improve the quality of laws and the
performance of the judicial system is more likely to respond to
criticism on legal and regulatory matters than to general complaints
about Russia's regression from democracy.
11 March 2009
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