3 Aircraft and support
Aircraft
TYPES AND MARKS
22. Table 1 in the MoD's written evidence to us sets
out the helicopters currently in use with the Armed Forces.[39]
Of the types of helicopter in service, several have subset marks.
There are, for example, four different marks of Lynx, three of
Merlin and five of Sea King. Beyond this, as additional equipment
is added through the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process,
the coherence of the fleet is reduced further, which impacts upon
how easily they can be maintained. Mr Nick Whitney of AgustaWestland
told us that
Where you get problems I think is when you modify
smaller batches of aircraft within those fleets. That is when
you get the problems in terms of support. You get a different
mark of aircraft and this is particularly relevant when you are
on operational deployment and you are looking to fit certain pieces
of equipment for operations that you will not fit to the rest
of the fleet. That can give difficulties in terms of support and
maybe training and other areas and lines of development.[40]
23. Several of the organisations which submitted
written evidence to us argued that a fleet with fewer types of
helicopters would be more capable, easier to support and cheaper
to run. The Society of British Aerospace Companies wrote that
"a fleet which consists of a wide variety of aircraft is
likely to incur significant costs in terms of maintenance and
support. A more standardised fleet maximises value for money
and introduces broad cost savings across all the lines of development."[41]
This point was echoed by Mr Nick Whitney of AgustaWestland in
oral evidence, when he said that
There is a fixed cost associated with operating
aircraft. The more aircraft you have, the more you spread that
fixed cost across your fleet. Equally, the points you raise about
having small fleets, the training burden and the additional cost
that that incurs, the problems that that incurs can all be solved
by having reduced numbers. You need the budget to be able to
make that happen.[42]
24. The MoD is planning to reduce the number of different
helicopter types through a programme of retiring some obsolete
models and consolidating others. The introduction of Future Lynx
will reduce the number of Lynx helicopters from four sub-types
to two, and plans for a 'Future Medium Helicopter' (FMH) will,
if proceeded with, consolidate Sea King Mk 4 and Puma into one
type with battlefield and maritime marks. Other helicopter types
such as Chinook and Apache have plenty of life left in them and
can have their OSDs pushed back through a mixture of capability
sustainment (CSP) and life extension (LEP) programmes. Enclosure
1 to Section 2 of the MoD's written memorandum to us illustrates
the current plans for the provision of helicopter capability in
the medium term.[43]
EXTENDING AND SUSTAINING
25. If the life of one type of useful platform can
be extended by replacing and upgrading particular parts at a reasonable
cost, then it is entirely sensible as a general principle. There
are, however, cases when life extension programmes are not the
right choice. During the inquiry into Future Capabilities conducted
by our predecessor Committee, the then Chief of the Air Staff
(now Chief of the Defence Staff) Air Chief Marshal Stirrup said
that
In terms of the overall efficiency of the helicopter
force, the sooner we can reduce the overall numbers of types,
the more output we will get from the force as a total. It is not
just a case of extending old types in service to meet the requirement,
that is not necessarily the most efficient way of doing it.[44]
26. The MoD currently plans to extend the lives of
the Puma and Sea King Mk 4 fleets, in order to bridge the gap
between now and the introduction of FMH between 2017 (for the
maritime version replacing Sea King Mk 4) and the early 2020s
(for the battlefield version replacing Puma). We raised specific
concerns with industry witnesses on 19 May with reference to the
proposed extension to the life of the Puma fleet. Answering the
general question of how the decision to extend a legacy airframe
or not is taken, Mr Nick Whitney from AgustaWestland explained
that
Industry will have a requirement to upgrade an
aircraft and we will upgrade that to within the design specification
that is laid upon us. That may or may not prove possible. If
you require full crashworthiness on an old aircraft that may not
be possible because physically the structure is incapable of being
upgraded to that point.[45]
27. On the specific question of the Puma LEP, Mr
Derek Sharples from Eurocopter told us that the project would
"see the aircraft re-engined; new avionics systems; new digital
autopilot; it will see new engine control systems; new tail rotor
blades; a strengthened tail."[46]
These improvements would undoubtedly make Puma a better helicopter,
but would not affect the aircraft's crashworthiness and aspects
of survivability. At our second session on 2 June, the Minister
said that he "did not like the sound" of using crashworthiness
as a factor, as he "would not dream of flying any helicopter
that we were not absolutely certain was as safe as it possibly
could be".[47] This
sounded to us as if the MoD had begun to share our doubts as to
whether extending the lives of both Sea King Mk 4 and Puma would
really be a sensible course of action to take, taking account
of the age of the Sea King and the survivability of passengers
in the Puma in the event of an uncontrolled landing. The Minister
admitted that proceeding with the LEP would result in "extended
exposure to risk"[48].
28. The Minister acknowledged this possible risk
when he revealed that in fact, he had
asked for a complete re-examination of this matter
which admittedly is at the eleventh hour. It does not mean to
say that we are to go in a different direction; we may go back
to the model that I have just set out which is the formal position
of the department today. We do not have any consents from the
Treasury or anywhere else to go in any other direction and I may
not seek them. It may be that we shall decide to go in another
direction even at the eleventh hour but we shall do it without
holding up matters at all, so we shall take decisions very rapidly.
The alternative, which I want to ensure we fully explore, is the
possibility of dispensing with the need to spend the taxpayers'
money on upgrading aircraft which have reached a certain age.
The Pumas must be 30 years' old."[49]
He went on to expand on this statement, saying that
what was being discussed was "bringing forward the future
medium helicopter procurement which would then certainly need
to be done on a modified off-the-shelf basis".[50]
If it went ahead, it would "not be quite a UOR but possibly
not the rather laborious full-scale classic international tender
which up to now has been the policy and formally remains the procurement
policy for the future medium helicopter".[51]
Finally, he said that he wanted "to make absolutely sure
we have fully explored the alternative before we sign contracts.
In any event we shall be signing contracts in the course of this
year."[52] While
we are grateful to the Minister for raising with us his uncertainties
about the decision to extend the life of Puma, we do not feel
that we were given the full picture on this issue by other witnesses.
We very much regret this.
THE NEXT TEN YEARS
29. In 2004, the National Audit Office produced a
report on Battlefield Helicopters in which it calculated
that there was a 38%. deficit in available helicopter lift, which
would continue until 2017/2018.[53]
Over the course of our inquiry, it became evident that the biggest
long term challenge was in the support helicopter fleet. The deficit
emerges in the form of the Sea King Mk 4 and Puma fleets. Battlefield
lift is predominantly provided by the RAF in the form of Puma,
Merlin, and Chinook. The CHF provides the Sea King Mk 4, which
is capable of both battlefield and seaborne amphibious support.
Over the next ten years, numbers of Mk 3 and 3a Merlin are expected
to remain the same, as long as the Capability Sustainment Programme
is agreed to. If the Chinook fleet suffers no losses, it too will
remain the same, but will be augmented by the addition of the
eight 'reverted' Chinook Mk 3 procured in the early nineties.
30. It is worth noting that, even with the LEP, there
is a serious question mark over whether Puma, even in its upgraded
form, would be of limited utility in combat operations. Given
the age of both Sea King and Puma and the poor survivability of
the Puma, extending their lives at considerable cost is not the
best option, either operationally or in terms of the use of public
money. We do not believe that these LEPs will provide adequate
capability or value for the taxpayer. Only a procurement of new
helicopters can meet the original objective of reducing the number
of types of helicopter in service within the UK Armed Forces.
Support
URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
31. In its written memorandum, the MoD explains that
Whereas the Equipment Programme is designed to
deliver long-term core capabilities that can be employed globally
to meet a range of potential future threats, the intention of
UORs is to adapt and respond quickly to unforeseen requirements
specific to particular operational environments and emerging threats—for
example as a result of the enemy forces' developing techniques,
tactics and procedures.[54]
In our Report on Defence Equipment 2009, we
concluded that "the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR)
process has continued to prove highly effective in enabling vital
equipment to be provided in quick time to our Armed Forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq."[55]
The helicopter fleet has benefited from significant improvements
delivered through the UOR process, for example:
- the fitting of improved Defensive
Aids Suites;
- the upgrading to 'Carson' rotor blades on the
Sea King Mk 4;
- the fitting the Merlin Mk 3 with the British
Experimental Rotorcraft Programme (BERP) Mk 4 blades;
- the addition of Display Night Vision Goggles
to the Sea King Mk 4 and Merlin Mk 3; and
- the upgrading of the engines of 22 Lynx Mk 9
with the Rolls-Royce T800 engine.[56]
32. All of these are welcome. The National Audit
Office notes that "[n]one of the helicopter types were designed
specifically to undertake missions in hot and dusty countries
such as Iraq and Afghanistan",[57]
and furthermore, that "[t]he mountainous nature of Afghanistan
also means that helicopters are forced to fly at higher altitudes
where the air is thinner and greater engine and rotor-blade performance
is required."[58]
The improvements to rotor-blades and engines will doubtless decrease
the frequency of occasions on which it is simply too hot to get
a helicopter off the ground with the required load on board, but
it remains to be seen just how much of a difference it makes over
the hottest part of the year.
33. Over the course of our written and oral evidence-taking,
two primary concerns on the issue of UORs emerged: the first,
their impact upon coherency, and the second, the question of 'theatre-entry
standards'. SELEX Galileo drew attention in its written memorandum
to the procurement of Defensive Aids Suites (DAS) as an example
of a time when a less disruptive strategy could have been adopted.[59]
In her evidence to us, Dr Beatrice Nicholas from SELEX Galileo
explained that she believed the specification for the UOR was
"often interpreted extremely narrowly", which had implications
for future coherency.[60]
We raised the question of the impact of UORs upon coherency and
the creation of so-called 'fleets within fleets' with the Minister,
and he admitted that
UORs always do raise the issue of coherence because
the theory is that you are buying something for just one particular
campaign and operation and may not want to have it as part of
your core defence capability. That is the theory of it, but in
practice you may well say that there are other insurgency-type
operations in similar conditions and that something you have purchased
for one particular UOR ought to be kept in permanent inventory
and you should maintain the support, spares, training and so forth
accordingly.[61]
34. The question over theatre-entry standards arose
in the course of our visit to Middle Wallop and Yeovilton. Both
air and ground crew told us that there were significant differences
between the aircraft available in the UK for training and familiarisation
and those deployed in-theatre. However, when we put this to the
Minister, he went to great length to assure us that
[I]t is an absolute principle when we buy new
equipment under the UOR, apart from the core defence programme,
that we buy sufficient number to ensure people can be trained
on exactly that type of equipment. This goes across the board;
it is not just helicopters. We always specify the numbers and
amounts of equipment we need to procure taking into account the
training programme so we do not have anybody going out to theatre
who has not been trained on the type of equipment, whether it
is weapons, communications equipment, armoured vehicles or what
have you, with which they will then be working in Afghanistan.
In the best run organisation something sometimes may just fall
between the cracks. I trust that has not happened on this occasion.
We will pursue it. That is an absolute principle. Sometimes I
have expressed frustration because we cannot get more of something
out into theatre—I will not say what it is—and I am
told, "No, Minister; we really need this number here for
training." We have that dialogue the whole time. We take
the training requirement very seriously and do not want our men
and women to go out to Afghanistan and run any risk at all because
they are suddenly confronted with something on which they have
not already been properly trained. It is an absolute principle
that before we send anybody out to a war zone they are given the
best possible training on exactly the kit they will use in theatre.[62]
35. We welcome the Minister's assurance that he
is committed to minimising the difference between the equipment
standards on an Apache in the UK and an Apache in Helmand. The
MoD should commit to making training aircraft as close to the
theatre-entry standard as is affordable, and we realise that this
might be achieved by fitting improved systems on training aircraft
in the United Kingdom or by teaching key pilotage techniques on
unmodified aircraft.
INDUSTRY'S ROLE
36. The
MoD's relationship with the helicopter industry is described in
the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS)], published in December
2005.[63] In our Report
on Defence Equipment 2009, we recorded that "[a]
key objective of the DIS was to move to a Through Life Capability
Management (TLCM) approach to acquiring and managing defence equipment
programmes",[64]
but noted that "some
industry representatives have raised concerns that the TLCM approach
has not been fully embedded".[65]
We took evidence on both the current status of DIS and TLCM in
the course of our inquiry.
37. It was clear to us from the evidence that we
took that Industry's position on DIS is best characterized as
anticipatory. It was striking both how easily industry referred
to DIS in the past tense, and how there seemed to be consensus
that a new version was necessary. Mr David Pitchforth told us
that Boeing, which works with the MoD on the highly successful
Chinook TLCM programme,
embraced the Defence Industrial Strategy as a
good thing, which gave clarity to industry; and we have invested
because of it and we would actually like to see that strategy
reinvigoured and picked up and moved forward again so we can continue
to use it as a roadmap to how we should be engaging with the Ministry
of Defence.[66]
He later added that
I think there is another version of the Strategy
which is imminent, I guess, and we would be interested to know
what that says about some of these other points that would need
addressing.[67]
38. This perspective was consistent with the written
evidence submitted by the RAeS which expressed concern that "ambiguity
in the Defence Industrial Strategy and associated Defence Technology
Strategy might lead to a long term erosion of the UK's rotorcraft
defence technological and industrial base."[68]
The recent Ministerial reshuffle within the MoD saw the return
of Lord Drayson as Minister of State for Strategic Defence Acquisition
Reform, with responsibility for Defence Acquisition Reform, Defence
Science and Technology and the Defence Industrial Strategy. Whether
this indicates a revitalisation of the long-awaited DIS 2.0 remains
to be seen, but it seems unlikely that any progress on DIS will
be completed before the Minister's deadline of "the end of
the year" for signing contracts on either the medium-lift
LEPs or a modified-off-the-shelf-FMH substitute. We were concerned
to hear from industry that the Defence Industrial Strategy, so
far as it relates to helicopters, needs to be 'picked up and moved
forward again'. The loss of momentum in relation to the Defence
Industrial Strategy may lead to significant acquisitions in this
sector taking place without sufficient reference to the DIS. This
would be regrettable if it prevented greater rationalisation of
helicopter types for the reasons we set out above. We urge the
MoD to avoid this if at all possible.
39. On the positive side, closer working between
the MoD and industry has proven highly beneficial. Integrated
Operational Support and Through-Life Capability Management have
both paid dividends in terms of available flying hours. Mr Nick
Whitney from AgustaWestland explained to us that "[w]ith
the new contracting methods, there is incentivisation on the industry
to improve the product through-life. Previously that has not
happened […] These long-term support contracts equally allow
that to happen with much greater urgency and much greater effect."[69]
He concluded that "[b]usiness needs predictability; and the
Ministry of Defence obviously needs flexibility and it is a balance.
I think the IOS arrangements allow us to strike the right balance
with improved value for money."[70]
Mr David Pitchforth gave us an example of the benefit that Boeing
had been able to deliver, when he said that "[w]hen we took
that [TLCS] on three years ago we contracted for 12,000 flying
hours of Chinook. The RAF had never achieved 12,000 hours at
the point when we took over the contract. We are now heading
towards 16,000 hours with a target of going even higher than that
in the future."[71]
40. An additional benefit of IOS and TLCM is the
opportunity it provides for contractor staff to work in-theatre
as part of a CONDO (Contractors ON Deployed Operations) scheme.
Mr Paul O'Hara from Rolls-Royce explained to us that "[i]f
you have deployed service engineers forwards with the units that
are actually utilising the equipment you can actually stop something
that would be coming back and therefore could be quite a costly
rejection."[72]
Dr Beatrice Nicholas from SELEX Galileo described CONDO operations
as "very motivating for our staff".[73]
Mr Declan O'Shea told us that Vector Aerospace had
people in Afghanistan as we speak. In December
we were requested to assist through the project team and Boeing
with people in Afghanistan and in early March we deployed eight
people to there. We did the proper due diligence, the duty of
care and we asked for volunteers and got many people who volunteered
and we rotate those every four months for as long as we are required
there. Certainly it is a motivational issue for our staff; they
feel that they are part of the system that is being deployed.
They see the aircraft in action as well as in the hangars and
we are delighted to be involved in it.[74]
41. At our second session, Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt
confirmed that the Vector team was "making a tangible difference".[75]
On support, closer working between the military and industry
through IOS and TLCM programmes is clearly the way forward. We
were impressed by the reports we had from companies of CONDO operations,
particularly with regard to their consequences for process improvement
and cost effectiveness through early interventions. We encourage
the MoD to capitalise upon lessons learned from the success of
the Chinook Through Life Capability Service programme.
SPARE PARTS
42. One area where support has struggled, however,
has been in the provision of spare parts. The NAO recorded in
its report on Support to High Intensity Operations that
shortages of spare parts were particularly affecting Merlin and
Apache, as "[t]he initial procurement of spares for both
helicopters is still being delivered from industry and as a consequence
there are some key components in short supply."[76]
This led to the MoD having to cannibalise helicopters based in
the UK—a decision very much of last resort—in an effort
to keep those helicopters deployed on operations in the air. Mr
Derek Sharples from Eurocopter told us that "[i]t is quite
common for 80% of all spares to be on stock for more than three
years and never called. So you have a very small number of high
rotating parts, and a very large percentage of slow movers."[77]
Mr Nick Whitney from AgustaWestland explained why these shortages
had arisen, when he told us that
I think the simple answer why is that there
are insufficient spares that have been procured in first instance.
We are operating aircraft in theatres that are more challenging
than the assumptions that were taken. If you certainly take the
case of Apache, it is fielded in theatre many years ahead of that
which was planned. Inevitably you work on the basis that you are
going to have an increasing training and flying burden, and you
plan your spares procurement around that accordingly. In the instance
of Apache you ramp that up, as a result of the conflicts that
we are currently in, significantly above that which was planned.[78]
43. The NAO wrote in its report that the MoD judged
that "the benefits of deploying Apache early outweighed the
risk posed by the lack of spare parts."[79]
The urgent action being taken within the MoD to improve the
acquisition and delivery of spares to all helicopters in theatre
needs to be given top priority.
39 Ev 60, table 1 Back
40
Q 6 Back
41
Ev 46, para 3.1 Back
42
Q 8 Back
43
Ev 70 Back
44
Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2004-05, Future
Capabilities, HC 45-II, Q 223 Back
45
Q 42 Back
46
Q 46 Back
47
Q 160 Back
48
Q 161 Back
49
Q 157 Back
50
Q 159 Back
51
ibid. Back
52
ibid. Back
53
National Audit Office, Battlefield Helicopters, HC 486,
Session 2003-04, figure 13 Back
54
Ev 75, para 3.27 Back
55
Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 2008-09, Defence
Equipment 2009, HC 107, para 29 Back
56
Ev 75, para 3.30 Back
57
National Audit Office, Support to High Intensity Operations,
HC 508, Session 2008-09, para 1.18 Back
58
ibid. Back
59
Ev 40, paras 13-17 Back
60
Q 82 Back
61
Q 180 Back
62
Q 186 Back
63
Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy, CM 6697,
December 2005, pp. 90-94 Back
64
HC (2008-09) 107, para 196 Back
65
ibid., para 197 Back
66
Q 57 Back
67
Q 59 Back
68
Ev 50, para 13 Back
69
Q 24 Back
70
Q 61 Back
71
ibid. Back
72
Q 77 Back
73
ibid. Back
74
Q 92 Back
75
Q 94 Back
76
National Audit Office, Support to High Intensity Operations,
HC 508, Session 2008-09, para 1.17 Back
77
Q 14 Back
78
Q 19 Back
79
National Audit Office, Support to High Intensity Operations,
HC 508, Session 2008-09, para 1.17 Back
|
