Memorandum from the Royal Aeronautical
Society
SUMMARY
— The helicopter is one of the most versatile
and ubiquitous of military platforms and plays a particularly
vital role in counter-insurgency warfare where UK armed forces
are deployed in ungoverned space and in difficult terrain.
— Helicopters are vital force-multipliers.
Theatre forces without the tempo, mobility and reach provided
by helicopters are likely to have to be larger to achieve the
same aims and would operate at a higher level of risk.
— There is a risk of procuring a number
of different types of helicopters to meet a wide range of different
tasks. The most affordable approach would be to optimize helicopter
types across a number of roles thereby minimizing the number of
fleets involved, paying particular attention to commonality of
mission systems and defensive aids suites.
— Uncertainty over the future direction
of MoD procurement is creating difficulties for UK industry in
meeting the needs of UK armed forces. There is too great a reliance
on UORs and there is a clear need for MoD to prioritise its requirements
and be prepared to take some risk against the Defence Planning
Assumptions.
— Overall, the partnering agreements between
the Ministry and industry have been a success. The approach has
resulted in more cost effective maintenance for the MoD centring
on the integrated operational support (IOS) concept. But there
seems to be growing ambiguity since the 2005 publication
of the Defence Industrial Strategy over the MoD's interpretation
of partnering
— There is a specific issue in relation
to self-protection of helicopter forces; the approach remains
piecemeal and lacks a coherent over-arching strategy that recognises
the importance of Electronic Warfare to modern theatres such as
Afghanistan and the requirement to preserve on-shore the intellectual
property and operational sovereignty in an area vital to self-protection.
INTRODUCTION
1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS)
is the Learned Society for the Aerospace and Aviation community.
Based in London, it has a worldwide membership of over 19,000,
with over 13,000 in the UK. Its Fellows and Members represent
all levels of the aeronautical community both active and retired
with around a half of these as professional engineers. In addition,
the Society has over 120 organisations that are members of
its Corporate Partners scheme. It has Airpower and Rotary Specialist
Groups, with members drawn from industry, academia and the Armed
Services.
THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE
HELICOPTER
2. The helicopter, in all of its variants,
has proven to be one of the most versatile and ubiquitous of military
platforms. From its early roles in medical evacuation and tactical
transport, the helicopter has evolved into a formidable offensive
aircraft, as well has emerging as a powerful element in the provision
of tactical heavy lift. The helicopter also plays an important
role in para-military operations such as maritime search and rescue.
The history of recent engagements by UK military forces suggests
that there are never quite enough aircraft to fulfill all of the
varied demands placed on the helicopter force, whether operated
by Army, RAF or Royal Naval personnel. In the UK, this is supported
by a world-class industrial capability centred on AgustaWestland
and a history of substantial public and private sector investment
in rotary-wing technology.
THE ROLE
PLAYED BY
HELICOPTERS ON
CURRENT OPERATIONS
IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN
3. There are four distinct but overlapping
helicopter roles in the type of counter-insurgency battlespace
represented by Iraq and Afghanistan or, in the future, any other
theatre represented by ungoverned space. In ascending order of
operational capability requirements, these are as follows.
(a) The sheer difficulty of surface transportation
of personnel and material represented by challenging terrain,
poor infrastructure and adverse climate makes heavy demands on
airlift. Where runways are not available, helicopter lift is the
only option as it is for the re-supply of small, remote enclaves.
(b) In terms of force protection, helicopter
movement of personnel in contested battlespace provides one of
the few ways by which to guarantee safety in the light of insurgents'
use of roadside improvised explosive devices. The same situation
arose in Northern Ireland in the 1970s because of the IRA's tactical
dominance of the ground where the Army needed to operate.
(c) Attack helicopters are called-on to provide
Close Air Support to troops in contact with the enemy.
(d) Helicopters are required to penetrate tactically
hostile ground, often during the conduct of a firefight, to recover
wounded personnel or deliver reinforcements. This latter task
is time critical and thus has to be conducted in all weathers,
potentially at night, regardless of the related environmental
conditions where zero visibility due to brown-out is often encountered.
4. Each of these roles also simultaneously
contributes to the ISTAR task and, on occasions, only helicopter
reconnaissance can resolve the ambiguity inherent in complex battlespace.
Taken together, helicopters are vital force-multipliers. Theatre
forces without the tempo, mobility and reach provided by helicopters
are likely to have to be larger to achieve the same aims and would
operate at a higher level of risk. This omits mention of important
maritime roles in antisubmarine warfare, anti-surface warfare,
maritime ISTAR and search and rescue at sea. That said, there
are dangers in assuming that a helicopter is the default option
for all theatre tasks. In terms of basic airlift, it is also important
to recognize that, in situations where even short runways or tactical
landing strips are available, light fixed wing turbo-prop aircraft
have a place in the force mix. For example, the C-27J Spartan
now selected for the US Army and the USAF as the Joint Cargo Aircraft
operating on a triangular tactical route of typical theatre distances
of a total of 600 miles costs only 12% of that of a Chinook
performing the same task with the same payload. This approach
also releases valuable helicopter lift for more specialist tasks.
5. The nature and variety of the land warfare
roles defines the characteristics of the helicopters concerned
in terms of lift carrying capacity, maneuverability, the ability
to withstand battle damage, electronic self-protection, firepower,
sensor performance and night vision capability. In seeking to
meet the full spectrum of roles, there would, therefore, be a
danger of creating an acquisition policy based on a number of
small fleets each optimized for its specialist role. In expeditionary
operations, this approach would place a heavy burden on logistic
support, training and UOR development. However, it is also true
that one helicopter can only be in one place at any one time so
a reduction in total numbers of helicopters deployed represents
a dilemma for a field commander. The alternative more affordable
approach would be to optimize helicopter types across a number
of roles thereby minimizing the number of fleets involved, paying
particular attention to commonality of mission systems and defensive
aids suites.
CURRENT AND
FUTURE SIZE
AND STRUCTURE
OF THE
UK HELICOPTER FLEET
6. The UK helicopter fleet has grown in
a piecemeal way from legacy platforms. There are now some 10 types
in service, mainly configured in small fleets that have been extensively
modified. This approach is costly in terms of maintenance, obsolescence
management, training and capability upgrade.
7. In seeking to address this problem, the
UK's helicopter strategy was jeopardised with the removal of £1.3 billion
from the associated programmes in the Medium Term Workstands associated
with the 2005 Equipment Programme. Continued uncertainty
over the strategy, particularly over the Future Medium Lift helicopter,
places doubt on the UK's ability to optimise its helicopter capability
across fewer, more modern types. The future programme already
envisages Future Lynx, re-lifing of the legacy Sea King and Puma
fleets, the UK's Search and Rescue helicopter replacement, and
the Future Medium Lift competition. It is not clear that this
approach is affordable.
8. In line with the Defence Industrial Strategy,
industry needs clarity of intent on the relative priority and
costs likely to be afforded to each element of the programme.
In addition a stronger focus for a coherent tri-service helicopter
strategy energised by a single senior (four-star) point of contact
within the UK MoD (as is the case for fixed-wing fast-jet aircraft)
is necessary. As it stands, helicopter operational capability
is heavily reliant on UORs. Taking AgustaWestland as an example,
the company has embodied 63 UORs in the UK helicopter fleet
over the last five years. The equivalent figures for the first
Gulf War and the Falklands War were three and one respectively.
Overall, there is a clear need for MoD to prioritise its requirements
and be prepared to take some risk against the Defence Planning
Assumptions.
CURRENT PROCUREMENT
AND MAINTENANCE
PROJECTS
9. The Defence Industrial Strategy and the
Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) in 2006 with AgustaWestland
now provides an example of the way in which joint MoD-industry
planning and maintenance activity is optimising availability of
the UK's helicopter fleets This has resulted in more cost effective
maintenance for the MoD centring on the integrated operational
support (IOS) concept.. Under this regime, AgustaWestland is incentivised
to achieve high levels of aircraft availability and fixed maintenance
costs, with more of the risk being taken on by industry than in
the past. It also means that industry has to be willing to absorb
the risk inherent if past MoD practice has embraced economies
in aircraft maintenance or husbandry,
10. Partnering also extends to the acquisition
of new platforms. In the case of the Future Lynx helicopter, AgustaWestland
adjusted the required funding profile to match the MoD resources
available thus taking-on additional financial risk. A similar
partnering approach is being applied to incremental capability
upgrade to existing helicopters where these offer significant
performance advantages at low risk. Recent examples are the integration
of the Modernised Target Acquisition and Designation System (MTADS)
to the Apache and Carson rotor blades to the Sea King. In this
latter case, the flexibility of the arrangement allowed the MoD
to specify a rotor blade manufactured by a competitor to be fitted
under the IOS process. In spite of these successes, there seems
to be growing ambiguity since the 2005 publication of the
Defence Industrial Strategy over the MoD's interpretation of partnering.
THE SUPPORT
STRUCTURE UNDERPINNING
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS
11. In terms of self-protection, situational
awareness and lethality, there is much commonality between fixed-wing
fast-jet aircraft and helicopters in the way these elements of
capability are generated. As an example, SELEX Galileo has collaborated
with the MoD to develop the integrated suites of defensive aids
equipments that provide a superior level of self-protection for
platforms operating in the most hostile environments. Drawing
on their long history in fixed-wing combat aircraft systems, they
have applied the development of this technology to helicopters,
particularly in the HIDAS self-protection suite for the UK's the
Apache AH Mk1 Attack Helicopter.
12. The efficacy of this system has been
operationally proven in Afghanistan and enjoys a high level of
crew confidence. As a result, the company funded a series of studies
into the cost benefits of a holistic approach to the provision
and support of Defensive Aids across the UK helicopter fleet leading
to an initiative known as DAS Coherency. This offers the advantages
of a cost effective route to enhanced operational capability by
adopting a "fitted for—not with" philosophy, generating
larger production runs and hence economies of scale, savings in
Through Life Cost, and better exploitation of investment. This
concept was applied to the Future Lynx programme resulting in
the same DAS architecture as UK Apache, and common equipment fit
with other UK helicopters. This, in turn, yields a common requirement
for mission support, logistics and training. However, the approach
remains piecemeal and lacks a coherent over-arching strategy that
recognises the importance of Electronic Warfare to modern theatres
such as Afghanistan and the requirement to preserve on-shore the
intellectual property and operational sovereignty in an area vital
to self-protection.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
13. The UK military helicopter fleet makes
a vital contribution to a wide range of military operations, especially
in counter insurgency contexts. There is evidence that this fleet
is overstretched and resources allocated to helicopter maintaining
this capability now and in the future are shrinking. The Society
is also concerned at the apparent absence of a "helicopter"
champion in the MoD able to impose a higher level of coherence
on fleet procurement and management. Finally, the Society is concerned
that ambiguity in the Defence Industrial Strategy and associated
Defence Technology Strategy might lead to a long term erosion
of the UK's rotorcraft defence technological and industrial base.
2 April 2009
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