Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
MR NICK
WHITNEY, MR
DAVID PITCHFORTH,
MR DEREK
SHARPLES AND
MR ALEX
SHARP
19 MAY 2009
Q20 Mr Hancock: Is there insufficient
resources going in then from the MoD to ensure that spare parts
are available for this number of aircraft to be regularly in combat?
Mr Whitney: I think it is difficult
to state precisely whether there is insufficient. There are challenges
in terms of—
Q21 Mr Hancock: Where is the problem
then? We put these operational aircraft in doing more than they
were originally meant to do and far sooner, but we did not supply
enough resources to make sure that they were always able to fly—very
fast turnaround over maintenance issues. Who is responsible?
Mr Whitney: It is not just spares;
you have to look at all of the lines of development. Your training
infrastructure has to be capable of producing pilots; your training
infrastructure has to be capable of producing the technicians
and maintainers. It is not just about spares supply.
Q22 Mr Hancock: It is no good having
well-trained pilots and crews, if you have not got Merlin gearboxes,
is it?
Mr Whitney: No absolutely. It
is no good having aircraft either if you have not got the pilots:
the whole lot has to come together to give the effect.
Q23 Mr Hancock: How do we get over
something like the ongoing failures of Merlin gearboxes?
Mr Whitney: In cases of ongoing
failures—and I do not recognise "ongoing failures of
Merlin gearboxes", but we have got some specific instances—
Mr Hancock: When you say you "do
not recognise" it, would you say there is not a disproportionate
number of gearboxes on the Merlins that fail?
Q24 Chairman: Let us allow Mr Whitney
to answer that question.
Mr Whitney: I think what I was
going to go back to was the method of contracting now in a long-term
support arrangement—we call then the IOS; the Integrated
Operational Support arrangements—incentivises industry to
put these issues right, to buy the correct number of spares. Derek
was absolutely right: the challenge is to understand your spares
requirements and get the spares on the shelf; clearly not to carry
too much inventory—there is a cost and it is driven as a
result of that—but to carry enough; to have those spares
at the right level of assembly. With the new contracting methods,
there is incentivisation on the industry to improve the product
through-life. Previously that has not happened, and I think that
is where there should be confidence that things are improving
and getting better. You will always have instances on helicopters
where a certain failure that has not been predicted will cause
an issue, and we have to work our way round it. These long-term
support contracts equally allow that to happen with much greater
urgency and much greater effect.
Mr Hancock: Why is there then a substantially
higher failure of the Merlin gearboxes?
Q25 Chairman: Would you recognise
that there was a substantially higher failure of Merlin gearboxes?
Mr Whitney: In comparison to what?
Q26 Mr Hancock: Other aircraft?
Mr Whitney: I would have to go
and examine the figures for that, and I am not in a position to
quote.
Q27 Mr Hancock: We suggest to you
there is, but you would not think that? That does not strike you
as something you are familiar with?
Mr Whitney: I am familiar with
the fact that the gearbox on the Merlin has had some issues in
the past in terms of lifing of components. When you develop an
aircraft and you develop new components you start off with the
life of a component and you test it and you increase that through-life.
That has not taken place in the manner that perhaps we predicted,
and that may be a problem to which you refer. Components are being
changed—not through failure but through the need to change
components on life. In maintaining airworthiness on a helicopter
you sometimes give components lives and you change them before
those lives expire—that is how you maintain safety. That
is something I could recognise, but I would need to come back
to you with the exact details of that if you require.[1]
Q28 Chairman: If you could do that would
be helpful. Mr Sharples wants to broaden it.
Mr Sharples: Chairman, a general
comment if I may to try to throw some light on the question. Cannibalisation
is more often a problem with new helicopters entering into service
than it is with those that have been in service for a number of
years. The reason for that is because new aircraft that enter
into service lack fleet experience; they lack flying hours; they
often are subject to unscheduled maintenance, unpredicted maintenance,
which was not considered during the design phase. They often have
heavy schedule maintenance programmes which are lightened as the
years go by through experience; and they can also be subject to
lack of technical expertise—just insufficient time in service
for the technical expertise to be built. We often find that cannibalisation
is more prevalent on new fleets in service than it is on old ones.
I am happy to say that on the Puma fleet in the RAF, cannibalisation
is not a major issue for us, because after so many years in service
and more than 70 million flying hours, the Puma is a very reliable
helicopter and now has had a fully mature service experience.
Mr Hancock: Can I just ask two quick
final questions. One is: I would like to know what any of you
would feel can be done to improve the system, speed up the system
so that the downtime on aircraft is cut; and my final question
goes back to the Apache issue. The real difference here, the crux
of the matter, is about this training on one type and then flying
another. It is the difference between the theatre entry standard
of Apache helicopters and those that are in the depth fleet; and
there is a substantial difference, is there not? That must create
a problem, either where they are in operational flying or in the
training that pilots get to fly those aircraft. If there is a
substantial difference between the two, there must be an issue
there that ought to be addressed, surely?
Q29 Chairman: Would you like to deal
with that second question first and then come back at the end
to what can be done to improve things?
Mr Whitney: I will take the Apache
aircraft question. I do not think the difference is substantial.
Yes, there are differences in terms of some of the modifications
associated around defensive aids kit and fuel tanks etc., but
I do not think this is a huge burden in terms of that to which
you allude. Perhaps industry is not the best judge of that; I
think the military would be a much better point at which to make
that question.
Mr Sharp: Certainly I do not have
the experience that you all do with the British military and how
many types. I was just listening to the number of types involved
and I think if you are looking for ways to increase efficiency
we come back to the same point that was made before, which is:
in a multi-role helicopter, if you have something that can do
more than one thing, and you have many more of them, then the
supply chain that will support those is going to support across
a broader array. If you have one that can be used for utility,
but can also be used for Medevac, but can also be used for lifting
a 105 mm Howitzer and ammo then there are more of that same type,
then you are driving towards having a logistics footprint that
supports that one multi-role asset versus many separate types
that may, through long lines of logistics, be difficult to support.
I used the MRCA example previously; the US Navy followed your
example and replaced some time ago all the F-4s, A-7s and A-6s
with an F-18. Now on our carrier deck an F-18 is a fighter; it
is an attack jet; it is an electronic warfare airplane; it is
now used as a tanker and you have one basic airplane. Yes, there
are some different types but the MFDs, the multifunction displays,
are the same; the stick and throttles are all in the same place;
the engines are the same. So you have, again, a multi-role attack
at this logistics problem; and now we have downsized the logistical
footprint on the aircraft carrier to support really one basic
type.
Chairman: I think we would all like many,
many more in the American way, Mr Sharp!
Q30 Mr Jenkin: On this question of
supply of spare parts, how do OEMs give confidence to the MoD
that battle-critical parts get priority over any other demands
from any other of your civilian customers who may be more commercially
valuable to you?
Mr Pitchforth: From a Boeing perspective
the UK Chinook fleet of spare parts is purely the UK Chinook fleet
of spare parts. There is no cross-fertilisation with any other
fleet, military or civilian. It is completely bespoke through
TLCS, for the UK Chinook aircraft.
Q31 Mr Jenkin: But that would not
be true for the Merlin, would it?
Mr Whitney: Absolutely, yes, they
are military bespoke aircraft. In fact, it goes one step further
in terms of the long-term support contracts because we have a
joint team. The team is sat together, either at Yeovil or Sherborne,
and that is a joint industry/MoD team.
Q32 Mr Jenkin: Supposing there is
a shortage of widgets on rotors, whatever it may be, and that
part is sourced from some other part of the world, or another
part of your Finmeccanica operation: how do you give confidence
to the MoD that, when that part is needed for a helicopter—
Mr Whitney: They are party to
the dialogue that goes on. They actually see the requests being
made. We have joint sessions with the companies concerned where
we sit just like this; we have a meeting where the MoD are actually
sat alongside us. It is not like we can hide behind anything.
Q33 Mr Jenkin: The military get the
priority?
Mr Whitney: Absolutely. In terms
of war fighting, I do not think there is any question that, when
it comes to UORs or support to the front line, industry absolutely
understand the urgency and need that is upon us and we stand up
to deliver.
Q34 Mr Hamilton: Could I just take
that one stage further and that is about the upgrades that continually
take place. I come from a background where I worked in heavy industry
for 20-odd years, in the coalmine industry, and it was quite regular
to upgrade as we went through heavy machinery. One of the things
that comes through is, when we started to put heavy engines into
machines which could not take it, we began to see the splits taking
place in the casts, and the splits taking place in a number of
other ways. My question is: what are the risks associated with
putting a powerful engine into an old frame?
Mr Sharp: Certainly in the US
we have experienced a number of issues, and then there are workarounds
to try to address those issues—the latest of which was the
E-2 Hawkeye put advanced triple broad engines with new propellers
on the front of them; and we had a lot of excessive vibration
in the back and fretting in the back end of the airplane. Those
tend to be unintended consequences of improvements to the system.
My experience in the military, part of which was looking at the
overhaul of fighters coming in over 55-60 months in San Diego,
we had a contract with the military where we did a standard statement
of work to overhaul that, ship it out, take the wings off, engines
out, and get it back to the fleet all bright and shiny. Although
that is a neat idea, each and every single airplane that comes
through, although on the outside they look the same, when you
take the turtlebacks off and you get on the inside, what has happened
to each one of the airplanes or helicopters, wherever it was,
is different; so the statement of work automatically mushrooms
into: does this keel beam need to be replaced; does the engine
need to be replaced? The cost savings of doing everything the
same way off an assembly line and upgrading it is very, very difficult
to quantify upfront until you actually get into the project; and
once you are into the project you need a lot more money to finish
it.
Q35 Chairman: Mr Whitney, I think
the Apache helicopter, which had a Rolls-Royce engine put into
it for the British buy, seems to have worked pretty well with
that Rolls-Royce engine?
Mr Whitney: Indeed it has. The
Rolls-Royce RTM engine is performing extremely well. It is higher
powered than the American engine that was fitted, and is demonstrating
that capability in theatre. However, I think the Apache was designed
from day one as a crashworthy aircraft. I think the issues that
you raise in terms of putting more powerful engines into older
aircraft can work. You can get greater performance from an aircraft,
but you have to then go back to the basic structure air crashworthiness.
Certainly if we are looking at a modern aircraft, it is designed
to different standards to an old aircraft, and that is where you
suffer the potential downsides of just increasing the power,
Q36 Mr Hamilton: Are you saying that
modern aircraft are different in the sense they are sleeker than
what the old aircraft were?
Mr Whitney: No, the other way
around. What I am saying is that a modern aircraft will be designed
around the concept of having a crashworthy undercarriage that
can take descent velocities much greater than older aircraft;
they will have attenuating seats that take impact and allow much
greater survival rates. I would not want to guess but if I looked
at a 40% crash case—and when you design for a crash case
there are some distinct criteria that you have to take into account;
there are lots of analyses done of lots of previous crashes—the
data that we design around an old aircraft would typically be
a 40% survival rate against that crash case; a more modern aircraft
would be circa 80%; and if I look at the future Lynx today, and
the future Lynx is a good point, the old Lynx is probably a 50%
aircraft; and the new future Lynx, which is a new structure, much
greater descent velocity, it would be a 95% aircraft. It just
gives you some analysis in terms of where you can get with modern
design.
Mr Hancock: The judgment for when an
aircraft can be upgraded is a pretty fine one, is it not? Those
judgments have to be pretty well analysed, do they not? You cannot
just say, "We're going to upgrade a Puma", for example,
without knowing the real consequences of that. Where are those
judgments made? Are they made by industry or are they made by
the MoD relating to the cost of either developing a new aircraft
or taking a chance on upgrading?
Chairman: I think we ought to move on
because we are running out of time and I want to cover a lot more
ground.
Q37 Mr Jenkin: We are using our helicopters
very much more intensively than we expected in battlefield conditions
and very harsh environments. What effect do you think this has
on their lifespan?
Mr Pitchforth: Some of that depends
upon whether the airframe is lifed. In the case of the Chinook
if it is not we can continue to repair and maintain that aircraft
throughout its life. There is an advantage also of being a member
of a very large fleet. The learning on the Chinook fleet is quite
extensive through the thousands of aircraft in service; so therefore
many of the issues that we may see with the extra usage we can
predict and/or inspect for, understanding when those issues are
going to arise. The Chinook fleet is a well understood fleet with
a large sample and statistically therefore we understand what
is going to happen to the airframe, because these are not pressurised
aircraft; they do not have the high stress issues that a pressurised
fuselage does, so therefore their life is considerably greater
than a pressurised aircraft.
Mr Sharples: Just a word on the
Puma fleet, if I may. I think it is fair to say that in comparison
to the civilian Puma fleet, the military Puma rate of flying is
not as intensive as some of the fleet leaders on the Puma fleet.
Offshore, for example in the very extreme conditions in which
Puma fleets are operating in the civilian world also, either in
Alaska, in the Middle East, in parts of South-East Asia or, indeed,
in the North Sea, to give an example, fleet leader in the civilian
Puma fleet currently has more than 38,000 flying hours on the
airframe. Although I cannot tell you what the fleet leader in
the RAF Puma fleet is, I am quite sure it is only a fraction of
that. That is to say, despite the intense use to which we put
our machines in military theatre—and again I have personal
experience of doing that—nevertheless these machines are
built for very intensive operations; and I do not think today
we are in danger of running out of the lifetime of these machines.
Q38 Mr Jenkin: Of course, some modern
airframes are lifed. Is this just the equivalent of food manufacturers
putting early sell-by dates on their processed foods, so the housewife
has to throw them away?
Mr Whitney: In terms of the products
that AgustaWestland support, I do not think it is. The impact
on operating in an extremely harsh environment may be that some
components require replacement sooner than anticipated; and in
a long-term support arrangement, like IMOS, that is costing us,
industry, money. The aircraft are designed to work within a flight
envelope, within an environment; and, indeed, the theatre they
are in is a challenging environment but it is one that they are
tested and designed to operate in.
Q39 Mr Jenkin: What is the airframe
life of a Merlin?
Mr Whitney: 10,000 hours.
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