Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)
REAR ADMIRAL
SIMON CHARLIER,
REAR ADMIRAL
TONY JOHNSTONE-BURT
OBE AND BRIGADIER
KEVIN ABRAHAM
2 JUNE 2009
Q120 Mr Havard: So, it is not good
but it is no different?
Rear Admiral Charlier: Obviously,
they are naval people and I take as much interest in this as my
colleague. We work very closely together to look at peaks and
troughs of retention and PVR rates. It is a much more complex
position than you might at first think. If you work people hard
in an operational theatre and continue to return them to that
same theatre eventually two things happen: first, they become
tired of that single involvement and all the pressures that go
with it in the cycle, which my colleague has just mentioned; second,
in the Sea King Mk4 force there are naval personnel with a particular
sub-specialisation which is the littoral manoeuvre and amphibious
warfare side, in this case flying. If you continually rotate them
into a land-based operation so they are doing a single task, although
the task varies within that operation, you combine the effects
of both operational stress and the performance of a role which
they are designed to do, but they have also joined the Navy and
we have to get that in balance. We work very closely together
to try to balance the operational demands that must come firstthere
is no doubt about that whatsoeverwith the performance of
the amphibious and littoral manoeuvre task of flying at sea and
embarking. We have to watch it very carefully to get it in balance
because that gives the varied military career in which most of
the people who have joined want to participate.
Q121 Mr Havard: Do you need to put
more resource and therefore more people into that particular area?
Therefore, do you need more people in the sense of the headline
figure as well? It may be embarrassing to say that you need more
people but if that is the reality is that what you need to do?
Rear Admiral Charlier: No. As
I said earlier, unless we were to predict a 10 or 20-year cycle
of continuing to support amphibious and littoral manoeuvre operations
and singularly land-based operations, I do not think that to overman
the Navy would be a good use of taxpayers' money. The Navy is
not designed around that process and that would require a whole
change of policy to deliver it. It is up to us, the Commanders,
to balance our people's role in employment as best we can to advance
the operational theatre within the budget we are given.
Chairman: I thought that was precisely
the scenario predicted for the next 10 or 20 years.
Mr Havard: Quite!
Q122 Linda Gilroy: Are there any
significant areas of capability for which you are unable to train
because of the pressures of deployment and the Harmony issues
that we have just been discussing? Are there things that you cannot
train for in the UK that are needed in Afghanistan?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: Yes,
there are. We have been in operations now for a decade in Joint
Helicopter Command and for six years we have been in operations
at full tilt. As a consequence, we talk about ourselves being
on what we call a campaign footing. My focus has been exclusively
on delivering success in Afghanistan and Iraq. Admiral Charlier
has mentioned one area in which we have not invested as much as
we should or would have liked: littoral manoeuvre and amphibious
warfare. There are two aspects of that that are of most interest
to me. One aspect is the embarked operational capability of my
crews and forces which is the ability to land and take off from
moving decks in rough seas by day or by night. That is what I
consider to be a core capability because if necessary we need
to do that come what may. We are just keeping the flame alive
in that sense, but we need to work at it. The second area is larger-scale
amphibious operations where we are moving companies of land forces,
usually Royal Marines, from sea to shore by air or surface by
the use of landing craft. That is a highly complex key capability.
I commanded HMS Ocean for two years and was very much involved
in doing that throughout that time. It is an extraordinarily complex
choreography of moving parts that we need to practise all the
time to keep the skills alive. To do that we have used HMS
Ocean this year on something called Exercise Taurus in the
Mediterranean and managed to keep alive that skill on a small
scale but only that. HMS Ocean is still at sea in the Far
East with a detachment of Lynx on board doing the same thing.
Those are the areas where we are in danger of losing focus and
we must concentrate on them. We shall do that next year and in
2011 in terms of our small-scale, focused intervention capability.
This is an area in which Admiral Charlier and I work very closely
with Brigadier Abraham to make sure we do not lose that capability
but it is a vulnerability, if you like.
Q123 Linda Gilroy: How long is keeping
the flame alive enough because your aircraft personnel have a
life, a career, if you like and over time presumably that becomes
more of an issue?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: It
is certainly an issue for retention and it is something on which
we need to work.
Rear Admiral Charlier: What we
have to dothis is where we try to work as closely together
as possibleis keep alive what we call a seedcorn capability
which we can grow by using often the experience of the more senior
people particularly in day and night deck landing skills, but
it is also related to the ship/air interfaceit is exactly
the same on the fixed-wing side as it is on the rotary-wing sidewhere
the ship itself needs to understand aviation and the dangers thereof
and how to operate a number of aircraft together on board as well
as the air crew themselves. Although we tend to focus on air crew
skills which are vitally important it is the whole package. We
try to maintain the seedcorn skill and allow the squadrons to
nominate those personnel who will be involved, concentrating particularly
on keeping the junior members up to speed as they are the most
inexperienced and building that through as has been mentioned,
but there is one big exercise this year. Next year we have Auriga
which is primarily a carrier strike exercise. We will have another
big littoral manoeuvre section to it where we will get back as
many people as possible for a reasonable amount of time to balance
their operational training needs to make sure that that seedcorn
is kept alive. What we are trying to do nowadays is be more clever
in helping the JHC with its environmental training that it needs
to do so people are forewarned before they go out to the operation
to tie in with what we need to do in the sense of littoral manoeuvres.
If you are clever you can programme those together so both gain
a benefit from the same event.
Q124 Linda Gilroy: Are you able over
a five-year period, say, to ensure that all personnel are able
to keep those skills alive and fresh?
Rear Admiral Charlier: Yes, I
believe we are but there is no doubt that we have to work at it.
Brigadier Abraham: In February,
I and others gave evidence on recuperation timelines. As we have
drawn down in Iraq, we are increasingly looking where we can to
reinvest energy, time and resources into training based on contingent
operational requirements rather than the specifics of Afghanistan.
The sort of things you have heard given as examples here will
be incorporated in our progressive training plan to try to reconstitute
and do expeditionary operations from a cold start.
Q125 Linda Gilroy: On the way ahead
for defence helicopter training, at the moment that is done through
the Defence Helicopter Flying School and that is contracted up
to the end of 2012. I believe that a study is going on as to how
coherent helicopter training can take place in future. Can you
tell us a bit about that and also link that with the role of simulators?
Our understanding is that simulation for helicopter forces is
not as comprehensive as it could be at the moment because of limitations
on the capacity and capability of simulators.
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: At
Shawbury, where we base our defence helicopter flying school,
we train all three Services' helicopter crews over a period of
months before they go into their respective frontlines. It has
been the subject of several reviews. The DHFS comes under the
RAF; I do not own the Defence Helicopter Flying School in that
sense. However, as you have already intimated, I receive the product
from it, so it is very important that the output standard is the
same as my input standard. That is working extremely well. You
will know that the flying training system is being contracted
over the next few years and that is why we are focusing very carefully
on it to see how we can find any other ways to use the skills.
The baseline core capability of our helicopter crews has gone
up with the intensity and requirement of operations as you imagine.
I want to make sure that that is absolutely dovetailed. You referred
to training in the UK which is also quite pertinent to the DHFS.
What I am trying to do at the moment is recreate the environmental
conditions that we are experiencing in Afghanistan and Iraq. To
do that I have to send my teams abroad to do training. We are
talking about dust landings, extreme temperatures, mountainous
terrain and density altitude. Afghanistan has both very cold winters
with snow and sweltering heat, as it is now, and there are also
extraordinarily low light conditions. We use the term `red illum'
which means that the ambient light levels go below 10 millilux;
in other words, night vision goggles cannot pick up enough ambient
light to discriminate and define shapes as well as they might.
All of those conditions can be experienced only abroad and that
is one example where we need to help transition our young air
crew by introducing them to night vision goggles during their
period of training in the different areas where they may train.
For example, in Norway the recirculation of snow causes a `whiteout'
and that requires the same techniques for landing because you
lose your visual references as you do with a `brownout' caused
by the recirculation of sand. Again, I think those techniques
can be introduced earlier. There are other areas where I hope
DHFS can standardise baseline training more comprehensively. That
work is going on now. As to simulators, you are right. Our urgent
operational requirement mechanism is fantastic and industry has
done very well to deliver us capability so quickly. One area that
you touched on in your previous session was the theatre entry
standard conundrum and the balance we had to draw between having
the benefit of an urgent operational requirement in theatre and
having enough to train on at home without delaying the deployment
of that capability before everybody is trained. It is a balance.
I can assure you that everybody has theatre entry standard training
before they go, and I can talk a little more about it if you wish.
To that end, we must ensure that people have that experience as
early as possible and we standardise as much as we can across
the fleets and have a common standard both in aircraft and training.
Q126 Chairman: In the interest of
not covering too much ground again we intended to ask questions
about theatre entry standard in our second session. That is not
to say you cannot add something that is very useful, but we have
a number of other questions we would like to ask you.
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: As
to the simulators, that lags behind the UOR process; that is the
last bit. It is coming on line but it takes about 18 months for
it to catch up. It is happening but the sooner we can do it the
better.
Q127 Chairman: What are the main
limiting factors in relation to helicopter availability? Would
it be manpower, spares or the hours that they can fly, fuel or
money? In order of priority what are the main limiting factors?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: I
know that my deputy introduced the concept of the four-legged
stool when you visited Middle Wallop.
Q128 Chairman: Perhaps I may say
how helpful his briefing was because we were extremely impressed.
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: Thank
you. The four-legged stool analogy is simplistic but effective.
The four legs are the peoplethe air crew, ground crew and
engineersthe aircraft themselves, the support, which is
all the equipment, and the training. For my 15 to 20-year robust
sustainable capability on operations those four legs must be as
strong and as long as each other; otherwise, the stool will fall
over. There are strengths and fragilities in each stool depending
on the aircraft type we are talking about, but one leg that is
probably the least robust is the people. Without wanting to repeat
myself, that is the one area on which I need to concentrate the
most. All of the other legs are coming good very quickly. We must
make sure that our training is realistic and there is enough of
it and it is in time to give people confidence in themselves,
their colleagues and the aircraft they are flying. As to the support
and aircraft themselves, again we are reducing the numbers of
fleets within fleets; there is a clear plan to standardise fleets
to theatre entry standards, and you will hear more about that
in a minute. I am most confident that we are coming good on the
other three legs. My big concern is about the people leg and that
is why addressing it is my top priority.
Q129 Chairman: Can you answer a question
about the hours of helicopters? As we understand it, the Treasury
of all people, have put a limit on the number of hours that helicopters
can fly in Afghanistan. Is that correct?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: No,
absolutely not. Brigadier Abraham may wish to add a little in
a moment. If that were so clearly we would reduce the operational
effect as a consequence. My whole drive is to see how while keeping
the four legs in balance I can increase the capability in the
hours we are flying in theatre. The hours are limited by those
four legs of the stool, not in budgetary terms. Of course that
is a factor according to what is achievable but that balance covers
it, so the answer is no.
Q130 Chairman: So, there is no decree
by the Treasury which say that Chinooks or Apaches can fly only
x number of hours this month?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: No,
definitely not.
Brigadier Abraham: I have never
heard that before; it is not the case.
Q131 Mr Jenkin: I declare an interest
on the Register of Members' Interests. I arranged a fund-raiser
for Combat Stress earlier this year which was substantially sponsored
by Finmeccanica. Earlier you mentioned hybrid warfare. You said
in a recent speech that you would like to see "helicopters
forces in the future swing from a symbol of fear to the enemy
to one of hope to civilians and friendly forces." What are
the practical difficulties for helicopters in that swing role?
What does that mean?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: Frank
Hoffman, an American academic and former member of the US Marine
Corps, coined that phrase in trying to describe the complexity
of warfare we face at the moment in Afghanistan and Iraq, where
you have an insurgent who has everything at his fingertips, whether
he is using the latest laptop in the morning to stream video or
whatever of IEDs to the local population or indulging in medieval
warfare in the afternoon by cutting off people's heads or whatever.
We have an extraordinary creature who is using everything he can
including the latest in technology to his own advantage. Michael
Evans has said we are now facing a war in which Microsoft co-exists
with machetes and stealth technology is met by suicide bombers.
That really wraps it up. The advantage enjoyed by the hybrid warrior
is the fact that he can move at will; he can exploit the dense
urban environment and terrain; he can use the local infrastructure
and transport facilities to hide, plan, attack and escape at will
and use it to his own advantage in dislocating our own forces.
My point is that the battlefield helicopter is the perfect antidote
to the hybrid warrior in the sense that the agility, flexibility,
versatility and potential lethality of a battlefield helicopter
counter the apparent advantages of the hybrid warrior. As the
roles of helicopters now begin to blur, which was why I referred
earlier to being smarter about our tasking to create greater effect
in theatre, what is happening is that we are using Apache not
only for close combat attack but for reconnaissance, intelligence
and surveillance. We use the Chinook both for emergency medical
relief and assault operations. You can swing from one to the other
and ditto across all the forces. You can pursue the hybrid warrior
from the urban environment into mountainous terrain, desert and
a maritime domain; you can swing straight from one to the other
without having to recheck and reset your forces either conceptually
or practically.
Q132 Mr Jenkin: This is about training
and attitude, not about equipment or reconfiguring helicopters
for different tasks?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: Exactly;
and it is about optimising our equipment where we can to fulfil
those roles, which is what we have done.
Q133 Mr Jenkin: Reverting to a previous
conversation with my colleague, is it not a fact that combat operations
tend to take priority and if there is a shortage of helicopter
capacity in theatre it is the humanitarian and nation building
aspect, the second part of the Comprehensive Approach, that loses
out?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: That
is absolutely right. We cannot do everything all the time, but
my objective is to create a joint helicopter command that is capable
of swinging from one to the other. What they actually do depends
on exactly what you say: numbers, capacity and the priorities
at the time.
Q134 Mr Jenkin: In that context,
helicopters are the supreme force multiplier?
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: Absolutely.
What I love about them is that they can deliver tempo to the Ground
Force Commander; in other words, they can ratchet it up or down,
manoeuvre and put in fresh troops without breaking contact.
Q135 Mr Jenkin: It is small wonder
that every Brigade Commander in Helmand has lamented the lack
of sufficient helicopters. He has adjusted his operations accordingly,
but if he had had more helicopters he would have been able to
achieve a different quantum.
Brigadier Abraham: I am not sure
I accept the premise that every Brigade Commander in Helmand has
lamented the lack of helicopters.
Q136 Mr Holloway: Privately, yes.
Brigadier Abraham: I do not accept
that premise.
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: A
Ground Force Commander will always want more helicopters for all
the reasons I have explained. We have what we have got and we
are doing the maximum with what we have got, and I think we can
do better still. That is my objective over the next two years
or so of my appointment.
Q137 Mr Jenkin: The last time we
were in Helmand we were extremely well briefed. It became apparent
that in terms of driving the conflict into a new phase that was
beyond the capacity of what we do in Helmand.
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: At
the moment in Helmand we are doing the best we can with what we
have got. We have just had a massive influx of American aviation
capability. Two hundred and ninety-five aircraft are arriving
as we speak. We now have the Marine Air Group totalling 40 in
Bastion and the CAB is arriving in Kandahar as we speak. I hope
that that will balance or cope with the huge influx of American
troops of 21,000 or 22,000. We are in a dynamic situation at the
moment, but aviation is something that we hope will improve all
the time.
Brigadier Abraham: As to the provision
of helicopters to Helmand, from November 2006 to date it has increased
by about 84%; by the summer of next year it will be about 115%
expressed in terms of hours. As you know, at the end of this year
and beginning of next year the Merlin force, currently finishing
in the Middle East, will redeploy there and the buy of the T800
engines for the Lynx will allow us to use those aircraft all year
round. These are sustainable increases in terms of the hours,
but we are building it on a steady profile in order that we do
not break the most important thing which my colleague mentioned
earlier, which is the people part of the four-legged stool.
Q138 Mr Jenkin: I am grateful to
you for putting that on the record, but it underlines that the
complaints to which I referred earlier were probably justified.
Brigadier Abraham: I do not accept
your premise that everyone has said that. Let me tell you what
one Brigade Commanders told me. It was said in private, so I will
not identify the individual. Helicopters are like money in your
bank account. If you are asked whether you would like some more,
the answer is always yes. Do you have enough to do what you have
to do? The answer is yes.
Mr Holloway: You referred to the hybrid
warrior. He is the one who is winning the battle for the people
which I would have thought would be the only way to win this.
What we face in Helmand is a peasant's revolt rather than an insurgency;
that is really the characteristic of this. What percentage of
your helicopter hours is used in winning back the people as opposed
to the military effect?
Chairman: You are asking the same question
that you asked before, are you not?
Mr Holloway: I am, but it is a very important
question.
Chairman: Putting it twice does not help.
Q139 Mr Holloway: I cannot see how
20% of your helicopter hours are used on the battle for the people.
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt: It
depends on what you mean by "battle for the people".
Clearly, you have a precise idea of what you mean by that question.
My point is that it can be interpreted in different ways. I will
try to answer in the way I understand your question. Referring
to my 15 to 20%, if you say that the battle for the people is
the recovery of people wounded by the Taliban
Mr Holloway: No; I mean winning or regaining
the consent of the people.
Chairman: I want to bring this exchange
to a close.
Mr Holloway: It is a fundamental question.
Chairman: It may be a fundamental question,
but next week we shall be conducting a Comprehensive Approach
evidence session where I believe this question is more appropriate
because it will not be confined to one particular type of platform.
Mr Holloway: That is why it is illuminating
to find out how a very important platform is being used in this
respect and we will not have witnesses like these to answer the
point next week.
Chairman: But we have already had an
answer to the question. I shall now move on to Linda Gilroy.
|