Helicopter capability - Defence Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-199)

MR QUENTIN DAVIES MP, MR ADRIAN BAGULEY AND COMMODORE RUSS HARDING

2 JUNE 2009

  Q180  Linda Gilroy: I want to ask about urgent operational requirements which are essential and for the most part greatly welcomed when they arrive but sometimes at the expense of maintaining coherency in the aircraft available in future. How does this affect planning? Is the impact of the number of available aircraft on the future coherence of the fleet, if that is the right term, absolutely inevitable? How do you plan that into all of the future scenarios that you are looking at?

  Mr Davies: UORs always do raise the issue of coherence because the theory is that you are buying something for just one particular campaign and operation and may not want to have it as part of your core defence capability. That is the theory of it, but in practice you may well say that there are other insurgency-type operations in similar conditions and that something you have purchased for one particular UOR ought to be kept in permanent inventory and you should maintain the support, spares, training and so forth accordingly. There have been some good examples of that in the case of armoured vehicles where the issue of coherence particularly arises. It does not arise so much in the case of helicopters because we are re-engining the Lynx. That is a very important programme to make it available to fly the existing Lynx, not the future Lynx or "Wildcat", in hot and high conditions. Apart from that I cannot think of another instance where we have used UORs and helicopters.

  Q181  Linda Gilroy: What about defensive aids suites?

  Mr Davies: Defensive aids suites can be slightly different in different theatres because of different conditions. For example, in Afghanistan there are different altitudes from those in Iraq, which for the most part is pretty flat. That is one reason why these things are different. But it may well be that having installed their defensive aids suites they are perfectly adequate for another campaign. We cannot predict in advance whether or not there will be a problem of coherence there or not. Broadly speaking, subject to what Commodore Harding may say all the kit that has been modified by UORs in the field of helicopters is such that we would not really want to change it at the end of an Afghan campaign as and when that arises. Obviously, I cannot predict exactly when that might happen. In other words, those enhancements will be permanent and useful ones and the defensive aids and certainly the engine upgrades are good examples of that.

  Q182  Linda Gilroy: They may be permanent for one particular aircraft but not capable of being permanent for others and therefore there are some compromises?

  Commodore Harding: There is a tension with UORs in the first place. I do not intend to sound patronising, but it is urgent and you are trying to get it out. That is one of the areas where initially there is a lack of coherence. You try to get to the boys and girls on the frontline a new camera that an aircraft has never had before and so you rush through with the manufacturers the fitting of that camera once you have established its requirement and understood what you want. You very quickly work back to make sure you have resilience in the training aircraft. While in an ideal world you would say that if that camera or a defensive aids system is the one to be used in Afghanistan, we should fit it all the way back across the fleet, the trouble with that approach is that you want to take out as few aircraft as possible to do it and so it takes time. You may get to the point where you spend five years fitting this particular camera as a defensive aid system and find it is a wasted resource. Therefore, there is tension in getting it out and how much you fit it and everything else. Another good example is that one of the reasons we are taking time to take Merlin out of Iraq and re-deploy it in Afghanistan is that we intend to change some of the theatre-essential upgrade equipment. Though it may seem difficult to understand, there is a different threat and we must take time to fit that equipment to those aircraft. Having done that to the aircraft we need to fly out, we need to train the crews who will go with those aircraft at the end of the year. Therefore, in relation to the whole thing about "fleets within fleets", which you are possibly talking about, that is something we must do. There is no doubt that the Chinook has a high number of different marks, variants and everything else inside it. We have already contracted for the first part of that programme, and we hope to go to contract very soon for the whole Chinook fleet and say that we need to design and incorporate a certain number of the UORs and get the equipment fit standard so that the crews can jump into an aircraft and it does not have something here, a bit over there and everything else and they have to do a little course to make sure they can fly that particular group of 19 over there.

  Q183  Linda Gilroy: I think the answer to the question whether it is inevitable there is a certain inbuilt incoherence in UORs is yes?

  Commodore Harding: Yes, if you do not want to waste resource.

  Q184  Linda Gilroy: I think the Committee would like to know whether you doing your best to minimise that?

  Commodore Harding: Yes. I came back into this job just over a year ago. I have to say that I was positively surprised by the way the relationship between the Department and Treasury was going in that it was working seamlessly. Over time we are learning lessons. If we go back to the Sea King Mk4 fleet and the upgrades we requested to take it from one theatre to the other, there are now bits that I have gone back to rework. If we look at what we did on Merlin over a year later and what we asked the Treasury to approve, we changed our approach. In some areas we asked for more of certain things and we were then required to provide the evidence to support them. We were grilled pretty hard, but we managed that. I think there is a positive story to tell in that respect. We are now going back to re-examine what we have done. As to Chinook, in relation to coherence and "fleets within fleets" where it becomes chronic, you have to go to the point of spending resource to get the aircraft to the necessary level.

  Mr Baguley: Certainly, in relation to the Merlin force, Mk3 and Mk3A, that Commodore Harding has just spoken about, we are bringing all of them to a common TES standard. As to the Chinook force, we are also trying to bring it to a common standard. As to the Lynx Mk9 force, we are bringing all of it to a common standard and fitting it with T800 engines. We are also bringing the Apache force to a common theatre standard. Where we can we try to reduce fleets within fleets and the theatre entry issues.

  Q185  Chairman: But this message does not seem to have got through to the men and women we met at Middle Wallop and Yeovilton who said that sometimes the theatre entry standard equipment in which they found themselves flying in Helmand province was something they saw for the first time when they got to Afghanistan. We are hearing a very good story from you, but we heard a different one from them. Why is that?

  Mr Davies: I do not think it is right to comment on that.

  Commodore Harding: I heard the industry session when that question was asked. I think Mr Hancock asked the question. We think it may have been AH where we use some of our aircraft for environmental training outside this country, ie the hot and high bits, that is, the experiential bits of piloting the aircraft in that respect. At the beginning I referred to Sea King Mk4 and the enhancements we asked for to take it to Afghanistan compared with what we have now provided for Merlin to go to Afghanistan where it is a full fleet fit; all have been fitted with the right number of fits. There are bits going back there.

  Q186  Chairman: What is the right number? Does the right number include a number of training aircraft for the UK?

  Commodore Harding: Absolutely, yes. You have a choice: either you make the decision to go to Afghanistan and outfit the whole fleet with the equipment or—I think this is the right approach—you outfit all of the aircraft. There are 28 Merlin Mk3s and Mk3As; it is not a huge fleet. It seemed to make sense. The Treasury and the Department accepted that we should fit all 28 and, based on the number or aircraft we keep permanently in theatre, which is a number we will not mention here, run that back through the maintenance requirement and the number you need to train people on that specific equipment before they go back to theatre. You buy sufficient number to fit them. There is a balance between splurging and saying you require 28 of these. I believe there is a balance in the investment decision to be made. I would be the first to cry—because I signed the business case with Mr Baguley—if I did not think we were asking for the right amount. In the case of Yeovilton and Middle Wallop, it is perhaps incumbent on us to trace that bit down to ground. I wholeheartedly agree. About two months ago I went flying in Sea King Mk4s using display night vision goggles. In some respects given failures and things not coming back out in some cases they seemed to be treating one or two of them as gold dust. Since then we have come back and said that this little box of tricks cannot cost a huge fortune; there are things we need to do here. That is why in particular I go round the air station COs regularly so they can download on me, but if there is something we have not picked up it is incumbent on us to do so and I will take that action.

  Mr Davies: Let me place on record that it is an absolute principle when we buy new equipment under a UOR, apart from the core defence programme, that we buy sufficient number to ensure people can be trained on exactly that type of equipment. This goes across the board; it is not just helicopters. We always specify the numbers and amounts of equipment we need to procure taking into account the training programme so we do not have anybody going out to theatre who has not been trained on the type of equipment, whether it is weapons, communications equipment, armoured vehicles or what have you, with which they will then be working in Afghanistan. In the best run organisation something sometimes may just fall between the cracks. I trust that has not happened on this occasion. We will pursue it. That is an absolute principle. Sometimes I have expressed frustration because we cannot get more of something out into theatre—I will not say what it is—and I am told, "No, Minister; we really need this number here for training." We have that dialogue the whole time. We take the training requirement very seriously and do not want our men and women to go out to Afghanistan and run any risk at all because they are suddenly confronted with something on which they have not already been properly trained. It is an absolute principle that before we send anybody out to a war zone they are given the best possible training on exactly the kit they will use in theatre.

  Q187  Chairman: All we can tell you is what we heard from the men and women undergoing the training before going out to Afghanistan.

  Mr Davies: I am grateful you have told us about that. Obviously, no one wants to break any confidences here. There may well have been something that has fallen between the cracks and Commodore Harding will look into it, but I want to reiterate the general principle on which we place a very great deal of importance.

  Chairman: It sounds a good general principle provided it is adhered to in practice.

  Q188  Mr Holloway: If you have only a limited amount of kit and it is desperately needed in theatre it is not unreasonable to get it out there and sort out the training aspect later. Surely, that is a priority; it works both ways.

  Mr Davies: I believe that you were a professional soldier in an earlier incarnation. I am not sure that you would have said that at the time.

  Q189  Mr Holloway: I can give you an example of where we received a piece of equipment. Although there was not very much of it we were very grateful for it and did not really care whether or not we had had the opportunity to be trained on it back in the UK. I think there are times—I am helping you here—when it is reasonable to send stuff over in that way.

  Mr Davies: You are trying to help me but I stand by what I have said. As Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, I believe we should rigorously uphold the principle I have just enunciated and do not send people to a war zone and ask them to try out equipment with which they are not familiar in the face of enemy fire. I do not believe that that is the right principle. Normally, we will withhold equipment until we have at least the minimum number of people who are properly trained on it. That is how we operate generally and also in the area of helicopters.

  Q190  Chairman: This principle applies not only to the use of the equipment in the face of enemy fire but also the maintenance of it that needs to be done out in theatre, presumably.

  Mr Davies: In other words, you are saying that people would not be maintaining equipment that had not been maintained elsewhere?

  Q191  Chairman: Yes.

  Commodore Harding: I think I can reassure you that if something is needed tomorrow in Afghanistan and a UOR comes out from PJHQ and people can be trained in theatre by a small team which goes out there that is what we would do.

  Q192  Mr Holloway: I worry about dogma getting in the way of practicalities.

  Commodore Harding: Yes.

  Mr Davies: But whether we train in theatre, Salisbury plain or whatever the important thing is that we train.

  Commodore Harding: Let me give a good example where we are making a wholesale change. In the up-engining of the Lynx Mk9 with the T800, which is the engine to go into the future Lynx, the Wildcat, some of my colleagues in DE&S have said that those aircraft will be delivered on that date and therefore they can be deployed shortly thereafter. Commander JHC and his team have said that we can do that but not until those crews have learned to refly that aircraft with a substantially different instrument panel and engine—there are other issues with the way the aircraft flies—and have done hot and high and environmental training. You get a certain enthusiasm to put the kit out earlier and in some cases you push back, but I reassure you that if there is a piece of kit—I can give examples but they are classified and I will not reveal them here—where you take it out and do the training there, but you are not talking of an aircraft or engine change; you are talking about that which goes in the hand and can be easily assimilated, and I think we have a good story on that.

  Q193  Linda Gilroy: If helicopters are force multipliers would not spending a greater proportion of the defence budget make a great deal of sense and be a very cost-effective way of improving the capability of our Armed Forces as a whole? I suppose the simple question is: why do they not get greater priority?

  Mr Davies: I have tried to illustrate that they get an awful lot of priority. We shall be spending a large number of billions of pounds on helicopters over the next 10 years. For reasons I mentioned earlier I shall not be more precise than that. There are always decisions to be taken on priorities. We want to maintain the right balance between different capabilities that we require because they are all interdependent. If you look at our plans I do not believe you can say that we are giving them too low a priority. I hope that the next time you go to Afghanistan you will specifically ask Commanders what they think about the availability, sustainability and quality of helicopters and check it against the answers that we have tried to give the Committee today. I believe you will be encouraged by the responses.

  Q194  Linda Gilroy: The responses we get will certainly reflect what you have said, but they will also reflect the fact that more helicopters can always add to capability. Last time I was in Afghanistan there was a very strong wish to see more helicopters, particularly newer ones.

  Mr Davies: I agree with you, and that is why we are providing more helicopters. We do not talk about the number of assets we have in theatre, but I have already said that the Chinook Mk3 will be available for deployment there within a few months. The first Merlin will also be available for deployment there in the next few months. The first re-engined Lynxes will be there in the early part of next year. We are making a very substantial commitment and I hope the Committee recognises that. It would be very churlish and rather perverse not to recognise that. A very considerable effort is being made.

  Q195  Linda Gilroy: I am quite sure we will recognise that, but whether we conclude there are sufficient numbers and capability to add up to the required force multiplier in difficult places like Afghanistan, taking into account all the other things we have discussed today such as the availability of training etc. is a matter to which we will give quite a lot of consideration. I do not think we can take it from the information you have offered us today that as much is being done as is optimal in terms of the capability that our Armed Forces need in Afghanistan.

  Mr Davies: Of course you do not just rely on what I have said to you today, nor would I expect or want you to do so. We want you to cross-check it. I quoted the figures in the House yesterday. There has been an 80% increase in helicopter hours available since November 2006 when the present pattern of war-fighting there has emerged and been sustained. By the end of next year the figure will be more than 100%.

  Mr Baguley: It will be 116%.

  Mr Davies: I repeat I am interested in capability and that is why those figures are very important. That is a function of the number of platforms available which we are increasing. It is also a function of good and increasing support and sustainability and having the necessary crews. That has been a problem and I do not disguise that fact from the Committee. There will be more crews. I was not present during the previous session. I do not know to what extent you dealt with that with Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt. Normally, I do not get involved in training, recruitment and remuneration issues but I have done so in this case. I have been talking to him about what we can do to improve retention and recruitment and we are making some substantial changes in those areas. As a result of all this I hope you will conclude that we will do everything possible to maximise the support Commanders require in the field of helicopters as in others in Afghanistan.

  Q196  Linda Gilroy: We shall see.

  Mr Baguley: I can give an example of where we have pulled together the four legs of the stool about which Commander JHC talked earlier. As to the Chinook force, we are now delivering 25% more hours without adding a single helicopter. That is why you need to be very careful about looking just at helicopter numbers.

  Commodore Harding: Certainly I and perhaps others sitting here need to look at the other forces because the Chinook model that I hold up needs to be replicated in other places. We need to see how we get that sea change in doing that.

  Q197  Chairman: I want to end by trying to get to the bottom of something which I do not yet understand. Is there any system of limiting the number of hours of helicopters?

  Mr Davies: A system whereby you say to the Commanders in the field that they cannot fly more than a certain number of hours?

  Q198  Chairman: Yes.

  Mr Davies: I know you like simple answers, Chairman: no. Commanders are absolutely free to use their assets as they wish. We would not dream of imposing such a constraint on them.

  Q199  Mr Holloway: Surely, they are constrained by maintenance schedules. Aircraft need to be maintained, so what you say cannot be correct.

  Mr Davies: You have completely misunderstood me. There are always constraints in life. We are increasing the number of helicopter hours available to Commanders, but the Chairman was asking whether we are imposing an artificial limit and saying that Commanders must not use a particular platform for more than so many thousand hours a year or a month. You had in mind whether we were giving some instruction of that kind because we were worried about the sustainability of the kit. It is entirely a matter for Commanders in the field to judge how they use the hours available. We are not constraining them.

  Mr Holloway: Available hours are a constraint.


 
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