Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-199)
MR QUENTIN
DAVIES MP, MR
ADRIAN BAGULEY
AND COMMODORE
RUSS HARDING
2 JUNE 2009
Q180 Linda Gilroy: I want to ask
about urgent operational requirements which are essential and
for the most part greatly welcomed when they arrive but sometimes
at the expense of maintaining coherency in the aircraft available
in future. How does this affect planning? Is the impact of the
number of available aircraft on the future coherence of the fleet,
if that is the right term, absolutely inevitable? How do you plan
that into all of the future scenarios that you are looking at?
Mr Davies: UORs always do raise
the issue of coherence because the theory is that you are buying
something for just one particular campaign and operation and may
not want to have it as part of your core defence capability. That
is the theory of it, but in practice you may well say that there
are other insurgency-type operations in similar conditions and
that something you have purchased for one particular UOR ought
to be kept in permanent inventory and you should maintain the
support, spares, training and so forth accordingly. There have
been some good examples of that in the case of armoured vehicles
where the issue of coherence particularly arises. It does not
arise so much in the case of helicopters because we are re-engining
the Lynx. That is a very important programme to make it available
to fly the existing Lynx, not the future Lynx or "Wildcat",
in hot and high conditions. Apart from that I cannot think of
another instance where we have used UORs and helicopters.
Q181 Linda Gilroy: What about defensive
aids suites?
Mr Davies: Defensive aids suites
can be slightly different in different theatres because of different
conditions. For example, in Afghanistan there are different altitudes
from those in Iraq, which for the most part is pretty flat. That
is one reason why these things are different. But it may well
be that having installed their defensive aids suites they are
perfectly adequate for another campaign. We cannot predict in
advance whether or not there will be a problem of coherence there
or not. Broadly speaking, subject to what Commodore Harding may
say all the kit that has been modified by UORs in the field of
helicopters is such that we would not really want to change it
at the end of an Afghan campaign as and when that arises. Obviously,
I cannot predict exactly when that might happen. In other words,
those enhancements will be permanent and useful ones and the defensive
aids and certainly the engine upgrades are good examples of that.
Q182 Linda Gilroy: They may be permanent
for one particular aircraft but not capable of being permanent
for others and therefore there are some compromises?
Commodore Harding: There is a
tension with UORs in the first place. I do not intend to sound
patronising, but it is urgent and you are trying to get it out.
That is one of the areas where initially there is a lack of coherence.
You try to get to the boys and girls on the frontline a new camera
that an aircraft has never had before and so you rush through
with the manufacturers the fitting of that camera once you have
established its requirement and understood what you want. You
very quickly work back to make sure you have resilience in the
training aircraft. While in an ideal world you would say that
if that camera or a defensive aids system is the one to be used
in Afghanistan, we should fit it all the way back across the fleet,
the trouble with that approach is that you want to take out as
few aircraft as possible to do it and so it takes time. You may
get to the point where you spend five years fitting this particular
camera as a defensive aid system and find it is a wasted resource.
Therefore, there is tension in getting it out and how much you
fit it and everything else. Another good example is that one of
the reasons we are taking time to take Merlin out of Iraq and
re-deploy it in Afghanistan is that we intend to change some of
the theatre-essential upgrade equipment. Though it may seem difficult
to understand, there is a different threat and we must take time
to fit that equipment to those aircraft. Having done that to the
aircraft we need to fly out, we need to train the crews who will
go with those aircraft at the end of the year. Therefore, in relation
to the whole thing about "fleets within fleets", which
you are possibly talking about, that is something we must do.
There is no doubt that the Chinook has a high number of different
marks, variants and everything else inside it. We have already
contracted for the first part of that programme, and we hope to
go to contract very soon for the whole Chinook fleet and say that
we need to design and incorporate a certain number of the UORs
and get the equipment fit standard so that the crews can jump
into an aircraft and it does not have something here, a bit over
there and everything else and they have to do a little course
to make sure they can fly that particular group of 19 over there.
Q183 Linda Gilroy: I think the answer
to the question whether it is inevitable there is a certain inbuilt
incoherence in UORs is yes?
Commodore Harding: Yes, if you
do not want to waste resource.
Q184 Linda Gilroy: I think the Committee
would like to know whether you doing your best to minimise that?
Commodore Harding: Yes. I came
back into this job just over a year ago. I have to say that I
was positively surprised by the way the relationship between the
Department and Treasury was going in that it was working seamlessly.
Over time we are learning lessons. If we go back to the Sea King
Mk4 fleet and the upgrades we requested to take it from one theatre
to the other, there are now bits that I have gone back to rework.
If we look at what we did on Merlin over a year later and what
we asked the Treasury to approve, we changed our approach. In
some areas we asked for more of certain things and we were then
required to provide the evidence to support them. We were grilled
pretty hard, but we managed that. I think there is a positive
story to tell in that respect. We are now going back to re-examine
what we have done. As to Chinook, in relation to coherence and
"fleets within fleets" where it becomes chronic, you
have to go to the point of spending resource to get the aircraft
to the necessary level.
Mr Baguley: Certainly, in relation
to the Merlin force, Mk3 and Mk3A, that Commodore Harding has
just spoken about, we are bringing all of them to a common TES
standard. As to the Chinook force, we are also trying to bring
it to a common standard. As to the Lynx Mk9 force, we are bringing
all of it to a common standard and fitting it with T800 engines.
We are also bringing the Apache force to a common theatre standard.
Where we can we try to reduce fleets within fleets and the theatre
entry issues.
Q185 Chairman: But this message does
not seem to have got through to the men and women we met at Middle
Wallop and Yeovilton who said that sometimes the theatre entry
standard equipment in which they found themselves flying in Helmand
province was something they saw for the first time when they got
to Afghanistan. We are hearing a very good story from you, but
we heard a different one from them. Why is that?
Mr Davies: I do not think it is
right to comment on that.
Commodore Harding: I heard the
industry session when that question was asked. I think Mr Hancock
asked the question. We think it may have been AH where we use
some of our aircraft for environmental training outside this country,
ie the hot and high bits, that is, the experiential bits of piloting
the aircraft in that respect. At the beginning I referred to Sea
King Mk4 and the enhancements we asked for to take it to Afghanistan
compared with what we have now provided for Merlin to go to Afghanistan
where it is a full fleet fit; all have been fitted with the right
number of fits. There are bits going back there.
Q186 Chairman: What is the right
number? Does the right number include a number of training aircraft
for the UK?
Commodore Harding: Absolutely,
yes. You have a choice: either you make the decision to go to
Afghanistan and outfit the whole fleet with the equipment orI
think this is the right approachyou outfit all of the aircraft.
There are 28 Merlin Mk3s and Mk3As; it is not a huge fleet. It
seemed to make sense. The Treasury and the Department accepted
that we should fit all 28 and, based on the number or aircraft
we keep permanently in theatre, which is a number we will not
mention here, run that back through the maintenance requirement
and the number you need to train people on that specific equipment
before they go back to theatre. You buy sufficient number to fit
them. There is a balance between splurging and saying you require
28 of these. I believe there is a balance in the investment decision
to be made. I would be the first to crybecause I signed
the business case with Mr Baguleyif I did not think we
were asking for the right amount. In the case of Yeovilton and
Middle Wallop, it is perhaps incumbent on us to trace that bit
down to ground. I wholeheartedly agree. About two months ago I
went flying in Sea King Mk4s using display night vision goggles.
In some respects given failures and things not coming back out
in some cases they seemed to be treating one or two of them as
gold dust. Since then we have come back and said that this little
box of tricks cannot cost a huge fortune; there are things we
need to do here. That is why in particular I go round the air
station COs regularly so they can download on me, but if there
is something we have not picked up it is incumbent on us to do
so and I will take that action.
Mr Davies: Let me place on record
that it is an absolute principle when we buy new equipment under
a UOR, apart from the core defence programme, that we buy sufficient
number to ensure people can be trained on exactly that type of
equipment. This goes across the board; it is not just helicopters.
We always specify the numbers and amounts of equipment we need
to procure taking into account the training programme so we do
not have anybody going out to theatre who has not been trained
on the type of equipment, whether it is weapons, communications
equipment, armoured vehicles or what have you, with which they
will then be working in Afghanistan. In the best run organisation
something sometimes may just fall between the cracks. I trust
that has not happened on this occasion. We will pursue it. That
is an absolute principle. Sometimes I have expressed frustration
because we cannot get more of something out into theatreI
will not say what it isand I am told, "No, Minister;
we really need this number here for training." We have that
dialogue the whole time. We take the training requirement very
seriously and do not want our men and women to go out to Afghanistan
and run any risk at all because they are suddenly confronted with
something on which they have not already been properly trained.
It is an absolute principle that before we send anybody out to
a war zone they are given the best possible training on exactly
the kit they will use in theatre.
Q187 Chairman: All we can tell you
is what we heard from the men and women undergoing the training
before going out to Afghanistan.
Mr Davies: I am grateful you have
told us about that. Obviously, no one wants to break any confidences
here. There may well have been something that has fallen between
the cracks and Commodore Harding will look into it, but I want
to reiterate the general principle on which we place a very great
deal of importance.
Chairman: It sounds a good general principle
provided it is adhered to in practice.
Q188 Mr Holloway: If you have only
a limited amount of kit and it is desperately needed in theatre
it is not unreasonable to get it out there and sort out the training
aspect later. Surely, that is a priority; it works both ways.
Mr Davies: I believe that you
were a professional soldier in an earlier incarnation. I am not
sure that you would have said that at the time.
Q189 Mr Holloway: I can give you
an example of where we received a piece of equipment. Although
there was not very much of it we were very grateful for it and
did not really care whether or not we had had the opportunity
to be trained on it back in the UK. I think there are timesI
am helping you herewhen it is reasonable to send stuff
over in that way.
Mr Davies: You are trying to help
me but I stand by what I have said. As Minister for Defence Equipment
and Support, I believe we should rigorously uphold the principle
I have just enunciated and do not send people to a war zone and
ask them to try out equipment with which they are not familiar
in the face of enemy fire. I do not believe that that is the right
principle. Normally, we will withhold equipment until we have
at least the minimum number of people who are properly trained
on it. That is how we operate generally and also in the area of
helicopters.
Q190 Chairman: This principle applies
not only to the use of the equipment in the face of enemy fire
but also the maintenance of it that needs to be done out in theatre,
presumably.
Mr Davies: In other words, you
are saying that people would not be maintaining equipment that
had not been maintained elsewhere?
Q191 Chairman: Yes.
Commodore Harding: I think I can
reassure you that if something is needed tomorrow in Afghanistan
and a UOR comes out from PJHQ and people can be trained in theatre
by a small team which goes out there that is what we would do.
Q192 Mr Holloway: I worry about dogma
getting in the way of practicalities.
Commodore Harding: Yes.
Mr Davies: But whether we train
in theatre, Salisbury plain or whatever the important thing is
that we train.
Commodore Harding: Let me give
a good example where we are making a wholesale change. In the
up-engining of the Lynx Mk9 with the T800, which is the engine
to go into the future Lynx, the Wildcat, some of my colleagues
in DE&S have said that those aircraft will be delivered on
that date and therefore they can be deployed shortly thereafter.
Commander JHC and his team have said that we can do that but not
until those crews have learned to refly that aircraft with a substantially
different instrument panel and enginethere are other issues
with the way the aircraft fliesand have done hot and high
and environmental training. You get a certain enthusiasm to put
the kit out earlier and in some cases you push back, but I reassure
you that if there is a piece of kitI can give examples
but they are classified and I will not reveal them herewhere
you take it out and do the training there, but you are not talking
of an aircraft or engine change; you are talking about that which
goes in the hand and can be easily assimilated, and I think we
have a good story on that.
Q193 Linda Gilroy: If helicopters
are force multipliers would not spending a greater proportion
of the defence budget make a great deal of sense and be a very
cost-effective way of improving the capability of our Armed Forces
as a whole? I suppose the simple question is: why do they not
get greater priority?
Mr Davies: I have tried to illustrate
that they get an awful lot of priority. We shall be spending a
large number of billions of pounds on helicopters over the next
10 years. For reasons I mentioned earlier I shall not be more
precise than that. There are always decisions to be taken on priorities.
We want to maintain the right balance between different capabilities
that we require because they are all interdependent. If you look
at our plans I do not believe you can say that we are giving them
too low a priority. I hope that the next time you go to Afghanistan
you will specifically ask Commanders what they think about the
availability, sustainability and quality of helicopters and check
it against the answers that we have tried to give the Committee
today. I believe you will be encouraged by the responses.
Q194 Linda Gilroy: The responses
we get will certainly reflect what you have said, but they will
also reflect the fact that more helicopters can always add to
capability. Last time I was in Afghanistan there was a very strong
wish to see more helicopters, particularly newer ones.
Mr Davies: I agree with you, and
that is why we are providing more helicopters. We do not talk
about the number of assets we have in theatre, but I have already
said that the Chinook Mk3 will be available for deployment there
within a few months. The first Merlin will also be available for
deployment there in the next few months. The first re-engined
Lynxes will be there in the early part of next year. We are making
a very substantial commitment and I hope the Committee recognises
that. It would be very churlish and rather perverse not to recognise
that. A very considerable effort is being made.
Q195 Linda Gilroy: I am quite sure
we will recognise that, but whether we conclude there are sufficient
numbers and capability to add up to the required force multiplier
in difficult places like Afghanistan, taking into account all
the other things we have discussed today such as the availability
of training etc. is a matter to which we will give quite a lot
of consideration. I do not think we can take it from the information
you have offered us today that as much is being done as is optimal
in terms of the capability that our Armed Forces need in Afghanistan.
Mr Davies: Of course you do not
just rely on what I have said to you today, nor would I expect
or want you to do so. We want you to cross-check it. I quoted
the figures in the House yesterday. There has been an 80% increase
in helicopter hours available since November 2006 when the present
pattern of war-fighting there has emerged and been sustained.
By the end of next year the figure will be more than 100%.
Mr Baguley: It will be 116%.
Mr Davies: I repeat I am interested
in capability and that is why those figures are very important.
That is a function of the number of platforms available which
we are increasing. It is also a function of good and increasing
support and sustainability and having the necessary crews. That
has been a problem and I do not disguise that fact from the Committee.
There will be more crews. I was not present during the previous
session. I do not know to what extent you dealt with that with
Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt. Normally, I do not get involved in
training, recruitment and remuneration issues but I have done
so in this case. I have been talking to him about what we can
do to improve retention and recruitment and we are making some
substantial changes in those areas. As a result of all this I
hope you will conclude that we will do everything possible to
maximise the support Commanders require in the field of helicopters
as in others in Afghanistan.
Q196 Linda Gilroy: We shall see.
Mr Baguley: I can give an example
of where we have pulled together the four legs of the stool about
which Commander JHC talked earlier. As to the Chinook force, we
are now delivering 25% more hours without adding a single helicopter.
That is why you need to be very careful about looking just at
helicopter numbers.
Commodore Harding: Certainly I
and perhaps others sitting here need to look at the other forces
because the Chinook model that I hold up needs to be replicated
in other places. We need to see how we get that sea change in
doing that.
Q197 Chairman: I want to end by trying
to get to the bottom of something which I do not yet understand.
Is there any system of limiting the number of hours of helicopters?
Mr Davies: A system whereby you
say to the Commanders in the field that they cannot fly more than
a certain number of hours?
Q198 Chairman: Yes.
Mr Davies: I know you like simple
answers, Chairman: no. Commanders are absolutely free to use their
assets as they wish. We would not dream of imposing such a constraint
on them.
Q199 Mr Holloway: Surely, they are
constrained by maintenance schedules. Aircraft need to be maintained,
so what you say cannot be correct.
Mr Davies: You have completely
misunderstood me. There are always constraints in life. We are
increasing the number of helicopter hours available to Commanders,
but the Chairman was asking whether we are imposing an artificial
limit and saying that Commanders must not use a particular platform
for more than so many thousand hours a year or a month. You had
in mind whether we were giving some instruction of that kind because
we were worried about the sustainability of the kit. It is entirely
a matter for Commanders in the field to judge how they use the
hours available. We are not constraining them.
Mr Holloway: Available hours are a constraint.
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