|
Our Scrutiny of the Estimates
1. The Treasury's Main Supply Estimates 2009-10
by which the Government requests resources from Parliament to
meet its expenditure plans for the Financial Year ahead were laid
before the House of Commons on Thursday 18 June.[1]
The House will be asked to agree them on Thursday 2 July.
2. The Main Supply Estimates contain an Estimate
for each Government department and, separately, for each public
service pension scheme. Our focus this year, as in the past, is
on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) departmental Main Estimate. The
MoD has as usual provided us with a memorandum which explains
key elements of the Estimate. This is attached to the Report.[2]
3. Shortly before the Main Estimates were laid,
the Government sent us its response to our Report on the Spring
Supplementary Estimate 2008-09. We have taken the opportunity
in this Report to comment on important elements of this response.
Further information was also sought from the MoD on both the Main
Estimate and the response to that earlier Report. Both the Government
response to our Report and the MoD's supplementary memorandum
responding to our request for further information are attached
to this Report.[3]
4. This year the Main Estimates were laid relatively
late. There was also an unexpected delay of sixteen days between
their intended laying date and the date on which they were finally
laid. However, the date on which the House will be asked to agree
the Main Estimates was not changed as a consequence of this delay.
There is thus significantly less time this year in which thorough
and detailed scrutiny can be carried out by departmental select
committees and Reports to the House can be drafted and agreed—indeed,
only the absolute minimum period permitted by the Standing Orders
of the House of Commons. We
have commented before on the very tight schedule which committees
such as ours have to adopt if they are to report on Supplementary
Estimates before they are taken in the House.[4]
It is highly regrettable that this year such a very tight schedule
should apply also to the Main Estimates. We expect the Government
in its response to this Report to set out the reason for the delays
and the actions it intends to take in future years to ensure such
delays do not happen again.
5. We are grateful to the MoD for replying so
promptly to our request for further information supplementary
to its response to our Spring Supplementary Estimate Report and
its Estimates memorandum. We also wish to thank the Committee
Office Scrutiny Unit for its help with regard to the particularly
tight deadline to which we had to work in preparing this Report,
and for its regular assistance in scrutinising the Estimates.
Ministry of Defence Request for
Resources
6. The MoD's Main Estimate requests resources
of £39.7 billion, with a net cash requirement of £37.7
billion. The MoD's Estimate is split between three Requests for
Resources (RfR):
- RfR1—Provision of Defence
Capability
- RfR2—Peace Keeping and Operations
- RfR3—War Pensions and Allowances
The headline figures are set out in the table below:Table1:
The Ministry of Defence's Request for Resources (£million)
| 2009-10 Provision
|
| 2007-08 Outturn
|
|
| Final Provision | Forecast Outturn
| |
| RfR1: Provision of Defence Capability
| 35,833 | 34,637
| 34,536 | 32,415
|
| RfR2: Peace Keeping and Operations
| 2,872 | 3,468
| 3,326 | 2,196
|
| RfR3: War Pensions and Allowances
| 1,024 | 1,015
| 1,014 | 1,014
|
| Net resource requirement
| 39,729 | 39,120
| 38,876 | 35,625
|
| Net cash requirement |
37,746 | 35,552
| 36,106 | 32,787
|
Source: HM Treasury, Main Supply Estimates 2009-10,
p 307
Provision of Defence Capability
7. RfR1 covers by far the largest proportion
of requested resources: its ambit includes personnel, equipment
and support costs for the Armed Forces (including, for example
the nuclear warhead programme). The departmental Main Estimate
breaks this down by Top Level Budget Holder (TLB). After a number
of changes to the TLBs over recent years they have this year remained
more or less the same as last year, excepting some name changes.
If this remains the case, it will make comparisons easier than
has been the case for the last few years. The RfR1 provision for
2009-10 is £2,412 million more than the RfR1 provision at
the time of the 2008-09 Main Estimates. Of particular note is
the resources expenditure in the Chief of Joint Operations TLB
which has risen 17% from last year's Main Estimates provision,
from £396 million to £464 million. Changes in other
TLBs are less striking. We
request the MoD in response to this Report explain the reasons
for the significant increase in resources allocated to the Chief
of Joint Operations TLB.
Peace Keeping and Operations
8. When we began our regular scrutiny of the
MoD's Estimates after the 2005 General Election, forecast costs
of operations for each Financial Year were first set down in the
Spring Supplementary Estimate towards the end of that Financial
Year. They would be voted on by the House shortly after that Estimate
was laid. During Financial Year 2006-07, we made the case for
the House receiving earlier notice of operational costs each Financial
Year and recommended that the MoD bring forward forecasts of operational
costs at an earlier point in future Financial Years.[5]
9. In response, the MoD signalled its intention
in future to bring forward operational costs to the House for
agreement in its Winter Supplementary Estimate which is laid before
the House some two to three months earlier than the Spring Supplementary
Estimate each year.[6]
We welcomed this move but pressed for some indication to be given
to the House at the time of the Main Estimates of what operational
costs were expected to be.[7]
We acknowledged that such forecast costs were likely to change
on account of the volatile and uncertain nature of operations,
and that further sums would probably need to be sought at the
time of the Supplementary Estimates later in the Financial Year.
However, we were aware from information submitted to us by the
MoD that the time-lag between MoD forecasts and their publication
of forecast costs based upon them in the Supplementary Estimates
was sometimes so great that earlier public notification of forecast
costs to the House was desirable, notwithstanding the possibility
of later changes to those costs.[8]
10. We were very pleased when, in its memorandum
accompanying the MoD Main Estimates for 2008-09, the MoD presented
a forecast cost for operations.[9]
In our Report on the 2008-09 Main Estimates we thanked the MoD
and asked for this total to be broken down in future in the same
way as the figures presented for operational costs in the MoD's
Supplementary Estimates memorandum.[10]
In this year's Main Estimates, the MoD has done this for the first
time.[11] Moreover, the
MoD has included, again for the first time within the body of
the Main Estimates, the formal request for operational resources
under RfR2. These operational costs will of course continue to
be resourced from the Reserve. We
welcome the MoD's willingness to share increasing amounts of information
on operational costs with the House at this early stage in the
Financial Year, and likewise for seeking formal approval from
the House for these funds earlier than before. These are not insignificant
steps in allowing our Committee and the House improved financial
scrutiny.
11. The MoD, in its memorandum accompanying the
2008-09 Main Estimates, included a forecast for operational costs
for that Financial Year of "at least £2Bn…[to be]
split between Afghanistan and Iraq"[12].
In our Report on those Main Estimates we commended the MoD for
this but pointed out that, while welcome, this information was
not as detailed as we had hoped.[13]
The information provided by the MoD in the 2009-10 Main Estimates
memorandum is a great advance on what was provided last year.
The Table (reproduced below) setting out forecast costs under
RfR2 for 2009-10 breaks down an overall sum—such as given
the previous year—into the same elements as feature in previous
Supplementary Estimates memoranda. We are grateful to the MoD
for this provision of more detailed information.Table
2: Estimated cost of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq at Main
Estimates 2009-10
| Cost Type
| Iraq £M
| Afghanistan £M
|
| Direct Resource DEL
| | |
| Civilian Personnel
| 9 | 16
|
| Military Personnel
| 37 | 148
|
| Stock/Other Consumption
| 189 | 480
|
| Infrastructure Costs
| 69 | 216
|
| Equipment Support Costs
| 231 | 485
|
| Other Costs and Services
| 93 | 423
|
| Income Foregone/ Generated (-)
| 1 | -12
|
| Total Direct Resource DEL
| 629 | 1,756
|
| Indirect Resource DEL
| 165 | 258
|
| Total Resource DEL
| 794 | 2,014
|
| Capital DEL
| | |
| Capital Additions
| 83 | 1,481
|
| Total Capital DEL
| 83 | 1,481
|
| Total Estimated Costs
| 877 | 3,495
|
Source: Ev 4, Table 8
12. In our Report on the 2008-09 Spring Supplementary
Estimate, we noted that, at that late point in the Financial Year,
the MoD was expecting to spend "over twice the amount it
set down as a likely minimum for operational costs at the time
of the last Main Estimate". We expressed the hope that the
2009-10 forecasts would be more robust.[14]
We are pleased to note that the figure for expected operational
costs in Afghanistan for 2009-10 set out in the memorandum accompanying
the Main Estimates is not only usefully broken down but more precise
and, importantly, greater in size than the figure of £3 billion
which the Prime Minister announced to the House on 29 April 2009.[15]
The MoD has clearly not kept complacently to the sort of forecast
outline minimum it placed within the memorandum accompanying the
Main Estimates for the last Financial Year but has set out what
we expect to be a more realistic and thus more robust figure.
13. Current forecasts suggest
that the cost of operations in Iraq this Financial Year will be
£877 million, and in Afghanistan £3,495 million, a total
of some £4,372 million.[16]
We do not yet have an out-turn for
Financial Year 2008-09 for those theatres, but on the basis of
the latest forecast included in the Spring Supplementary Estimates
(of £1,958 million and £2,559 million for Iraq and Afghanistan
respectively—in total, £4,517 million),[17]
these sums represent a decrease
of 55.2% and an increase of 36.6% respectively against expected
costs for Financial Year 2008-09. The
overall reduction, adding together both theatres, is 3.2%.
This is the first reduction
in overall costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since those
operations began to be carried out in both theatres, although
Supplementary Estimates this Year might negate that reduction.
14. Resource expenditure on peacekeeping is down
17.2%, as against the forecast from the 2008-09 Spring Supplementary
Estimate, from £3,400m to £2,800 million. Within this,
the Iraq resource spend is down from £1679m to £794
million (-52%) and the Afghanistan resource spend is up from £1710m
to £2014 million (+18%). Capital expenditure on peacekeeping
is on the same basis up 38% from £1,128m to £1,564 million,
of which the Iraq net capital spend is down from £273m to
£83 million (-70%) and the Afghanistan net capital spend
is up from £849m to £1481 million (+74%).
15. The reduction in costs for Iraq is of course
largely a result of the drawdown of UK forces. Continuing costs
in this theatre reflect specific drawdown costs and the costs
for the main UK military presence in the first part of the Financial
Year and for the remaining, much smaller, elements for the rest
of the Year, the majority of UK Forces leaving Iraq by the end
of July 2009. The MoD memorandum is helpful about the grounds
for the increase in Afghanistan costs:
"Operations in Afghanistan include the additional
security costs required for the local elections, and the costs
of around 200 personnel providing counter improvised explosive
device (IED) expertise. Capital costs for Afghanistan include
Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) such as further force protection
(e.g. tactical support vehicles and surveillance equipment), and
ongoing further modifications to military equipment for use in
the operational environment (e.g. further adaptations to Tornado
aircraft and Lynx and Merlin helicopters). UORs by their very
nature reveal a capability gap in a specific operational environment
and are therefore sensitive. We therefore cannot provide precise
details. There is also an additional capital provision for increased
airfield and associated support infrastructure in Afghanistan."[18]
16. As this will be our last opportunity in this
Parliament to scrutinise the MoD's Main Estimates, we have taken
the opportunity to put side by side the costs of operations in
Iraq and in Afghanistan for each Financial Year since we began
our scrutiny of these costs in 2005. We have set these out below
for Iraq, for Afghanistan, and then for both theatres combined.
These tables help provide a sense of the scale of these operations
in the last five years, of the changes in the scale of the component
costs and of their overall trajectory.
Figure
1: Overall cost of operations, Iraq and Afghanistan, 2005-06 to
2009-10
Source:
previous Defence Committee Reports and Ev 4, Table 8Table
3: Iraq: cost of operations, 2005-06 to 2009-10 (£ million)
| Cost Type
| Iraq outturn
2005-06
| Iraq outturn
2006-07
| Iraq outturn
2007-08
| Iraq
forecast
2008-09 (Spring)
| Iraq
forecast
2009-10 (Main)
|
| Resource - Direct
| | | |
| |
| Military personnel
| 80 | 100
| 98 | 116
| 37 |
| Civilian personnel
| 14 | 15
| 14 | 18
| 9 |
| Stock/other consumption
| 219 | 218
| 237 | 240
| 189 |
| Infrastructure
Costs
| 81 | 83
| 130 | 150
| 69 |
| Equipment support costs
| 220 | 206
| 278 | 356
| 231 |
| Other costs and services
| 111 | 137
| 162 | 175
| 93 |
| Income foregone / (generated)
| 10 | 5
| 4 | (1)
| 1 |
| Indirect Resource
| 62 | 23
| 131 | 625
| 165 |
| Total (Resource)
| 797 | 787
| 1054 | 1679
| 794 |
| Capital Additions
| 160 | 169
| 403 | 279
| 83 |
| TOTAL
| 957 | 956
| 1,457 | 1,958
| 877 |
Source: previous Defence Committee Reports and
Ev 4, Table 8Table
4: Afghanistan: cost of operations, 2005-06 to 2009-10 (£
million)
| Cost Type
| Afghan
outturn
2005-06
| Afghan
outturn
2006-07
| Afghan
outturn
2007-08
| Afghan
forecast
2008-09 (Spring)
| Afghan
forecast
2009-10 (Main)
|
| Resource - Direct
| | | |
| |
| Military personnel
| 8 | 50
| 85 | 73
| 148 |
| Civilian personnel
| 2 | 4
| 9 | 12
| 16 |
| Stock/other consumption
| 57 | 164
| 301 | 521
| 480 |
| Infrastructure
Costs
| 11 | 101
| 149 | 167
| 216 |
| Equipment support costs
| 24 | 112
| 200 | 422
| 485 |
| Other costs and services
| 37 | 89
| 160 | 305
| 423 |
| Income foregone / (generated)
| 8 | (2)
| (11) | (15)
| (12) |
| Indirect Resource
| 1 | 42
| 156 | 225
| 258 |
| Total (Resource)
| 148 | 560
| 1,049 | 1,710
| 2014 |
| Capital Additions
| 51 | 178
| 433 | 849
| 1,481 |
| TOTAL
| 199 | 738
| 1,482 | 2,559
| 3,495 |
Source: previous Defence Committee Reports and
Ev 4, Table 8Table
5: Iraq and Afghanistan: cost of operations, 2005-06 to 2009-10
(£ million)
| Cost Type
| Iraq /Afghanistan outturn
2005-06
| Iraq
/Afghanistan outturn
2006-07
| Iraq
/Afghanistan outturn
2007-08
| Iraq
/Afghanistan
forecast
2008-09 (Spring)
| Iraq
/Afghanistan
forecast
2009-10
(Main)
|
| Resource - Direct
| | | |
| |
| Military personnel
| 88 | 150
| 183 | 189
| 185 |
| Civilian personnel
| 16 | 19
| 23 | 30
| 25 |
| Stock/other consumption
| 276 | 382
| 538 | 761
| 669 |
| Infrastructure
Costs
| 92 | 184
| 279 | 317
| 285 |
| Equipment support costs
| 244 | 318
| 478 | 778
| 716 |
| Other costs and services
| 148 | 226
| 322 | 480
| 516 |
| Income foregone / (generated)
| 18 | 3
| (7) | (16)
| (11) |
| Indirect Resource
| 63 | 65
| 287 | 850
| 423 |
| Total (Resource)
| 945 | 1,347
| 2,103 | 3,389
| 2,808 |
| Capital Additions
| 211 | 347
| 836 | 1128
| 1564 |
| TOTAL
| 1,156 | 1,694
| 2,939 | 4,517
| 4,372 |
Source: previous Defence Committee reports and
Ev 4, Table 8
Drawdown in Iraq
17. Given that most UK forces will have withdrawn
from Iraq by the end of July 2009, four months into the Financial
Year, it is perhaps not surprising that the estimated costs of
£877 million for this Financial Year are under half of the
amount forecast for the whole of the preceding twelve months.
Clearly there were always going to be specific costs relating
to drawdown which would be additional to the general operational
costs for UK forces for the first part of 2009 during which the
main bulk of UK forces remained in Iraq. The Spring Supplementary
Estimate for 2008-09 included an additional £455 million
to cover some of these specific drawdown costs within that Financial
Year.[19] The Government
response to our Report on those Estimates, however, fails to set
out to what extent this allocation was used during the Financial
Year.[20] An additional
request for this information has also been met by the statement
that the figures cannot be given as they are "still subject
to final audit confirmation" and that "work is ongoing
to ascertain the final impairment costs of fighting equipment
deployed in Iraq".[21]
The supplementary memorandum from the MoD does however say that
"the provisional Indirect DEL out-turn for 2008-09 suggests
a lower figure" than £455 million.[22]
18. The Government response to our Report on
the 2008-09 Spring Supplementary Estimate did however set out
in some detail expected drawdown costs for Iraq for 2009-10. Component
parts of these costs will be:
- £13 million for hire service
contracts to replace equipment returned to the UK;
- £97 million for mechanical handling equipment
(e.g. cranes) and other equipment support costs;
- £21 million infrastructure, accommodation
and other costs of withdrawal;
- £56 million for transport (through Defence
Supply Chain Operations Movement and Vehicles Group; and
- (£10 million) stock return from theatre.[23]
19. These component costs aggregate to £177
million. Consequently, the remaining £700 million cost for
2009-10 is to cover the presence of the main UK force in Iraq
until its withdrawal by the end of July 2009 (for four months
of the Financial Year) and the smaller force of some 400 personnel
whose role in Iraq will be maintained for the rest of the Financial
Year. However, the sum of £700 million is nearly half the
cost of maintaining the full UK force in Iraq for the previous
twelve months (excluding the extra £455 million drawdown
contingency). We
expect the MoD, in its response to this Report, to set out more
clearly why the cost of operations in Iraq in Financial Year 2009-10
is still so relatively significant when for most of that Year
only approximately 400 UK personnel will remain in theatre.
20. Given that drawdown cost for Iraq for 2009-10,
set at £177 million, is significantly lower than the contingency
set aside for 2008-09, most of the drawdown cost for Op TELC as
a whole clearly fell within that earlier year. It is therefore
frustrating that the response to our request for a breakdown of
drawdown costs for 2008-09 has twice met with no substantive response.
This is unsatisfactory. We
expect the MoD in its response to this Report, or within its Annual
Report and Accounts to set out clearly, comprehensively and in
appropriate detail the specific drawdown costs in Iraq for Financial
Year 2008-09. If these costs significantly exceed or fall under
the £455 million allocated for the purpose, we also expect
the MoD to explain why this is so.
21. A Departmental Minute laid before the House
on the same day that we received the Government response to our
Report on the 2008-09 Spring Supplementary Estimate provides an
insight into some of the drawdown costs of Iraq. This Minute concerns
the gifting to US forces infrastructure consisting of four dining
facilities and four other incomplete structures (three accommodation
units and a hospital unit). This infrastructure (which will in
turn be passed on to the Iraqi Government) is valued at some £96.476
million in total—some £45.399 million for the dining
facilities and some £50.620 million for the incomplete structures.
(The total also includes a small sum of £456,886 to cover
the contents of the completed buildings.)[24]
Their cost of construction fell in Financial Years 2007-08 and
2008-09, some £61 million in the former and some £35
million in the latter, under RfR2 in each year.[25]
22. This Minute, and the related letter from
the then Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon John Hutton
MP, to Edward Leigh MP, the Chairman of the Committee of Public
Accounts, reveals that the £96.476 million loss of these
buildings will need to be covered in this year's Estimates. As
there is no evidence that it has been covered in the Main Estimates
as laid on 18 June, it will presumably be covered at the time
of the Winter Supplementary Estimates. It seems odd that the Government
did not make reference to this information in its response to
our Report or in the memorandum accompanying the Main Estimates.
Indeed, the drawdown costs for Iraq set out in the Government
response for this Financial Year are entirely silent on this loss.
We expect the MoD to set
out for us when the costs of the loss represented by the gifting
of infrastructure to US forces in Iraq will be accounted for,
and when the House will formally be asked to vote monies as a
consequence. We also request an explanation of why this drawdown
cost does not feature in the broken down costs set out in the
Government response to our last Report on the Spring Supplementary
Estimates.
Urgent Operational Requirements
23. In our Report last year on the 2008-09 Main
Estimates we expressed some concern at the future impact on the
MoD's main Budget of the substantial sum expected to be spent
on Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) in that Financial Year.[26]
At the time of those Main Estimates, the MoD expected the cost
of UORs in 2008-09 to amount to £1.065 billion. By the time
of the Winter Supplementary Estimates this figure had been refined
to £1.063 billion[27]—and
by the time of the Spring Supplementary Estimate it had fallen
very slightly to £1.054 billion.[28]
The formal outturn cost on UORs for that Year is yet to be made
available to us.[29]
We accept the assurances of the MoD in the Government response
attached to this Report that the cost will not go beyond the £1.065
billion originally cited, not least because 50% of any sums spent
on UORs beyond this limit would fall partly on the MoD main Budget
for 2010-2011, in line with the agreement between the Treasury
and the MoD announced to the House by the then Secretary of State,
the Rt Hon Des Browne MP, on 12 November 2007.[30]
24. In the memorandum accompanying the MoD Main
Estimates for 2009-10, the MoD helpfully broke down UOR costs
for each theatre and by resource and capital. This is set out
in the Table below: Table
6: Forecast UOR expenditure breakdown in 2008-09
| Type of Cost
| Iraq £M
| Afghanistan £M
| Total UOR £M
|
| Resource
| 116 | 128
| 244 |
| Capital
| 147 | 663
| 810 |
| Total |
263 | 791
| 1,054 |
Source: Ev 13
The MoD also pointed out in that memorandum that
the additional capital request in the Spring Supplementary Estimate
included new UOR costs of £13 million for Iraq and a combination
of £17 million new costs, some forecast UOR reductions of
£18 million and £53 million for the Protected Mobility
UOR package for Afghanistan.[31]
That this additional UOR cost of £65 million is likely still
to permit the total UOR cost in the outturn to come in lower than
the total set at the time of the Winter Supplementary Estimate
presumably means that there were other savings earlier in the
Year or that the original forecast was generous. We
would be grateful for confirmation of UOR costs for 2008-09, accompanied
by a note explaining the changes to the composition of these costs
over the period concerned.
25. We note that the MoD in its response to our
earlier Report and in the later supplementary memorandum also
points out that the estimate for UORs in Financial Year 2009-10,
as agreed with HM Treasury, is £635 million, considerably
less than for the previous Financial Year. Any UOR costs over
and above this agreed sum of £635 million will fall in full
on the Defence budget in Financial Year 2011-12.[32]
We would
be grateful for an explanation of why UOR costs beyond the limit
agreed between the Treasury and the MoD are now to fall in full
upon the MoD two Financial Years later: this seems to go against
the agreement announced to the House by the then Secretary of
State, the Rt Hon Des Browne MP, in November 2007, which stated
that such costs would be split 50:50 between the Treasury and
the MoD. One reason
for the reduction in UOR costs is that the Protected Mobility
Package (PMP) for 2009-10 will not be taken as part of the UOR
spend as it was in 2008-09. (Arrangements for 2010-11 are not
yet settled.) While £53 million of the PMP was covered by
the total UOR estimate last Financial Year, the £424 million
of Treasury contribution to this Financial Year's PMP costs is
being dealt with separately, out with the UOR allocation.[33]
However, even taking into account the amount of PMP costs within
UOR costs last year, UOR costs this year will still be below non-PMP
UOR costs for Afghanistan last year. We
request the MoD, in its response to this Report, to break down
the projected 2009-10 £635 million UOR costs in the same
way as it did for 2008-09, by theatre and by capital or resource
type. We are concerned that this limit on UOR costs may be an
indication that the key ingredients of UORs, namely that they
are required, urgently, for operational reasons, may be seen taking
second place to cost considerations. We also request the MoD to
give an explanation of why UOR costs are expected to be so much
less than for the previous Financial Year.
26. The supplementary memorandum from the MoD
attached to this Report helpfully sets out that while the Treasury
is providing £500 million for this PMP over three Financial
Years (£53 million in 2008-09, £424 million in 2009-10
and £23 million in 2010-11) it is not clear yet what the
costs to the MoD will be and when they will fall. The estimate
given in the Government response to our Report on Defence Equipment
2009 (received on 27 April) suggested that the total cost of the
PMP would be £680 million, £180 million thus falling
to be paid for by the MoD.[34]
This overall sum has already risen by 9.7% since the original
estimate. As the £500 million Treasury contribution is already
set and not subject to change, the MoD will have to carry 100%
of any continuing increase in costs for the PMP. We
are concerned that there might still be significant increases
in the cost of the Protected Mobility Package, all of which will
fall to be paid in full by the MoD. We request the MoD in its
response to this Report set out its latest assessment of the cost
to it of this Package, when this cost is likely to fall, and when
the House will formally be notified of this cost.
Conclusion
27. We recommend that the House
of Commons approve the MoD's Main Estimates, and have identified
no issues which require a debate before it does so. The House
should note that for the first time these Estimates contain a
formal request for resources for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
which means that, while they cannot directly be compared to previous
Main Estimates, they do represent a more realistic assessment
of operational costs and of monies for which the MoD is responsible
for the whole Financial Year.
1 HM Treasury, Central Government Supply Estimates
2009-10, Main Supply Estimates, 18 July 2009, HC 514 Back
2
Ev 1-10 Back
3
Ev 11-14 and Ev 14-15 respectively Back
4
Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2007-08, Operational
costs in Afghanistan and Iraq: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2007-08,
HC 400, paras 2 and 3 Back
5
Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, Costs
of peace-keeping in Iraq and Afghanistan: Spring Supplementary
Estimate 2005-06, HC 980, para 15 Back
6
Defence Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2005-06, Costs of
peace-keeping in Iraq and Afghanistan: Spring Supplementary Estimate
2005-06: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report
of Session 2005-06, HC 1136, paras 3 and 4 Back
7
Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 2006-07, Costs of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: Winter Supplementary Estimate
2006-07, HC 129, para 8 Back
8
Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2007-08, Ministry
of Defence Main Estimates 2008-09, HC 885, paras 17-27 Back
9
ibid., Ev 3, para 6.6 Back
10
ibid., para 15 Back
11
Ev 4, Table 8 Back
12
HC (2007-08) 885, Ev 3, para 4.4 Back
13
HC (2007-08) 885, paras 14, 15 and 17 Back
14
Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2008-09, Spring
Supplementary Estimate 2008-09, HC 301, para 7 Back
15
Ev 12, response to recommendation 6 Back
16
Ev 4, Table 8 Back
17
HC (2008-09) 301, p 9, Table 2 Back
18
Ev 4, para 4.4 Back
19
HC (2008-09) 301, paras 8 and 9 Back
20
Ev 12, response to recommendation 7 Back
21
Ev 15, response to question 5 Back
22
ibid. Back
23
Ev 13, response to recommendation 8 Back
24
Ev 16 and 17 Back
25
Ev 14, response to question 1 Back
26
HC (2007-08) 885, para 14 Back
27
Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2008-09, Winter
Supplementary Estimates 2008-09, HC 52, para 17 Back
28
HC (2008-09) 301, para 15 Back
29
Ev 13, response to recommendation 10 Back
30
HC Deb, 12 November 2007, col 500 Back
31
Ev 13, response to recommendation 9 Back
32
ibid., response to recommendation 10 Back
33
Ev 13, response to recommendation 10, and Ev 15, response to question
6 Back
34
Defence Committee, First Special Report of Session 2008-09, Defence
Equipment 2009: Government response to the Committee's Third Report
of Session 2008-09, HC 491, p 5, response to recommendation
7 Back
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