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CA 14
Supplementary memorandum from the Department for International Development (DfID)
MEETING DFID'S WORKFORCE DEMANDS IN HOSTILE AND DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENTS
1. Introduction
1. This note summarises the DFID study of its ability to fill posts in hostile and difficult environments and how it is taking forward the agreed recommendations.
2. Rationale and purpose of the study
2.1. This study undertaken between January and May 2009, looked at how DFID could better meet the workforce demands of a set of particularly difficult locations - those where the challenges of living and working, combined with restrictive posting arrangements ("forced unaccompanied" or "child-free") necessitated by those conditions, are thought to limit the number (and possibly quality) of candidates willing to serve in those programmes many of which are also corporate priorities.
2.2 Currently DFID applies restrictive posting arrangements (RPA) to nine locations, comprising:
i. countries either in, or emerging from conflict:
ii. situations posing a serious terrorist threat: and
iii. smaller posts where living conditions are unsuitable for dependent children.
3. The study's relevance however goes well beyond DFID's current approach to staffing those nine programmes. Rising insecurity in some other locations, and an increasing focus on fragile and conflict affected states (as outlined in the commitments made in the recent White Paper), mean DFID should reasonably expect and plan for a future where more of its people will work in places where RPAs are in force. Focusing on the current nine RPA locations provided a useful "control group" to understand what motivates people to volunteer for these situations and to review DFID's response.
3. Main findings of the study
3.1. Evidence gathered from HR records; surveys of those who have and have not served in these places; and a review of what others (both HMG parties and international bodies are doing) led the study to eight core conclusions about DFID's performance to date in meeting the workforce demands of difficult postings.
3.2. Conclusion one - an ever increasing number and proportion of DFID's staff are serving in difficult places.
On 31 March 2009, the nine RPA locations
accounted for 85 Home Civil Service (HCS) posts - 21.3% of DFID's HCS working
overseas; up from 47 (11.2%) in December 2006, and 29 (less than 5%) in 2003. DFID
has been particularly successful in mobilising people to work in some very
difficult places. Between April 2004 and December 2008, 74 different (HCS) staff
worked in
Table 1: Forced unaccompanied and child free posts
3.3. Conclusion two - thus far DFID has successfully met the demand for staff.
The "gap profile" for RPA locations has been broadly similar to that for other overseas offices, and the success rate in filling vacancies at least comparable to other overseas offices.
3.4. Conclusion three - some posts are harder to fill than others.
A2/A1 advisory posts - specifically for economics and governance - have proved most difficult to fill. These skills are in high demand across the organisation, giving advisers more choice in terms of postings. In contrast, Band B administrative posts have been comparatively easier to resource. The study's analysis suggested this reflects the generally younger age profile of that group (family commitments are therefore less likely to be an impediment); the greater promotion opportunities for Band B staff for which service in an RPA location is considered an advantage; and the significant uplift to salaries made by allowances.
3.5. Conclusion four - difficult posts don't necessarily attract a specific "set" or "type" of person.
Records show that the average age, gender and family status of those serving in RPA locations has been broadly the same as others working overseas. But, there is some evidence of an emerging core of people serving repeatedly in these places.
3.6. Conclusion five - the volunteer principle remains the best. The legal case for DFID to direct people to work in specific locations exists. But the benefits of shifting away from the volunteer principle are doubtful particularly when it has yet to be shown that DFID has fully exploited the volunteer route. Downsides include: · motivation and productivity - people required to work in any location against their will be less motivated than volunteers
· consistency of application - requiring some but not others to move against their will - particularly where personal security may be compromised - would be seen as unfair
· compromises the key duty of care principle, that if staff are volunteers, then they can reasonably be judged to have made an informed decision about working in a situation which may involve personal risk. 3.7. Conclusion six - career opportunities and job satisfaction are more important factors in encouraging volunteers than financial inducements.
The results of a survey of all DFID staff who had served in RPAs over the last 5 years showed 82% took the job for career enhancement and new challenges. Just 5% cited financial benefit. But most people (54%) would not have applied without some financial recognition. Additional money is thus a necessary, but not sufficient factor in generating volunteers. A similar picture emerged in terms of additional leave and "breather" breaks (the six on two off rotation) offered in some RPA locations. While never a primary reason for volunteering, the overwhelming majority of people (78%) where these extra benefits are offered indicated they would not be prepared to go without the regular periods away from post to reunite with family and friends.
3.8. Conclusion seven - there is a potentially large pool of untapped volunteers within DFID.
A survey of 120 advisory staff (focused on those with the skills in greatest demand) showed only 13% were unwilling to consider an RPA posting. 15% described themselves as very willing; 25% as willing and 47% had an open mind. In terms of the reasons for not having applied thus far, 82% cited compulsory unaccompanied status and 77% the additional stress it would cause to family members.
3.9. Conclusion eight - other organisations are facing similar staffing challenges.
FCO and MoD in the
4. The study's case for further change
4.1. The study assessed that while DFID has been successful in meeting the current demands for staff to work in RPAs to date, the business case to consider a revised and strengthened approach is strong given:
· the likely increase in workforce demands from fragile and conflict affected states generated by DFID's focus on this agenda
· a concern that our current approach cannot guarantee to generate a secure, predictable supply of the best, well prepared talent to take on professionally challenging, high profile assignments which we know are hard to fill.
5. Agreed recommendations for improvement
5.1. In looking at how DFID could improve its approach to meeting the demands of hard to fill posts the study identified three core principles:
i. there's no single magical "fix." The requirement is for more intensive proactive management and a comprehensive approach which identifies demand early and generates a steady flow of volunteers based on delivering the incentives needed to generate volunteers and which better manages succession;
ii. all parts of DFID (not simply those looking to fill specific vacancies) need to be involved. This is corporate and hence a shared responsibility;
iii. the proposed measures won't solve all DFID's problems in staffing "difficult to fill posts," nor will they address wider issues around refreshing the skills base.
5.2. The study set out eight areas for potential improvements. These have been considered by DFID and the recommendations below agreed..
5.3. Recommendation 1 - DFID should retain the volunteer principle for all posts. Compulsion should be the very final step and only when it has been definitively shown that efforts to generate volunteers have failed.
5.4. Recommendation 2 - increasing financial incentives was unlikely to generate significantly more volunteers.
5.5. Recommendation 3 - DFID should adopt a strategy based on pro-actively developing and managing three sources of volunteers: those from within the existing workforce; new recruits into DFID and secondments; and making better and more structured use of consultants.
5.6. Recommendation 4 - as a general premise, the key to such a strategy should be the adoption of a pool approach to fill a defined core of priority hard to fill posts based on MoD's experience in deploying civilians through its "Support to Operations" initiative.
5.7. Membership of the pool would not be automatic. Applicants would be first sifted for suitability - including personal awareness training - with the possibility that individuals deemed narrowly unsuitable could be given specific training to bring them up to standard over a period of time to enable them to deploy.
5.8. Recommendation 5 - more specifically, DFID should establish its own "pool" as the primary source of candidates for difficult to fill posts and draw on the Stabilisation Unit's Civilian Stabilisation Support cadre (CSSC) where the DFID pool is not able to find a suitable individual.
5.9. The
establishment of the CSSC was one of the key recommendations of the 2008
Cabinet Office review of the
5.10. Recommendation 6 - it was desirable to strengthen the 'career incentive'; e.g. to manage 'next posting' moves better; and to ensure that DFID tracks appointments and decisions on promotability to assess the extent to which people with relevant stretching experience in fragile states are being recognised.
5.11 The study considered the case for giving Divisions in DFID greater flexibility to vary guidance regarding the proportion of staff assessed as "exceptionally suited for promotion" for RPA locations. DFID concluded that it was possible to use career incentives whilst maintaining the integrity of the promotability system. It was also important not to 'over-promise' career enhancements for staff which could be difficult to fulfil.
5.12. Recommendation 7 - future recruitment exercises (including secondments) for those core skills in greatest demand (particularly economics, governance and conflict) should invite applicants to join the pool described above as means of entry into DFID.
5.13. Recommendation 8 - DFID's Heads of Profession (responsible for the recruitment and professional development of DFID's advisors) should work closely with the SU to make better use of its database of deployable civilian experts (DCEs) in order to meet specific predictable staffing needs as well as manage their professional cadres in ways that make sure they are providing sufficient numbers of people for the difficult posts DFID needs to fill.
6. Taking the study forward
6.1. DFID is making progress on a number of the recommendations with Human Resources Division (HRD) leading on a review of incentives and benefits as part of the Public Value Programme (PVP) Allowances Review. HRD is also facilitating consultation between Stabilisation Unit and the Heads of Profession to encourage professional Advisory staff to volunteer to be on the Stabilisation cadre. In support of recommendations 3, 4 and 5 HRD will contact Directors in December to identify which posts should be included as part of the 'pool and cluster' approach. It has discussed the timing issues with the Stabilisation Unit to ensure that, if DFID's volunteer staff are either not available or suitable for a key vacancy, DFID can immediately call upon the Stabilisation cadre without losing significant time.
Why Counter Narcotics in Helmand is the
largest poppy producing province in 2008/09 CN plan: In 2008/09 Governor
Mangal developed (with What was the impact? There were two elements to judge the success of the plan: counter narcotics and governance impacts. Both can only be truly judged on a much longer timeframe. However, even in the first year, and in its basic form, the plan had positive impacts on both: · Opium cultivation decreased in 2009. Although predominantly driven by price effects, analysis shows that the CN plan positively built on this price impact. This shows that even under the toughest security conditions, progress is possible. · Governance impact was
demonstrated in the relatively secure areas of What should happen in the future? Sustained counter
narcotics programmes are needed to impact on the trade and insurgency in Programmes should be concentrated in relatively secure areas of the province, with all three elements of the plan (public information, licit livelihoods and rule of law) integrated and sequenced to provide maximum impact. This integrated model for delivery - through the provincial government, with international military and civilian support - should be applied in other provinces in the South. Programmes should be directed where there is strong Afghan provincial leadership - either the governor, or relevant line ministries - and concentrating activity in relatively secure areas. Recommendations for poppy producing provinces in the South: · Identify where there is potential Afghan leadership capacity to run a CN programme · Identify areas within the province where the security and economic environment is permissive, or can be improved to allow outreach by the provincial and district leadership, as well as access to markets for farmers · Work with the Afghan provincial leadership to develop public information, livelihood and rule of law plans. These should be as comprehensive as capacity permits, and should look to build up over a multi-year timeframe [1] |