Russia 01

Memorandum from Martin McCauley

Introduction

Before examining Russia's relations with NATO and the implications for Great Britain it would be useful to look at the distribution of power in Russia today.

The Putin regime exhibits some similarities with the former Soviet and Tsarist regimes. What is striking is the super-centralised state. Decision making is conducted by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitry Medvedev and a small group of officials. The way they reach decisions is opaque and difficult to decipher. The rationale is the self-preservation of this elite in power.

There is an ongoing struggle for influence among these officials over Putin. As the economy fails, some will argue that there is a western conspiracy to weaken Russia. Putin, who has a limited understanding of economics, will find it more and more difficult to decide on appropriate policies in the present crisis.

The present distribution of power has been called 'semi-presidentialism'. This refers to the fact that while Dmitry Medvedev is President he does not have the power of Vladimir Putin when he was President between 2000 and 2008. Medvedev appears to concentrate mainly on legal affairs and the fight against corruption. The real power rests with Vladimir Putin who is responsible for foreign, security and economic affairs. However some Russian observers would argue that Putin is the front man for the Yeltsin 'family' - a group consisting of Yeltsin family members, officials and oligarchs - which handpicked Putin as President in 2000. In this analysis, Putin is not a free agent but is there to defend the interests of the 'family'. The Medvedev-Putin tandem is not an example of dual power or a diarchy: Medvedev is the junior in the relationship. Despite what some observers originally feared (particularly in the UK), this relationship has not weakened the Russian state. In fact, it can be argued, it has strengthened existing power relations.

Medvedev is the softer face of Kremlin power. He appears more conciliatory and open to dialogue.

How is it that a small coterie in the Kremlin has acquired the right to take all key decisions?

When Vladimir Putin became President of Russia in 2000, he had several goals to pursue. He was fearful that Russia could fragment as the Soviet Union had done in 1991. As an outsider in Moscow - he was from St Petersburg - he brought with him a team which was dominated by members from that city. As he had never been elected to a major public office, he had no political support base on which he could rely. His background was in the security services, the KGB and the FSB. It was almost inevitable that former security officials would play a major role in his administration.

His first task was to gain control of the media. Two media magnates, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, were quickly sent into exile and their empires acquired by the state.

The FSB, other security agencies and military personnel now play a major role in the upper echelons of the state administration (they are collectively known as the siloviki or strong ones). Putin trusts uniformed personnel. Something like six thousand FSB officers occupy state positions and military generals are often found as governors, presidential envoys and so on. The military has prevented the development of civilian military experts by simply denying them access to information. This is a 'need to know' system, bearing comparison with the Soviet model.

Whereas the Duma under Yeltsin attempted to rein in the military and security services, the present parliament, in the words of a Russian critic, is a 'puppet show'.

Another favoured group under Putin is the bureaucracy. The astonishing fact is that there are now more bureaucrats in Russia than under the communists. Putin has secured their loyalty by generous payments and perks. Officials can use their positions to extract bribes from the population and in this way greatly augment their disposable income.

Putin has been a lucky politician. The explosion of oil and commodity prices during this decade has made possible the development of a 'Putin model' of governance.

One estimate is that the oil bonanza has brought in an extra $1.3 trillion (Russian GDP last year was about $1.8 trillion). About $700 billion of this was held in the Central Bank of Russia, stabilisation and wealth funds. The rest could be spent on priming the 'Putin model'.

Since oil was the main source of the new wealth, the state had to gain control over it. The confiscation of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Yukos - the most efficient oil company in Russia at the time - was part of this campaign.

The Kremlin exerts political influence over key sectors of the economy, such as the oil sector, by keeping everything centralised. It does this by appointing senior officials, many of them members of the presidential administration, to chair the boards of directors of key companies. The Kremlin tentacles reach everywhere. A recent example of this was the appointment, in December 2008, of Alexander Voloshin, head of the presidential administration from 1999 to 2003, as chair of Norilsk Nickel. These company directors report on a regular basis to Putin and the presidential administration. It goes without saying that these high officials are chosen not for their managerial expertise but for their loyalty to the Putin Team.

The presidential administration is roughly equivalent to the Party Central Committee Secretariat

during the communist regime. Its departments parallel all government ministries and agencies.

Hence it can be regarded as a parallel government.

Another reason for the state control of the oil industry was that much of it was in Siberia. If Moscow owned the wells Siberia could not think of becoming semi-independent of Moscow.

Petrodollars have promoted the emergence of a new, well to do business middle class. It has integrated into the world economy and now has business interests worldwide. It is a major source of legitimacy for the 'Putin model'. Most of these businessmen are involved in state-owned or state-influenced enterprises. In other words, they are tied to the Kremlin.

Some of the new business middle class refer to the present system as 'authoritarian liberalism' or 'managed democracy'. The aim is to restore order to the chaotic market of the 1990s. Hence one can say it is a semi-market economy. The present economic downturn has revealed that the government lacks the skills to manage successfully this new semi-market economy.

What are the components of the 'Putin model'?

· A super-centralised state softened now by semi-presidentialism

· A constrained, semi-market economy

· A very limited role for the population, the intelligentsia and the business community in political decision making; their role is mainly to legitimise the existing system

· The emasculation of civil society

· The neutering of the Duma, Council of the Federation and other representative bodies

· The elimination of real politics and its replacement by virtual politics

· The abandonment of the election of governors and their nomination by Moscow

· An expanding bureaucracy and security apparatus

· The toleration of corruption as officials use their office for private gain

Social protests could always be resolved by throwing money at the problem.

The population and the intelligentsia were bought off with rising living standards. This is a major reason why there is no meaningful political and intellectual opposition to the 'Putin model'.

The above is the domestic face of the 'Putin model'. What is its foreign aspect?

Putin's foreign policy was based on two premises:

· The flow of petrodollars would last forever

· America was in decline and, by extension, NATO was in decline

The 'Putin model' is authoritarian. Its core is anti-Americanism. This is because it detests the US concept of liberal democracy, which Russia views as suffused with 'imperial' ambitions and exported to the rest of the world; civil society and a liberal market economy. Anti-Americanism stems from Moscow's perception that Washington engages in double standards. It preaches the rule of law and democracy while sowing chaos throughout the world. The fear is that American values could lead to the breakup of the Russian state. This, in Putin's perception, almost happened in the 1990s.Russia has developed a semi-market economy which acts as a barrier to the penetration of American capital and, indirectly, influence.

When once pressed about how long the 'Putin model' would last, Putin replied: '15-20 years'.

The 'Putin model' has developed 'managed democracy' or 'liberal authoritarianism' which means that the Putin Team tries to take all key decisions. It manages a semi-market economy dominated by state companies. Businessmen operate under the watchful eye of the presidential administration and the FSB. If a company is viewed as operating against the interests of the Kremlin, the tax inspectorate is loosed upon it and it is soon brought into line.

As previously mentioned, political-economic power is heavily centralised. The trend of appointing top officials to be chairs of strategically important companies began under Putin. Initially the key factor was to ensure the growth of these key industrial sectors but it is now to prevent the collapse of the economy. This trend is set to continue in the present economic downturn.

Abroad it talks of 'sovereign democracy'. This is an attempt to protect Russian against foreign influence. The new business class is used to spread Russian influence abroad and to legitimise the regime. The myth has to be maintained abroad that Russia is a great power. This leads to self-censorship and is one of the reasons why Russia has been so slow to react to the world economic downturn. The argument, articulated by Putin, was, until recently, that Russia was so strong that it would not be affected, like America and others, by the credit crunch.

The argument is that Russia has special security needs. President Dmitry Medvedev has spoken of a 'zone of privileged influence'. He has declined to specify what he means by this. Presumably it means the former republics of the Soviet Union. No foreign power is to encroach on it. Hence Ukraine and Georgia are of special significance for Moscow. Under no circumstances is NATO to be permitted to draw these two states into its alliance.

Medvedev has also claimed the right for Moscow to intervene in neighbouring states to protect the rights of ethnic Russian and Russian speakers belonging to other ethnic groups. He has even talked about using force to change borders in certain circumstances. Here he is reiterating arguments first advanced by Putin.

Putin was Prime Minister when Russia launched its second war in Chechnya in 1999. That bloody conflict lasted several years and sowed the seeds of the present security problems in the North Caucasus. The ruthlessness displayed during the Chechen campaign is one of the marks of the 'Putin model'.

The Current and Future Relationship Between Russia and NATO, And Between NATO Members, Including Examining Areas Of Tension And Cooperation

As pointed out above, Russia regards NATO as an enemy. It is a cloak for the spreading of American influence and power.

The 'Putin model' has shallow roots in the Russian population, no loyal institutions to defend it and the United Russia party - the ruling party - may prove of little use in a crisis. The new business middle class is a source of support but economic collapse, as in 1998, would wipe out many members of this group.

The liberal democratic model is an alternative for a small part of Russia's intelligentsia. The Putin Team has to ensure that its appeal is restricted to a small part of the intelligentsia.

Given the above, it is not surprising that Putin (the real master in Russia) is relentlessly negative about the United States and all it stands for. A recent example was Davos where he blamed the financial crisis on America. As one Russian commentator put it sarcastically, Putin's speech would have been fine had it been delivered by any other statesman! Russia's economic performance since August 2008 has been poor and the rouble has been one of the three worst performing currencies in the world. It is falling almost daily at present.

Putin is aware that political and military power is based on economic power. The flood of petrodollars after 2002 made it possible to design a new strategic architecture. The core of this was to exclude the American military and NATO from the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moscow would like to have included the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe. However most of them were already in NATO.

Moscow's strategy is to weaken and gradually exclude the Unites States from European security. It argues that Europe does not need NATO any more. Its security can be looked after by a pan-European security organisation. Naturally, Russia would be a leading member of this club. It follows that it could not take any decision which Russia regarded as inimical to its interests.

The implications of the war in Georgia in August 2008

Russia won the war but its equipment was often inferior to that of the Georgian army. This led to a radical rethink about the Russian military. Putin, during his period as President between 2000 and 2008, often talked about military reform. However he achieved very little due to the opposition of the top military brass. Georgia revealed that Russia had to modernise its armed forces.

In October 2008, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov - his detractors delight in pointing out that he is a former furniture salesman and tax inspector without any military expertise - announced a fundamental shakeup of the military. About 300,000 officers and warrant officers are to go in the next three years. About 150,000 will stay but will have to adjust to a quite different military service.

Promises have been made to provide housing for retired officers but Putin has conceded that his cannot be done in Moscow and St Petersburg because of the high cost of property there. Retired officers will have to accept housing in cheaper regions. However the opportunity of employment there will be limited, given the present recession.

Retired officers took to the streets of Moscow in December 2008 to protest against the reform. Generals and admirals with full chests of medals were arrested.

The Ministry of Defence has now backtracked and said the reform will be delayed by up to six months.

One of the reasons for the rethink was the refusal of police units in the Russian Far East to use force against demonstrators in Khabarovsk and other Siberian cities. It is worth noting that no police units anywhere in Siberia were willing to use force against protestors. Units had to be brought in from Moscow to manhandle the crowds.

The Moscow demonstrators were dealt with by drafting in provincial units. Moscow units were deemed too unreliable.

The Kremlin might have to call on the military if police units were not willing to use force against protesters. Given that many officers will be forced to retire because of the military reforms, they may be reluctant to use force against the population. One can envisage a rerun of the situation in August 1991 when military units declined to fire on Russian demonstrators.

The recent report by the IISS on Russia's military capabilities reveals Russia has lost much of its military might over the last 20 years.

Future of Russia and NATO Relations

It all depends on the Obama administration. The main priority for Washington is the domestic American economy. Defence spending will be closely examined to see where savings can be made.

Russia's economic situation is worsening by the day. Even the Russian Minister of Finance is talking about Russia becoming a borrower next year. Some Russian economists expect Russia to be bankrupt before the end of 2009. Hence the grandiose defence plans to modernise Russian weapons have had to be scaled back.

Russia will attempt to make a virtue out of necessity. It is offering cooperation if NATO treats it as an equal, apologises for past mistakes, drops the anti-missile scheme in Poland and the Czech Republic, abandons plans to make Ukraine and Georgia members and stays away from it 'zone of privileged interests'. Quite a shopping list!

Russia's bargaining hand is becoming weaker by the day. NATO does not need to make any concessions to Russia at present.

Differences within NATO

There is a tension between 'Old' Europe and 'New' Europe in NATO. The east Europeans see Russia as a threat. 'Old' Europe, in the main, does not share this perception.

A major player in the 'Old' Europe team is Germany. It does not see Russia as a threat but as an opportunity.

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the present German Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the SPD's candidate for Chancellor in this year's general elections. He has already begun his electoral campaign by addressing an open letter to President Obama about NATO-Russia relations. He sees President Medvedev as a man untouched by the 'Cold War' mentality. He omits all mention in his letter to Vladimir Putin.

He proposes a new security architecture for Europe which will supersede NATO. However 'NATO will be needed in the future too', he remarks, but on a new basis of 'common security of East and West, from Vancouver to Vladivostok'. This appears to go beyond the idea of a pan-European security organisation.

Steinmeier, in contrast to his Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is keen to start negotiations on this new strategic partnership with Russia.

As Steinmeier presented the SPD take on security, Joschka Fischer,did the same for the Greens. Fischer was German Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2005. His article is entitled: 'Russia in NATO: Finding Russia's Place in Europe'. He argues that the West needs Russia's cooperation to address conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Korea and global challenges such as energy security and climate change. The price to pay would be an enhanced role for Russia within NATO, 'including the prospect of full membership'.

An SPD-Green coalition government is a real prospect in Germany after the upcoming elections. This would exacerbate divisions within NATO and weaken the alliance.

The Effectiveness of the NATO-Russia Council

It has been in abeyance since the conflict in Georgia in August 2008. Unofficial contact has been re-established but it is expected that full relations will be resumed after the Munich conference this month.

Dmitry Rogozin, who was a leading nationalist politician before becoming Russia's permanent representative to NATO, never misses an opportunity to attack NATO and the West.

It was noticeable that Moscow was very subdued in its criticism of Israel's actions in Gaza. This was presumably because it wanted to protect its burgeoning military cooperation with Tel Aviv. The only discordant voice was Rogozin who lambasted NATO for double standards. He compared NATO's sharp condemnation of excessive force in Georgia with NATO's silence on Gaza.

The Council could become an important forum for debating cooperation. Russia will set preconditions. These will include the abandonment of the anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia is declining economically and this will make it more amenable to compromise.

The Implications of Recent Tensions With Russia For UK Security

The Alexander Litvinenko-Andrei Lugavoi affair has soured Russian-British relations. Lugavoi is now a member of the Duma and cannot be extradited. A compromise needs to be reached. One suggestion would be to allow the affair to be quietly forgotten.

i) South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia has now lost these territories. The only way they could come back under the control of Tbilisi would be the total collapse of Russia and its fragmentation into many small states. This is unlikely to happen.

Russia would like to bring Georgia back into the 'Russian fold'. This means it could consider attempting to occupy the whole of Georgia.

The Armenian minority in Georgia is very poor and feel disadvantaged. A pretext could be manufactured whereby they call on Russia to protect them.

The main risk is to Ukraine. Ethnic Russians make up a majority of the population of Crimea. Sevastopol, the main Russian naval base on the Black Sea, is in Crimea. Occupying Crimea would, therefore, have naval advantages as well.

Eastern Ukraine, bordering on Russia, also has a majority of ethnic Russians.

Moldova is a divided state and Russia's influence there is already substantial.

The risks of Russia intervening militarily will be discussed below.

ii) Ballistic Missile Defence

NATO regards the anti-missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic as a 'substantial contribution' to protecting its allies against long range ballistic missiles. Moscow regards the system as having an 'anti-Russian potential'. If missiles were fired they would reach Moscow 'in four minutes after take-off and are so precise that they can hit the window of our President's office in the Kremlin'. Such is the graphic opinion of Dmitry Rogozin. For this reason, a strong Russia would never agree to the deployment.

In order to counter the missile defence, Russia announced it would deploy Iskander SS26 missiles in Kaliningrad oblast (the former German East Prussia) which borders Poland and Lithuania which are NATO countries.

The Russian military claim that the SS26 has a range of 500 km and is very accurate and cannot be shot down by any missile defence. They are at present deployed in the North Caucasus and were used in the war against Georgia. However some of them proved inaccurate and hit residential areas. Hence the missile is still being tested. This means there are, in reality, no Iskanders to deploy in Kaliningrad oblast.

President Medvedev and President Obama are expected to have their first meeting at the G20 group of countries in London in April. The Russian President would like to abandon the deployment of SS26s in return for the Americans not installing a ballistic missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic. This would be a very good deal for Moscow since it has no Iskanders to deploy.

iii) NATO Enlargement

As mentioned above Russia will fight tooth and nail to prevent Ukraine and Georgia becoming NATO members. The same applied to other states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states.

These states may become members of the European Union but when it comes to a military alliance, Russia perceives the spread of NATO as a cancer which could be terminal for it.

iv) Russia's Suspension of Participation in the CFE Treaty

The CFE Treaty was judged as restricting the deployment of Russian armour in the south and in the North Caucasus. This condition had to be removed to permit Russia to fight successfully in Georgia.

 

Russia always threatens to retarget its missiles on Europe if it finds that its interests are being ignored. Moscow was annoyed that the United States and NATO were not willing to give sufficient weight to Russian objections to the expansion of NATO in eastern Europe. It feels that the West does not treat Russia as an equal or great power.

 

The Current And Future Relationship Between Russia, the UK and EU

 

Current political relations between Russia and the UK are frosty but economic relations are thriving. There are many small and medium sized companies (SMEs) involved in trade and consultancy. Many young Russians work for a time in London to gain experience and then return to Russia. They are members of the new Russian business middle class.

 

The economic downturn threatens this relationship. If the Russian state faces bankruptcy - a rerun of 1998 - these promising developments may be nipped in the bud.

 

Vladimir Putin was a little more conciliatory at Davos but this was based on his perception that Russia is becoming economically weaker. Russia may use up its currency reserves by the summer. It might then approach the IMF for some emergency loans.

Hence the weaker Russia becomes the more amenable it will become to compromises on defence.

 

Social unrest is likely in Russia if large scale unemployment becomes a reality. The Russian budget is already in deficit and an oil price of $70 a barrel is needed to balance it. The Central Bank of Russia cannot continue bailing out companies and defending the rouble forever. Food is becoming much more expensive - Russia imports about half of its food - and a major factor in the demise of the Gorbachev regime was its inability to provision the country.

 

The 2009 Russian budget is based on oil at $41 a barrel and a 5 per cent deficit is expected. If the oil price drops to $30 or lower some Russian commentators think that mass social unrest will become inevitable. A price of $10 might presage doom for the regime.

 

In other words, the Putin Team will not be able to spend its way out of trouble this time.

There is a possibility that the Putin Team will be swept away in the wave of protests.

 

In order to stay in office a government needs the support of its security services. It is debatable if the military would now fully support the Putin Team given the disquiet over military reform. It might not be willing to shoot at Russian demonstrators. There are hints that middle level FSB officers are unhappy with the present state of affairs. In other words the Putin Team cannot rely on the security services carrying out orders to use force against demonstrators.

 

There is another scenario. The Putin Team may become so desperate that it might provoke a conflict in Georgia and Crimea in order to unify the nation behind them.

As mentioned above there is a doubt that the military would obey orders to launch offensives in Georgia and Crimea.

 

The US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in Washington on 9 January 2009, will give the Russian military pause for thought. The US and Georgia have 'shared values and common interests' and these are of a 'vital' character.

This presumably implies that the US would come to Georgia's aid if attacked by Russia.

At present the Russian military are no match for the US military.

 

Conclusion

 

The present situation in Russia is reminiscent, in some ways, of the late Gorbachev years. If the economy collapses it will have a ripple effect throughout the world. British banks are exposed to Russian debt. London will need skilful diplomacy to recover some of this debt.

 

There is however a weakness at the heart of the Putin regime. In the long term, Moscow's perception is that Obama's emphasis on an ethical foreign policy is not good for Russia. Britain here can play an important role behind the scenes. Skilful diplomacy is needed to help Russia emerge from the mess the Putin Team is in. Britain can act as a bridge between Russia and the West. This could result in great advantages for Britain.

 

Diplomacy is aided by the business intelligence consultancies and the SMEs which are playing a vital role in meshing the two countries together. Their numbers have expanded greatly since the economic meltdown in Russia in 1998. They are in regular contact with Russia and are poised to play an even greater role in the future.

 

Foreign policy in Russia is elaborated by the Kremlin's foreign policy team and Putin's people. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a secondary role. It is worth stressing that foreign policy is made by the Putin Team and not by Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister. Some Russian commentators see him merely as an errand boy for the Putin Team.

 

In this regard it would be useful to establish links to members of the presidential administration (which includes the Kremlin's foreign policy team) and regard the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ambassador in London as secondary figures.

 

 

It is important to stress that the presidential administration views Britain as the United States' aircraft carrier in Europe. In order to overcome this perception, London could stress that Britain is becoming much more independent in its thinking. Hillary Clinton may speak of 'the special relationship' but it is Obama who will decide foreign policy. The experiences of his relatives in Kenya during the Mau-Mau era may be reflected in his attitude to Britain. He may prefer a closer relationship with Germany and France.

 

The point can be made that Russia and Britain are natural allies. London can point to the mutually beneficial economic ties which already exist and argue that mutual political ties would be a natural development.

 

The presidential administration contains a strongly anti-western element. It perceives the British media to be anti-Russian. The bête noir is Boris Berezovsky. Putin regards him as a personal enemy. Berezovsky has made some inflammatory statements about regime change in Russia.

 

The Berezovsky problem has to be addressed. Perhaps he could be encouraged to desist from making provocative statements which can only harm British-Russian relations.

 

It will be interesting to read the Evening Standard's coverage of Russian affairs now that Alexander Lebedev is the owner. He already owns part of Novaya Gazeta, the only independent newspaper left in Moscow. It is critical of the Putin regime.

 

The point can be made to the presidential administration that Russia's PR image in Britain and the West needs to be improved - to put it mildly. London can advise and help here.

 

The security situation in Ingushetia is causing grave concern. Some commentators even envisage it developing into a civil war. Britain could offer to share intelligence about Muslim extremists operating throughout the whole of the North Caucasus. Moscow would appreciate that.

 

During this time of weakness, there are those around Putin who are trying to gain advantage for themselves. One tactic would be to tell him that there are enemies everywhere whose aim is to overthrow him. London can point out to Putin that it will not permit its territory to be used by dissident groups to engage in subversive acts against him. This is a very important point and would send the right signal to Moscow.

At this time of tension no move should be undertaken which could be perceived as provocative by Moscow.

Relations between Russia and the EU will improve rapidly if the Obama administration can agree a deal on the anti-missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. This will defuse tensions in the short term, at least.

 

The present Czech government is likely to remain Euro-Atlanticist as is the President who is a Eurosceptic. He favours an Anglo-American version of political and economic conservatism.

Energy security will remain a problem as long as the Putin Team remain in office. They have made quite clear by their actions that energy will be used as a political weapon.

 

It is worth mentioning the main pipelines here and Russia's pipeline politics.

 

Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, wishes to reduce the flow of gas through Ukraine and Poland to eastern and western Europe. It proposes building two new pipelines to ensure this:

 

Nord Stream: a joint venture with German and Dutch companies will carry gas from northern Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany and beyond.

 

South Stream: to bring Central Asian gas (most gas that flows through Ukraine to the rest of Europe is now Central Asian gas) under the Black Sea to the Balkans and beyond.

 

The EU would like to weaken dependency on Russian gas and has proposed a pipeline, called Nabucco, to bring Central Asian, Middle East and Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey. The problem is that at present there is not enough gas to fill the pipeline. Gazprom signed a contract with Uzbekistan last month which gives it almost total control over Uzbek gas exports.

 

Germany favours Nord Stream ad is cool about Nabucco. Berlin wishes to increase its dependency on Russian gas while EU policy is to decrease dependency.

 

If Radek Sikorski, the present Polish Minister of Defence becomes the next NATO secretary general, the alliance will be in the hands of an experienced official who knows and understands the Russians. NATO, in order to remain relevant, needs to resist German calls for a new security architecture in Europe which would sideline it.

Berlin places its own special relationship with Moscow ahead of the interests of the NATO alliance.

 

This said, it was good to hear that Germany turned down a closer partnership with Russia. Apparently Gazprom offered Germany the right to distribute all its gas in Europe. Berlin would then have dominated the European gas industry. In return, Germany had to downgrade its relations with the United States. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, turned the lucrative offer down. She preferred the Atlantic alliance to a new Eastern alliance.

 

If the next German government is formed by the SPD and Greens, a renewed offer by Gazprom might prove irresistible.

 

The conclusion is that the weaker the Putin Team becomes, the better the outlook for improved British political relations with Moscow. Putin could become more dictatorial as the economy weakens. Internal political conflicts would, however, weaken him. He could end up like Gorbachev in 1991. His writ, he complained, only extended to the door of his office.

 

A more diplomatic and malleable Russian leader than Putin would be a step forward.

9 February 2009