Russia 04

Memorandum from the Polish Embassy of London

 

I. NATO-Russia relations, NATO-Russia Council

NATO should consider an adequate and constructive response to the challenges posed by Moscow's policies. It is our view that the Alliance has got the potential to come up with such a response. At present, we should focus on an open, enhanced debate on the overall picture of the NATO-Russia relationship, which would include, among others, the issue of the actual goals of Russia's actions towards NATO and its member states, and the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. Without a conclusive completion of such a discussion, it is difficult to picture further evolution of NATO-Russia relations.

2. Poland has always been in favour of a constructive dialogue with Moscow. We believe it should be based on common values and principles and shared rules of behaviour. Russia's recent actions put to doubt its willingness to respect the generally recognised principles, as well as legal and international agreements it has pledged to adhere to. We will be working to make sure that NATO does not brush this aside, as this would send out a worrying signal which would in turn lead to the escalation of Russian activities.

3. We believe that NATO-Russia dialogue is necessary for the European security.

This dialogue requires goodwill and sincerity of both parties. We are convinced that the Alliance displays such goodwill and good intentions. We think that a complete implementation of Sarkozy plan by Moscow would point towards the presence of such goodwill and intentions in Moscow, as well.

4. In our view, the mechanisms for NATO-Moscow co-operation have so far not delivered on the expectations. This was because the goals of the co-operation were interpreted differently by the Alliance and Moscow. At the same time, we see no need to develop new formulas for NATO-Russia co-operation, as weaknesses stem from causes beyond logistics.

 

II. NATO Member States- Russia relations:

1. In Poland's view, the extent and intensity of NATO member states' relations with Russia should be determined by an agreed platform of co-operation between the Alliance and Moscow. We mustn't allow for the uniformity of NATO states policies with regard to Russia to be questioned.

2. We will encourage our NATO partners to perceive the issues of NATO-Moscow relations in the field of security and the individual members states' relations with Russia in a complementary way.

 

III. NATO enlargement, NATO-Georgia relations, NATO-Ukraine:

1. The best tool of stabilising the Euro-Atlantic area are NATO's and EU's enlargement policies. Maintaining membership prospects and active NATO and EU assistance with the adjustment policies will be the best remedy for the post-Soviet region and may constitute a part of a constructive answer to Moscow's politics in the area.

2. We will continue to strive for - in an appropriate time frame - Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership. We wish however to focus on achieving actual results of pro-NATO modernisation of the two countries, which will bring closer and make their accession more realistic.

3. We welcomed the decision to appoint the NATO-Georgia Commission. We hope that it will constitute a forum for realistic and practical co-operation between NATO and Georgia, aimed at bringing Tbilisi closer to NATO membership and supporting Georgian authorities. The ongoing preparations for the Annual National Program will make it possible to formulate an ambitious agenda of co-operation.

4. We will continue to support international activities aimed at solving the South Ossetia and Abchasia crisis. We actively participate in observation missions in Georgia and are willing to increase our involvement in this country.

5. We will consequently advocate Kiev's membership in NATO, as we believe it is in line with the Alliance's long-term strategic interests. Kiev should obtain a permanent place in Europe's security architecture, which would correspond to Ukraine's potential and its people's will. We rule out any other sources of influence on the directions on Kiev's integration aspirations.

6. In December 2008, not all of the allies were ready to take the bold decision to award MAP to Ukraine. We should however notice the positive elements of the debate on NATO-Ukraine relations during the NAC and NUC meetings, which demonstrate that no one questions decisions on Ukraine's NATO membership, taken in Bucharest, and Ukraine's road to NATO does not necessarily have to lead via MAP.

7. We should now focus on preparing Ukraine for membership in such a way so that inviting Kiev to join NATO would be a mere formality, when favourable political circumstances arise.

8. In our view, most of the reforms and adjustment processes may and should be conducted through existing mechanisms of Kiev-NATO co-operation, predominantly the NUC and Annual National Programme, which is currently being developed.

 

IV. Missile Defence (MD):

1. We believe the MD should not be a cause of friction in our bilateral relations with Russia. We wish to continue dialogue with Moscow in order to make it clear that the MD base will only serve the declared defence purposes and will not be used in activities which would pose a threat to the Russian Federation's security. The components of the Unites States' MD system will not be aimed against the safety of either Russia or any other country.

2. We actively participate in developing the set of proposals on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures for Russia with regard to MD.

3. We are convinced that TCBMs should take into account the principle of sovereignty of our two countries, reciprocity (possibility to inspect military installations of the Russian partners, especially in the Kaliningrad District) and proportionality. We are open to visits of Russian inspectors to the US MD base, however we do not agree to their permanent presence on the site. Inspections taking place with our knowledge and consent do not arise our concerns.

 

10 February 2009