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Russia 07
Memorandum from Maria-Pierre Nisus
Introduction
The recent conflict in Georgia over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has demonstrated the classical realist principles. If there were misapprehension before about the possibility of a pro-Western and a cooperative Russia, the Russian-Georgian conflict should clarify any misconceptions. In fact, Russia has never been, and would never be a Pro-Western country. The Russian invasion into Georgia confirmed, once again, its willingness to exercise its authority in its respective sphere of influence. Further, Russia entered by force into Georgia gave clearly an idea about Russia's intention on being a major player in the international arena and the major power in its respective region. As a matter of fact, Russia has regained international prestige and recognition by invading a country that is strongly backed by the West. Indeed, Russia has recovered from the 1990s turmoil. The economic crisis, border and domestic strife (Chechnya and Ukraine issues) and the international embarrassment in the Balkans, Russia has returned to its position on the international stage thanks to an energy market growth. Thus, one should recognize that the conflict between Russia and Georgia is a war between Russia and the West, Georgia being a proxy in this struggle. Russia is in search of greater sovereign power based on the 19th Century balance of power structure in the international arena and in its respective region. Its autocracy power will increase at the expense of the West. In light of this, the conflict in Georgia points out Russia's capacity and willingness to make use of its power and influence against a Western-backed democracy.
Therefore, the conflict has encouraged major shifts in the position of forces and priorities in NATO territory. The Russia and the West approach should be rethought in light of future developments and relations with states in the Caucasus region. What will be the role of the West vis-à-vis the Russian foreign policy? On which based the relations between the West and Russia should be done in regards to the Caucasus region?
I - Russia Foreign Policy - An overview
After the demise of the Soviet Union, democracy was slowly taken place in Russia, audacious dreams from the Russian elites were expected. In this approach, the US and Europe foreign policy towards Russia was done in a tactless manner. The first step would have to help Russian democracy take root and integrate Russia into Europe. In fact, what has been done, was the NATO expansion toward the Eastern border in a bilateral manner. Yet, the integration of Russian satellite countries into NATO should take Russia into account. Certainly, nothing could be done effectively without Russia on board. Principally, the US foreign policy did not considered Russia's dimension or the features of its political culture. It was illogical to think that Russia will remain ineffectual after the Soviet Union collapse. The outcome of the West's foreign policy was the disillusionment of Russian elites and the rank-and-file, which in the opposite gave a push to the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies and reduced the chance of a democracy in Russia. The liberal parties and the models of development they were promoting were stop, leaving the place for a Russian foreign policy turned toward the progress nature of a centre of power structure.
The post-Soviet policy was based on a paradigm centred on the restricted role of interaction with the West, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic axis. In fact, the Russia's foreign policy did not go beyond the traditional Russian-Western post-Soviet paradigm, while relations with other partner countries in Asia and Middle-East, in particular Iran will often be viewed by the West as a challenge. This post-Soviet approach was counterproductive, as it impeded to identify the Russian foreign policy interests and the efficacious implementation of measures support them. The Russian foreign policy becomes a continuous chain of concessions and reciprocal attitudes from the West, which were not reached. This often has irritated Russia and has produced confrontational actions toward the West. The twenty-first century has seen more concessions made in the part of Russia, in regards to two shutdowns of military sites (radio electronic surveillance centre at Lourdes in Cuba and a naval base in Cam Ranh in Vietnam). Indeed, Russia's concessions to the West were seen as a total surrender on all its satellite countries, and the West integrated them as valuable members into the transatlantic security organisation. The military action in Georgia was just a way to exhibit that it did not accept any longer the post-soviet foreign policy paradigm. NATO's expansion to the CIS space, notably Georgia and Ukraine, is viewed as a challenge for Russia. Kosovo's independence is perceived as a violation of international law and the US's anti-ballistic missile shield in Europe are seen as a threat to Russia strategic defence. The Russian political groups[i] conception of these different challenges are quite diverse. This includes the new generation of "imperialist idealists" and pragmatist ideas together with the Palmerton's dictum of 19th century Russia to the 21st century, claiming that Russia does not have permanent friends or enemies, but permanent interests" The conservative is the ruling power and is conducted by the motive "the worst, the better". They are interested in a new confrontation with the West, believing that Russia is a strong and independent centre of power. They condemn the US unilateralism and NATO intercession in the international affairs, but concurrently they support and follow the US example and acquiring anything that Russia can take. The Kosovo was an example from the West used for the annexion and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. The liberal party understands that Russia needs to protect its national interests within international law. They are dissatisfied with the West for disregarding Russia's legitimate interests and misplaced an opportunity to reinforce Russia into its democratic reforms. It is evident that the NATO presence in the Caucasus region will engender conflicting risk with Russia. These challenges reflected in the new Russian foreign policy concept, which underlines the need to enhance the role of the UN and the international law as the most significant international institution, an effective military forces as tool to resolve international disputes, the need for diplomacy and instruments of "soft power", and the requirement of multilateralism and cooperation among the various regional organisations[ii].
II - The Transatlantic Security Organisation and Russia relations
NATO-Russia relations
It is clear enough to acknowledge that the South Caucasus including the Black Sea area is a strategic location, where struggle of power is taking place between the West and Russia. On one hand, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) consider the Eastern Europe as a new territory in term of security, energy and transport developments. On the other hand, the South Caucasus and Black sea region is viewed as competition and confrontation with the West and eastern countries seeking to break away from Moscow's power. The recent event in Georgia in regards to Abkhazia and South Ossetia ethnic tensions in its territory, seeking independence was an opportunity for Russia to exert economic pressure and military provocation toward Georgia. The coercive diplomatic strategy and policy of intimidation have been executed to maintain the status quo in the region.
NATO-Georgia relations
Georgia, together with Ukraine has made efforts to achieve membership to NATO, have been perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its security[iii]. Since 2004, the Saakashvili Government has been seeking to join NATO and was very close to receiving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the recent NATO summit in Bucharest. Instead, Georgia was offered an intensified political commitment with NATO and the prospect of eventual membership to the organisation. In this case certain NATO members have got a major role in stopping this initiative, mostly under the Russia pressure. Indeed, the Russia invasion into Georgia gives a hint of Russia's capacity. The integration of Georgia within NATO would be a complex situation, knowing that Georgia has lost its sovereign power over its entire territory, and it is sure it would seek the Alliance support to resolve this issue, and this will exacerbate a confrontation with Russia. Further, if after the Russian-Georgian dispute in 2006, that Georgia succeeded to be a NATO member, what would be the Russia's attitude in regards to the August events? Would Russia be intimidated? Or would it consider the use of forces toward Georgia? It is obvious that the situation would be worst today. The implementation of NATO's Article Five in the Charter would bring an insecure environment in the Caucasus region with a risk of spill-over of increasing confrontation with local power close to the West. Yet, such scenario has not happened, but it should be considered in regards to the Membership Action Plan. Thus, relations between NATO-Georgia and Russia should be thought carefully. Their relations should be based on cooperation seeking interest for all, but not at the expense of Russia.
The Georgia conflict had a direct effect on NATO Partnerships insofar as NATO Foreign Ministers settle on the creation of a NATO-Georgia Commission to improve the existent NATO-Georgia relationships. The real consequences of this war is unknown at the present time, but yet, attention should be devoted to the Community of Independent States (CIS) states, as Russia may apply assertive policy towards them and may try to undermine their relations with NATO. In this view, the important question is how the NATO-Russia relationship will further develop? NATO Allies need to examine what kind of relationship is desirable as well as possible. These reflections must consider an appropriate policy response that must not be reactive to Russia, but should reflect the values and the strategic interests of the Alliance. Thus, developing closer relations and cooperation between Russia and the Alliance will be preferable and necessary to curb any conflicts in the Caucasus region and beyond.
NATO-Russia Council
Russia and the West have still common ground of interests, particularly in combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, principally all nuclear armaments and international terrorism threats. Theses issues are significant as well to Russia as to the West, which are included them in their agenda. Working together with Russia on strategies to tackle these concerns will require multilateral efforts. Further, Russia has made clear its will to make a key part of these issues in their foreign policy approach. It is, thus, an opportunity for the West, in particular, the US, the UK and other members of the Alliance to encourage and stimulus Russia to work together in order to forge common strategies and jointly take a leading role in broader multilateral efforts[iv]. Expanding cooperation in the nuclear proliferation field would be a means to develop a multilateral approach on this matter with Russia's collaboration. In addition, Russia has made known its willingness to supply nuclear fuel. For that reason, Russia and the West should work on a compromise to facilitate the use of nuclear power without spreading in third countries, and also, reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. The NATO-Russia Council should be a support to increase cooperation and understanding between parties. It should be used to make Russia more prone to deeper military cooperation with NATO. Joint military exercise I the NATO framework is an example to performs NATO and Russia's military force interoperable for future counter-terrorism exercises or joint peacekeeping or joint counter-terrorism operations. This is an important instrument in international relations.
III - THE IMPLICATIONS OF GEORGIA CONFLICT AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
Consequences of The Russian-Georgian territorial dispute in the Caucasus region and beyond
The Caucasus is a region of many confrontations and antagonism, having frozen or active or again secessionist forces troubling Georgia, and Armenia/Azerbaijan with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Crimea region of the Ukraine and Javakhk region of Georgia are also possible areas of hostility owing to their principal ethnic group. The new situation in Georgia has changed the perception of other states in the region about their NATO aspiration and pro-Western orientation. This will have a resonant outcome beyond the Caucasus region to such an extent that the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev offered a precise vision of the CIS stating: "The principle of any state's territorial integrity is recognised by the world community. All the member-nations of the CIS speak against separatism, and such complicated inter-ethnic problems should be settled peacefully through negotiations. There is no military solution to them."[v] Indeed, the CIS states are mostly concerned with various forms of separatism and can, at any moment, threaten their territorial integrity.
Region of tension
The Russian ethnic minorities in Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Ukraine can be used by Russia to bring tensions. The Russian's military aggressions brought on Georgia, gives Russia possibilities to interfere in the state's internal affairs.
Georgia - is composed of two significant ethnic groups: the Azaris in the Marneuli district and the Armenians in Javakheti. In the past tensions have risen in Javakheti and these have been tackled by the Saakashvili administration. Also, in co-operations with Armenia and Azerbaijan ethnic issues have been resolved, as they did not want to damage their relations with Georgia. Yet, there are fears in Georgia that Russian undercover operatives might provoke the Armenians of Javakheti. It is certain ethnic tensions in the Caucasus region would inevitably be an opportunity for Russia government to dismantle Georgian state irretrievably.
Azerbaijan - could be destabilised by Russia
in mitigating the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.
Co-operation with Armenia and Azerbaijan would be the only solution over this
tension, but it would leave the parties with dangerous and unforeseeable
consequences, as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had been the bloodiest in the
former Soviet Union. Yet, an eruption in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would
not be in Russia's interests. The conflict could escalate and Russia would not
be able to control such a situation. Ukraine - according to many western analysts the potential and future military clash will be the Crimea region, considering the Russian ethnic population and also a strategic location for Russia as it host the Russia's Black Sea fleet. It is conceivable to believe that Russia may possibly target it for annexation. Regarding the territory integrity of Ukraine, Russia could apply similar strategy to the Crimea Russian population, in distributing passports. Moreover, the Ukrainians are strongly opposed to Ukraine's NATO aspiration, and it would be easy for Russia to contrive some separatist outcome, if circumstances required it. Another interesting point is Russia could provoke a division between the East and the West. In fact, there is no large majority in favour of a pro-Western orientation in Ukraine; the country is divided between Ukrainian-speaking Western side, and in the East Ukrainians - both ethnic Ukrainians and Russians - speaking Russia. Thus, the opposition to NATO is geographically and linguistically apparent throughout the Ukraine. This could give Russia a push in its fight to keep the state, or an important part of its territory within its sphere of influence. In addition, other means could be used by Russia to undermine Ukraine's NATO ambition. Russia will seek to provoke reaction against Ukraine's currently pro-Western central government. Destabilising the Ukrainian government, a new one will bring to the fore as a pro-Russian Ukrainian government, which will re-align with Russia, and ambitions with NATO will be abandoned as well as pro-Western states would be repressed[vi].
Russia's sphere of influence
With the experience of Georgia and the suggestion made for possible conflict demonstrates how important the neighbourhood is for Russia. The significant issue to highlight is that none of its close neighbour states envisage their future as part of a Russia-dominated association; they are all seeking a future based on independence and full national sovereignty. Such concept and NATO aspiration will be hard to achieve. As the Russian government has mentioned in its new foreign policy Concept's statement that "Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the Alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian border as a whole".[vii] Unlike the Baltic States, Russia regards Ukraine and Georgia as its strategic sphere of influence for both energy and security. Another point is the EU and NATO membership, which is a divisive matter. This not only affects their relations with the EU, but also their relations with Russia. The European Neighbourhood Plan (ENP) is a means to integrate the European Union institution. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine envisage obtaining a European membership, as it is their foreign political objective. Armenia and Azerbaijan are interested to join the EU and the ENP is a means to support their domestic reform agenda. The EU-Ukraine relations has made significant steps forward in its membership, leaving open the way for further developments in their relations[viii]. With the consequence of the Georgian conflict Russia will not allowed any western presence in the region. The EU's recognition of Kosovo had affected Russia's interests in the Balkans. Thus, the approval of a Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit was perceived by Russia as a provocation. The necessity of a well-managed diplomacy with Russia will avoid undesirable outcomes and could produce positive results, for instance, by securing new commitments on territorial integrity and democratic values. The EU works in regards to the ENP has brought real outcomes in this approach[ix].
The US's proposed ballistic missile defence system and the Convention Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
The US-Russian relations suffered important obstacles following the conflict in Georgia. In fact, US objective to deploy ballistic missile radar in Czech Republic and silo-based interceptor missiles in Poland have been one of the most significant factors in the Russian-Georgian conflict[x]. The US reason for the missile deployment in Europe is to counter any threats coming from Iran. Yet, Russia strongly reject such plan and revealing that Iran has still not have the capacity to develop ballistic missile and nuclear weapons. Russia threatened to deploy short range of missile against the Baltic States. The US military infrastructure in both territory Poland and the Czech Republic clearly upsets Russia, which sees such US's efforts are aimed at Russia not Iran. The factors of such misunderstanding are due to the Russian's perception of NATO as the Cold War adversary. Russia needs to take into account the transformation of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. NATO's force structure and missions has changed dramatically. It is suggested that Russia should progress in its vision and relations with the Alliance, and also, the US should consider greater transparency in its foreign policy towards Russia. Some constraints on missile deployments or other military infrastructures to ease legitimate Russian concerns, in particular, in sensible area in the Caucasus region.
Efforts to resume Russia's participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty has is importance. Indeed, to secure the Caucasus area, dialogue with Russia should continue in order to find an arrangement on Russia military presence in Moldova. Agreement on missiles should be included, as they could be used to threaten the European security. The Bush Administration has suggested parallel actions to limit the NATO military equipment in the new member countries, and also bringing the Baltic States into the CFE regime in parallel with Russian steps regarding Moldova and Georgia. This proposition would be complicated to apply vis-à-vis the Georgian conflict. Yet, Obama Administration and NATO Allies should pursue this objective. NATO members should offer a proposal in which would include the parallel actions plan and an agreement to Medvedev's initiative for a European security conference.
NATO-Russia cooperation should carry on dialogues and negotiations to improve protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials, prevent nuclear proliferation and counter international terrorism. This would open opportunity for Russia and the West in dealing with such issues, Iran, North Korea, and WMD as Russia could bring its experience and knowledge. Similarly, Russia is ready to provide its help in Afghanistan within a multilateral efforts, such as a working project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian as a military unit. Or again, Russia, American, British and NATO warship off Somalian coast to counter piracy. Greater initiatives should be considered in order to bring the full potential for NATO-Russia cooperation. This will require accepting joint decision-making on some important issues. Thus, development of a truly cooperative relationship and confidence building will settle down in the long term.
NATO enlargement
NATO enlargement is a concern for Russia, particularly, the integration of Georgia and Ukraine, although, NATO enlargement and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) are not aimed to irritate Russia. Whilst, the latter sees these objectives differently. Widening NATO has been a means to strengthen the difficult democratic and economic change made by new members and to promote a wider, stable and secure Europe. The consequence of the NATO-Russia relations has had a negative impact on the membership of both Georgia and Ukraine. Thus, has the conflict in Georgia diminished Georgia's chance, including Ukraine, to join NATO or have these events helped accelerate the process of accession? The Russian invasion in Georgia has brought a broad support amongst the Russian ethnic population and also has reinforced the nationalistic trend in Russia. Such situation will be difficult but not impossible for Georgia to integrate the Alliance.
In addition, the central point of the NATO organisation was based on the Article 5 agreed by the members "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". Joining NATO has always required from its members and potential members an obligation to adhere to the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Since the end of the Cold War, the Strategic Concept of the Alliance has been reviewed to provide for members more responsive actions to defend not just other members but to engage in a complete range of crisis response, operating outside of European area if necessary.
How NATO will continue its expansion, with regards to Georgia and Ukraine without irritating Russia? To deal with NATO and MAP more effectively following suggestions could be considered. - NATO could withdraw from the Cold War approach and be simply a transatlantic regional defence alliance. Its concerns would be essentially about threats from the East, and new members would commit to democratic and market-oriented values. - Alternatively, NATO could remain principally region-focused inclusive security arrangement, but an organisation willing to play a global function, with membership open to all those committed to its basic values. It is an opportunity for Russia to integrate itself and return to the route of democratic reform and with a responsible international conduct. These suggestions would permit the NATO expansion without bringing any crisis from Russia, but rather a means to integrate it as a member in an organisation reformed into one focused essentially on cooperative security. It seems the path to these directions will be difficult to realize, still, it is important to take them into account and working on them immediately. The post-Georgian conflict reveals that NATO with its Cold War approach is a higher risk activity at Russia's borders and the Article 5 would not ease the situation. It is certain, at the present climate promoting these ideas are impossible. NATO members enjoy the idea of NATO as an 'iron barrier', and in particular the US. Thus, many would consider such suggestions with reservation and any effort made in this way should not be considered as a weakness or rewarding Russia's aggression.
Will further enlargement make the Alliance stronger or will it bring it new challenges and risks to its security? Applying the American government's way, which is to prompt the Georgian and Ukrainian membership, will bring continuous crisis and in such situation the organisation will not be able or willing to encounter militarily. Also, retracting any membership from Georgia and Ukraine and applying a new approach to Russia will evidently be seen as a conciliation or a weakness from a number of NATO members, but in the opposite will encourage Russia in its aggressions. Neither NATO should not agree to Russian strategic approach in regards to its relations with Georgia and Ukraine nor should it comply with Russian efforts to impede both countries to integrate the organisation. In the opposite, the Alliance should remain open and work with these countries for possible membership in 2009. NATO importance on military operations remains applicable, but NATO Allies states need to examine and agree on an appropriate equilibrium between operations and the capacity to defend against outside attack. This is principally significant for the Baltic States, which possess limited armed forces and which are also geographically more exposed to security threats. In light of this, the Euro-Atlantic community should plan for a wide-ranging dialogue and cooperation with Russia on European security matters. This should implicate questions about NATO-Russia relations, Ukraine-Georgia relations with NATO, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty issue, and finally, the Russian President's suggestion for a European security conference. Decisions made in the NATO-Georgia Commission should be used in a diplomatic way for a full discussion and negotiation with Russia. These dialogues should explain its motivation for supporting Georgia, but also, Ukraine in their integration in the Alliance. In this perspective, Russia should see that the Alliance is not a threat, but rather a partner.
IV - RUSSIA, NATO AND EU RELATIONS
Russia was acting in a post-imperial attitude towards Georgia and the concern of this has raised worries about Ukraine. In fact, if the region should be freed from any conflicts, thus, the Ukraine membership should be abandoned. It should, instead, focus on a EU membership. Georgia was a fractious case in its NATO ambition, pushing Ukraine in similar path would result in a far more intense situation than that in Georgia. The western policies towards Russia should take another direction for more successful relations with Russia.
- The conception in which the US thinking towards Russia has long been based on this following question: "Is Russia follow the democratic path?" has not been successful and should be stopped. In the opposite, analysis of the reason of such attitude from Russia should be taken into account as a defensive or tactical action or a means to define a new Russian policy. - There is a need to correct the US predecessor Administration's strategies. Also, International norms need to be restored and Russia needs to stop being ignored by the West. - The need for a multiple track strategy for dealing with Russia has long been a necessity.
Relations with Russia need to be enhanced in terms of developing a long-term strategy. This include: - European members with NATO and the US needs to have a common voice regarding their polices towards Russia, - Democratic regimes in the Former Soviet Union need to be strengthened - A real bilateral strategy with Russia should not be based on values but instead on areas of agreement and common interests. - The main role remains for Europe: EU, OSCE, NATO and bilateral relations as UK-Russia. Renewing these relations with Russia could only benefit both countries, in the domain as energy trade (achieving a compromise to avoid Russia using energy resources as a weapon, and also, stopping using such policy against Ukraine), international security (maintaining the European security, an agreement has to be found on arms control and nuclear proliferation and ballistic missile.), the NATO Membership Action Plan should be rethought in a way to give more flexibility to NATO in its relations with Russia and also allowing the Ukrainian-Georgian expansion in the region without affecting Russia. Policy on fighting international terrorism and drug trafficking, and broad initiatives for a full relations between both countries should be set. This will require to all parties to cooperate, to trust and to make joint decision-making with Russia on significant issues. These agreements should be clear and based on mutual concessions. This is important as the future of Russia is in Europe. Therefore, all European organisations and institutions, along with NATO must remain open for a possible integration of Russia.
CONCLUSION: What does the future hold?
The Georgian conflict reveals the weakness of all EU institutions and its incapacity to respond effectively to any crisis. Yet, the West should find a balance in its policy towards Russia, stating clearly that Russia actions have violated international norms and rules. Whilst fostering cooperation and integration in existing international institutions. The West's attitude vis-à-vis Russian foreign policy should pay heed to Russia and deal with core common interests. Cooperation is essential for the west and Russia; in this case, Europe needs to end the pretence that it has universally shared values with Russia. The West's understanding is democracy as having legitimacy, but Russia is not a democratic states. Yet, it should be considered as one. In this aspect, the West should be more pragmatic in its decisions when dealing with Russia. Russia's desire is to redefine its relationship with the West and to have a EU-Russia working partnership. The Membership Action Plan should make potential integration of Georgia and Ukraine, but similar offer should be bestowed to Russia. Therefore, Russia and the West should go forward and this should be the foundation of a new start.
[i] The main political groups are the ruling moderate conservatives, nationalists, communists and the Russian liberals. [ii] Alexander Aksenyonok, "Paradigm Change in Russian Foreign Policy", and Alexander Lukin, "From Post-Soviet paradigm to Russian Foreign Policy" in Russia in the Global Affairs, Vol.6, no4, October-December 2008. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ [2/02/2009] , see also The Eu-Russia Centre Review, The Russian Foreign Policy, Eight Issue http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/review_viii_final_13_10.pdf [05/02/2009] [iii] Stefen Pifer, Reversing the decline: An Agenda for US-Russian Relations in 2009, Policy Paper no10, January 2009, Foreign Policy at Brooking [iv] Idem [v] Russia in the Global Affairs, , Vol. 6 no 4, October-December 2008, p 153 [vi]Ivan Koltyarov, "The logic of South Ossetia conflict", and also, Sergei Markedonov, "Regional conflicts reloaded" in Russia in the Global Affairs, Vol.6, no4, October-December 2008. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ [02/02/2009] [vii] The Eu-Russia Centre Review, The Russian Foreign Policy, Eight Issue, p 61 http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/review_viii_final_13_10.pdf [05/02/2009] [viii] Olena Prystayko, "EU-Russia Common Neibourghood", and other topics in The Eu-Russia Centre Review, The Russian Foreign Policy, Eight Issue http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/review_viii_final_13_10.pdf [05/02/2009] [ix] Olena Prystayko, "EU-Russia Common Neibourghood", in The Eu-Russia Centre Review, The Russian Foreign Policy, Eight Issue http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/review_viii_final_13_10.pdf [05/02/2009] [x] Stefen Pifer, Reversing the decline: An Agenda for US-Russian Relations in 2009, Policy Paper no10, January 2009, Foreign Policy at Brooking
11February 2009 |