UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 434House of COMMONSMINUTES OF EVIDENCETAKEN BEFOREDEFENCE COMMITTEE
HELICOPTER CAPABILITY
Tuesday 19 May 2009MR NICK WHITNEY, MR DAVID PITCHFORTH, MR DEREK SHARPLES and MR ALEX SHARPMR PAUL O'HARA, DR BEATRICE NICHOLAS and MR DECLAN O'SHEAEvidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 92
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Defence Committee on Members present Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair Mr David Crausby Linda Gilroy Mr David Hamilton Mr Mike Hancock Mr Bernard Jenkin Robert Key Mrs Madeleine Moon ________________ Witnesses: Mr Nick Whitney, Senior Vice President, UK Government Business Unit, AgustaWestland Mr David Pitchforth Managing Director, Boeing UK Rotorcraft Support, Mr Derek Sharples, Vice President of Customer Support, Eurocopter and Mr Alex Sharp, Regional Sales Manager - Europe, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, gave evidence. Q1 Chairman: Good morning. Could I ask you please to introduce yourselves and to just give a very brief outline of the industry you are here to represent. Who would like to begin? Mr Sharples: My name is Derek Sharples. I am the Executive Vice President for Support and Services in the Eurocopter group of companies. I am here today representing the Eurocopter manufacturer, the original equipment manufacturer and supplier of Eurocopter products to the UK Armed Forces Mr Pitchforth: I am David Pitchforth. I work for the Boeing company and I am the
Managing Director of UK Rotorcraft Support here in-country; and I am here to
represent Boeing as we stand with our Mr Whitney: Good morning, Chairman. My name is Nick Whitney. I am Senior Vice President for the Mr Sharp: Good morning, Chairman. Alex Sharp, Sikorsky Aircraft in the Chairman: Thank you. We have this session which will last for about an hour with you, and then we will move on to some representatives of other companies. Are there any declarations of interest? Mr Jenkin: Chairman, may I draw attention to an entry on the Register of Members' Interests under "miscellaneous and unremunerated items". I organised a charitable event for combat stress earlier this year; it was sponsored by Finmeccanica. Mrs Moon: Perhaps I should declare that I did an industry/parliament trust fellowship, part of which was with Finmeccanica. Q2 Chairman: Could you please explain, and let us start at
the other end, which Mr Sharp: I am pleased to be here; thank you for
allowing me to come and speak with you.
Sikorsky has had a long history in the Mr Whitney: Principally, we support a number of Rotorcraft platforms. If we look at Apache, the attack helicopter which is actually doing good service in Afghanistan as we speak; the Merlin Mk1 which is in service with the Royal Navy; the Merlin Mk3 which is in service with the RAF, but also in service in Iraq; we also support the Sea King aircraft in terms of its role with the RAF in search and rescue; and the Mk4 aircraft in Afghanistan, and the Royal Navy. We also support the Gazelle; and we have had involvement with Puma. We do a number of modifications; and we are also installing modifications on some Chinook airframes. Q3 Chairman: While you support some of them, you make some of them as well? There is a distinction. Mr Whitney: We have manufactured Apache, Merlin, Sea King and we support the other aircraft. We do not manufacture Chinook. Q4 Chairman: Mr Sharp, the Sea King is a Sikorsky design? Mr Sharp: Yes. Mr Pitchforth: We are primarily involved in the Chinook
aircraft, which we are the manufacturers of.
We also support that aircraft here for the Mr Sharples: Chairman, thank you very much for this
opportunity to address you this morning.
Eurocopter is the world's largest manufacturer of helicopters. Last year we delivered 585 helicopters to a
market base of 2,500 customers around the world in 140 countries. In the Q5 Chairman: You are talking there about the civilian fleet? Mr Sharples: Generally it is civilian and military. In the military fleet in the UK Armed Forces,
we have 122 helicopters in service, including 44 Puma HC1s, more than 40
Gazelles and 38 helicopters at the Mr Whitney: Chairman, could I just make one other point. I have omitted to mention of course that we also provide and support the existing Lynx aircraft; and indeed the new aircraft which has now been renamed the Wildcat, which is currently in build. Chairman: I think we knew that, but thank you for reminding us. We have a lot of questions to ask and we have less than an hour to get through them. You do not need each of you to answer each of the questions. If you feel that the point you would have made has already been made, there is no need to say it again; there is no need to come in on everything. Q6 Mr Crausby: Of the nearly 600 helicopters that we own, I understand we have 17 different types and within those types there are several subset marks: for example, we have four different marks of Lynx, three of Merlin, five of Sea King. So many subsets are bound to cause problems. Can you describe to us some of the problems that arise from having so many fleets within fleets? Mr Whitney: There are good reasons for having fleets of aircraft and fleets within fleets. If we look at the Merlin aircraft we have a number of aircraft that were procured for the RAF. We have added to that with six aircraft coming with a separate designation, but operate alongside them. There are 44 aircraft that were originally procured for the Merlins; so you end up with a designation Mk1, Mk3, Mk3a. Where you get problems I think is when you modify smaller batches of aircraft within those fleets. That is when you get the problems in terms of support. You get a different mark of aircraft and this is particularly relevant when you are on operational deployment and you are looking to fit certain pieces of equipment for operations that you will not fit to the rest of the fleet. That can give difficulties in terms of support and maybe training and other areas and lines of development. Q7 Mr Crausby: We are given to understand, for example, that on training some of our crews have to train on one type of helicopter only to go into operation on a completely different sort. Is that a problem we can resolve? Mr Whitney: I do not think you can train on a different aircraft from the one you are going to fly in theatre. You can probably train on a variant that is slightly different and does not necessarily have all of the equipment, and there will have to be some training means of catching-up that training. Yes, you could be forced to operate in that manner. Q8 Mr Crausby: Is there a general acceptance that we have too many types and too many subsets? Would we not be better off with fewer? What sort of improvements could you see with a more coherent fleet? I know it is easier said than done but from our point of view is that the place to be, to have less types, less subsets and a more manageable fleet; or would that deny us some flexibility? Mr Whitney: I think personally my view would be, yes, that is the place to be. You can get greater economies of scale by having larger fleets. There is a fixed cost associated with operating aircraft. The more aircraft you have, the more you spread that fixed cost across your fleet. Equally, the points you raise about having small fleets, the training burden and the additional cost that that incurs, the problems that that incurs can all be solved by having reduced numbers. You need the budget to be able to make that happen. Mr Sharples: Could I reply to your question in a different way. You ask: what are the principal problems of having so many fleets inside fleets, and there are two important problems for operating aircraft front line in that regard. One of them is configuration management. It means understanding and controlling what is on your helicopter; knowing what is on your helicopter; and therefore being able to provide the correct parts for that particular sub fleet. Understanding the configuration of the helicopter and controlling the configuration is one of the challenges of multiple fleet operations. A second one, which is closely linked, is obsolescence management. It means ensuring that you are able to manage out of your fleet small batches of obsolescent equipment, and ensure that you are providing from the supply chain replacement parts which are new and current and available in small batches. In the industry one of our key challenges is to manage the supply chain which is often enthusiastic to be involved in high rate production, but not so enthusiastic to be involved in small batch manufacturing for subsequent small fleets in service, particularly when configurations of aircraft change during service. If I could just make a comment as well on your training question: it is true that in our Armed Forces we train our pilots, and therefore our technicians as well, on different helicopters from those that are operated front line. Of course, there is a cost issue there. First of all, we are training ab initio from the beginning, and therefore we want to train our young pilots on simple aircraft in order to acclimatise them to airworthiness and to basic flying training; and gradually step-by-step the training system becomes more sophisticated as we move towards the front line, and therefore towards the aircraft that they will eventually operate in theatre. Therefore, my point would be that it would not be cost-effective to use the same aircraft for training, in particular for basic training, as is used front line, because of course these are very expensive and sophisticated weapons systems. Q9 Chairman: Mr Sharples, would you suggest that it would be a wise way to train pilots to train them in the UK on, for example, analogue cockpits and then to send them out to Afghanistan, so that the first time they are using digital cockpits is when they are in operation against the Taliban? Mr Sharples: I have some personal experiences as for 25 years I was a Fleet Air Arm helicopter pilot and went through the military flying training programme and operated Sea King front line in theatre. To answer your question, I think it is more cost-effective to train pilots on cockpits and machines which are similar to those that they will eventually operate front line. To answer your direct question, where available, glass cockpit training is available at ab initio level these days in simple helicopters; and where we can, we should make available that level of training to our pilots. Q10 Chairman: "Where we can": but surely we should be training pilots
before they go out to Mr Sharples: Yes, I would have to agree. It is certainly true in other sectors of the aerospace industry and the general aviation sector, a light aircraft sector these days. You can find light aircraft with similar avionics, screens, layouts, and systems in light aircraft similar to very sophisticated Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Yes, you can familiarise and you should where possible familiarise on systems which are similar to those you will operate in-theatre. It is clearly cost-effective; it is clearly more efficient training; and it clearly brings to the pilot more familiarisation with the systems that they will ultimately be asked to operate in battle. Q11 Chairman: But in battle their hand should go instinctively to the right place, so they should know exactly where the levers are without having to think about it. So they should have been doing it for a long time, is that not right? Mr Sharples: I think the concept of commonality is one which is already prevalent in the aircraft industry; is one which is not so prevalent in the helicopter business; would certainly bring additional advantages to familiarity and therefore reduce training, more reliability, greater flight safety. Mr Sharp: Chairman, going back to the training question,
I do not disagree. Certainly in the US
my experience, ten years on fixed wing with the US Navy and then as a reserve
pilot, was that the more commonality you have in training, clearly gives you
benefits in the field - no question. I
think we have seen a move certainly across the Pond towards similar
systems. Certainly the great reliance on
simulator training of a glass cockpit gives you that advantage without tearing
up airplanes. I would like to go back to
an earlier question (because I think it is important to understand) that my colleagues
here talked about in terms of configuration control. Configuration control through small subsets
is difficult. It is not uncommon to have
little problem with that domestically at training bases, potentially here in
the Chairman: That is extremely helpful. We are just about to get onto that series of questions now. Mike Hancock? Q12 Mr Hancock: Can I just go back to the question about training and pilots being trained, say, on Apaches here which have one type of configuration and then they go to theatre and they are flying a different type. Is it as easy as what you have said, Mr Sharples, to switch from one style of training to actually flying in combat? Mr Sharples: I am afraid I do not have experience of flying the Apache. I have flown multiple types of Sea King. The difference training can be relatively minor, but it really depends on how much difference there is in terms of systems management and systems on the training machine compared to the weapon. Q13 Mr Hancock: For how long on a relatively new aircraft like the Apache can it be possible to have that sort of variant? Mr Whitney: I think it is important to understand there is a process of learning to fly a helicopter, and you start at the defence helicopter flying school and you are introduced into the rotary wing concept on relatively simple aircraft; you move up to more complex aircraft; and you then go through a progress where you convert to role, and convert to type. Converting to type is a training that you go through to learn to fly, let us say, a Lynx or an Apache; and this is taking you from a basic helicopter where you have done single engine and twin engine, and you go into a specific training phase to learn to fly the Apache. You then go conversion to role, which is teaching you to fight the Apache, or to use the aircraft in its true combat environment. This is not a week's training; it is many weeks of training. So pilots will not go into theatre and get into an aircraft and not know what to expect. I think that is a false illusion if that is being taken by the Committee. There are procedures that they have to go through. I think the point you do get is, with these small fleets within fleets where you might be modifying aircraft for the battlefield environment quickly but through the urgent operational procedures, you could end up where there is some additional training or some equipment that is fitted to those aircraft that is not "not understood" but might be not on the training aircraft and you will have to find alternative means of training - whether that be simulation, textbook etc. Q14 Mr Hancock: Can I ask then about the Through-Life Commitment that you have to service these aircraft, and where the delays occur. If you take on the responsibility to provide through-life maintenance for a particular helicopter, why are there such long delays in getting parts for these helicopters when you have signed up to give the service which you said you would at the initial stages? Mr Sharples: I would like to think with the Through-Life Support Contract that we have recently signed there will be less delays in future than there have been in the past prior to signing the contract. I think one of the advantages that the OEM brings to the operator with through-life contracts is that we are able to bring our full resources of logistics, maintenance and technical support to the operators, which the operators have not necessarily had access to previously. In Eurocopter we have in the region of €500 million of inventory located in stock logistic centres around the world. One of the core competences necessary to manage the spares supply chain is the ability to anticipate and forecast what will be needed in terms of spares for maintenance. That may sound simple but it is not, for the simple reason that most spares required for helicopters are in fact very rarely called up from the inventories. It is quite common for 80 % of all spares to be on stock for more than three years and never called. So you have a very small number of high rotating parts, and a very large percentage of slow movers. Therefore, one of the key competences is to predict which parts will be required and which parts are to be therefore stored in an inventory. Through the OEMs, the Armed Forces have access to a core competence which is logistics forecasting. Q15 Chairman: We will have to move away from Ministry of Defence abbreviations here. Mr Sharples: The manufacturing supply chain. One of the things that the manufacturing supply chain is most capable of doing is managing the supply chain. We have more than 2,500 suppliers in Eurocopter and one of our key tasks is to manage that supply chain so that they can deliver on time to our facilities. You ask: why are there difficulties? The simple answer is: it is a great challenge to manage the supply chain from anticipation, through to procurement, inventory and eventually delivery of parts to a diverse fleet in service in often very remote geographical locations. Q16 Mr Hancock: That is what you have signed up to do, is it not? Mr Sharples: Yes, we have, and we have signed up to deliver according to KPIs with the MoD in terms of performance. Q17 Mr Hancock: So why is there so much cannibalisation going on? If 80% of the spare parts stay on the shelf for up to three years you will have worked out by now that the 20% is the critical area, would you not? Why is it that helicopters are regularly cannibalised and some of them never fly again, because that 20% is not forthcoming? Mr Pitchforth: I would like to talk about our TLCS programme. Q18 Mr Hancock: I would like you to answer that question, first, about why it is that the parts are not available and so much cannibalisation goes on? Mr Pitchforth: I do not recognise the hypothesis you are making, because under TLCS we are delivering more aircraft than contracted. We are contracted to produce 27 aircraft and currently today we have produced 29 aircraft, so that is above our target. For those items that are in scope we have very, very low levels of cannibalisation. We do not allow cannibalisation on our depth line, unless it is for an aircraft state in theatre which requires that to be removed and taken to theatre urgently. Under TLCS I do not recognise the cannibalisation statement and/or the long lead time. We are producing aircraft above the contracted and targeted level; and for the items in scope we are above our KPIs on component production to theatre also. I would be interested to understand this specific area. Mr Hancock: You do not think that helicopters are regularly cannibalised to provide spare parts for operational aircraft? Q19 Chairman: Or not Chinooks anyway! Mr Pitchforth: The only time a Chinook would be cannibalised is if there was a state in theatre where it needed a component that was not available in the supply chain; otherwise we resist that as much as we can. Mr Whitney: I have to take the question. We have two support schemes in place: one supporting the Sea King, which we call SKIOS; and one supporting the Merlin which is called IMOS. These are long-term support contracts with longer pricing periods so we can see a long-term throughput, and that enables us to work with the supply chain; indeed partner with the supply chain; partner with the Ministry of Defence. Your direct question about cannibalisation, yes, it happens; it is happening today on Merlin; it is happening on Apache. I think the simple answer why is that there are insufficient spares that have been procured in first instance. We are operating aircraft in theatres that are more challenging than the assumptions that were taken. If you certainly take the case of Apache, it is fielded in theatre many years ahead of that which was planned. Inevitably you work on the basis that you are going to have an increasing training and flying burden, and you plan your spares procurement around that accordingly. In the instance of Apache you ramp that up, as a result of the conflicts that we are currently in, significantly above that which was planned. Q20 Mr Hancock: Is there insufficient resources going in then from the MoD to ensure that spare parts are available for this number of aircraft to be regularly in combat? Mr Whitney: I think it is difficult to state precisely whether there is insufficient. There are challenges in terms of ----- Q21 Mr Hancock: Where is the problem then? We put these operational aircraft in doing more than they were originally meant to do and far sooner, but we did not supply enough resources to make sure that they were always able to fly - very fast turnaround over maintenance issues. Who is responsible? Mr Whitney: It is not just spares; you have to look at all of the lines of development. Your training infrastructure has to be capable of producing pilots; your training infrastructure has to be capable of producing the technicians and maintainers. It is not just about spares supply. Q22 Mr Hancock: It is no good having well-trained pilots and crews, if you have not got Merlin gearboxes, is it? Mr Whitney: No absolutely. It is no good having aircraft either if you have not got the pilots: the whole lot has to come together to give the effect. Q23 Mr Hancock: How do we get over something like the ongoing failures of Merlin gearboxes? Mr Whitney: In cases of ongoing failures - and I do not recognise "ongoing failures of Merlin gearboxes", but we have got some specific instances ----- Mr Hancock: When you say you "do not recognise" it, would you say there is not a disproportionate number of gearboxes on the Merlins that fail? Q24 Chairman: Let us allow Mr Whitney to answer that question. Mr Whitney: I think what I was going to go back to was the method of contracting now in a long-term support arrangement - we call then the IOS; the Integrated Operational Support arrangements - incentivises industry to put these issues right, to buy the correct number of spares. Derek was absolutely right: the challenge is to understand your spares requirements and get the spares on the shelf; clearly not to carry too much inventory - there is a cost and it is driven as a result of that - but to carry enough; to have those spares at the right level of assembly. With the new contracting methods, there is incentivisation on the industry to improve the product through-life. Previously that has not happened, and I think that is where there should be confidence that things are improving and getting better. You will always have instances on helicopters where a certain failure that has not been predicted will cause an issue, and we have to work our way round it. These long-term support contracts equally allow that to happen with much greater urgency and much greater effect. Mr Hancock: Why is there then a substantially higher failure of the Merlin gearboxes? Q25 Chairman: Would you recognise that there was a substantially higher failure of Merlin gearboxes? Mr Whitney: In comparison to what? Q26 Mr Hancock: Other aircraft? Mr Whitney: I would have to go and examine the figures for that, and I am not in a position to quote. Q27 Mr Hancock: We suggest to you there is, but you would not think that? That does not strike you as something you are familiar with? Mr Whitney: I am familiar with the fact that the gearbox on the Merlin has had some issues in the past in terms of lifing of components. When you develop an aircraft and you develop new components you start off with the life of a component and you test it and you increase that through-life. That has not taken place in the manner that perhaps we predicted, and that may be a problem to which you refer. Components are being changed - not through failure but through the need to change components on life. In maintaining airworthiness on a helicopter you sometimes give components lives and you change them before those lives expire - that is how you maintain safety. That is something I could recognise, but I would need to come back to you with the exact details of that if you require. Q28 Chairman: If you could do that would be helpful. Mr Sharples wants to broaden it. Mr Sharples: Chairman, a general comment if I may to try to throw some light on the question. Cannibalisation is more often a problem with new helicopters entering into service than it is with those that have been in service for a number of years. The reason for that is because new aircraft that enter into service lack fleet experience; they lack flying hours; they often are subject to unscheduled maintenance, unpredicted maintenance, which was not considered during the design phase. They often have heavy schedule maintenance programmes which are lightened as the years go by through experience; and they can also be subject to lack of technical expertise - just insufficient time in service for the technical expertise to be built. We often find that cannibalisation is more prevalent on new fleets in service than it is on old ones. I am happy to say that on the Puma fleet in the RAF, cannibalisation is not a major issue for us, because after so many years in service and more than 70 million flying hours, the Puma is a very reliable helicopter and now has had a fully mature service experience. Mr Hancock: Can I just ask two quick final questions. One is: I would like to know what any of you would feel can be done to improve the system, speed up the system so that the downtime on aircraft is cut; and my final question goes back to the Apache issue. The real difference here, the crux of the matter, is about this training on one type and then flying another. It is the difference between the theatre entry standard of Apache helicopters and those that are in the depth fleet; and there is a substantial difference, is there not? That must create a problem, either where they are in operational flying or in the training that pilots get to fly those aircraft. If there is a substantial difference between the two, there must be an issue there that ought to be addressed, surely? Q29 Chairman: Would you like to deal with that second question first and then come back at the end to what can be done to improve things? Mr Whitney: I will take the Apache aircraft question. I do not think the difference is substantial. Yes, there are differences in terms of some of the modifications associated around defensive aids kit and fuel tanks etc., but I do not think this is a huge burden in terms of that to which you allude. Perhaps industry is not the best judge of that; I think the military would be a much better point at which to make that question. Mr Sharp: Certainly I do not have the experience that
you all do with the British military and how many types. I was just listening to the number of types
involved and I think if you are looking for ways to increase efficiency we come
back to the same point that was made before, which is: in a multi-role helicopter, if you have
something that can do more than one thing, and you have many more of them, then
the supply chain that will support those is going to support across a broader
array. If you have one that can be used
for utility, but can also be used for Medevac, but can also be used for lifting
a Chairman: I think we would all like many, many more in the American way, Mr Sharp! Q30 Mr Jenkin: On this question of supply of spare parts, how do OEMs give confidence to the MoD that battle-critical parts get priority over any other demands from any other of your civilian customers who may be more commercially valuable to you? Mr Pitchforth: From a Boeing perspective the UK Chinook fleet of spare parts is purely the UK Chinook fleet of spare parts. There is no cross-fertilisation with any other fleet, military or civilian. It is completely bespoke through TLCS, for the UK Chinook aircraft. Q31 Mr Jenkin: But that would not be true for the Merlin, would it? Mr Whitney: Absolutely, yes, they are military bespoke aircraft. In fact, it goes one step further in terms of the long-term support contracts because we have a joint team. The team is sat together, either at Yeovil or Sherborne, and that is a joint industry/MoD team. Q32 Mr Jenkin: Supposing there is a shortage of widgets on rotors, whatever it may be, and that part is sourced from some other part of the world, or another part of your Finmeccanica operation: how do you give confidence to the MoD that, when that part is needed for a helicopter ------- Mr Whitney: They are party to the dialogue that goes on. They actually see the requests being made. We have joint sessions with the companies concerned where we sit just like this; we have a meeting where the MoD are actually sat alongside us. It is not like we can hide behind anything. Q33 Mr Jenkin: The military get the priority? Mr Whitney: Absolutely. In terms of war fighting, I do not think there is any question that, when it comes to UORs or support to the front line, industry absolutely understand the urgency and need that is upon us and we stand up to deliver. Q34 Mr Hamilton: Could I just take that one stage further and that is about the upgrades that continually take place. I come from a background where I worked in heavy industry for 20-odd years, in the coalmine industry, and it was quite regular to upgrade as we went through heavy machinery. One of the things that comes through is, when we started to put heavy engines into machines which could not take it, we began to see the splits taking place in the casts, and the splits taking place in a number of other ways. My question is: what are the risks associated with putting a powerful engine into an old frame? Mr Sharp: Certainly in the US we have experienced a number of issues, and then there are workarounds to try to address those issues - the latest of which was the E-2 Hawkeye put advanced triple broad engines with new propellers on the front of them; and we had a lot of excessive vibration in the back and fretting in the back end of the airplane. Those tend to be unintended consequences of improvements to the system. My experience in the military, part of which was looking at the overhaul of fighters coming in over 55-60 months in San Diego, we had a contract with the military where we did a standard statement of work to overhaul that, ship it out, take the wings off, engines out, and get it back to the fleet all bright and shiny. Although that is a neat idea, each and every single airplane that comes through, although on the outside they look the same, when you take the turtlebacks off and you get on the inside, what has happened to each one of the airplanes or helicopters, wherever it was, is different; so the statement of work automatically mushrooms into: does this keel beam need to be replaced; does the engine need to be replaced? The cost savings of doing everything the same way off an assembly line and upgrading it is very, very difficult to quantify upfront until you actually get into the project; and once you are into the project you need a lot more money to finish it. Q35 Chairman: Mr Whitney, I think the Apache helicopter, which had a Rolls Royce engine put into it for the British buy, seems to have worked pretty well with that Rolls Royce engine? Mr Whitney: Indeed it has. The Rolls Royce RTM engine is performing extremely well. It is higher powered than the American engine that was fitted, and is demonstrating that capability in theatre. However, I think the Apache was designed from day one as a crashworthy aircraft. I think the issues that you raise in terms of putting more powerful engines into older aircraft can work. You can get greater performance from an aircraft, but you have to then go back to the basic structure air crashworthiness. Certainly if we are looking at a modern aircraft, it is designed to different standards to an old aircraft, and that is where you suffer the potential downsides of just increasing the power, Q36 Mr Hamilton: Are you saying that modern aircraft are different in the sense they are sleeker than what the old aircraft were? Mr Whitney: No, the other way around. What I am saying is that a modern aircraft will be designed around the concept of having a crashworthy undercarriage that can take descent velocities much greater than older aircraft; they will have attenuating seats that take impact and allow much greater survival rates. I would not want to guess but if I looked at a 40% crash case - and when you design for a crash case there are some distinct criteria that you have to take into account; there are lots of analyses done of lots of previous crashes - the data that we design around an old aircraft would typically be a 40% survival rate against that crash case; a more modern aircraft would be circa 80%; and if I look at the future Lynx today, and the future Lynx is a good point, the old Lynx is probably a 50% aircraft; and the new future Lynx, which is a new structure, much greater descent velocity, it would be a 95% aircraft. It just gives you some analysis in terms of where you can get with modern design. Mr Hancock: The judgment for when an aircraft can be upgraded is a pretty fine one, is it not? Those judgments have to be pretty well analysed, do they not? You cannot just say, "We're going to upgrade a Puma", for example, without knowing the real consequences of that. Where are those judgments made? Are they made by industry or are they made by the MoD relating to the cost of either developing a new aircraft or taking a chance on upgrading? Chairman: I think we ought to move on because we are running out of time and I want to cover a lot more ground. Q37 Mr Jenkin: We are using our helicopters very much more intensively than we expected in battlefield conditions and very harsh environments. What effect do you think this has on their lifespan? Mr Pitchforth: Some of that depends upon whether the airframe is lifed. In the case of the Chinook if it is not we can continue to repair and maintain that aircraft throughout its life. There is an advantage also of being a member of a very large fleet. The learning on the Chinook fleet is quite extensive through the thousands of aircraft in service; so therefore many of the issues that we may see with the extra usage we can predict and/or inspect for, understanding when those issues are going to arise. The Chinook fleet is a well understood fleet with a large sample and statistically therefore we understand what is going to happen to the airframe, because these are not pressurised aircraft; they do not have the hoop stress issues that a pressurised fuselage does, so therefore their life is considerably greater than a pressurised aircraft. Mr Sharples: Just a word on the Puma fleet, if I may. I think it is fair to say that in comparison to the civilian Puma fleet, the military Puma rate of flying is not as intensive as some of the fleet leaders on the Puma fleet. Offshore, for example in the very extreme conditions in which Puma fleets are operating in the civilian world also, either in Alaska, in the Middle East, in parts of South-East Asia or, indeed, in the North Sea, to give an example, fleet leader in the civilian Puma fleet currently has more than 38,000 flying hours on the airframe. Although I cannot tell you what the fleet leader in the RAF Puma fleet is, I am quite sure it is only a fraction of that. That is to say, despite the intense use to which we put our machines in military theatre - and again I have personal experience of doing that - nevertheless these machines are built for very intensive operations; and I do not think today we are in danger of running out of the lifetime of these machines. Q38 Mr Jenkin: Of course, some modern airframes are lifed. Is this just the equivalent of food manufacturers putting early sell-by dates on their processed foods, so the housewife has to throw them away? Mr Whitney: In terms of the products that AgustaWestland support, I do not think it is. The impact on operating in an extremely harsh environment may be that some components require replacement sooner than anticipated; and in a long-term support arrangement, like IMOS, that is costing us, industry, money. The aircraft are designed to work within a flight envelope, within an environment; and, indeed, the theatre they are in is a challenging environment but it is one that they are tested and designed to operate in. Q39 Mr Jenkin: What is the airframe life of a Merlin? Mr Whitney: 10,000 hours. Q40 Mr Jenkin: We have just heard these Pumas are doing 35,000. Mr Whitney: It is only limited to 10,000 by the requirement that was set in the early days. We have actually done studies that are ongoing right now with the Ministry of Defence, and the aircraft is capable of being extended to 15,000 hours. Q41 Mr Jenkin: That is still half of 30,000 hours. It does not sound such good value for money? Mr Whitney: You are not flying anything like that rate in the military. In a civil environment you are flying much, much more. Q42 Robert Key: How do you decide when extending the out-of-service date introduces unacceptable risk? How do you decide in engineering terms, or is it not an engineering decision? It is a statistical decision, or a legal decision. How do you decide? Mr Whitney: I do not think that is an industry decision. Industry will have a requirement to upgrade an aircraft and we will upgrade that to within the design specification that is laid upon us. That may or may not prove possible. If you require full crashworthiness on an old aircraft that may not be possible because physically the structure is incapable of being upgraded to that point. Q43 Robert Key: Have I got it right, you have said it is not the manufacturer's responsibility to make the judgment about the risk of extending the life of a helicopter? Mr Whitney: Clearly there is an absolute judgment to be made, but there is a specification that will be laid upon the manufacturer that we will be complying with. Q44 Robert Key: Who makes that specification? Mr Sharples In fact it is the responsibility of the design authority for the helicopter. In the case of Eurocopter, we are the design authority for the design of our own helicopters. To answer your question directly: it is the responsibility of our engineering team to make the statistical analysis on failure rate. To give you a number, if I may: the commercial certification requirements oblige the design of passenger-carrying machines - be they helicopters or airplanes - not to fail within 1 x 109 flying hours. There is a statistical obligation on the designers to ensure that aircraft will not fail; and, therefore, the designers build in redundancy either to the airframe or to the systems to ensure that that failure rate in all circumstances be it original design or upgrade is maintained. In our case, for the Puma upgrade our engineering team has calculated, as you would call it, the "consequences" of the upgrade programme. We have worked jointly hand-in-hand with the MoD, and it is a joint decision in this case - it will be a joint decision between industry and the MoD - to upgrade the programme based on upgrade experience that we already have, for example, in the Puma fleet in Portugal, and in the military fleets in the Middle East, which have already been upgraded. Q45 Robert Key: The Ministry of Defence is going to spend £235 million, is it, on upgrading the 43 Pumas, when we know that the Puma is not crashworthy and is therefore not fit for purpose. Is that not true? Mr Sharples: I would not comment on whether or not ----- Q46 Robert Key: Why will you not comment? Mr Sharples: I will comment on the question of the life extension programme, Mr Key. The objective I think of an extension programme is to improve the performance, the availability, the reliability, the easiness of operation of the helicopter and, therefore, the safety of that helicopter as well. The life extension programme of the Puma fleet will see the aircraft re-engined; new avionics systems; new digital autopilot; it will see new engine control systems; new tail rotor blades; a strengthened tail. All of those enhancements will ensure that that helicopter is more reliable, easier to operate and more available for the next ten years than it has been in the past. Q47 Robert Key: None of which has anything to do with its crashworthiness? Mr Sharples: I think it does, if I may. I think strengthening the tail; I think providing greater power margin; I think ensuring that engine control is simpler and easier to operate for the pilots; yes, I think that does improve crashworthiness. Q48 Chairman: Could you explain that, please? Can you talk us through why engine control improves crashworthiness? Mr Sharples: Automatic engine control allows the engines to respond more quickly when power is called for by the pilot. Therefore, in a situation where the pilot may find himself and his crew operating in marginal conditions, for example in hot and high conditions in mountains or in very severe weather conditions, his ability to call and expect to receive additional power at critical moments makes the aircraft a safer, more reliable machine. Q49 Robert Key: Will the recent High Court judgment about the Human Rights Act aspect of this make any difference to your decision-making when it comes to the extension of aircraft life, knowing that you are going to be responsible for sending military personnel into theatre in an aircraft that you must know is not crashworthy? Mr Sharples: Once again, the Puma is a very crashworthy aircraft and will be more so ----- Q50 Robert Key: I am sorry, did I hear that right: it "is a very crashworthy aircraft"? Mr Sharples: I did say that. The Puma is designed according to the design standards required by both the civil aviation authorities and the military aviation authorities. Q51 Robert Key: What percentage figure is it in terms of the crashworthiness scale? Mr Sharples: I am sorry, I do not have the figure. Q52 Robert Key: Someone trotted out some statistics a few minutes ago about, "This helicopter is 50%, that one is 90%". What about the Puma? Mr Sharples: Do you mean in terms of its accident rate, for example? Yes, I can give you a statistic on that. Offshore in the civilian world the fatal accident rate of the Super Puma is currently running at less than 0.5 fatal accidents/100,000 flying hours - that is half the average for offshore oil and gas helicopters in general. Q53 Chairman: Is that the most dangerous aspect of flying that the Pumas do? Mr Sharples: I am not sure I can answer that question, Chairman. You could make a judgment yourself on how dangerous offshore oil and gas operations are. They are certainly very challenging; certainly a very difficult and demanding environment. Robert Key: If the Ministry of Defence decided not to spend £235 million upgrading these non-crashworthy aircraft, what would be available instead? Chairman: I want to say the witness has said that he considers that the Puma is crashworthy, so I do not want you to ask the question in a way that denies the witness's answer. Q54 Robert Key: I have my opinion, Chairman, but of course I accept your advice. What alternative is available to the Ministry of Defence to purchase or to upgrade, if they decided that they were not prepared to take the risk of flying with Puma? Mr Sharples: Once again, the risk associated with the upgrade is a shared risk both between industry and the Ministry of Defence. The design authority for the Puma is industry and, therefore, it is our responsibility to ensure the integrity of the design. Q55 Robert
Key: So this is going to be a question for the
Ministry of Defence, for Ministers, I guess, in the end, because they are going
to have to make the judgment. Could I
just ask about the Sea King Sikorsky, and the fact that here we have a
wonderful aircraft, in which we flew quite recently, but it is 40 years old,
and there is a proposal to extend the life by a further four years for the Mk7s
and another six years for the Mk4s.
There were cracks in the mainframe ten years ago; there are cracks in
the mainframe now. How realistic is it
to keep this wonderful old antique flying on operational duties? After all, it is now going to go to Mr Sharp: I defer to my colleague from AgustaWestland. From a Sikorsky point of view, clearly we have looked at it in the commercial - our business is both commercial and military. We have moved on in the commercial world and developed the S-92, which we have put out into the fleet - there are over 100 of them out there now; the ones in the North Sea flying at 185-190 hours/ month; there are four of them that are now deployed with your UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency in pretty challenging conditions up on Sumburgh and Stornoway and doing some pretty great things. I cannot comment on whether that upgrade is the right thing or not really. That judgment is going to come through MoD; it is going to come through combatant commanders with the operational requests that are going to go to the requirements officers in Whitehall, and they are going to go and find out what the best piece of kit is that you want to put out on the front line. There are obviously other alternatives in the market today that you could purchase. Q56 Chairman: Mr Whitney, do you need to add anything on that? Mr Whitney: No, not on Sea King. I think the same arguments apply. It is an old aircraft but you can upgrade it,
and it is operating in Q57 Mrs
Moon: The Royal Aeronautical
Society has expressed a concern that the Ministry of Defence's industrial
strategy could have an erosion of the Mr Pitchforth: The Defence Industrial Strategy is the reason I am sat here today from Boeing. It requested that Boeing put down more of an in-country presence with engineering capability and what was described as a "footprint", to give the MoD the ability to interact with a company in an easier manner. We are doing that and we embraced the Defence Industrial Strategy as a good thing, which gave clarity to industry; and we have invested because of it and we would actually like to see that strategy reinvigoured and picked up and moved forward again so we can continue to use it as a roadmap to how we should be engaging with the Ministry of Defence. Mr Whitney: If I take the AgustaWestland answer, we fully supported the Defence Industrial Strategy; indeed, we signed a strategic partnering arrangement with the Ministry of Defence in June 2006 and have seen real benefit from that in terms of the way in which we work together and plan together; and look to manage some of the problems that there are in terms of managing the helicopter fleet with a small budget, shall we say. I think the more that can be done in terms of partnering and strategic partnering under the guise of the Defence Industrial Strategy the better. Mr Sharp: If I could just address that from a Sikorsky
point of view. I think less of a focus
for us - certainly we are not part of your Defence Industrial Strategy per se -
but we certainly from a corporate standpoint, would look at partnering as so
important across all of our different military and customer bases. From a military standpoint on the support
side, we have partnering agreements in Mrs Moon: Does the Strategy place sufficient emphasis on competition? Q58 Chairman: That is the other side of the question. Mr Sharples: Eurocopter has taken the decision to invest in
the Q59 Mrs Moon: Does that imply that you do not think it has opened up to competition enough yet? Mr Sharples: I think we would be happy to be invited to have every opportunity to bid whenever those opportunities are available. Mr Pitchforth: The first version of the Defence Industrial Strategy focussed mainly on maintaining and preserving the skills in-country and/or growing those skills as we have done with Boeing. We have done that with our partners at Vector Aerospace in Fleetland in our depth line, increased the knowledge, capability and skills in-country. I think there is another version of the Strategy which is imminent, I guess, and we would be interested to know what that says about some of these other points that would need addressing. Q60 Chairman: You would like to see a second version of the Defence Industrial Strategy soon, would you? Mr Pitchforth: It has always been our understanding that that has been on the cards. Mr Sharp: To follow my colleague from Eurocopter's
comments, of course we are always happy to bid or be involved in anything that
we can be. The real question - in terms
of "is competition working for you" - is probably better answered by asking the
question not to us as industry colleagues but more to the MoD; and that is to the
brave men and women that fight for your country. Do they think they have the best products on
site in Mrs Moon: I can assure you this Committee does ask that question on a regular basis. Q61 Mr Crausby: Can you tell us something about Integrated Operational Support - how is it working in comparison with the more traditional support systems? Mr Whitney: The Integrated Operational Support models that I referred to earlier on, IMOS for Merlin and SKIOS for Sea King, are working very well. We have a partnership so we have taken on board the supply base; they are part of our team. We have taken on board the MoD and work in a totally joined-up manner in delivering the support necessary to keep those aircraft on the front line. I think it is worth also pointing out to demonstrate the value-for- money case to meet Treasury approval we had to demonstrate the fact that we could do this even more efficiently than the previous regime. In terms of the Sea King business case, I think the figure was 10% cheaper; the Merlin was nearer 20%. That is what is being delivered today. The transfer of risk to industry I think allows the Ministry of Defence to walk away from those risks; industry can manage it. As I said previously, the incentivisation is now with us to improve the product through-life and maintain it through- life. By having a long-term partnered arrangement, looking forward, with a five-year pricing period allows us to work with the supply base and plan accordingly; rather than perhaps in the past where orders would have been sporadic - every three or four years a spike of orders; business cannot plan on that basis. Business needs predictability; and the Ministry of Defence obviously needs flexibility and it is a balance. I think the IOS arrangements allow us to strike the right balance with improved value for money. Mr Pitchforth: Our version of the Integrated Operational Support scheme is TLCS for the Chinook. When we took that on three years ago we contracted for 12,000 flying hours of Chinook. The RAF had never achieved 12,000 hours at the point when we took over the contract. We are now heading towards 16,000 hours with a target of going even higher than that in the future. To answer your question: we are delivering capability in theatre today as we speak from the Chinook fleet at a lower cost than we were doing previously. I regard that as a success. Q62 Mr Crausby: How does that work from a safety point of view? I understand there is a transfer of financial risk, but is there a transfer of personal risk to industry from the MoD? In the sense that the MoD have a responsibility to ensure that our service personnel are unbelievably safe, and sometimes a reduction in cost can have an effect on that. How can we be assured that the transfer of financial risk to industry maintains the standards of safety? Mr Whitney: There is no change in the airworthiness approvals process as a result of this. The underwriting of the aircraft safety primarily is down to the Ministry of Defence being happy with the evidence that is given to them, and that does not change. I do not think airworthiness changes in any way. There is no way that we, industry, could for instance fit a part to an aircraft that was not of the right standard. I think that is what you are potentially suggesting could happen; that would not happen in this instance. Q63 Mrs Moon: Could I just talk to you about the system of Integrated Operational Support and how that is working. I wanted to find out whether, in fact, in terms of support on aircraft and their maintenance and their actual operation in theatre and preparation for deployment, do you think there is a greater role for industry; is there a possibility of you extending your role in making sure that craft are available and are actually serviced and ready for deployment? Is that something you feel is an area you can expand further into? Mr Sharp: I cannot comment on SKIOS or IMOS - those are not our programmes. I would tell you that I think in the commercial world, certainly our commercial business, we have tried to employ new technology, latest technology, we call it HUMS but it is an integrated HUM system - Helicopter Usage Monitoring System - which monitors wear, monitors vibrations and so on and so forth. Rather than a reactive maintenance - where the airplane comes in, the pilot reports it broken and we go to maintenance and we ask for the right part to fix the airplane and get it back up - what HUMS allows you to do, certainly in businesses in offshore oil where you are trying to make money on thin margins at high operational tempos, is that it allows you to predict a bearing starting to go bad and then pre-ordering it, selecting it and doing that maintenance, rather than waiting for the thing to break. We have talked to our military, our government about that and that is going to be going on; the next generation Black Hawk is a full up HUMS system that the military will be able to take advantage of that same technology in terms of more predictive maintenance rather than reactive maintenance. Mr Pitchforth: We are actually doing that already; we are moving forward with our Vector colleagues to support the Chinook fleet forward at RAF Odiham and also into Afghanistan; and that is to take the knowledge and skills that we have established in Fleetlands in changing the depth facility and learning through our lean process and moving that knowledge out, first of all to the UK operating base at Odiham and then further forward even to theatre. Today in theatre we have a team led by Boeing with Vector technicians helping the RAF today on the ramp as the aircraft take off at theatre. So we like to see the learning from that and we do not know if that is a short learning exercise that we will need to repeat periodically or whether that is a constant involvement that we are taking the first steps into helping in the way that you have described. Chairman: Can I say thank you very much indeed to all of you for your helpful information, which is the first part of our evidence session today. Memorandum submitted by SELEX Galileo and Vector Aerospace Corporation Examination of WitnessesWitnesses: Mr Paul O'Hara, Vice President, Customer Relations, (Defence Aerospace) Rolls-Royce, Dr Beatrice Nicholas, Director, Surveillance and Protection Technologies, SELEX Galileo and Mr Declan O'Shea, Chief Executive, Vector Aerospace Corporation, gave evidence. Q64 Chairman: May I welcome our three new witnesses. May I repeat that you do not need to answer every question, and actually you have heard all these questions answered anyway so you need only add to anything you think you would like to add because we are going to be going through the same sorts of questions and we do not need to do it at huge length. But I would like to say thank you very much indeed for coming. Mr O'Shea, would you like to begin by introducing yourself and saying what your company does? Mr O'Shea: Certainly; thank you, Mr
Chairman. My name is Declan O'Shea and I
am the President and Chief Executive of Vector Aerospace. Vector Aerospace is a company based in Q65 Chairman: Thank you very much. Dr Nicholas. Dr Nicholas: My name is Beatrice Nicholas;
I work for SELEX Galileo, which is part of the Finmeccanica Group. I am the Director of the Surveillance and
Protection Technology area within the electronic warfare business there and we
provide electronic warfare equipment to wide range of helicopter platforms for
the Q66 Chairman: Thank you. Mr O'Hara. Mr O'Hara: A very good morning to
you. My name is Paul O'Hara; I am the
Rolls-Royce Vice President to Customer Relations. I am representing Rolls-Royce, which has one
of the broadest portfolios of aerospace products in the world. I am actually employed out of Q67 Chairman: Thank you. In relation to helicopters what do your companies do? Mr O'Hara. Mr O'Hara: Rolls-Royce is proud to be
associated with the defence business. We
are working on a number of products which you have already described this
morning. On the Lynx helicopter, we have
the Rolls-Royce Gem engine; in addition to that we are actively supporting the
UOR to replace the Gem engines with the LH Tech T800. On the Sea King helicopter we have the Gnome
engine which, as we have heard again this morning, is deployed in various
locations around the world. RTM322,
again a partner engine but it is on a number of Merlin applications, of which
there are at least three; and the Apache helicopter. There are other products that we are
associated with but they are not necessarily in the Dr Nicholas: We make a wide range of electronic warfare equipment, which is fitted to helicopters that are in service with all three of the services. For instance, we have the HIDAS equipment, which is fitted to the UK Apache and will also go on to the future Lynx known as the Wildcat with AgustaWestland. We made the Sky Guardian 200 Radar Warning Receiver, which has been on a wide range of platforms for a number of years; and the Sky Guardian 2000 Radar Warning Receiver which is on the Sea King and Merlin Mk 3. Through other parts of the company - not the part with which I am directly associated - we also make radar and other equipment which is fitted on various parts of the helicopter fleet. Q68 Chairman: Do you make glass cockpits? Dr Nicholas: We do not, no. Q69 Chairman: Mr O'Shea? Mr O'Shea: We provide depth maintenance at Fleetlands for the Chinook, Sea King and Lynx helicopter platforms, and for those same platforms in Almondbank we provide the dynamic components. Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. David Crausby. Q70 Mr Crausby: As I said in the first part, we have in the region of 586 helicopters owned, of which there are 17 types and several subsets within each type. So can you tell us what problems that fleet within fleet causes and what is the ideal situation we should be at? What kinds of numbers of types and subsets should we be aiming at and what would be the problems that are associated with all of that? Mr O'Hara: I will take that first, sir. I think from a Rolls-Royce perspective obviously the greater the number of variants - and certainly I am talking obviously at an engine level - then it does entail that you need greater numbers of spares and different types of spares, more importantly, to support those subsets. The ideal is obviously that you have fewer numbers, certainly from an engine perspective, and therefore in terms of reducing the logistical footprint. On the Merlin, as an example, there are three different types of engines. With regards to different marks they are subsets of the RTN 322 but there are subtle differences, which although the pilots themselves in terms of overall operation will not be aware of, when you start to get to logistical footprints, when you start talking about a supply chain then obviously that entails that different parts have to be made. The ideal, certainly from an engine perspective, is to commonise where possible; that brings economies of scale into being and it means that there are less spare parts that you have to procure to support that activity, and overall that reduces the logistical footprint. Mr O'Shea: From our perspective it is largely an issue of planning. I think from the commercial side commonality has been the key for a long time and that certainly drives down costs. In planning the aircraft the main issue is the supply chain because with the subsets of aircraft there are many subsets of parts that are required. So it is not a key to delivering the aircraft; the key is ensuring that you have the parts and that is really a budgetary issue. Dr Nicholas: If I can add to that, as an equipment supplier to helicopters? It is a great advantage for us if we can have common equipment across a range of platforms; certainly from the supply point of view it makes it much easier for us to have common equipment. It will reduce cost because we can have larger productions runs. As my colleagues have said, it also eases the supply chain and the logistics chain. I think in addition there is also a big benefit across the wide range of lines of development in that we can train pilots, maintenance crew and our teams on a single set of equipment which they will find on a number of platforms, and that reduces cost and reduces repair time because we get a faster turnaround. I think one other really important point for us is that if we have common equipment across a wide range of platforms it makes it easier for us to justify investment in the new technology for the future so that we can improve the capability of equipment and deal with the threat as that evolves. Q71 Mr Crausby: How big an issue is the training problem that we raised in the first part? The Chairman described the example of training on analogue systems only to operate on digital systems. Some answers to that were that we would get around that, but would you like to be the first person to fly with the pilot in an operation going straight on to a digital system? Mr O'Shea: Clearly you want to be trained on the system that you are going to use and for commercial aircraft the whole cockpit management team has been there for quite some time, so clearly it has to be better to train on the systems that you are going to use. Dr Nicholas: I think the same. We work very closely with the aircraft manufacturers to make sure that we get the right training packages in place, but a diversity of equipment certainly makes it more difficult for not only the pilots but other crew transferring from one aircraft to another; so if we can have more commonality of equipment that makes that transfer simpler. Q72 Mr Crausby: Is it a serious problem in your experience? Dr Nicholas: Anecdotally we have heard suggestions but I do not have any hard evidence of that - it would be anecdotal. Mr O'Hara: I do not see that to a large extent from an engine perspective because largely the systems that we have are integrated with the cockpit, so the only example I could give is the transition from a Gem powered Lynx to a T800 powered Lynx. In that case there will be an additional glass screen but the training that has been put in place through AgustaWestland in conjunction with the authority, will actually train the pilots to utilise that additional glass screen which therefore they will be used to that when they actually go into operation through the UOR. Q73 Mr Hamilton: With the variety of things that have happened, with the variety of choices that are available and with the changes that take place, how much downtime does a pilot have to adjust to every single change that takes place? The point about familiarity - and I think Mr Sharp said earlier and you are reiterating - is that the familiarity has to really be the key to the whole thing; that the person who gets in the cockpit should have very little change, irrespective of what change is round the corner. But from what we have heard we have not reached that position, but that there is constant change; so how much downtime does that mean for the pilots? Dr Nicholas: I am not sure that there is constant change of the equipment but there is constant change between platforms because the equipment is different on different platforms. I am afraid I do not know. Q74 Mr Hamilton: And this has to change for each one? Dr Nicholas: In some cases yes. I am afraid I do know what the impact of that is. Q75 Chairman: That is not your field? Dr Nicholas: No. Q76 Mr Hamilton: Can I ask a question about cannibalisation of spare parts because it was raised earlier on. What are the problems in relation to cannibalisation of spare parts? Mr O'Shea: We are responsible for three platforms: that is the Chinook, the Sea King and the Lynx. The Chinook we do not have a cannibalisation issue, and although the Sea King is 40 years old we do not have a cannibalisation issue there. Clearly there is some redundancy on the Lynx because their numbers are reducing, so there are donor aircraft coming available. And from time to time, because we operate pulse lines, we may have to take one from an incoming aircraft to test it more quickly than the process would otherwise suggest, and bring it forward. But we rarely find that we have a cannibalisation issue. Mr O'Hara: From a large perspective it does depend upon the type of support arrangement that we are contracted to. So from an engine perspective where it is more traditional type support you are far more likely to have support issues in terms of the procurement of the spares, the legacy spares, as opposed to a more inclusive type arrangement where it is more on track with an availability contract, where we as industry - sorry to use the terminology - are directly responsible for the whole procurement, the resourcing of the spares, the actual forecasting of the spares, etc, which means that as a total package it is far easier to deliver the product that you are actually trying to get forward. Q77 Mr Hamilton: So on the spares issue what improvements are you making to try and speed up the process to get spares on the field as quickly as possible? Mr O'Hara: On the traditional side, it is things like life extension and it is about looking at the number of arisings; it is actually trying to stop the arisings from occurring in the first place. If you have deployed service engineers forwards with the units that are actually utilising the equipment you can actually stop something that would be coming back and therefore could be quite a costly rejection. Investing in repairs as opposed to actually utilising brand new components is another way of cost reduction as well; so it is all about working both with the people who are actually doing the level servicing - in some circumstances it is ourselves, in some cases it is partner companies - but at the end of the day it is working together to try and reduce the cost of those operations. That is in a traditional sense and in the availability we take a far more inclusive type of arrangement so that all aspects of the engine support are incorporated into that supply. Q78 Mr Hamilton: Could I ask the final part of my question and that is the risks associated with putting a more powerful engine into an old airframe? Mr O'Hara: Perhaps I should answer that. It is on a case by case basis. I think there was a particular case that you were debating this morning but I would talk about two subjects that I am aware of: one is with the Lynx, with the T800 and the second one is RTM 322 and we are proposing growth variance of that for the Merlin application. We have worked hand in glove with the aircraft manufacture so it is not about - an example was used this morning of almost overpowering the aircraft and therefore the aircraft not being able to take it. We have worked very, very closely in the integration programme of the LH Tech T800 on to the Lynx. The aircraft is well capable of taking the performance that it provides and therefore what we are doing, although we are an engine supplier and the engine is a product, it is actually increasing the capability of the air vehicle very, very significantly in an airworthiness role, in a safe method and a supportable method. On the RTM 322 we do have a bigger variant of that particular engine, with which we are in discussions and negotiations with AgustaWestland, and that similarly would provide the Merlin with increased capability in a safe environment and a supportable environment as well. So on a case by case basis we do have examples where we have taken engines, all being new designs, and they have gone into some aircraft that have already been out there for a long time, like the Lynx, and there are other examples where we are buffering it into newer aircraft like the Merlin. The final thing I would say, if I may just go a little bit further, we were talking about the RTM 322 integration into the Apache. I think in terms of taking one engine out and putting another engine type in, that tends to be the textbook integration programme and everybody that was involved in it from the Authority, AgustaWestland, ourselves and Boeing, it was the textbook way of actually doing an engine integration. Q79 Chairman: We were all told at the time though that it was a very dangerous thing to do. Mr O'Hara: Before they made the judgment most people were concerned that it was a very, very large risk to the programme. It became very, very apparent when the demonstrator aircraft that was out in the States was not actually going to be required for the full extent of the programme, and LBA 6 demonstration programme in the States was cut short because of the progress and success that we had made in the States. The remainder of the flying was done on prototype aircraft in AgustaWestland in Yeovil. Q80 Chairman: That was an experiment in a sense that worked. There have been lots that have not, have there not? Mr O'Hara: I would not say from a Rolls-Royce perspective; I am not aware of any integration programmes that have not worked and I would not necessarily describe the RTM 322 going on to the Apache as an experiment; I think it was a calculated risk, people knew that there was a risk. Certainly from an industry perspective we thought that the risk was manageable and therefore we were very well engaged with the programme and keen to take it on. Q81 Chairman: As the person who took the decision I suppose I should not really describe it as an experiment myself. Mr O'Hara: I am not at liberty to comment, sir! Q82 Robert Key: Can I ask you about changing operational priorities? Dr Nicholas, you gave us a very good brief, if I may say so, and one of the things that really struck me was your experience of UORs and you said that Urgent Operational Requirements are generally a disrupter to coherency, and you gave the example of the Chinook integrated project team being the only team that took up the challenge that you gave them in trying to get around this problem. And you said, "In addition, future capability insertion will be more onerous," if the Ministry of Defence insists on this rather piecemeal fleet within a fleet approach. Would you like to tell us how you think this is looking over the next few years? Is the MoD going to go on insisting on the insertion of UORs that are disruptive? Dr Nicholas: Firstly I would like to say that in the company we absolutely support the need to get equipment out to the forces as rapidly as possible, so clearly for any urgent operational requirement by definition it is urgent and so it needs to take the most time effective route. However, we believe that the requirement is often interpreted extremely narrowly and for instance on the Chinook what we did was to introduce what we term a DAS controller, which basically means that it will be much simpler in the future to integrate additional capability into the defence based system on the helicopter to improve protection against new threats as they emerge. If we had taken the very narrow approach just to add the new sensors and effectors that future proofing would not have been there, whereas on the Chinook it is present. Q83 Robert Key: Do you see any end to this particular way of doing business? Dr Nicholas: No, and I do not think we would necessarily want to. I guess we would like to see an end to the conflict, of course; but what we would like to see is more engagement about how the procurement process actually is used so that we can get the most cost effective and most future proof procurements in place in the circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment. Q84 Robert Key: Is this because there is such inertia at Abbey Wood, for example, that they are not anticipating the need to insert new programmes? Dr Nicholas: No. I think the engagement we have had with Abbey Wood has always been very constructive. I think it is about the rules within which they operate and that sometimes they need to be modified as circumstances change. Q85 Robert Key: In what way could they be modified? Dr Nicholas: I think to allow more discretion would be useful. Q86 Robert Key: Discretion in how they set the contract or discretion in engineering terms at your end? Dr Nicholas: I think both. Robert Key: That is helpful, thank you. Q87 Mrs Moon: I would like to go back to the Defence Industrial Strategy. Is it an adequate basis for a relationship with you and does it place sufficient emphasis on competition? Mr O'Shea: Maybe I could start on that,
Mrs Moon. We bought the DARA companies
and Fleetlands and Almondbank last year with effect from Dr Nicholas: From our point of view the
partnership model that was introduced in the Defence Industrial Strategy has
been very helpful because it has helped us to build long-term relationships,
both with the helicopter manufacturers but also with other equipment
suppliers. I think the accompanying
Defence Technology Strategy has been very, very important in recognising the need
to maintain a sovereign capability in the Mr O'Hara: From a Rolls-Royce perspective we welcome the transparency, the clarity and the certainty that the DIS actually brought with regards to the relationship between industry and the UK MoD. We would welcome a DIS 2; we understand obviously that there are other priorities at the moment which are keeping us from moving forward generally on that, but overall we think it is a very positive way of describing the relationship and actually moving it forwards. Q88 Mr Crausby: How big an issue is technological sovereignty? I read in the Defence Industrial Strategy that we will continue to invest in research and support of the development of key helicopter related technologies. Then it goes on to say that the investment averages approximately £13 million per year. Is that adequate? It does not sound very much to me for such an important field. What do we really need to do and how much money do we really need to put in, in order to maintain sovereignty over this level of technology? Mr O'Hara: From a Rolls-Royce perspective we are heavily investing in our products on an annual basis. The DIS did not particularly mention proportion systems with regards to R&T. There was an R&T project which was on fixed wing but it was not on the rotary wing side. So what we would welcome is the opportunity to discuss in DIS2 how we could work and move forwards in terms of R&T investment in rotorcraft products. We are investing in our products; we are bringing growth products back to the market - and I have mentioned one before in terms of the RTM 322. T800 was heavily invested from Rolls-Royce and its partners as well. So there are products out there; there are things that we could be doing in the future - things like the first infrared suppression technologies. There are things that we should be looking at to invest in in the future and we would welcome that to be incorporated into DIS2. Mr O'Shea: From the Vector perspective we provide skilled labour on these platforms. I think there was a nervousness when the MoD sold it to a private industry as to what would we do with it? But since then we have taken on all of the technical people that were there; we have taken on all of the apprentices that came out. We currently have 51 apprentices going to 70 apprentices and we have taken on NAAS accreditation for the whole site. So for our part we will continue to invest in the people that will deliver these platforms ultimately. Dr Nicholas: In the field of electronic
warfare clearly we have a dependence on technology right the way from the base
technologies of things like semiconductor technologies right the way up through
signal processing, materials technology.
So we have a very, very high dependence on science and technology in the
science and technology base of the Q89 Mr Crausby: But are we doing enough to maintain that sort of technological sovereignty that we really feel we should have? Dr Nicholas: I guess we could always do
more but I think that we have a very sound technological base in the Q90 Mrs Moon: How do you feel the system of Integrated Operational Support is working? Is it effective? Dr Nicholas: I cannot really comment on that because none of the contracts that I have fall within the Integrated Operational Support scheme. Mr O'Hara: It is the same for Rolls-Royce. We direct contract in terms of whether it is traditional or the preferred availability type contract. Our services contracts are not under the prime contractor and are direct with the UK MoD. What it gives is direct visibility to both partners; it gives value for money; it gives benefits on both sides. So therefore we are not operating under an IOS scheme per se. Mr O'Shea: We operate in two IOS schemes; there is the TLCS through Boeing and the other is the IOS with Sea King through AgustaWestland. Then we operate directly with the MoD, with the IPT Lynx. I think to look at Chinook - and my colleague David Pitchforth referred to it earlier on today - when we took over the contract they were flying 12,000 hours - that is what the contract was for - and they had never flown more than that. At this point we are heading past 16,000 hours on some of the platforms. Our contract was to deliver 27 to forward and we are currently at 30 today. Q91 Chairman: I thought he said 29. Mr O'Shea: The Boeing number may be 29. Ours not in maintenance in Fleetlands would be 30. That is today and we will continue to do that. However, with the Lynx aircraft we are direct with the IPT but what we have done there is we have set up a logistical cell at Fleetlands where we have AgustaWestland and we have the project team itself and we have Vector Aerospace involved in it and that gets over the planning issues, the logistic issues and the supply chain issues as well. Q92 Mrs Moon: Do you think that industry could take on a further expanded role in relation to preparation for aircraft for deployment and while in deployment? Is that something, for example, in terms of Rolls-Royce, in taking the maintenance of engines and the maintenance of defence equipment? Do you think that there is an opportunity for industry to expand into that in the field? Also, in terms of the question David Crausby asked about the protection of staff in the Armed Forces, do you think you could get your staff to take on those roles in theatre and are they equipped and prepared to do that? Mr O'Hara: We are already involved in what is called CONDA, which is Contractors on Deployed Operations. So although it is relatively small numbers what we have done is that we have assessed the risks, we have looked at the depth stands, we have looked at the depth coms that are applicable to it and found a way forwards for people who are not military - they may be reservists but primarily they are Rolls-Royce plc staff who have actually gone forward. I went out to the Balkans in the early 1990s as a field service engineer in a previous role, supporting operations. We know there are benefits for that; we have people there today on fixed wing and what we believe is that that would bring advantages to the role that the services have to do. At the end of the day it is about getting the skills sets; it is about getting the knowledge where it is necessary. As I have said before, if you have an ability to keep an aircraft flying then that has a significant impact on its operational capability. If you then stop an engine being removed as an item you stop it having to go through a large logistical chain to come all the way back for somebody to fix something that could have taken quite a short time to repair whilst on operations. So there are huge benefits to doing CONDO operations. We have looked at ways of doing that and we are prepared to do that; we do have people who would volunteer to do that. Dr Nicholas: In the fixed wing arena rather than the helicopter arena we certainly had staff deployed in country during the first Gulf War and we are certainly prepared to do that in current operations. We certainly see a tremendous benefit in understanding how the equipment truly performs in theatre. If you can get very rapid feedback from the crew who are using it you can then optimise the performance much more rapidly. Also, we find that it is very motivating for our staff to get that close contact and understand how the equipment is really being used. Mr O'Shea: We have people in Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I think that we have no further questions for you and we would like to thank you enormously for coming along to help us with our inquiry; it is much appreciated. |