Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy - Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee Contents



89. On 26 January 2009, the Committee held its first Science Question Time with the Minister for Science and Innovation, Lord Drayson. During this session, the Minister suggested that the UK should identify, and concentrate support on, areas of research in which the UK could: (a) be world leading; and (b) have the potential to provide significant economic returns on any investment:

    I am calling for a serious debate about the areas of focus for this country in the future. […] That is a debate which I know will cause some interest, but I do think it is one which we need to have because it is the reality of the environment in which we operate as a country.[68]

    I think it would be actually good for the country to get a clear sense of what it is we think we can lead the world in over the next ten years.[69]

90. Asked by the Chairman whether he had "the bottle to lead this debate", Lord Drayson replied "Yes"[70] and added "It is a bit late now if I have not!"[71]

91. Following our session with the Science Minister, a number of speeches and public comments were made about this debate. (Hereafter, it is called the 'strategic priorities debate'.)

92. On 4 February 2009, Lord Drayson gave a speech at the Foundation for Science and Technology, in which he outlined further the context:

    This evening I want to stimulate a debate on our national science and innovation strategy, and whether it is adequately geared up to cope with the future. Since day one in this job, the global economic downturn has dominated. With its origins firmly linked to systemic problems in the global financial system, the current downturn has been more severe and more rapid than anything we've seen in recent memory.

    I can relate personally to the impact of recession on businesses and on people. As an undergraduate apprentice sponsored by British Leyland in 1979, I well remember Red Robbo's picket lines ranged in front of K Gate at Longbridge and saw a once-great business collapsing before my eyes.

    As a science entrepreneur, during the difficult period of the early '90s, I had to make colleagues redundant, and I had the bank manager threaten to put my company into receivership unless I came up with the money to pay off the business overdraft.

    I got through those tough times, but those experiences taught me some lessons. Like the importance of having a broad portfolio of products and services; not relying too much on one area which can expose you to sudden risk; of knowing what your strengths are - and playing to them. And being aware of limited resources - and investing them wisely.

    I mention these lessons because I believe we should ask ourselves—in the midst of this global downturn—are we applying these lessons well enough to our science and innovation policy?

    […] What are the future growth areas? Where will future jobs and wealth come from? Where does the UK really have the potential to take world-class science and build world-class business from it? What is government's role in facilitating this transition?

    Peter Mandelson has argued for a new industrial activism, where government sets out a strategic framework as a bridge to the future, where business and investors have confidence in the long-term direction.

    What is the role of science policy here?

    […] Has the time come for the UK—as part of a clear economic strategy—to make choices about the balance of investment in science and innovation to favour those areas in which the UK has clear competitive advantage? [72]

93. These are serious questions, which instinctively cause unease because they raise questions about whether the Government is planning a return—albeit more strategically—to the policy of picking winners, the British Leyland mention acting as an uncomfortable reminder. We return to this question later.

94. It also raises questions about the Government's vision for UK science. The Science Minister, the then Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Prime Minister have all made strong commitments to 'pure', curiosity-driven research.[73] As the Royal Academy of Engineering put it: "All political speeches to date on the subject have stressed that this vision is about reaping the benefits of research already funded and that the commitment to curiosity-driven research funding remains unaffected".[74]

95. Despite this, there have been concerns in the academic community that an increased focus on translation will amount to decreased focus, and possibly reduced funding, on basic science. These concerns have centred on: the changes to the Research Council funding application process so that each funding application—including basic research with no immediate or obvious application—must be accompanied by impact plans that should demonstrate the contribution that the research will make to society and the economy; the forthcoming Research Excellence Framework, which will include an assessment of the economic and social impact of research;[75] and steps that have been taken to refocus research funding on priority areas supporting "key areas of economic potential".[76]


96. Putting these concerns to one side for a moment, we should first ask what this debate is about. Our initial question was whether Lord Drayson was calling for a debate about whether the UK should be more strategic in its approach to funding science, or a debate about how the UK should be more strategic. We asked several players and received a mixture of responses.

97. Lord Drayson, the initiator of the debate, told us that he intended this to be a debate about whether the UK needs to be more strategic:

    My point in raising the topic as a debate was to stimulate a serious debate about whether or not the science community felt that we should apply more focus to decision-making around research priorities […][77]

And after agreement to discuss how:

    and also to encourage them, should they come to that conclusion, as to make recommendations as to how that should be done.[78]

98. However, when he launched the debate at the January 2009 Science Question Time, he said that he believed that there would need to be "more concentrations" in the UK's research spend,[79] as if the debate would be about how to determine the strategic focus.

99. Professor Adrian Smith, Director General for Science and Research, argued that this is about whether there should be more focussed research funding.[80] Iain Gray, Chief Executive of the Technology Strategy Board, disagreed: "My belief is it is how we are going to do it. It is about focus, identifying areas that we are going to make a big difference in."[81]

100. John Denham, the then Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, was not clear. On balance, his comments seem to suggest that the debate is about how to be more strategic with funding:

    We believe that we should have that discussion about how they organise research to ensure that we maintain fundamental research and get the maximum economic benefit from the substantial investment that we make in research. That is under way. It is not an 'if'—we are doing it. It is a discussion that the research councils are having.[82]

101. Nick Dusic from the Campaign for Science and Engineering was, like us, confused: "We have had Lord Drayson's, John Denham's and the Prime Minister's speech, and each has a different focus on this issue".[83]

102. The second area of confusion was raised by both the Institute of Physics and the Medical Research Council (MRC). They pointed out that key to the debate was what Lord Drayson meant by 'competitive advantage': "Should we infer that advantage is used here in an industrial, financial, or intellectual sense?"[84] If he means scientifically competitive, the MRC argued, "the Research Councils already do this in supporting excellence through peer review".[85] If he meant economically competitive "any policy would need to recognise that the UK needs to grow new strengths as well as building on existing ones".[86]

103. The third and most significant misunderstanding was that the debate would probably result in a major shift of policy towards science funding. This was certainly our understanding: when he launched the debate at Science Question Time, Lord Drayson indicated that there would need to be concentration in science funding.[87] This apparently is not the case. When we later asked him if there would be a government policy announcement as a result of the debate, he succinctly replied: "No".[88]

104. We have since, however, heard that Lord Mandelson has indicated that a decision has been taken to push ahead with prioritising applied research. In a speech in which he talked about his "commitment to maintaining the support and standards of scientific research", he declared: "and I don't mean only applied research, which will obviously receive greater emphasis, but fundamental science as well" (emphasis added).[89]

105. We are left wondering what this strategic priorities debate was about and whether it has led to a major shift in Government policy. We are in favour of a discussion about how best to focus research funds so that the UK gets maximum reward from its investment, but the lesson to be learned is that the Government should be clear in its own mind about the format and goals of a debate before launching it. (This recommendation is expanded later in the chapter.)

Picking winners?

106. Some aspects of this debate seemed to us to share characteristics with the 'picking winners' policy of the 1970s. Lord Drayson did not launch this debate in isolation. It followed an announcement by the Business Secretary, Lord Mandelson, that the government would support industry through the recession in what he described as "market-based industrial activism".[90]

107. This new industrial activism, the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee, is not the old picking winners philosophy of, as he put it, "taking one company or a second company and saying that we were going to back this single company to the hilt".[91] Rather it is about backing the development of skills and research in successful sectors in the UK economy.[92] But this raises the same problem that bedevilled the policies of the 1970s when decisions were made about which companies to back. Now it seems the Government will have to make decisions about which sectors to back. The Chairman asked the Prime Minister how he intended to do this during a Liaison Committee session in February 2009. The Prime Minister replied that "they pick themselves".[93]

108. Do they? During our major inquiry into engineering, we conducted a case study inquiry into plastic electronics. We discovered during the course of that inquiry that the plastic electronics industry "is likely to grow substantially over the next few years" and that "the UK's research base puts it in a unique position to capitalise on this growth".[94] However, during the course of the inquiry we witnessed potentially successful UK start-ups folding or moving overseas. It was clear that the UK was missing out "on the opportunity to exploit the economic potential offered by the commercialisation of innovative technologies".[95] Industries do not 'pick themselves'. In the case of plastic electronics, the USA, Germany and Japan were picking the UK's start-ups and turning them into winners; the UK was losing out.

109. Past experience of failing to accurately 'pick winners' has led to a risk-averse executive. The belief that 'sectors will pick themselves' is misplaced and when proactive interventions by Government are not forthcoming, potentially successful industries that germinate in the UK, blossom elsewhere. Choosing to support one sector over another will be difficult. The Government should develop clear and agreed methodologies for determining priorities and acceptability of risk.

110. There is another side to this point: with a finite budget, if one is to pick winners and give them extra funding, money must be withdrawn from something else, the losers. We saw the detrimental impact that shifting priorities can cause when we looked at one Research Council, the Science and Technology Facilities Council, as part of our Science Budget Allocations inquiry.[96] The impact of increasing the focus of the whole research budget on, say, energy security or biotech, would be larger and could cause irreparable damage to many research sectors. We have pushed the Science Minister on this point, but have been unable to elicit a clear answer. For example:

    Chairman: […] you would be arguing within the cabinet that in research terms, we should in fact be putting greater resources into these areas like medicine and life sciences, and in so doing at the expense of what? […]

    Lord Drayson: Firstly I would say that the very nature of science means that you need to have the underpinning science across the piece, so for example to do good life science research you still need to have good statisticians, you still need to have good physics.[97]

111. If the Government is to develop clear and agreed methodologies for identifying areas of high priority, these must also be effective in identifying areas of low priority. Further, the Government should not prevaricate on this issue: if it decides to prioritise some areas of research it should come clean about which areas of research will see reduced investment.

International partnerships

112. The UK's science and engineering industries are among the strongest in the world. The three 'Bs', BP, BA and BT are, for example, some of the largest multinationals in their respective sectors, and the UK's pharmaceutical sector continues to do well. Similarly, the UK's science and engineering research base is very strong and attracts the world's best researchers, both to work in British universities and also to engage in international collaboration. The UK has played a lead or key role in several high profile international research projects, such as the human genome project, the Large Hadron Collider and building the ITER fusion reactor.

113. We noted in our engineering report, however, that the UK was absent in some important nuclear engineering research projects. While this should not distract from the UK's considerable strength in this area, it was clear to us that a relatively small amount of funding would facilitate a large amount of collaborative international research activity, from which the UK would likely draw significant economic benefits in the decades to come. We suggested to the Government that it should commission the National Nuclear Laboratory to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on international R&D.[98] The Government rejected this in favour of a more hands-off approach, allowing the NNL to take the lead in assessing the UK's options should it choose to do so.[99]

114. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills should consider long-term investment returns when it considers strategic priorities in international partnerships.

Directed and non-directed research

115. Before moving to the final part of this chapter, it is important, having stated our support for having a debate about strategic science funding, to restate the importance of basic research. The late Lord Porter, the former President of the Royal Society, famously once said that there are two kinds of science: applied and not yet applied. We asked Professor Lord Krebs about the balance between 'applied and not yet applied' research. He gave us an illustrative example of the effectiveness of basic science, which is worth reproducing in full:

    Last night I happened to bump into one of our Nobel Prize winners, Tim Hunt, who won a Nobel Prize a few years ago for his discoveries relating to cancer research. I asked him the question that you are putting to us, should the Government focus on key areas of priority and he said absolutely not. If you want to foster the kind of innovative research that led to him winning a Nobel Prize you should allow great freedom for scientists to propose research and judge it on excellence. He made the point to me that the greater the originality of research the less predictable the outcomes are likely to be. [...] I pointed to a very nice study that was described by Sir William Paten a few years ago in his book Man and Mouse in which he looked at ten key advances in cardiovascular medicine and he traced back where those key advances came from and he identified about 600 papers in the literature that led to these key medical developments. Over 40% of them had nothing to do with cardiovascular medicine at all and many of them were not carried out in medical departments or medical faculties; they were carried out in departments of chemistry, engineering, physics, botany, agriculture, zoology, et cetera. I think the difficulty with prioritisation is the inherent unpredictability of where the key advances are going to come from. If I could just add one more point, it is not that I am totally against having key themes—indeed, when I was chief executive of NERC we did have certain key themes broadly defined and the research councils have that mechanism today—but I do think that the key themes and the priorities should be presented in a broad way so that the scientists can be innovative within those themes and not be too prescriptive. I agree with Lord Rees that we do not want to see a shift in the balance between strategically directed research and responsive mode.[100]

116. Professor Fisk added:

    I am reminded of Karl Popper's observation that if you were going to predict the wheel essentially you would have just invented it. It is very hard to talk about picking winners in science. I do contend—I do not know if this is a consensus with my colleagues—that it is a jolly sight easier to spot losers.[101]

117. Curiosity-driven research is a key component of a successful knowledge-economy. We strongly endorse the view that increased focus in applied research and industrial follow-through should not be at the expense of blue-skies research, which is one of the UK's greatest strengths.


118. The final part of this chapter explores consultation. The Government is committed to using consultation to make better policy:

    This Government is committed to effective consultation; consultation which is targeted at, and easily accessible to, those with a clear interest in the policy in question. Effective consultation brings to light valuable information which the Government can use to design effective solutions. Put simply, effective consultation allows the Government to make informed decisions on matters of policy, to improve the delivery of public services, and to improve the accountability of public bodies.[102]

119. There are two kinds of consultation that the Government uses: formal and informal. We have received submissions on both kinds and here we briefly comment on each. We consider both the formal Science and Society consultation that DIUS launched in July 2008, and the informal strategic priorities debate.


120. The Science and Society consultation was launched by the then Science Minister, Ian Pearson MP. It was presented as a "consultation on developing a new strategy for the UK".[103] In particular, the Minister said:

    I believe we need a society that is excited by science; values its importance to our social and economic wellbeing; feels confident in its use; and supports a representative well-qualified scientific workforce. […] I believe we now need a more mature relationship between science, policy and society, with each group working to better understand the needs, concerns, aspirations and ways of working of the others.[104]

121. The consultation attracted 3,200 question responses from more than 400 individuals, organisations and umbrella groups from across business, education, media, policy, science and the third sector.[105] A summary of responses was collated; the key messages were:

a)  the UK should aim to have a science-literate population that is critically engaged and a skilled, representative scientific workforce; this will best be achieved by:

i.  joining up science and society activities, with an enhanced role for the Government as co-ordinator and enabler of science and society activities;

ii.  recognising school and college science education as the underpinning of national STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills;

iii.  increasing the connectivity between the science community, the media, education and industry; and

iv.  improving the equality and diversity amongst those studying and working in science and engineering disciplines;

b)  more use needs to be made of social science in public engagement and STEM issues.[106]

122. Running through this list, it is not clear how useful this consultation was. The Government was already committed to improving the STEM qualifications of the population as part of its drive towards a knowledge economy; school was already identified as a key vehicle to meet those aims and the Government has taken a number of steps to improve STEM teaching and participation; many initiatives that link the science community to the wider world already receive Government support; and equality and diversity are core values in just about every part of what the Government does. The notion that the Government should play an enhanced role as a co-ordinator and enabler of science and society activities is tantamount to the science and society community asking for more money and co-ordination, which was fairly predictable. And the charge that the Government could make better use of social science has been well made previously.[107]

123. We asked Tracey Brown, Managing Director of Sense About Science, what she thought about the consultation. She commented:

    It is such an enormous range of subjects that were covered that it did just re-pose the questions in the end and I think they found themselves with something perhaps rather overwhelming because it was not very focused. One of my frustrations is that there is very little being invited in the way of true evaluation of what had gone before, which I suspect might be because there is a lot of incentive to talk about the fact that money was well-spent, and therefore nobody wants to ask the really difficult questions about where it might not have been so well-spent. Surely, actually, that is where you are going to develop quite a useful set of insights into what should be developed in the future. It is only a summary that has been produced and they are now looking to evaluate that summary, but the hands-off almost no comment feel to it is quite strong.[108]

124. Sir Roland Jackson, Chief Executive of the British Science Association, added:

    I would say that what the consultation, as far as I have seen it so far, has shown—perhaps not surprisingly—is how diverse and complex what we call public engagement is. [… T]rying to capture it all under one heading is a bit too difficult.[109]

125. On 26 May 2009, the Government announced the formation of five Expert Groups that will engage the science community, media, public, business and policy makers "to help change cultural attitudes to science in the UK".[110] Lord Drayson explained that "a significant outcome from the consultation is that respondents want us—Government—to take a more active role".[111] Therefore, these groups have been set up to look at: how to demonstrate the relevance of science to everyday life; partnerships between the media and scientists; science and learning; science careers; and how science and engineering can be socially responsible and ethical.

126. It is unlikely that the Science and Society consultation will contribute substantially to "a new strategy for the UK": most of what has been said was either predictable or already government policy. However, we will watch the work of the Expert Groups with interest.


127. We have discussed the debate on strategic science funding in terms of content, and we have made clear our support for the notion of a debate on whether science funding should be more strategic. Now we consider it as an example of informal consultation.

128. The first problem that faced this consultation is that nobody really knew what was being discussed. As we highlighted above, the Government has not even managed to make it clear whether this was a debate about whether science funding should be more focussed or about how to focus science funding. We asked Lord Drayson if, in hindsight, following the confusion, it would have been better to conduct a more formal consultation, perhaps publishing a Green Paper on strategic science funding as a basis for discussion. Lord Drayson replied:

    I have thought about this, and in retrospect, no, I do not. I think that the way in which the debate was able to be initiated as quickly as it was by the method which I took, the way in which it was very effective, I must say, in stimulating response, so there was no shortage of response to the debate, in fact it had a useful by-product, I believe, in contributing to the raising of the overall profile of the importance of science as part of the debate about our response to the economic downturn.[112]

129. The points about starting the debate quickly and raising science into discussions about economic recovery are well made. But the point about the lack of clarity in the debate was not satisfactorily answered. We discovered that the clarity issue was not isolated to this debate. Sense About Science told us: "There seems to be a tendency in science and policy engagement to be coy about the existence of debates and misconceptions, making only euphemistic reference to them".[113] Tracey Brown later gave an example:

    For example […] the recent consultation that started two years ago on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act update made reference to things being controversial, for instance, and did not explain why they are controversial or actually on what basis the Government assumed them to be controversial.[114]

130. But it is not just clarity about the content of consultations that is the problem. Another issue is clarity about what is at stake in a consultation.

    One of the biggest problems is not knowing what is at stake. [… S]ometimes what is at stake only becomes clear at some later stage of implementation, and then the scientists get told off for the fact that they did not realise quickly enough that this was going to wipe out their use of a particular procedure, for example. We had this with the Tissue Bill, we had it with the Physical Agents Directive[[115]] and so forth.[116]

131. The problem of what is at stake is something that has plagued the informal consultation on strategic science funding. Much of the agitation in the science community has come about over concern that the Government is going to take money away from basic science to do more applied science. If the Government had made it clear from the outset whether this debate was about (a) if a more strategic approach to all science funding was required, or (b) how to be more strategic in terms of focussing just the applied research, the resulting responses may have been more constructive. Whether or not the Government feels that it has been clear on this matter, the extent of the confusion among respondents demonstrates that more could have been done to make it clear what was at stake. For example, the production of a single document to which the Government could point—or even a single speech, rather than the several public speeches that were made on the issue—would have been useful.

132. We welcome the Government's commitment to consultation. It would be helpful if the Government was clearer about the reasons for each consultation and what was at stake. This would make the process more worthwhile for all concerned and would remove the feeling of 'box-ticking' that so often accompanies consultations.

133. In the case of the strategic-priorities debate, the benefits of a fast-moving process have been countered by a lack of coherence. Launching the debate with a Green Paper or something similar would have given a focus to the debate that was sorely lacking. We acknowledge that this would have elongated the timeframe for the debate, but since the intention was always for an on-going debate, this should not have been seen as a problem.


134. In some senses this debate on strategic priorities has been a distraction. At the outset, our plan was to examine whether the Government places science and engineering at the heart of policy, and if not, how it should do so. This debate has narrowed our focus somewhat into a number of smaller, but important, questions. If we step back a moment from the issue of whether or not the UK needs to make choices about "the balance of investment in science and innovation to favour those areas in which the UK has clear competitive advantage",[117] there are a number of broader questions into which this fits. The most important may be: what role will science and engineering play in the future UK economy? From it run a series of questions about science, engineering, education, academia, industry, international competition and co-operation, and—the subject of this chapter—strategic investment in R&D. It seems important that in asking the question about strategic science funding, the broader picture about the future role of science and engineering in the UK economy should be revisited.

135. AstraZenca told us:

    If the UK is to remain globally competitive it must create and enact a robust, long-term national science and engineering strategy that stretches from fundamental science through to applied and translational activities that will ensure economic impact and rapid exploitation.[118]

136. We could not agree more.

137. Any debate on strategic science funding should be put in the wider context of the role of science and engineering in the economic and social wellbeing of the UK. The 2004 ten-year science and innovation framework was successful in focussing attention on the importance of science and innovation. We now suggest that the UK needs a 'national science and engineering strategy'. The Government should spend the last two-years of the ten-year framework (2012 and 2013) reviewing the science and innovation framework and consulting on a new strategy that will set out the direction of travel for science and engineering within UK plc from 2014 until 2024.

68   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Q6 Back

69   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Q 16 Back

70   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Q 10 Back

71   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Q 11 Back

72   www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/lord_drayson/fst Back

73   Lord Drayson: www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/lord_drayson/fst;
John Denham MP: www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/john_denham/science_funding;
Lord Mandelson: www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/ministerialteam/Speeches/page51775.html; and
Gordon Brown MP: oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 12 February 2009, HC (2008-09) 257-i, Q 46 Back

74   Ev 275 Back

75   www.hefce.ac.uk/Research/ref Back

76   HM Treasury, Budget 2009, April 2009, p 130 Back

77   Q 366 Back

78   Q 366 Back

79   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Qq 8-9 Back

80   Q 140 Back

81   Oral evidence taken on 1 April 2009, HC (2008-09) 384-i, Q 22 Back

82   HC Deb, 27 April 2009, col 603 Back

83   Q 148 Back

84   Ev 248 Back

85   Ev 244 Back

86   Ev 244 Back

87   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Qq 8-9 Back

88   Q 372 Back

89   www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article6471800.ece Back

90   The RSA Lecture, 'A new industrial activism', 17 December 2008
www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/ministerialteam/Speeches/page49416.html Back

91   Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 12 February 2009, HC (2008-09) 257-i, Q 40 Back

92   Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 12 February 2009, HC (2008-09) 257-i, Q 40 Back

93   Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 12 February 2009, HC (2008-09) 257-i, Q 41 Back

94   IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, p 41 Back

95   IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, p 52 Back

96   IUSS Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2007-2008, Science Budget Allocations, HC 215-I Back

97   Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 169-i, Q 4 Back

98   IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, pp 25-26 Back

99   IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report Back

100   Qq 40-41 Back

101   Q 44 Back

102   John Hutton (then Business Secretary): HM Government, Code of Practice on Consultation, July 2008 Back

103   Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, A vision for Science and Society, July 2008 Back

104   Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, A vision for Science and Society, July 2008 Back

105   Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, Science and Society: Summary of Consultation Responses, p 2 Back

106   Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, Science and Society: Summary of Consultation Responses Back

107   For example, 'That full complement of riches': the contributions of the arts, humanities and social sciences to the nation's wealth, British Academy, January 2004; and Maximizing the social, policy and economic impacts of research in the humanities and social sciences, PPG LSE Public Policy Group, a report to the British Academy, July 2008. Back

108   Q 237 Back

109   Q 238 Back

110   www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/press_releases/science_society_expert_groups Back

111   www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/press_releases/science_society_expert_groups Back

112   Q 369 Back

113   Ev 224 Back

114   Q 220 Back

115   see Science and Technology Committee, Watching the Directives: Scientific Advice on the EU Physical Agents (Electromagnetic Fields) Directive, HC 1030 Back

116   Q 234 Back

117   www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/lord_drayson/fst Back

118   Ev 93 Back

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