Conclusions and recommendations
Science and engineering at the
heart of Government policy?
1 We were impressed by the Science Minister and
Government Chief Scientific Adviser's frank assessment of how
science and engineering advice is used in Government. We were
pleased to hear that they have taken up those concerns we raised
in the engineering report and that they have an appetite to improve
the use of evidence in policy-making. (Paragraph 24)
PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY
EXAMPLES
2 We regret that the Government failed to answer
the core reasons for having Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers.
We urge the Government to give fuller consideration to our recommendation
that "Some departments should have Departmental Chief Engineering
Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers
(DCSAs), and some should have both." (Paragraph 29)
3 The Government had an opportunity at the last
reshuffle to move GO-Science as per our recommendation in the
engineering report. That it did not, was a missed opportunity.
As the Government Chief Scientific Adviser explained, location
matters because it affords daily face-to-face interaction between
colleagues in the same building; and as he further pointed out,
he has only seen the Prime Minster four times in the past year.
We therefore appeal directly to the Prime Minster, who is responsible
for GO-Science, to bring it into the Cabinet Office alongside
the Strategy Unit. (Paragraph 37)
4 We are reassured to hear that Professor Beddington
will take steps to look at the MHRA's decision to licence homeopathic
products as well as the wider issue of the purchasing of homeopathy
by the NHS. We hope that he will be able to bring scientific evidence
to the centre of this complex policy issue. (Paragraph 42)
5 We call on the DCSF Chief Scientific Adviser
to explain what advice she provided, if any, on the Every Child
literacy and numeracy programmes and report it to the House. (Paragraph
47)
SCIENCE ADVISORY COUNCILS/COMMITTEES
6 We agree with Professor Beddington that Departmental
Chief Scientific Advisers should have devolved responsibility
for the quality of scientific advice in each department. On that
basis, it is crucial that each DCSA has a tight grip on their
departmental remits and have sufficient support so that problem
policy areas can be identified and dealt with. The DCSA must challenge
policy-makers to demonstrate clear evidence to support policy
or to acknowledge that no such evidence exists. The GCSA needs
to be advised by DCSAs of those instances where DCSAs have been
overruled on such matters; and we further recommend that he publishes
these in his annual report. (Paragraph 48)
7 Strong consideration should be given to increasing
the number of departments that have Science Advisory Councils
with a departmental remit. The Department of Health, the Department
of Energy and Climate Change and the Department for Transport
are obvious 'top-of-the-list' candidates, with the latter two
in particular needing high quality engineering advice. (Paragraph
54)
8 SAC members should not be criticised for publishing
scientific papers or making statements as professionals, independent
of their role as Government advisers. (Paragraph 64)
9 It is important to safeguard the independence
of the advisory system. In situations where the independence of
a SAC chairman or member is or might be threatened for political
reasons, support should be offered by the DCSA and/or the GCSA.
(Paragraph 67)
10 We welcome the steps taken by the GCSA to
deal with one incident that occurred between the Chairman of the
ACMD and the Home Secretary. Further steps that should have been
taken are: (1) the GSCA should have written or spoken to the Chairman
of the ACMD, letting him know that support was being provided;
(2) the correspondence between the GCSA and the Home Secretary
should have been published immediately so that other SAC Chairmen
and the public (including the science community) could see that
support was being offered; and (3) the GCSA should have provided
public support for the Chairman of the ACMD and for his right
to publish. (Paragraph 68)
11 The Government should seek specialist advice
prior to making policy decisions, early in the policy-making process.
Clearly the Government should be free to reject the advice of
its SACs, since scientific evidence is only one factor—albeit
a very important one—in policy decisions: Advisers advise,
Ministers decide. However, when the Government does take a different
policy decision to that recommended by a SAC, it should make clear
its reasons for doing so. (Paragraph 69)
12 We conclude that there would be value in being
clear in the Code of Practice as to what 'independence' means.
Members of Science Advisory Committees are likely to represent
the views of their constituencies; what is important is that they
have no conflict of interest with Government. Therefore, in the
case of Science Advisory Committees, 'independence' should mean
'independence from Government'. (Paragraph 73)
13 We agree that SACs should recruit members
based on competencies. However, we are concerned that dropping
the term 'lay' removes an expectation that specialist advisory
councils should have non-specialist members. Additionally, we
are not convinced by the argument that scientists from one subject
are necessarily a 'lay' person in another scientific area. Whether
or not they are called 'lay members', non-specialists do have
a lot to offer specialist committees. The presumption should be
that SACs have lay/non-specialist members. (Paragraph 78)
14 We support the Code of Practice's emphasis
on the importance of publishing documents relating to the work
of science advisory committees. We would prefer a slightly different
emphasis on open meetings. Rather than recommending that SACs
"should aim to hold open meetings on a regular basis",
we suggest that SACs "should aim to hold the majority of
their meetings in public, making use of new media wherever possible".
(Paragraph 82)
15 We can see the logic and agree that it is
important that SAC advice should be presented to Ministers in
advance of publication, giving them sufficient time to consider
a response. However, it is also clear that SAC advice should,
when it is given to Ministers, be final advice, and not a launching
pad for debate. On this basis, we recommend that the process of
SACs providing evidence to Ministers should be as transparent
as possible. SAC evidence that is presented to Ministers should
subsequently be published in unaltered form, along with the date
on which the evidence was presented to Ministers and the details
of any requests for alterations or clarifications of the evidence.
(Paragraph 84)
16 We recommend that a small press office be
set up within the Government Office for Science, to serve the
press needs of GO-Science and all the Science Advisory Committees
across Government. (Paragraph 86)
CONCLUSION
17 Shuffling the body responsible for providing
cross-departmental science and engineering advice from one department
to another and then back again within the space of two years is
the opposite of 'putting science and engineering at the heart
of Government policy'. It reduces science and engineering advice
to, at best, a peripheral policy concern, and, at worst, a political
bargaining chip. If science and engineering are to be successfully
placed at the heart of policy, as the Government is keen to do,
two things need to happen. First, the Government Office for Science
(and Engineering, as we would have it) should have a stable home.
We believe that this should be the Cabinet Office: the heart of
Government. Second, there needs to be a Government Chief Engineer
and a Government Chief Scientist, who are responsible for cross-departmental
advice and coordination, freeing up the Government Chief Scientific
(and Engineering) Adviser to advise the Prime Minister more closely
and to act as a public figurehead for science and engineering
in the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 88)
Debating strategic priorities
18 We are left wondering what this strategic
priorities debate was about and whether it has led to a major
shift in Government policy. We are in favour of a discussion about
how best to focus research funds so that the UK gets maximum reward
from its investment, but the lesson to be learned is that the
Government should be clear in its own mind about the format and
goals of a debate before launching it. (Paragraph 105)
19 Past experience of failing to accurately 'pick
winners' has led to a risk-averse executive. The belief that 'sectors
will pick themselves' is misplaced and when proactive interventions
by Government are not forthcoming, potentially successful industries
that germinate in the UK, blossom elsewhere. Choosing to support
one sector over another will be difficult. The Government should
develop clear and agreed methodologies for determining priorities
and acceptability of risk. (Paragraph 109)
20 If the Government is to develop clear and
agreed methodologies for identifying areas of high priority, these
must also be effective in identifying areas of low priority. Further,
the Government should not prevaricate on this issue: if it decides
to prioritise some areas of research it should come clean about
which areas of research will see reduced investment. (Paragraph
111)
21 The Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills should consider long-term investment returns when it considers
strategic priorities in international partnerships. (Paragraph
114)
22 Curiosity-driven research is a key component
of a successful knowledge-economy. We strongly endorse the view
that increased focus in applied research and industrial follow-through
should not be at the expense of blue-skies research, which is
one of the UK's greatest strengths. (Paragraph 117)
23 It is unlikely that the Science and Society
consultation will contribute substantially to "a new strategy
for the UK": most of what has been said was either predictable
or already government policy. However, we will watch the work
of the Expert Groups with interest. (Paragraph 126)
24 We welcome the Government's commitment to
consultation. It would be helpful if the Government was clearer
about the reasons for each consultation and what was at stake.
This would make the process more worthwhile for all concerned
and would remove the feeling of 'box-ticking' that so often accompanies
consultations.(Paragraph 132)
25 In the case of the strategic-priorities debate,
the benefits of a fast-moving process have been countered by a
lack of coherence. Launching the debate with a Green Paper or
something similar would have given a focus to the debate that
was sorely lacking. We acknowledge that this would have elongated
the timeframe for the debate, but since the intention was always
for an on-going debate, this should not have been seen as a problem.
(Paragraph 133)
26 Any debate on strategic science funding should
be put in the wider context of the role of science and engineering
in the economic and social wellbeing of the UK. The 2004 ten-year
science and innovation framework was successful in focussing attention
on the importance of science and innovation. We now suggest that
the UK needs a 'national science and engineering strategy'. The
Government should spend the last two-years of the ten-year framework
(2012 and 2013) reviewing the science and innovation framework
and consulting on a new strategy that will set out the direction
of travel for science and engineering within UK plc from 2014
until 2024. (Paragraph 137)
The Haldane Principle
27 The 2009 Budget Research Council savings have
had an impact on the way that Research Councils allocate their
funds. While this cannot be regarded as dictating 'detailed decisions',
it is not 'over-arching strategy' either; it is somewhere in between.
(Paragraph 155)
28 These 'savings' are in reality a strategic
influencing of research funding streams. Whether or not it is
the right thing to do is open to debate. But, either way, the
Government should communicate clearly what it is doing and not
label them as something they are not. (Paragraph 156)
29 To conclude, we are in favour of the idea
that researchers are best placed to make detailed funding decisions
on the one hand and, in principle, we support the Government to
set the over-arching strategic direction on the other. However,
it is necessary for the Government to spell out the relationship
between these two notions for a broader funding principle to be
of any use. (Paragraph 157)
30 Research Councils are not, and never have
been, the 'guardians of the independence of science'. That responsibility
has historically lain, and should remain, with the learned societies,
universities and individual academics. (Paragraph 159)
31 The Government's refusal to give us confidential
access to papers relevant to this inquiry is unacceptable. Without
seeing the Science Budget Allocation letters, we are forced to
speculate that the Government has exerted inappropriate influence
over the Research Councils. However, we have been unable to confirm
or deny this suspicion because of the Government's contempt for
Parliamentary scrutiny. (Paragraph 165)
32 Logically, the Government cannot support both
the Excellence and Haldane Principles in their current form and
be responsible for promoting science and engineering as a means
of economic recovery and growth in the regions. The time is ripe
for an unambiguous rationalisation of the two concepts. Researchers,
industry, regional and national policy makers and the public have
a right to know on what basis research funding is distributed
both nationally and regionally; the rationale for funding decisions
should be transparent and rigorous. The Government should adjust
the framework for research funding and regional development so
that it does not contain internal contradictions. (Paragraph 173)
33 Science and engineering are crucial to the
economic wellbeing of every region in the UK, and development
strategies that have supported and made use of science and engineering
have proven successful. In the consideration of UK science policy,
it is essential that the regional dimension is clearly and publicly
set out. It is important that the Government is able to communicate
its role in regional development and in science policy, and especially
the relationship between the two. It will only be able to do this
if it resolves the conflict between its regional policies and
the Haldane Principle. (Paragraph 176)
34 The relationships between the Government and
the research bodies that it funds should be both explicit and
transparent. We recommend that the different streams of research
funding are mapped and the nature of the contract between Government
and the research bodies described. (Paragraph 181)
35 We have already given our support for a more
strategic approach to setting priorities in science funding, specifically
at the applied end of the spectrum. Considering this issue in
the context of the Haldane Principle highlights the need for a
new approach to science funding that incorporates the good elements
of Haldane in relation to basic science, but does not hinder a
more mission-driven approach to get the full benefits of applied
science and engineering. (Paragraph 185)
Science and engineering scrutiny
36 The time has come for a new framework to replace
the Haldane Principle (however it is understood) that adds transparency
and rigour to the relationship between Government and the research
community. It is important that the diversity of relationships
between Government and the various bodies it funds to do research
are included under a broad set of principles. We recommend that
the Council for Science and Technology be commissioned to carry
out this work. (Paragraph 188)
37 Changes to the science and engineering scrutiny
programme to make reviews shorter and mandatory are welcome. We
recommend that there should be regular and constructive liaison
between the newly formed Science and Technology Committee and
the Science and Engineering Assurance team. (Paragraph 194)
38 We would like to thank all those who made
strong representation to the Leader of the House on our behalf.
We also recognise the responsibility that derives from a consensus
in Parliament and the science and engineering community that science
and technology scrutiny matters. We will strive to make the work
of the new Committee—which is essential for the democratic
scrutiny of science, engineering and technology—relevant,
rigorous and transparent. (Paragraph 207)
39 The current arrangement for the future Science
and Technology Committee is the best that could be achieved following
the machinery of Government changes. We suggest that following
the general election the committee responsible for science, engineering
and technology policy should be called the Science, Engineering
and Technology Committee. (Paragraph 210)
40 We suggest that the Science, Engineering and
Technology Committee should revert to its original 11 members
with a quorum of three. (Paragraph 212)
41 To avoid complications related to the lines
of departmental responsibility and future machinery of Government
changes, we suggest that following the next general election the
Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should be installed
as a free-standing committee with a cross-departmental remit for
science and engineering including research budgets across Government.
(Paragraph 214)
Conclusions
42 We close this inquiry by urging the Government
to raise its game. When it turns its attention to updating the
Science Framework, we recommend that the Government consult widely
with a view to producing a successor ten-year science and engineering
strategy that is both tangible and ambitious. We suggest that
built into this strategy—in the spirit of scientific and
engineering endeavour—should be an assessment of what benefits,
if any, are delivered by putting science and engineering at the
heart of Government policy. (Paragraph 216)
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