Memorandum 14
Submission from the Institute of Physics
(IoP)
SUMMARY OF
KEY POINTS
— It is difficult to ascertain the
effectiveness of the CST, partly because its work is not clearly
visible to the science and engineering community. The Cabinet
Sub-Committee is a relatively new body, so it is too early to
offer comment on it.— A disadvantage of creating a Department
for Science would be the potential loss of the CSAs which would
have the effect of decoupling science policy from decisions made
in other departments which risks making science a distinct and
self-contained activity within policy.— Instead of a
Department for Science, to strengthen science in government, the
departmental CSA principle should be built on
— There are low levels of science-trained
people employed in higher levels of government, and this has an
impact on the government's ability to formulate science policy.
— It is imperative that the government
engages with the learned societies and professional bodies when
seeking advice on science and engineering issues.
— The Institute supports the Haldane
Principle that decisions should be taken on scientific merit free
from political and administrative pressures. There is a strong
case for expanding on the Haldane Principle in light of the money
and authority now held by the devolved governments and the RDAs.
— The learned societies and professional
bodies have an important role to play in countering the lack of
public trust and confidence in science and engineering by providing
scientific advice which is clearly independent and objective.
— Regarding the RDAs, scientific expertise
is increasing at the centre of regional decision-making bodies
but further progress could be made—there remains a perception
that some RDAs are not as engaged with science as they should
be.
Whether the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Science and
Innovation and the Council for Science and Technology put science
and engineering at the heart of policy-making and whether there
should be a Department for Science
1. Regarding the Council for Science and
Technology (CST), it is often difficult to ascertain its effectiveness,
partly because its work is not clearly visible to the science
and engineering community. Because the CST has low visibility
externally, its actual role, as distinct from its remit, is often
unclear. It is also not clear how it avoids duplication with what
other bodies are doing. Indeed there is overlap, but the CST is
in the unique position of providing information directly to the
Prime Minister. The CST needs to foster closer links with other
bodies, which will certainly support it in the provision of information
and avoid duplication of effort.
2. The Cabinet Sub-Committee is a relatively
new body, so it is too early to offer comment on it. However,
it is odd that on its website[39]
it is stated that the Government Chief Scientific Advisor (GCSA)
may be invited to attend meetings. The GCSA heads the Government
Office for Science (GO-Science) which "co-ordinates and develops
good practice on how Government should seek and use scientific
advice in policy making…" and is a champion of "Science
in Government", which is an initiative working to improve
the quality and use of science and technology across government.
Therefore, it is imperative that the GCSA is expected to
attend the meetings, particularly as the GCSA's role is independent
to the ministers of the various departments.
3. The introduction of departmental Chief
Scientific Advisers (CSAs) a few years ago was very welcome and
has proved effective in some areas at bringing science to the
forefront of policy development. The CSAs reflect the reach of
science, and keep it in the minds of all ministers and departments,
rather than just one. It is evident that in some departments the
CSA has direct involvement and influence in policy formulation
and oversight of execution; this is not yet the case for all departments.
4. It is worth noting that there are no
CSAs in Northern Ireland or Wales. In Wales, we understand that
the First Minister is considering a report on the role of a CSA
for Wales. It is crucial that an appointment of a CSA is made
in particular to bring science and engineering to the forefront
of government policy in Wales. In Northern Ireland, we urge that
an appointment of a CSA is made in particular to drive forward
the implementation of the recommendations of the STEM Review,
which we understand is still being undertaken.[40]
5. As for the question of whether there
should be a Department for Science, such a proposal was mooted
before the creation of DIUS and there was much discussion amongst
the science and engineering community on this issue. DIUS is itself
a relatively new department, and the transition from the amalgamation
of the relevant functions of the former DTI and DfES has been
smooth; the Institute is of the view that it is highly unlikely
for there to be another reorganisation, particularly as the recent
Cabinet Office Capability Review[41]
reported that DIUS has made a strong start to its first 18 months
in operation and is "…well placed to realise the benefit
of bringing together government investment in skills, innovation
and publicly sponsored science and research in support of better
economic and social well-being."
6. A disadvantage of creating a Department
for Science would be the potential loss of the CSAs which would
have the effect of decoupling science policy from decisions made
in other departments which risks making science a distinct and
self-contained activity within policy. This could result in science
becoming isolated, even neglected, in policy decisions, particularly
from education and the innovation and business support mechanisms
within DIUS, which could result in an unnecessary competition
for resources. Instead of a Department for Science, to strengthen
science in government, the departmental CSA principle should be
built on. More people with science backgrounds should be found
in the policy units of government departments, either through
an expansion of the offices of the CSAs, or preferably, the incorporation
of science-trained workers in each departmental policy unit.
How Government formulates science and engineering
policy (strengths and weaknesses of the current system)
7. A weakness of the current system is that
there are low levels of science-trained people employed in higher
levels of government, and this has an impact on the government's
ability to formulate science policy.
8. In part due to this, and to the decline of
the National Laboratories, academics and commercial consultants
are increasingly used as advisers to government on areas of science,
and are considered as independent advisers. In the absence of
an opportunity to strengthen and expand the government's science
facilities, the funding streams for scientists used by government
should be acknowledged to prevent accusations of bias. The American
DARPA model incorporates a secondment programme for increasing
the number of science-trained people in government. A similar
programme could be considered in the UK.
9. In addition, the introduction of a STEM
stream within the Civil Service could be considered. Within this,
it would be very important that the entry requirements for graduates
entering the stream were high to ensure quality (as with other
specialist streams). The training for staff in the stream would
include a significant element of economics, statistics and the
social sciences—these are the core skills for evidence-based
policy-making in government, and staff would build on their existing
high levels of scientific training.
10. We note that the Chief Scientific Adviser's
Committee (CSAC) is the principal committee at official level
dealing with issues relating to science, engineering and technology.
Its membership consists of the GCSA, and the CSAs or their equivalent
from all government departments and devolved administrations.
Once again, looking from the outside in, it is difficult for us
to make quantifiable statements as to the effectiveness of the
CSAC in formulating government policy, particularly as we have
little or no interaction with the GCSA and/or the departmental
CSAs, unless we actively approach them on an issue of concern/interest.
The former House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in
its inquiry report, "Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence
Base Policy Making", made several recommendations on
how the work and effectiveness of the GCSA and the departmental
CSAs could be improved, particularly their interactions with civil
servants, scientists and learned societies and professional bodies.
On the latter, the Committee reported that it "…found
scope for greater involvement of the learned societies and professional
bodies in the UK scientific advisory system, not least in order
to reduce dependence upon external consultants." To date
we have not experienced any change (ie greater level of engagement)
in our interactions with the government on matters of science
policy.
11. In addition, the government has published
its "Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making"
which address how "…evidence should be sought and applied
to enhance the ability of government decision makers to make better-informed
decisions." The guidelines are regularly issued for public
consultation by the GCSA, something which is to be lauded.
12. Reflecting on the guidelines which were
last updated in 2005 following consultation, we note, on
the same theme, that government departments are encouraged to
engage with a wide variety of scientific learned societies and
professional bodies when seeking specialist advice. We feel that
this is imperative as the learned societies and professional bodies,
such as the Institute, have access to a significant number of
members who have a wealth of experience on a variety of scientific-based
issues. Their input will undoubtedly supplement advice received
from other, more traditional sources. An obvious benefit in using
"independent" scientific learned societies and professional
bodies to offer their opinions on important issues is that the
general public may be more inclined to believe them than the government.
13. Overall, the guidelines appear to be
predicated on the assumption that it is straightforward to define
the "issues" that need scientific advice, to determine
the "best source" for finding that advice and what is
likely to impact upon policy making.
Such decisions themselves involve expertise.
There is often no consensus on where the "best" advice
may reside and which policies may be affected. Very often, these
decisions are taken by civil servants within government departments.
Although they have a responsibility to be neutral and unbiased,
they may still have pressures that could affect the judgments
that they are making.
Whether the views of the science and engineering
community are, or should be, central to the formulation of government
policy, and how the success of any consultation is assessed
14. The views of the science and engineering
community should be included at the centre of policy formulation,
as they will have the necessary technical expertise to judge the
full depth and impact of decisions. As stated in the previous
section, this is something the government's own guidelines recommend
and it is something that the scientific and engineering learned
societies and professional bodies are keen to be involved in as
part of their remit of representing the views of their members.
15. As a learned society and professional body,
the Institute's main input in determining the UK's science and
engineering policy is via responding to consultation documents
that are issued by government departments. Representing over 36,000 members,
the Institute is in a strong position to provide advice on matters
relating to science and engineering policy, obviously with a strong
emphasis on physics.
16. However, the main concern we have regarding
consultations is that quite often we feel that policy makers are
simply going through the motions and that consultations sometimes
take place at a relatively advanced stage of the decision making
process.
17. A good example of this was the government's
"Science and innovation investment framework 2004-14:
next steps" consultation which proposed amongst other
things, to merge the Council for the Central Laboratory of the
Research Councils (CCLRC) with the Particle Physics and Astronomy
Research Council (PPARC) to form the Science and Technology Facilities
Council (STFC). Another example was the former DfES's consultation
on the "Reform of Higher Education Research Assessment and
Funding" which proposed to replace the peer-reviewed Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE) with a metrics-based measure of research
assessment. In response to both of these consultations, the Institute
engaged its membership and submitted responses; but the feeling
throughout the process was that decisions had already been taken.
We would have liked to have been involved in the decision-making
process that informed both of these important step changes in
the research base at an earlier stage, where our concerns and
comments would have had more impact and relevance.
18. In addition to consultations, which
are still the best and most considered approach to requesting
input to inform policy making, the Institute would welcome more
public meetings, such as those that were organised by BERR for
the "Future of Nuclear Power: The role of nuclear power in
a low carbon economy" consultation. Most importantly, these
meetings (often regional) enable the general public, in addition
to the usual stakeholders, to discuss pertinent issues. The aforementioned
consultation is an example of an issue of wider public and national
importance, whereas issues such as those affecting the science
or research base will be of more limited interest. Nonetheless,
the Institute would welcome the opportunity to attend either public
or private meetings to offer its expertise on relevant issues.
Indeed, it may be appropriate to hold private meetings at an earlier
stage in the development process, when the objective/remit of
a consultation is still being defined.
The case for a regional science policy (versus
national science policy) and whether the Haldane principle needs
updating
19. The Haldane Principle has recently come
to the fore as a result of the STFC financial situation, where
there were doubts as to whether decisions, such as those pertaining
to the future of the Daresbury Laboratory, were made by research
council officials based on independent scientific advice or were
influenced by ministerial intervention.
20. The RCUK Review of UK Physics[42]
reported that at the highest level the Haldane Principle is working
effectively but not so in terms of developing regional policy,
where there are potential conflicts of issues with regards to
the siting of large-scale facilities. The Review recommended that
DIUS and BERR should consider a restatement of the Haldane Principle,
but the RCUK response to the recommendation instead reiterated
the existing remit of the Principle without adequately addressing
the regional issue.
21. The Institute supports the Haldane Principle
that decisions should be taken on scientific merit free from political
and administrative pressures. There is a strong case for expanding
on the Haldane Principle in light of the money and authority now
held by the devolved governments and the Regional Development
Agencies (RDAs). It is almost universally embraced that university
research funding should be driven by the quality of the science
and coordinated through the research councils. However, we believe
that there is currently a question mark over the effectiveness
of the Haldane Principle in insulating this funding from government
directions, and particularly the role of the RDAs in this area.
22. At a recent meeting organised by the
Foundation for Science and Technology[43]
on the RCUK Review of UK Physics, co-sponsored by the Institute,
there was some discussion on this issue, where it was suggested
by members of the audience that it should be left to politicians
to resolve such conflicts and not scientists and that the research
councils should think in national, not regional, terms. However,
it was also suggested that the research councils should be aware
of the resources in different regions that the RDAs have which
can be allocated to sustain research activity. The Institute is
of the view that this is an issue that clearly needs further investigation
and would be keen to work with other science and engineering learned
societies and professional bodies, and perhaps even the IUSS Committee,
in organising an event to debate the Haldane Principle in greater
depth.
23. In terms of the impact of the Principle
on both large-scale facilities and regional and local research
capabilities, we note that there is an apparent "social engineering"
agenda in some aspects of regional development policy. The aim
of this is to bring all regions to the same level and encourage
inter-regional competition, which ignores the realities of the
larger and more relevant competitions between the UK and the rest
of the world. There is clearly a lack of coherence in regional
policy, which is exacerbated by the duplication of effort between
the RDAs and the sub-regional and national bodies.
24. To be able to truly compete on a global
scale, the science and enterprise strategies of the RDAs should
build on existing regional strengths and capabilities rather than
attempting to capitalise on the next big thing and try to create
a successful sector from scratch. To this end the RDAs should
leverage their funding to support programmes which have both regional
and national importance and the Technology Strategy Board should
drive this strategy in parallel with the research council-driven
agenda.
Engaging the public and increasing public confidence
in science and engineering policy
25. The learned societies and professional
bodies have an important role to play in countering the lack of
public trust and confidence in science and engineering by providing
scientific advice which is clearly independent and objective.
26. DIUS recently undertook a public consultation
on its vision for Science and Society[44]
and we hope that the input from the science and engineering community
will help shape a vision that fosters greater public trust and
engagement in ever more increasingly complex, but critical issues,
such as energy security and climate change.
27. One of the questions in the consultation
asked how policy makers can better engage with society about the
development of science. The Institute is of the view that the
best way to engage will depend on the individual objectives of
the activity. Representation of policy makers on boards of Knowledge
Transfer Networks and other research-industry networks would be
one approach. Another would be "citizen" representatives
on Scientific Advisory Committees, which can sometimes work well.
In other instances proactive public consultation methods are needed.
Many consultations are not accessible to non-specialists, so where
their input is needed differentiation in consultation processes
will be required, with appropriate publicity, to ensure that all
parties can have a meaningful engagement. There are bodies with
expertise in public dialogue methods, such as the Consultation
Institute, and policy makers should make use of these. Policy
makers also need to be explicit about the extent to which they
will make use of contributions.
28. In terms of improving the trust in and
respect for science and engineering, the Institute is of the view
that the relationship between science and society requires the
three communities—scientists, parliament and the wider public—to
interact together on a basis of mutual understanding. Recent policy
decisions concerning issues such as BSE, GM foods, mobile phones
and nuclear waste, have illustrated shortcomings in this interaction.
29. In particular, the media has an important
role to play here. For instance, the newspapers are currently
awash with "climate disaster stories", where there is
no dearth of opinion from all and sundry about future climate
change scenarios and more worryingly whether the science that
backs these scenarios is robust. Fewer, but official statements
from reliable sources, such as government departments and agencies,
would be of help. This is not a suggestion to stifle debate, which
can continue through relevant avenues, but a request that bad
science, or unproven theories are not provided the media coverage
they do not warrant.
30. What we need to do is find ways of raising
awareness among the public of what science is and how it is undertaken,
the importance of risk and quantitative decision making, what
refereeing means (ie the importance of exposing ideas to criticism),
how to read media reports critically (eg sample sizes, etc.) so
that the public have the tools to be able to identify good or
bad science themselves.
31. Some arms of the media, particularly
the scientific, technological and medical specialists, in the
main deal professionally and competently with the majority of
topics.
32. Even though the House of Lords Science
and Technology Committee, in its report "Science and Society"[45]
published in 2000, concluded against the adoption of a Code of
Practice to ensure that the media reports scientific matters accurately
where any breaches could be referred to the Press Complaints Commission,
the IUSS Committee may wish to ascertain through the course of
its inquiry whether the House of Lords Committee's conclusion
needs to be challenged and if so, how an appropriate Code could
be developed and implemented.
The role of GO-Science, DIUS and other Government
departments, charities, learned societies, Regional Development
Agencies, industry and other stakeholders in determining UK science
and engineering policy
33. These organisations must be equally
involved in policy making, alongside expert scientists and engineers.
As a learned society and professional body, our main input in
determining the UK's science and engineering policy is via responding
to consultation documents that are issued by government departments.
But there are other measures in place that can enable scientists
and engineers better to interact with civil servants and policy
makers.
34. Parliamentary bodies such as the Select Committees
engage very effectively with the science community already, regularly
visiting scientific establishments and inviting evidence from
scientists. Learned societies and professional bodies have a role
to play in providing briefing material for policy makers, or facilitating
meetings between ministers and relevant leading scientists.
35. Regarding the RDAs, scientific expertise
is increasing at the centre of regional decision-making bodies
but further progress could be made—there remains a perception
that some RDAs are not as engaged with science as they should
be. The recent OECD analysis of innovation in the north of England[46]
highlighted a number of areas of concern, including duplication
of effort, and also the lack of expertise in RDAs when it comes
to setting enterprise strategies suited to science-based industries.
36. GO-Science needs to develop a clearer
strategy and focus for its own work, which includes the need to
become more proactive, and shaping the debate across Whitehall
rather than simply responding reactively to a plethora of disparate
issues.
How government science and engineering policy
should be scrutinised
37. The Institute is of the view that the
Select Committees of both Houses play a crucial role in scrutinising
the work of government departments, which includes science and
engineering policy. However, we are concerned that the creation
of the House of Commons IUSS Committee as a replacement of the
former Science and Technology Committee means that the key science
and engineering policies of DIUS and other government departments
may not be covered so thoroughly (even though the addition of
"Science" to "IUS" has been a positive development).
The remit of the new Committee is broader with the creation of
DIUS, which includes higher education, etc., and it does not have
a cross-cutting role to scrutinise other government departments,
as it has a structure which more directly parallels DIUS. Although
a significant proportion of the government's science-related programmes
are now concentrated in DIUS, there is no doubt that such programmes
will also continue to be important elements of other departments'
responsibilities. In environment, energy, health, agriculture,
and transport policies, science and engineering continue to play
a key role.
January 2009
39 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees/edsi.aspx Back
40
www.delni.gov.uk/index/successthroughskills/stem-rev.htm Back
41
http://nds.coi.gov.uk/environment/fullDetail.asp?ReleaseID=387228&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromDepartment=False Back
42
www.rcuk.ac.uk/news/081001.htm Back
43
www.foundation.org.uk Back
44
http://interactive.dius.gov.uk/scienceandsociety/site Back
45
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldsctech/38/3802.htm Back
46
OECD Reviews of Regional Innovation: North of England, United
Kingdom, OECD Publishing 2008. Back
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