Memorandum 22
Submission by GeneWatch UK
GeneWatch UK is a not-for-profit group that
monitors developments in genetic technologies from a public interest,
environmental protection and animal welfare perspective. GeneWatch
believes people should have a voice in whether or how these technologies
are used and campaigns for safeguards for people, animals and
the environment. We work on all aspects of genetic technologies—from
GM crops and foods to genetic testing of humans.
GeneWatch welcomes the opportunity to input to the
Committee's inquiry. We are currently completing an investigation
of the corporate shaping of science, innovation and the economy
in the UK and Europe and our submission draws on some of the findings
of this investigation (which has not yet been published).
SUMMARY
Major Government and EU investments in science
have been driven by a political commitment to the knowledge-based
economy (KBE), in which science and technology—particularly
biotechnology—are seen as the key drivers for economic growth.
However, there is a stark contrast between this political commitment
and the failure of the biotech industry to deliver economic benefit.
GeneWatch UK's research suggests that the idea of
the KBE is failing in at least four ways:
— It is not delivering, and cannot
deliver, the promised revolutions in health, agriculture and sustainability.
Indeed, in many situations, the false solutions that it offers
may undermine alternative approaches and create significant opportunity
costs.
— It is not delivering, and cannot
deliver, a "race to the top" for Europe's economies.
— By locking "knowledge"
into intellectual property, it fixes old ideas (such as the idea
of genes as major risk factors for common diseases) and seeks
to market them, distorting research priorities and promoting misinformation,
rather than stimulating creativity. Patenting also prioritises
"technologies of control", designed to monopolise markets
and maximise profits. People are unlikely to accept such technologies
as of benefit to them.
— The uncritical promotion of (often
barely credible) technical solutions for major social problems,
combined with the loss of independent expertise to inform policy
and regulation, is undermining democratic values and trust in
institutions.
The questions posed by the Committee cannot
be answered without radically re-thinking the relationship between
science and society. This requires a major overhaul of the research
funding system, including:
— More democratic decisions about research
funding priorities;
— Greater accountability and scrutiny
of research investment decisions: including economic assessments
and appraisals;
— Public engagement in setting research
questions and priorities;
— More funding for research which does
not necessarily benefit large corporations but may deliver other
benefits;
— Fundamental reform of the science
advisory system and the system for providing incentives for and
assessment of research, including major reform of the patents
system;
— Funding for "counter-expertise"
and multi-disciplinary research;
— A commitment to take public opinions
into account in decisions about science and innovation.
Q1. Whether the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Science
and Innovation and the Council for Science and Technology put
science and engineering at the heart of policy-making and whether
there should be a Department for Science.
Q3. Whether the views of the science and engineering
community are, or should be, central to the formulation of government
policy, and how the success of any consultation is assessed.
1. These questions cannot be answered without
considering how decisions are being made about what science and
engineering projects are supported, and the relationship between
science and society. GeneWatch agrees with the researchers on
science and innovation policy who argue that a radical revision
of this relationship is required, which reviews past experiences
properly and reflects in a fundamental way on how to support more
democratically and technically robust science and technology policies.[57],[58]
2. Science and engineering play important roles
in society, but many other factors and types of knowledge are
also important in formulating Government policy. In addition,
progress in science depends on specialisation, but this can also
lead to ignorance about alternative approaches and/or the potential
unintended consequences of particular scientific assumptions or
applications. Some engineers argue that the present intellectual
and professional division of labour and the knowledge infrastructure
built on it together prevent genuine solutions by promoting an
"end of pipe" approach to dealing with problems and
relying too much on specialists who are often unaware of the undesired
effects of their decisions.[59]
Others have argued that treating science as an instrument of policy,
serving the interests of government and commerce, neglects the
important "non-instrumental" roles of science: including
the creation of critical scenarios and world pictures; the stimulation
of rational attitudes; and the production of enlightened practitioners
and independent experts.[60]
3. GeneWatch UK's research, the main outcomes
of which are described below, suggests that the Government's commitment
to the so-called "knowledge-based economy" is distorting
research priorities (towards what is patentable, rather than what
is scientifically valid or useful); changing the nature of science
itself and what is considered "knowledge"; and undermining
access to independent advice on science and technology—especially
the ability to assess claims about the benefits to be delivered
as a result of investments in particular innovation strategies.
Members of the Council for Science and Technology and other Government
science advisors represent a narrow range of interests, dominated
by a strong commitment to biotechnology, nuclear power and surveillance
technologies. Unless this expertise is broadened, attempts to
bring advice on science and technology closer to the heart of
government will only further erode public trust in Government
science policy and faith in its claims about the benefits of investing
in the "knowledge-based economy".
Q2. How Government formulates science and
engineering policy (strengths and weaknesses of the current system).
4. The idea of the knowledge-based economy
has become a key driver of research investment in Britain, Europe
and worldwide and underpins how Government formulates science
and engineering policy. The "knowledge" embedded in
a product is seen as adding value to it and is protected by intellectual
property rights, which gives value to this knowledge and allows
it to be traded rather than freely used (by applying protectionism
to "knowledge" rather than to goods). Within the European
Union, the advocates of this approach argue that Europe, with
its scientific institutions and capacity to produce knowledge,
will be able to capitalise on this globally and sustain Europe's
economy in the face of the threat from China, India and other
developing countries that are rapidly industrialising and where
manufacturing costs are low.
5. Supporters of the knowledge-based economy
(KBE), claim that science and technology will be a major driver
of economic growth and at the same time deliver technical solutions
to health, agricultural, social and environmental problems, within
Europe and world-wide.
6. Biosciences and biotechnology—particularly
human and plant genomics—are seen as central to the knowledge-based
economy, as are information and communication technologies. For
example the EU's Competitiveness in Biotechnology Advisory Group
(CBAG) states:[61]"Both
during and since the Lisbon and Stockholm summits, biotechnology
has been clearly identified as the backbone of a knowledge-based
economy, a vital driver of Europe's competitiveness".
Along with new genetically engineered products—including
plants, animals and micro-organisms—"genetic information"
is seen as a commodity. In Britain in particular, access to human
genetic information, obtained from patients in the National Health
Service (NHS) and linked to electronic medical records, is seen
as a key selling point to attract the biotech and pharmaceutical
industries.
7. However, there is a stark contrast between
the political commitment to biotechnology as a driver for growth
and the failure of the biotech industry to deliver economic benefit.[62],[63]
8. GeneWatch's investigation highlights
major weaknesses in this policy framework. This does not mean
that biotechnologies and the biosciences cannot contribute to
health, agricultural or sustainability objectives, or to the economy.
However, it does mean that it is necessary to re-think the whole
idea of the "knowledge-based bio-economy" (KBBE) and
the knowledge-based economy in general.
9. We conclude that the vision of the knowledge-based
economy is deeply flawed because it is based on the idea of knowledge
as a commodity that can be patented and then bought and sold.
In this system, both social and scientific tests of what is considered
knowledge are abandoned in favour of valuation by the market.
Knowledge becomes defined by whatever can be commercialised and
alternative understandings or approaches are dismissed as unscientific
or anti-progress. In adopting this approach, policy makers undermine
the knowledge and debate on which they and society at large rely
to make informed decisions and to make realistic and informed
appraisals of techno-scientific claims. This can lead to political
entrapment in particular innovation strategies as a result of
factors which include: the preference for advance over retreat
(the tendency "to favour the investor over the protestor");
the digging in of commitments at the outset of risky, complex
and costly projects; the neglect of externalities; and the entrenchment
of political commitments and sunk costs, leading to an escalation
of commitments ("good money thrown after bad").[64]
This creates an innovation system in which political commitments
are "dug in", in contrast to one in which many diverse
and creative alternatives are being pursued.[65]
10. The main findings of GeneWatch UK's
investigation are that:
1. Major investment decisions in R&D and
in research infrastructure are being made by the EU and by the
UK Government without due scientific diligence or cost-benefit
analysis. "Optimism bias"—leading to significant
underestimates of social, environmental and economic risks—is
rife. Yet the UK Treasury does not apply its rules for economic
assessment or appraisal to major R&D investments, unlike other
major infrastructure projects.
2. To help drive the knowledge-based economy,
expertise from a narrow range of industries seen as key to the
KBE has been integrated into the scientific institutions, government
departments and research councils where research funding decisions
are made. Industry representatives appointed to research funding
boards are likely to influence research strategies and choose
research priorities from their own perspective. This is taken
to a new level by the European Technology Platforms, where research
strategies in food, health and agriculture are being determined
by the "vision" of the relevant commercial sectors.
3. Although many major R&D investments involve
public-private partnerships—including those developed by
the biotech industry as part of the EU's European Technology Platforms—the
risks are largely borne by the general public and the taxpayer.
4. A small number of enthusiasts for particular
approaches dominate the decision-making processes for R&D
investments. These individuals often have vested interests in
promoting these approaches. Barely credible claims are often made
that the development of genetics and genomics, including GM crops
and large-scale genetic databases, will eliminate problems as
diverse as hunger, cancer, crime, obesity and adverse drug reactions.
Typically no independent analysis of these claims is made and
critics are dismissed as "anti-science".
5. Political commitments to particular approaches
and the role of vested interests are often hidden and rarely open
to proper public scrutiny. For example, the UK Government and
the EU's DG Research have both endorsed a paradigm shift in medicine
to personalised prevention based on genetic risk prediction. This
approach has been variously supported by the tobacco, nuclear,
chemical, food and pharmaceutical industries as a means to expand
the market for medicines and functional foods and to avoid controls
on unhealthy products and pollution, by promoting genetic explanations
for cancer and obesity. There is no evidence that it is of benefit
to health or likely to be cost-effective.
6. The research funding system encourages the
patenting, promotion and marketing of scientific discoveries,
even though most published research findings are false.[66]
This undermines the concept of the scientific method as a means
of formulating and testing hypotheses with experimental evidence,
and replaces it with a system that encourages exaggerated claims,
including to policy makers and investors and to the public via
the media.
7. Science and innovation has become increasingly
disconnected from the users of research. This is most striking
in food and farming research, where agricultural colleges and
traditional plant breeding have largely disappeared and research
priorities are driven by what can be patented by commercial seed
companies or "add value" for food manufacturers.
8. There are likely to be significant opportunity
costs as a result of poor investments made via the current research
funding system. Billions of pounds and euros are being spent on
ineffective or spurious solutions to major social, environmental,
health and economic problems: including hunger and obesity.
9. The public is becoming increasingly alienated
and disillusioned and is sceptical that research priorities are
being set in the public interest or that they will deliver economic
benefits. For example, the Science Horizons project found that
it is widely assumed that policy-makers in government and big
business are not candid with citizens and that technology is being
developed by industry and/or government in order to make profits,
rather than in response to societal needs.
Q4. The case for a regional science policy
(versus national science policy) and whether the Haldane principle
needs updating.
11. The Haldane Principle implies that researchers
are best placed to determine detailed priorities; that government's
role is to set the over-arching strategy; and that research councils
are guardians of the independence of science from too much government
interference. It is often cited to state that scientists rather
than politicians should determine how research funds are spent.
However, the Haldane Principle does not reflect reality because
the entire system of research funding is now shaped by institutional
commitments to the knowledge-based economy.
12. GeneWatch believes that research funding
decisions are inevitably political decisions, about how
to best spend public money, which institutions to support and
what incentives to provide to researchers in academia and industry.
These decisions have economic consequences and potentially affect
the lives of billions of people, because they influence what questions
are asked and which approaches are adopted to tackle the problems
that we face. Research funding decisions in food, health and agriculture
can literally be life or death decisions and can also impact profoundly
on the environment and the lives of future generations. [67],[68],[69],[70],[71],[72],[73]
13. Research funding decisions need to take
into account what research is considered scientifically "doable".
But they are not—and cannot be—made in some pure "scientific"
way. History shows that such decisions are always shaped by politics
and by vested interests:[74]
the challenge is how to improve the system to make better, more
accountable decisions.
14. Motivations for researchers include
curiosity, reputation, career, research money for the creation
and development of a research team; and personal income.[75]
Building individual and collective careers creates scientific
"bandwagons" that promote further investment in particular
research agendas.[76]
Since 1997, the system of incentives for researchers has been
strongly influenced by the Government's commitment to the knowledge-based
economy, as defined and promoted by the OECD.[77]
Patents, based on science not validated by other academics, have
become part of the equation that measures prestige, and therefore
career advancement and funding.[78]
The scope of patents has also broadened to include what previously
would have been regarded as discoveries rather than inventions
(including plants and human genes). Other factors which influence
what research gets done include academic disciplines and hierarchy.
For example, in the past, medical research was largely done by
physician-scientists who also treated patients, but this changed
with the explosion of molecular biology in the 1970s, when clinical
and basic research started to separate.[79]
There has been a marked decline in the numbers of trainees and
professionals in physiology and pharmacology as the more reductionist
disciplines of molecular biology and genetics have gained in prestige
and influence.[80]
15. Because scientists are in a fierce competition
to maintain and increase public support and funding they routinely
hype the practical applications of their work, yet peer reviewers
do not assess the credibility of the claims made for the future
benefits that might arise from the research.[81]
Hype is often influenced by commercial interests, is reported
uncritically by the media, and distorts public expectations and
research priorities.[82],[83],[84],[85],[86],[87],[88]
16. Biotechnology became a business when
the knowledge emerging from scientific research became Intellectual
Property (IP) that was valued and could be bought and sold: however
this business model has not been successful, and the expansion
of the patent system is increasingly widely criticised for being
counter-productive to industry as well as raising serious ethical
concerns.[89],[90],[91]
"Knowledge" that is patented—the key measure of
the knowledge-based economy—does not represent a scientific
consensus about what has been established, or meet traditional
definitions of knowledge as established by the "scientific
method". For example, so-called "genetic information"
is mostly wrong[92]
but this genetic misinformation is now being marketed directly
to the public, with potentially serious implications for public
health.[93]
17. The current system of research funding,
in the context of the knowledge-based economy, means that—with
some exceptions—most public research funding tends to follow
the research investment strategies set by vested interests linked
to powerful industrial sectors, rather than seeking the most effective
ways to tackle serious problems such as hunger, obesity and environmental
degradation. For example, the food industry's research priorities
are not necessarily those most likely to be effective in tackling
the current epidemic of obesity and diet-related disease,[94]
and important gaps in health research reflect biases within the
health research economy which mean that research that is unlikely
to be profitable or is of little scientific interest tends to
be neglected.[95]
18. Closer links between universities and
communities at a local or regional level; and the development
of science policies at regional level—or the level of the
devolved administrations—could play a part in making decisions
more accountable. However, updating the Haldane Principle is an
inadequate response to the pervasive effects of the Government's
commitment to the KBE. A major re-think of science policy is needed.
The issues that need to be addressed include:
— Who defines the public interest?
— What mechanisms and institutions
are needed to attempt to deliver public benefit from science and
technology?
— How can "blue skies" research
and the "non-instrumental" roles of science be safeguarded,
including the ability to assess and debate techno-scientific claims?
— Who should bear the financial risk
of research and innovation?
— How should research priorities be
decided?
Q5. Engaging the public and increasing public
confidence in science and engineering policy.
Q6. The role of GO-Science, DIUS and other
Government departments, charities, learned societies, Regional
Development Agencies, industry and other stakeholders in determining
UK science and engineering policy.
Q7. How government science and engineering
policy should be scrutinised.
19. The Government's commitment to the knowledge-based
economy has major implications for the relationship between science,
democracy and the economy as forms of good hitherto seen primarily
as non-economic resources (culture, talent, knowledge, social
relations) become forms of capital.[96]
The notion of public-private partnership in the knowledge economy
presumes that the interests of the market, state and citizens
are the same and that no differences or conflicts of interest
exist. However, conflicts between different interests are pervasive
in the bioeconomy, and wealth creation is often directed at narrow,
vested interests, rather than society as a whole. For example,
there are strongly conflicting views about the future of food
and agriculture, which imply radically different research agendas.[97]
In addition, as the Harvard economist Gary Pisano has shown, the
model of science as a business has been a failure: profitability
in the medical biotech industry has been flat for over 30 years
and without the biggest biotech firm, Amgen, the industry has
made steady losses throughout its history, even before the current
economic crisis.[98]
20. When the Government developed its policies
on the knowledge economy, as a key element of the Third Way, Anthony
Giddens stated: "Science and technology used to be seen
as outside politics, but this view has become obsolete… Decision-making
in these contexts cannot be left to the "experts" but
must involve politicians and citizens".[99]
However, although there has been some (belated) recognition of
the need to engage the public more in decisions about science
and technology—reflected, for example, in the 2004 launch
of the "Sciencewise" programme—this has not yet
impacted significantly on science and innovation policy or research
priorities.
21. In GeneWatch UK's view, the Government's
commitment to the "knowledge-based economy" and its
failure to make transparent and accountable decisions in the area
of investments in science and technology underpins the "striking
trust deficit" identified in the Science Horizons Deliberative
Panel report,[100]
in which some people saw expert priorities for research investments
as inevitably not the same as those of the average citizen. The
2007 Science Horizons report states that the discussions
about science and technology "brought to the surface numerous
deep seated social concerns and policy themes".[101]
These included anxieties about privacy and surveillance, erosion
of the human dimension in services and relationship building,
future employment, trustworthiness of authorities, safety, fair
access to technology and the potential for technologies to be
misused. The concern that technology is being developed by industry
and/or government in order to make profits, rather than in response
to societal needs was "a fairly common theme"
and some people expressed feeling a lack of control over the direction
in which science and technology is heading. Trust in expert authorities
in the abstract tended to be low and there was "pervasive
anxiety" about potential abuse of technologies. It is
also "widely assumed that policy-makers in government
and big business are not candid with citizens".
22. The European Commission's Bureau of
European Policy Advisors 2005 report of a qualitative study
of the attitudes of EU citizens towards the renewed Lisbon Strategy
also found: "…that attitudes on the subject are extremely
variable. They tend to be positive in some countries, at least
for some population categories, but often negative, sceptical
or reserved for the majority of other persons questioned."[102]
People were doubtful about the credibility of investment in the
knowledge-based economy as a recovery plan for a Europe that had
failed over the course of the previous five years and: "Responsibility
for the mediocre situation was mainly placed with political leaders
or governments and their erroneous policy choices and their mismanagement
of public money".
23. Many researchers have concluded that
to address the dislocation of science from the public, there needs
to be more civil society engagement with setting the research
agenda and science and innovation policies. Participation is generally
seen as furthering two aims—more democratic decisions and
better ones. However, it is not a panacea and the notion of upstream
engagement is a contested concept giving rise to its own dilemmas
and tensions. Participation, whether upstream or not, is influenced
by power dynamics and can either open up or close down debate.
24. GeneWatch UK was recently involved in
a EC-funded project which involved people from civil society organisations
and academics in a study about participation in science.[103]
Based on evidence gathered by interviewing members of civil society
organisations (CSOs) in ten European countries the research found
that, contrary to popular perception, CSOs that were engaged in
debates about the development of agricultural biotechnology are
not anti-science, but felt that current policy-making frameworks
are disproportionately orientated towards the co-operation between
science and industry, leaving other actors either under-represented
or not represented at all. Although the original intention of
the project was to focus on "good practice" in participation,
the study found that CSOs believe themselves to be operating within
a structure that fundamentally denies them opportunities for meaningful
participation. The report identifies ten principles for effective
participation.
25. In GeneWatch's view the issues identified
in this submission can only be addressed by a major overhaul of
the research funding system, which requires:
— More democratic decisions about research
funding priorities and a more diverse research agenda;
— Greater accountability and scrutiny
of research investment decisions: including economic assessments
and appraisals, scrutiny of scientific and technical assumptions,
and active steps to prevent political "entrapment" in
research agendas based on false assumptions and misleading claims;
— Public engagement in setting research
questions and priorities, including consideration of a variety
of alternative approaches to addressing problems;
— Public engagement in research itself,
involving closer co-operation between universities, communities
and civil society organisations (for example, GeneWatch UK is
currently involved in the EC-funded project "Facilitating
Alternative Agro-Food Networks", which is an example of co-operative
research[104]);
— More funding for research which does
not necessarily benefit large corporations but may deliver other
benefits including economic ones (for example, public health research,
and research into improving organic and low-input farming methods);
— Fundamental reform of the science
advisory system and the system for providing incentives for and
assessment of research, including major reform of the patents
system;
— Funding for "counter-expertise"
and multi-disciplinary research which can identify long-term scientific
uncertainties and regulatory gaps;
— A commitment to take public opinions
into account in decisions about science and innovation, including
methods to ensure full consideration of the broader social and
economic issues associated with adopting particular technologies.
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