Memorandum 101
Submission from Dr Stephen Dearden
— This submission argues that there is
evidence of serious failures in the maintenance of the integrity
of the current system of degree awards— It has arisen from
the creation of a competitive market in higher education, the
marginalisation of academic staff with the shift to centralised
management and the pursuit of the government's widening access
objective.
— The problem can be addressed through
the strengthening of the system of external examiners or the adoption
of external assessment of core units.
— The conflict between the need to raise
the fee cap while limiting the burden upon public funds of loan
subsidies could be addressed by targeting support to those students
from low income households who also meet higher matriculation
and performance criteria.
1. The available evidence on social and
private rate of return to investment in higher education is challenged
by a number of methodological problems and data limitations. Any
conclusions drawn will also be compromised by the significant
change in the UK's medium-term economic situation. However the
evidence does suggest that it is important not to focus upon average
returns but to disaggregated results to take into account degree
subject, classification and institution.
2. Drawing upon the limited quantitative
and survey evidence there is some indication that a new binary
divide is emerging in higher education. The post 92 institutions
appear to have been the major destination for those students drawn
into higher education by the widening access policies of the government.
These institutions are becoming characterised by low relative
entry qualifications, high dropout rates and poorer employment/pay
returns. At the undergraduate level there are also suggestions
that these institutions are most vulnerable to pressures to compromise
academic standards to achieve recruitment and retention targets.
3. The maintenance of academic standards
is central to the reputation of any institution. Evidence to the
committee of a systemic problem has already been provided by other
contributors and arises from three factors—the creation
of a competitive market environment in higher education: the marginalisation
of academic staff through the move from "collegiate"
to "line management" organisational structures: widening
participation targets achieved through the financial constraint
of a fee cap.
4. The nature of the compromising of academic
standards varies across the sectors. In the case of the old universities
the pressures arise from concern with league table rankings or
to maintain the flow of postgraduate overseas students. In the
case of the post 92 institutions it is to ensure sufficient recruitment
and retention of undergraduates.
5. Academic standards have been compromised
by changes in degree regulations (eg "compensation criteria"),
changes in the method of assessment—especially the greater
weighting being given to course assessment—changes in degree
course content and individual course syllabuses, management pressure
on academic staff to "fully utilise the range of marks"
and, in the extreme case, the threat of loss of teaching leading
to staff priming students on exam content. Much of this is impossible
to identify through formal monitoring procedures.
6. Although the introduction of continuous
assessment has been justified as offering students the opportunity
to demonstrate a wider range of skills, without a process of "standardisation"
it undermines any inter-temporal comparisons of degree standards.
I'm not aware of any such standardisation being undertaken in
any institution.
7. The role of the QAA, focused upon organisational
structures and bureaucracy, has failed to identify these problems
and lacks the confidence of large numbers of academic staff. The
contrast with its academic-led predecessor, the Council for National
Academic Awards is stark.
8. I believe one solution lies in the enhancement
of the role of the external examiner. But it is essential that
external examiners are appointed from outside of the institution,
from a national pool, and that their reports be given sufficient
weight. A Council for External Examiners, perhaps as part of HEFC,
would ensure their objectivity, enhance their role, ensure experience
is shared across the university sectors and provide additional
training. External examiners should also report directly to such
a Council to ensure that institutional management give sufficient
weight to their views. It is currently far too easy for senior
management to ignore their comments. It would also be important
that they were sufficiently remunerated in view of the current
difficulty of attracting academic staff to these roles. The current
system, exploiting an "old boys network" of friendly
examiners compromises their integrity, especially where they are
drawn from similar institutions. It is also crucial that they
are drawn from amongst active "academic" staff, not
management grades, with standing in their disciplines.
9. A more problematic alternative might
be to move towards restoring externally set and marked examinations.
Most degree courses include common elements that define their
"discipline" base. These units could be externally examined,
while allowing individual institutions to maintain the flexibility
of offering their own particular course specialisms. Discrepancies
in the marks between these externally assessed units and those
offered internally would flag any problems in academic standards.
10. A more robust externally-monitored system
of assessment would also allow consideration of the introduction
of a performance threshold for access to student loans. The proposal
to raise the fee cap presents problems of public funding to provide
the necessary loan subsidy. Although adjustments can be made through
the introduction of differing qualifying income thresholds or
terms of loan repayments, including real interest rates, the focusing
of financial support upon more adequately qualified and motivated
students from low income households could be addressed. Widening
opportunity is not achieved by dissipating limited public funds
upon students who will not benefit from degree level studies as
a result of their lack of motivation or preparation (the Robbins
Principle).
11. A related issue that I believe the Committee
needs to address is that of institutional governance and the adoption
of the new 'manageralist 'model. Although most acute in the post
92 institutions, the shift from collegiate to line-management
organisational structures has been profound. A history of recurring
financial and organisational crises, the suspension and resignation
of university Vice-Chancellors/Directors and votes of no-confidence
by academic staff, suggest the "training company" model
for Universities encouraged by successive governments has been
far from successful. The government's proposal to allow a further
reduction in the size of post 92 University Board of Governors,
with the complete exclusion of academic staff, should be a major
cause of concern.
12. The Committee should also urge the government
to address the problem of student loan repayments by EU nationals
and the qualifying period of residence in the UK for "home
fee" payments.
13. Robust administrative arrangements also
need to be put in place to identify what appears to be the increasing
problem of bogus qualifications (forged or awarded by non-accredited
colleges) presented by UK or EU passport holders born outside
of the EU. As this involves access to subsidised student loans
this would represent fraud. Universities should be clear in their
responsibility to forward such cases to the appropriate authorities
for investigation.
14. Universities are dependent for their
success and their future upon the motivation and commitment of
their academic staff. Institutions which are dominated by a new
"management class", are devoid of open debate and have
compromised integrity are no longer "Universities",
whatever they may be called.
March 2009
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