Memorandum 119
[Manchester Metropolitan University, Mr
Cairns submission and correspondence]
Submission from WJ Cairns[386]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— The author of this submission is critical
of the terms of reference of this investigation.— Nevertheless,
he hereby presents his evidence to the effect that, not only in
his own area, but in most other academic fields of study, there
are many forces at work which inevitably lead to a reduction in
standards. — These relate mainly to the need to retain student
numbers, which if they were allowed to fall because of high failure
rates would have dire economic consequences for the institution
in general and probably for the individual tutors in particular.
— The alleged safeguards in place, in the
shape of internal and external second assessment, are totally
inadequate for the purpose of countering this trend.
— He illustrates this sorry state of affairs
by a case study which is based upon his own experience in organising,
teaching and assessing various law courses on the International
Business degree at his University.
— This involved an exercise in distortion
of the results which, in the author's view, amounts to blatant
cheating.
INTRODUCTION
1. Because of the relatively short notice
received for the submission of evidence, as well as a combination
of heavy teaching, research and administrative duties, my observations
are less complete than I would like them to be. However, I was
extremely keen to participate in the debate, which is highly necessary
even if, as I mention below, the terms of reference on which this
inquiry is based are not beyond criticism.
2. First of all, I wish to state that the framework
for this investigation as set by the Committee is extremely unsatisfactory,
largely because of its omissions—the most glaring of which
relate to (a) course level and content and (b) methods and levels
of assessment. Even the headings laid down by the Committee are
tightly circumscribed in such a way as to obstruct a thorough
examination of the underlying issues.
3. Let us take as an example the "Admissions"
heading. Here, surely two of the main issues to be examined in
the context of the general theme of the inquiry are (a) have admission
criteria widened to the point of including students who are not
equal to the intellectual challenge of higher education, and (b)
have the admissions criteria kept pace with the manner in which
the qualifications at secondary education level have evolved,
mainly in relation to A levels and GCSEs. In other words, do admissions
criteria take account of the possibility that a reduction in standards
has also taken place as regards these qualifications, even if
nominally they are the same as those which were awarded 20 or
30 years ago?
ASSESSMENT—THEN
AND NOW
4. To those of us who have been involved
in the assessment of law subjects taught at the level of higher
education, it is obvious that standards have dropped substantially.
This is not only the case, as is generally believed, because of
the incidence of course work and of "seen" examination
papers. It also has to do with the manner in which the various
assessed elements—whether in the form of examinations, tests,
essays and other items of coursework—are evaluated and marked.
More particularly it relates to a tacit understanding amongst
university staff that assessment levels and methods shall be geared
mainly, if not exclusively, to the need to retain as many students
as possible for the subsequent years and for graduation.
5. Because this is a tacit understanding it is
very difficult, if not totally impossible, to supply hard documentary
evidence of any such trend. However, there are a number of indicators
and official statements of policy which very much point in that
direction. A telling example of this is the requirement, now made
of all courses at my University, that assessors should "use
the full range of marks". This is a coded way of instructing
tutors to include more students in the top evaluation brackets.
This does not necessarily involve the distortion and subsequent
changing of marks—although this too frequently occurs, as
can be seen elsewhere in this paper—but manifests itself
in the form of awarding higher marks than before in order to meet
target numbers. Any course for which this is not done will face
the danger that (a) the throughput to the subsequent years of
the course will drop, raising possible question marks over staffing
levels and therefore the possibility of redundancies, and (b)
the University's authorities, faced with a higher than average
failure rate or a lower than average percentage of students in
the higher evaluation brackets (ie 2(1) and Firsts), will exercise
heavy pressure on the departments concerned to "see the error
of their ways".
6. This process is also aided and abetted
by the "internal market" system. In the vast majority
of Universities, individual departments and/or faculties have
become "cost centres", in other words, independent budget-holding
units. If they teach students outside their departments and/or
faculties, they charge the other department and/or faculty for
services rendered on the basis of a costing formula known as "FTE"
(full-time equivalent"). This means that the department providing
the service has every interest in maintaining numbers at a high
level—and therefore to be as generous in their marking as
possible.
7. This is particularly the case with departments
which are traditionally felt to be "overstaffed" and
whose subjects are on the wane in popularity terms. Languages
departments are particularly vulnerable to such pressures. Languages
degrees as such are in numerical decline, and ever fewer courses
which used to offer the possibility of a combination with languages
(eg international/European business studies, Law and French/German/Spanish,
etc) are currently inclined to do so. This trend has already caused
the closure of several university languages departments (including,
devastatingly, at Bradford University, once regarded as a prototype
institution for this kind of course). Faced with these dramatic
trends, language departments will be extremely reluctant to fail
any students—whether on their own degrees or on those which
they service.
THE ROLE
OF SECOND
MARKERS AND
EXTERNAL EXAMINERS
8. It is often maintained that adequate
safeguards exist for the maintenance of standards—in the
face of the trends mentioned above—in the shape of double
marking procedures and the watchful eye exercised by the external
examiners. Sadly, this pretension is frequently no more than a
snare and a delusion.
9. In the first place, internal second markers
are subject to the same constraints as those facing their colleagues
in terms of the need to retain sufficient student numbers for
the sake of their own survival. This is the case even where the
second markers form part of a different department. They are also
subject to the same policy of "using the full range of marks"
and therefore will act and mark accordingly. In most cases, the
only adjustments made will be upwards, particularly when it comes
to second-marking assignments and scripts which the first marker
has failed.
10. The role of the external examiner is,
in principle, supposed to be that of a supervisor and guarantor
of certain standards of quality and probity. Sadly, this lofty
aspiration is met more in the breach than in the observance because
of two main factors. In the first place, many universities have
succeeded in severely restricting the scope for action by the
external examiner by the manner in which they circumscribe his/her
duties in the relevant regulations. In many cases, the external
examiner does not monitor the general level of the marks or is
given the opportunity to change individual grades, since all he/she
is called upon to do is to arbitrate between first and second
markers and/or make a decision in borderline cases. (Even within
this limited scope their room for manoeuvre is even narrower,
since internal examiners are now instructed not to issue borderline
marks of 39, 49, 59, etc!)
11. However, there is another way in which
the external examiner is unable fully to exercise his role as
guardian of standards, in that he/she cannot possibly know what
has passed between tutor and student prior to the assessment,
or the input which the tutor has had in it (in the case of coursework).
For it is the worst-kept secret in the academic world that, for
unseen examination papers, most tutors provide their students
with the contents of the paper beforehand, or at least give them
a list of topics from which the questions will be drawn. The role
of the external examiner is therefore predicated on an assumption
of academic integrity which, for the most part, does not exist.
12. However, there is another side to the
external examiner's role which connives at the current reduction
in academic standards in higher education. At the Board of Examiners,
which they are entitled to attend as of right, it will often be
they who will pass adverse comment if they feel that internal
examiners have been "less than generous". This is particularly
the case in relation to first-class degrees. At my own University,
this happens very frequently—if I owned a "blue note"
for every occasion on which I have heard the words "why don't
you give more Firsts" at a board of examiners' meeting I
would be a rich man indeed. In fact, external examiners can play
an even more insidious role in the present trend of lowering standards—as
will be apparent from the case study featured below.
THE BUSINESS
IN EUROPE/INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS DEGREE
AT MMU—A CASE
STUDY
13. My experience as a tutor for this course
over the entire 20 years of its existence represent a microcosm
of all the ills which I have cited in the paragraphs stated above.
14. My association with this course started when
I was a member of the Languages Department of Manchester Metropolitan
University (then Manchester Polytechnic) in my capacity of lecturer
in law and languages (Law and French/Law and German). Because
of a dispute between the course organisers and the then Department
of Law, I was called upon to organise and teach, entirely by myself,
the Business Law and Comparative Business Law course in Year One,
and the EC/EU Law course in Year Two. For the first 10 years,
the results were reasonably satisfactory. Even though the level
of preparation on the part of the students was generally on the
minimal side, and the level of the examination questions was kept
as low as possible—even taking account of the fact that
these were not specialist law students—the students showed
a certain level of commitment and most were able to weather the
examination thanks to reasonable preparation. There certainly
was no question of "tipping off" the students about
the contents of the examination paper, or restricting the examination
to certain topics only, as seems to be standard practice in the
present-day world of higher education. However, matters have taken
a considerable turn for the worse over the past decade.
15. During the last 10 years or so, the
students have seemed to be increasingly incapable of committing
any sizeable piece of information to memory, and to do so in a
structured and reasonably grammatical way. This gave rise to increasing
levels of low grades and failures and was giving the course organisers
a good deal of concern. At a certain point, it was decided to
change the entire profile and dimension of the law content of
the course. The first-year element was incorporated into a broader
course called "Business Environment", to be taught on
a wide variety of programmes. The second year course was to stand
alone and be called "International Business Law".
16. The first-year course came on stream
in the academic year 2003-04. Even though the Law questions were
straightforward, including as they did such questions as "Describe
the conditions for the validity of a contract under English law"
and "Explain the relevant of the law of torts to business
activity", the results were devastating, with an 85% failure
rate. Naturally this caused consternation among the authorities.
I was called to a meeting with various Business School course
administrators, and subjected to nothing less than a kangaroo
court as to why failure rates were so high. At the various boards
of examinations that followed, the marks were all increased by
20 (not 20%, but 20 in absolute terms) in order to achieve reasonable
pass levels.
17. The next year, the Year Two course came
into operation. Assessment was based on 30 per cent coursework,
70% unseen examination. Even with the help of a higher average
coursework mark, the overall failure rate was 85%, as can be seen
from Appendix 1 attached (to the paper version of this submission).[387]
These marks were all confirmed by the internal second marker,
[***][388]
(see Appendix 2). At the preliminary exam board held on 2 June,
it was agreed that these marks were very low, but that the verdict
of the external examiner was still awaited. The external examiner
was [***],[389]
a lecturer at [***] who had no recognised expertise in international
business law, and whose appointment therefore contravened the
relevant QAA rules.
18. When [***the external examiner***]
provided his report (Appendix 3), he expressed concern at the
low level of the marks and suggested—predictably enough—that
"the full mark range should be reflected", by increasing
the average mark by 10%. However, by some strange turn of events,
further discussions took place between the course leaders and
[***the external examiner***] (myself not being involved)
as a result of which the marks were increased by 20 (once again,
not 20% but 20 in absolute terms). The marks, thus increased,
were presented to the full Board of Examiners in such a way as
not to give the slightest indication as to the manner in which
the marks had been altered.
19. At the full Board, held on 10 June,
I requested that those present should be informed of the true
course of events. An explanation was duly given by one of the
course leaders, whereupon I expressed my disagreement with such
goings-on and left the room. (Contrary to what the Course Leaders
later reported (see Appendix 4), I did not level any abuse at
the External Examiner—or anyone else for that matter). The
Board subsequently confirmed the altered marks (see Appendix 5).
20. I subsequently protested about this
process in an email addressed to the parties involved, as well
as the University Vice Chancellor and Secretary (Appendix 6).
As can be seen from Appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10, my objections were
overruled—but, in the process, the correspondence in question
fully reveals the degree of distortion and downright cheating
which had occurred by raising the marks in question. In his final
report to the University, the external examiner, who earlier had
stated that my own teaching and organisation of the course was
not to blame for the high failure rate, completely altered course
and suggested, in a manner which can fairly be described as defamatory,
that the entire affair was virtually entirely to be blamed on
my incompetence (See Appendix 11).
21. As a result of this fiasco, the rules
were changed. The unseen examination was replaced by a seen examination—the
questions remaining as easy as they were in the unseen paper—but
still horrendous failure rates were recorded at the first diet
of examinations. For the reassessment, an attempt was made by
the course leaders to remove me from this process—on this
occasion, however, my protests were heeded by the University authorities
and I was reinstated. Since then, the examination has been made
even easier, with the students even being given the main points
to put in their answers! However, I have now been informed that,
as from next year, International Business Law is to be axed from
the Year Two curriculum...
CONCLUSION
22. The findings of the case study set out
under the previous section cannot be dismissed as merely anecdotal
evidence, in the light of the general points and issues highlighted
under items 1 to 3—which I am confident will be reflected
in many other submissions from different institutions. They point
to a general and calamitous reduction in academic standards, by
means which include downright cheating, across the board which
we ignore at our peril.
January 2009
386 School of Law, Manchester Metropolitan University. Back
387
Appendices not printed. Back
388
Details not published. Back
389
Details not published. Back
|
