Engineering: turning ideas into reality - Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee Contents

5  Engineering in Government

We cannot afford a public service culture where all you do is tell the Government what you think the Government wants to hear. […] The Government must receive the best advice, based on the best available information and evidence.

Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, 30 April 2008

There is nothing a government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult.

John Maynard Keynes

It is a capital mistake to theorise before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.

Sherlock Holmes in A Study in Scarlet, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle


231.  The impetus for this case study was to explore whether there is scope to improve Government policy making and delivery through changing the way in which engineers are involved with the process. Judging from comments made by the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Government will welcome our efforts in this regard. The Rt Hon John Denham MP told us that "The real challenge is getting the best policy advice, whether that is social science, science or engineering, into Government in a systematic way",[273] and that "this is a process we need to strengthen rather than say we have it absolutely all right at the moment".[274]

232.  Before proceeding to explain how we think the policy-making process could be strengthened, it is necessary to outline the landscape of science and engineering advice structures in Government. It is a minefield of acronyms and initialisms, and we hope that the following paragraphs and Figure 2 help the reader make some sense of it.
Figure 2. Organogram of science advisory structures in Government

233.  The Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), currently Professor John Beddington, oversees science advice—which the Government argues includes engineering advice[275]—across Government and is also head of profession for scientists and engineers in the civil service. The GCSA is supported by the Government Office for Science (GO-Science, once part of the Office for Science and Innovation). Although the GCSA and GO-Science have cross-departmental responsibility for science advice, they are situated within the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS), rather than the Cabinet Office as was suggested by the former Science and Technology Committee.[276]

234.  Supporting the work of the GCSA are Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), who are responsible for science advice in each of their departments. Not all DCSAs are necessarily scientists. For example, the DCSA for the Ministry of Defence is an engineer (Professor Mark Welland) and the DCSA for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is an economist (Anita Charlesworth). Neither does every Department have a DCSA, which was an ambition of Professor Sir David King, the former GCSA, and remains a commitment for the present incumbent of that post.

235.  DCSAs sit on the Chief Scientific Advisers Committee (CSAC), which is tasked with advising the GCSA (who chairs CSAC) on science, engineering and technology matters relevant to Government. The highest level Committee, which advises the Prime Minister on science and technology issues, is the Council for Science and Technology, which is co-chaired by the GCSA.[277]

236.  Also working under the broad heading of 'specialist advice' to Government are the National Statistician (currently Karen Dunnell), the Chief Government Social Scientist (currently Professor Paul Wiles, who is also DCSA for the Home Office), and the joint heads of the Government Economic Service (currently Vicky Price, BERR, and Dave Ramsden, HM Treasury)—presently there is not a Government Chief Economist.

237.  The most significant change since our predecessor Committee considered the science-policy structure in Government is that of the role of the Minister for Science and Innovation, currently Lord Drayson, who acts to promote the importance of science advice across Government. He attends Cabinet and chairs the newly formed Cabinet Sub-Committee on Science and Innovation.[278] This Committee is made up of Ministers from key Departments with a science remit, such as the Department for Health (DH), Defra, Transport and DECC. Lord Drayson told us that "I have been given the task of setting up this brand new committee for science and innovation to make sure that science is put at the heart of government policy".[279]

238.  Working alongside the Minister for Science and Innovation at DIUS is the Director General for Science and Research, Professor Adrian Smith, who is responsible for science and research policy, including the science budget allocations and public engagement on key scientific issues. He is also DIUS's DCSA.

Science = science + engineering?

239.  The Government is adamant that when it talks about science, it means science and engineering,[280] and acknowledges that "We tend perhaps not to see them as quite separate activities".[281] The Secretary of State appealed to us not to take the Government's shorthand as "a judgment of the department's interest in engineering".[282] We take him at his word, and accept that the Government does not intentionally seek to downgrade engineering. (Although his Department's new campaign, Science: So what? So everything, surely cannot help.) However, it may be that the persistent use of the solitary word 'science' as code for science, technology, engineering and maths, not to mention social science, economics and statistics, is a symptom of the status of engineering advice in Government.

240.  Before we consider this point, however, it is useful to explore the way in which the Government and others perceive the relationship between science and engineering (and scientific advice and engineering advice). We have heard two interpretations of the relationship between science and engineering in a policy context. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but as a matter of emphasis they are interesting.

241.  The 'essential continuum' interpretation is that pure science and pure engineering sit at two ends of a continuum with heavy science—or light engineering, depending on your professional persuasion—sitting between the two. This is the position taken by the GCSA[283] and Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills,[284] who use it as a line of argument to support a system in which a GCSA oversees DCSAs without a need for an additional Government Chief Engineering Adviser or his/her departmental concomitants. As Professor Beddington put it:

[T]hese strands of advice form an essential continuum and to put them into silos would be unhelpful. I have scientific and engineering advice, and what is pure science and what is engineering does not seem to me a fruitful debate as they link across lots of different areas.[285]

242.  The alternative to focusing on the similarities is to place more emphasis on the differences. The 'essential difference' interpretation is the notion that notwithstanding niche research areas, science and engineering are disciplines that differ fundamentally, particularly in their goals: scientists set out to find out how things work whereas engineers typically are more interested in whether they can turn ideas into reality. In a policy situation the distinction is obvious. For example, in setting carbon emissions targets one might turn to scientists to gain an understanding of what impact carbon emissions have on the climate and to engineers to identify what is possible in terms of practical actions. Only with both strands of advice is it possible to set meaningful targets and develop a strategy for meeting them. To give an historic example:

When Michael Faraday explored the problem of exploding dust in coal mines, he cracked the science and then, in his final report on these tragic events, gave his view of how much fresh air needed to be supplied in order to stop this happening, and then very bluntly says he does not have an idea how on earth how he would get that amount of fresh air down into the mine. "This has to be left", he said, "to men who are practical".[286]

The 'essential difference' interpretation inexorably leads to the conclusion that there should, at least in some cases, be both scientific advisers and engineering advisers.

243.  These arguments are not mutually exclusive but differ in emphasis. It is obviously true both that science and engineering are different disciplines and that there is an overlap between the two. It is matter of determining the relative weight of the differences and the similarities. We take the view that the majority of professional activity that can be classified as science and/or engineering falls very clearly into one of the categories—science or engineering—but not both. Even in cases where people move between engineering and science, they know the difference between the two:

I think there is a strong overlap and that people move from being engineers to being scientists and back again. Of course I spent my working career in industry in the United States and there we did that all the time. We would even be both scientists and engineers almost simultaneously. I managed large projects during the day and in the evening I looked at viruses in the scanning electron microscope that I had built.[287]


244.  Irrespective of whether one chooses to focus on the similarities or the differences between engineering and science, the fact that there are differences strongly suggests that there will be instances in which engineering advice is more useful than scientific advice. Professor Beddington despite his position that "there is a clear continuum" between science and engineering,[288] clearly distinguishes between the two. When the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was formed, he stepped in "to ensure that they had engineering advice"[289]; and he has advised the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) that it needs both engineering and social science advice.[290] His conclusion is that "we need to have, as chief scientific advisers, where appropriate, engineers".[291] The Government is clearly in support of Professor Beddington's position, since the MoD, BERR, DfT and CLG have engineers in the DCSA role. In other words, the differences between engineering advice and science advice are already recognised by Government.

245.   So what, specifically, is it that engineers bring to the policy environment? The Royal Academy of Engineering put this clearly on behalf of a large section of the engineering community, including most of the professional engineering institutions:

[E]ngineering is a quite different discipline [from science], pursued in a different manner towards different ends. Engineering is concerned with solving practical problems and in changing the physical world, using scientific, technical and business skills. Science, on the other hand, is principally about understanding the nature of the world. The practical nature of engineering means that engineering advice and expertise is of great value in developing policy and delivering projects. For example, the need for engineering advice is particularly pertinent in the area of climate change. The big challenge is no longer the search for evidence for climate change but rather the search for means of avoiding its advance and mitigating its effects, many of which will be matters of engineering and technology.[292]

246.  Professor Chris Snowden expanded on the expertise that engineers can provide:

[T]o be an engineer […] you have to have a clear understanding of the science behind the issues you are addressing. At the same time, you also have to understand (a) how it is applied, (b) how it would be implemented, so that has cost implications, reliability implications and it also has […] socio-economic implications.[293]

247.  And Professor Michael Kelly went further:

It comes back to the distinction between a scientist and an engineer. Any engineer worth his/her salt has managed a complicated programme somewhere along the way. It is one of the preconditions for even consideration to be a Fellow of the Academy: what is the big project you have seen through? When it comes to management, there are short courses for civil servants on how to manage but even the management that goes on inside a department of something going on outside tends to be at arm's length and comes back to the point that David made earlier, that as long as the finances are right and there is a good line to put against each bullet point in the milestones to the project, that is it. For somebody to get up there and say, "This is going awry", or "this is going off the tracks or this will not work at some point", engineers are past masters at that.[294]

[M]aking professional judgements about the feasibility of aspects of projects [… is] integral to an engineering training and […] may not necessarily come through the regular scientific route.[295]

248.  We conclude that engineering advice and scientific advice offer different things to the policy formulation process and that the benefits of both should be recognised. Further, it should not be assumed that a scientific adviser can offer competent engineering advice or even know when it is needed.

Engineering advice in policy

249.  Engineering advice is crucial to many policy areas. The Government has consulted closely with engineers on how to keep Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices at safe distances from critical national infrastructure, on the implementation of a new Incident Recording System for the Fire Service and on dealing with cable corrosion on the Severn Bridge.[296] Adaptation and mitigation of climate change is a major policy area: the flood and coastal erosion risk management is run by engineers from Defra, the Environment Agency, local authorities and internal drainage boards; "practitioners [i.e., engineers] are at the forefront of policy development and the consideration of strategic solutions".[297] The Energy Research Partnership and the Energy Technologies Institute, which are both joint public-private ventures to promote energy research and innovation in the UK, are other examples where engineering is at the heart of the Government's strategy for moving towards a carbon neutral economy.

250.  One regular voice for engineering in Government is the Council for Science and Technology. CST advises the Prime Minister and the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales on "strategic issues that cut across the responsibilities of individual government departments".[298] According to CST, it organises its work around five broad themes: research, science and society, education, science and Government, and technology innovation. No mention of engineering, which is strange since seven of its members are engineers and many of its reports are engineering-related. We aim to revisit the role of CST in our inquiry on 'Putting science and engineering at the heart of Government policy'.

251.  Unfortunately, the policy-making machine does not always operate effectively. During the course of this inquiry we came across several examples of bad practice. In each case the common factor is an absolute or relative absence of engineering advice:

  • on carbon efficiency:

We have been told privately by reliable sources that unrealistic estimates have been made about the contribution of non-fossil fuel sources to energy supply and CO2 emissions reduction as well as the potential carbon emissions savings of various energy efficiency measures. A sound engineering insight would have given a clearer picture of the contributions of the different energy technologies, the timescales in which they could feasibly come on-stream and the measures necessary to mitigate risk—whether technical, political, commercial or otherwise.[299]

If you look at all the 30 odd policy measures out there for reduction of carbon emissions in buildings, I have been asking for two years what exactly is the expectation in terms of actual carbon savings by 2015. That is a hard engineering question so that we will know in 2012 if we are on the trajectory. I am afraid I cannot get that answer.[300]

  • on microgeneration:

Engineers' views are […] essential to identify barriers to certain policy solutions […] For example, while the use of microgeneration of electricity through wind power might be recommended, this recommendation is undermined by the fact that the electricity grid is not currently designed to deal with the feeding back of large amounts of power into the grid—the distribution system is designed to be one-way.[301]

  • on renewables:

[T]he new commitment to 25 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2020 is, to say the least, going to be a massive, if not impossible, challenge. It is going to mean installing ten large turbines a day every day that you can practise in the North Sea, which is about 60 days a year, until 2020, ten a day every day until 2020, and there is one barge at the moment that is capable of carrying, and erecting, one of those towers, so you do not gain engineers' confidence by having a strategy that just states that there is going to be 25 gigawatts of offshore wind in the North Sea.[302]

  • on eco-towns:

Recent plans for developing Eco-towns were drawn up with the help of a steering committee (the Eco Towns Challenge Panel) which had no engineering input. The contribution of an engineer in this case would have been to look at the intended outcome—reducing domestic carbon emissions within the UK—and assessing whether this was the best means to meet that outcome.[303]

I am well aware of one eco-town site that, for example, does not have the transport infrastructure to connect it to the economy it would have to serve, so I would suggest that that is a fairly serious problem in terms of the rationale for the eco-town.[304]

  • on building new houses:

[V]ast housing proposals have been made […] only to find that all of these housing proposals had been made without any consideration of water supply. Engineers would have stopped that immediately.[305]

  • on large IT projects:

Large IT systems are an area of Government procurement that has and continues to experience both bad press and implementation problems. Some would assert that specifications have been driven by political imperatives rather than being derived from operational requirements; a situation which would apply to both the ID Card project and the National IT Programme (Connecting for Health). It is possible that this approach has led to decisions about the architecture of systems being taken or assumed before detailed expert advice was taken. Here, a distinction needs to be made between the advice received by Government in the procurement of systems, which is often good and realistic, and the advice received in the development of policies which are delivered through the procurement of IT, which is often lacking.[306]

252.  One particularly alarming example was the review of the Severn Tidal Power Feasibility Study to assess options for harnessing the tidal power of the Severn Estuary. Professor Beddington told us that he "wrote to the Secretary of State […] indicating that it was absolutely essential […] that there was significant engineering input",[307] which suggests that at the time Professor Beddington wrote the letter that the level of 'engineering input' was not 'significant' enough. It is alarming not only because it is plainly obvious that engineering input on a project like this is crucial at all stages of consideration, from initial discussion to implementation, but also because the Government uses this feasibility study as a example of best practice in its written submission.[308]

253.  These examples raise a number of points: the absence of strategic planning and roadmaps, the importance of acting as an intelligent customer, a lack of clear guidance on policy making and the dangers of not seeking engineering advice early in policy formulation. We shall deal with these points in turn.


254.  We discussed strategic planning and roadmaps in the chapters on nuclear engineering and on plastic electronics. It is clear from the above examples that detailed roadmaps are not used in several areas of Government.


255.   The Royal Academy of Engineering and the engineering institutions have called for the Government to be an 'intelligent customer':

Government needs to be an intelligent customer for the engineering advice it receives. This means having civil service staff who are able to understand and evaluate engineering advice. With the focus strongly on evidence-based policy, the civil service should have amongst its staff engineers who are able to source and assess technical evidence. Evidence-based policy in key areas such as climate change, energy supply and low-carbon transport is only achievable with the input of policy advisers with an understanding of the required evidence—and that will include engineering evidence.[309]

The examples of bad practice given above suggest that the Government does not have sufficient engineering capacity in several major policy areas. One of the problems with a capacity shortage is that the Government has to rely more on bought-in expertise. Professor David Fisk, a former Chief Scientific Adviser, outlined three situations in which consultants might be used:

  • when in-house staff out-source engineering analysis that they could have completed themselves so they have more time to focus on the most difficult issues—the staff can then check that the out-sourced work is correct
  • when in-house staff are able to formulate the problem but are not able to devise the solution, so it out-sources the analysis—in this situation staff can still check the quality of the work
  • when in-house staff are unable to formulate the problem coherently but still out-sources some analysis—in this situation staff are unable to assess the quality of the answers that come back.[310]

He therefore commented that:

Innovation Nation rightly proposes obtaining private sector advice in formulating tenders to provoke more innovative proposals but it is silent as to how in the proposals received the innovative are to be distinguished from the disasters.[311]

256.  We asked Professor Snowden why he thought this problem existed:

Chairman: [U]nless the Government is an intelligent customer and it actually has at board level or certainly at the very highest level that sort of advice, that critical advice, then, no matter how many consultants you have thereafter, if you have made an initial policy decision which is flawed, you are living with it thereafter, are you not?

Professor Snowden: You may be.

Chairman: Well, if that is obvious to me and it is obvious to you, why is it not obvious to the Government?

Professor Snowden: Because they have not got the advice in the first place or the training. It is a serious point, and I will give an example. You may wonder why these things arise, but, if you look at the makeup in other countries of governments, you will find that engineers and scientists populate a large number of these places. The President of China himself is actually an engineer, so is his Vice President. They are not practising engineers today obviously, but they do have an appreciation of the skill-set. Now, I am not suggesting everybody needs to be engineers, but it is useful to have some content of that from the point of view of having input at that early stage.[312]

257.  How the Government should go about improving its engineering capability is something we discuss later. In the meantime, we conclude that the Government, in several policy areas of several departments, does not have sufficient in-house engineering expertise to act as an intelligent customer.


258.  One way in which the policy process could be improved is effective implementation of sensible guidelines on policy making. Such guidelines already exist for science, but not for engineering. The Government claims that 'science' as a broad heading includes engineering, but the GCSA's Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making[313] only refers to engineering in a footnote. It is the only time that engineering is mentioned in the whole document. In the footnote, 'science' is broken down into, for example, forestry science, veterinary science, mathematical sciences and so on, while engineering is lumped as an entirety into 'engineering and technology'.

259.  We asked Professor Beddington whether these guidelines should be updated. He agreed that they should,[314] and told us that "it is one of the things that I am going to be discussing with my team of chief scientific advisers".[315]

260.  The Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making should explicitly include engineering advice. We are pleased that Professor Beddington has already agreed to review these guidelines, and suggest that the research and engineering community be consulted on the content of the guidelines.


261.  Our final observation on the examples given above is that even in cases where engineering advice has been sought, it often comes too late. This can have profound implications. For example, with regard to eco-towns, the Royal Academy of Engineering argues that had consultation with engineers taken place before the policy decision was taken: "Engineers would have been highly likely to conclude that the outcome would be better served by retro-fitting existing housing to reduce its carbon emissions, a view that seems to be emerging through the consultation process".[316]

262.   In another example from the Royal Academy of Engineering and the engineering institutions:

Although the MoD continues to struggle to deliver projects to time, cost and performance, it appears more likely to take engineering advice than other Departments. The recent review of the Royal Navy procurement of two large aircraft carriers by Sir John Parker FREng was instigated at a late stage to give the Government comfort that the contract could be managed and delivered by industry. It is welcome that the Government should seek such advice, but it could be an integral part of the procurement process for difficult projects rather than a late stage add-on.[317]

263.  This theme of early consultation was something that was raised time and again in submissions:

I do not think Government engages engineers early enough in the procurement processes. I think they should be there from day one on these large-scale projects and identified as such.[318]

[T]he Royal Academy and the institutions […] are quite often consulted very far down the process. In one particular case this year, we had 48 hours' notice to provide a consultation on a paper on energy, which, as you can probably appreciate, provides a very limited ability to usefully input to that process and it is far too far down the process. The key point I would make is that engineering input needs to be in the developmental and formulation phase of the policies and strategies, not as an afterthought or in the implementation phase.[319]

Even in our own department [CLG] where it was a matter of setting up a climate change group, we have two economists and a statistician; that was the starting point of a problem which is essentially about climate change in buildings. If they had said, "Let us get a buildings engineer and a couple of people to support that", I would have said that was the appropriate way to start.[320]

264.  And the Government Chief Scientific Adviser honestly observed:

[E]co-towns is one where it seems to me engineering advice should have been sought at an earlier time and I have concerns with that.[321]

265.  Engineering advice should be sought early in policy formulation and before policy is agreed, not just in project delivery. We recommend that the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills and the Minister for Science and Innovation act as champions in cabinet for the early engagement of engineers in policy making. Further, this issue should also be central to discussions in the Science and Innovation Cabinet Sub-Committee.


266.  So how should the civil service go about sourcing engineering advice? We were struck by the ease of communication between the engineering communities and Governments in China and Japan and observed that the close ties between the two are largely cultural. China is still a developing country that is rapidly building itself, literally, and engineers are highly valued as a result. Japan traditionally has a very strong engineering base—it built itself out of the post-war economic doldrums and through its high-tech engineering industries it has a strong economy. Although both nations are noticing that the younger generation is increasingly attracted to financial services, it is noteworthy that engineers still occupy high places in both Governments.

267.  In addition, the Chinese and Japanese engineering academies—the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) and the Engineering Academy of Japan (EAJ)—carry enormous authority. The President of the CAE bears the same rank as a Government minister. There are stark differences between the Chinese political system and the UK's, which perhaps makes it easier for policy to be influenced by engineers at the highest level of the Chinese Government. However, the Japanese and UK political systems are quite similar, yet in Japan, the engagement between the EAJ and the Government is—or at least appeared to us—to be more policy-oriented than the relationship between the Royal Academy of Engineering and the UK Government.

268.  One of our predecessor Committees, the Science and Technology Committee, was equally impressed by the system in the United States:

We saw during our visit to the US the more formalised role fulfilled by the National Academies—the National Academy of Science, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine and National Research Council—in the provision of scientific advice to Government. The National Academies have a mandate to "investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art" whenever called upon to do so by any Department of the Government. Most of the science policy and technical work is conducted by the National Academies' operating arm, the National Research Council, which was created expressly for this purpose. Collectively, the National Academies "provide a public service by working outside the framework of government to ensure independent advice on matters of science, technology, and medicine". We recognise that the UK's learned societies were established within a different institutional framework. Nonetheless, the Government has on occasion commissioned work from the learned societies, including a well-received Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering study on nanotechnology. We find the institutional structure of the scientific advisory system in the US attractive and encourage the Government to discuss with the learned societies the extent to which similar arrangements could be adopted in the UK and the changes that this would necessitate.

In the meantime, there is ample room for greater involvement of the learned societies and professional bodies in the UK scientific advisory system.[322]

269.  We were surprised that when we asked Professor Beddington whether or not the Government should be required to consult the UK National Academies over policy decisions he replied: "It is not a question I have thought about".[323] Consequently, we find ourselves in a situation where we could repeat these 2006 recommendations without alteration in 2009, which suggests a certain amount of inattention on the Government's part. As we have stated, the Government could source engineering advice better, which means that the Civil Service Steering Board—on which the Government had pinned its evidence-based-policy hopes—has not yet contributed a sufficiently stringent "check on the quality of evidence-based policy making".[324]

270.  In particular, the Science and Technology Committee's assertion that "there is ample room for greater involvement of the learned societies" remains true. In relation to this point, Lord Broers posed and answered a question to the Committee:

Well, would you choose, in order to get a transport policy, the ex-CEO of British Airways? Is that the way to get a transport policy for the country? Surely, one should have gone to the Royal Academy of Engineering.[325]

271.  It is a fair comment, but why the Royal Academy of Engineering rather than, for example, one or more of the professional institutions? As Lord Broers warned, the Royal Academy of Engineering has "to tread very carefully because the institutions are very jealous" of its closeness to Government.[326] The Government has itself pointed out that it has "many organisations" to which it can turn for specialist advice.[327] This represents a further problem in our view: many officials do not have sufficient knowledge of the sector to be able to decide who to turn to for advice. We are not even convinced that all DCSAs, the majority of whom do not have an engineering background, and some of whom do not even have a scientific background, would know all the players in this complex landscape.

272.  The danger of such a situation, where policy makers know that they need engineering advice—let us assume that this step has been taken—but do not know who to turn to are two-fold. First, most obviously, they may go to the wrong people for advice and receive inadequate advice. Second, and more likely, they will go to lots of people and receive a plurality of advice. As Professor Snowden warned us, currently "different departments in government are very happy to go to different institutions" and as a result they end up with an unnecessary "diversity of input".[328] He argued that it would be better for the Government "to go to the Royal Academy of Engineering who could also then quite easily liaise with the relevant institutions for the expertise that the Government would need. It would be a very straightforward thing to do."[329] This suggestion has also been put forward by a large section of the engineering profession[330] in a joint statement: "The Royal Academy of Engineering could act as a broker in the preparation, collation and submission of profession-wide advice where and when it is required".[331] We agree. For engineering advice, the Government should consider the Royal Academy of Engineering as its first port of call. The Academy can then bring together the relevant experts, including representation from the relevant professional institutions, to provide impartial, expert and timely input to policy formulation.

273.  The Government should set up a Working Group with the Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering, the British Academy and the Academy of Medical Sciences to explore how and whether the relationship between Government and the Academies could be formalised so as to improve policy making. We reiterate the 2006 Science and Technology Committee recommendation that strong consideration should be given to the US model.

Engineering in the civil service

274.  No-one knows how many civil servants were trained as scientists or engineers. When asked if he knew how many there were, Professor John Beddington told us:

No, I do not. I posed that question when I walked in the door, Chairman. The answer is: it is difficult to tell. The information is not available in any detail to be able to do it. Some departments have it well; other departments do not.[332]

And when asked when he would have that information, he replied: "I do not know […] I make no promises on this, Chairman."[333]

275.  Unlike the economist and statistician classes, Government has kept no central record of engineers in Government since the mid-1980s.[334] Professor David Fisk, whose long tenure as a Chief Scientific Adviser in Government places him in a good position to comment, explained:

In central government the numbers of professionally qualified engineers are to say the least modest. DTI in its last year did not know the precise number of Chartered Engineers through it 'could recall ten'. If this is really true it is a smaller number than the number of members of the Chinese Politburo with engineering qualifications! DfT's Rail Group which undertakes much of the role of the old Strategic Rail Authority has just twelve chartered engineers in a staff of almost 300.

These figures are in stark contrast to those of the 1960s when a great deal of engineering was undertaken in, or close to, Central Government. […] At this time the Civil Service had a well defined class called 'Professional and Technical Officer' that paralleled 'Scientific Officer' class. Between 1939 and 1959 the numbers in both classes rose from 11,000 to 70,000. The dramatic reduction since then reflects a change in Government structure rather than the amount of engineering undertaken in the name of the public sector. If anything, engineering issues have increased both in scale and complexity.[335]

My broad conclusion is that the strength of engineering knowledge in government is largely the result of accident; that, despite the Professional Skills Agenda, there is not much evidence of nurturing professional skills; that neither sponsor departments nor supervisory boards seem to take much interest in human capital in engineering as part of a statutory function's 'balanced scorecard'; that, while there may be no magic percentage of engineers in public service, other pressures mean the UK is likely to have ended up with too few not too many.[336]

276.  The Government has provided us with the most up-to-date data on the number of civil servants with a scientific or engineering background.[337] Engineers play a key role in several departments and agencies. For example:

—  in the Health and Safety Executive there are 594 civil servants with a degree in engineering, and 135 chartered engineers (out of approximately 3,500 staff); and

—  in the Ministry of Defence there are approximately 650 chartered engineers (out of approximately 76,000 full-time equivalents).[338]

277.  In most departments, however, the Government does not know how many engineers it has. This is true of the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR), the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Department of Health (DH), the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) there appear to be none.[339]

278.  The lack of records is problematic because without a clear understanding of what expertise exists in the civil service, it is impossible to say one way or the other whether the right expertise exists in each policy area. It is worrying because it flies in the face of repeated calls for such data to be kept. It is worth reproducing what one of our predecessor Committees had to say on the matter:

There are no accurate figures regarding the total numbers of scientists and engineers in the workforce, despite the recommendation in the 2002 Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research that "Departments should maintain records on specialist staff in order to be able to identify their scientific qualifications and experience". Nevertheless, Sir David King said there had been a "continuing reduction of scientists and engineers in the civil service", which he described as "a concern". […] We recommend that the Government implement the 2002 recommendation of the Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research to maintain records on specialist staff in order to identify their qualities and experience […].[340]

279.  The Government responded that:

From 2007, the Common Employee Record (CER) is likely to provide data on professional categories and PSG [Professional Skills for Government] career grouping. At present plans for rollout of the CER does not include collecting data on qualifications but this might be added once the CER has been successfully implemented.[341]

280.  It appears that the Government has made little progress.

281.  We reiterate the 2006 Science and Technology Committee's previous recommendation that: "the Government implement the 2002 recommendation of the Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research to maintain records on specialist staff in order to identify their qualities and experience".


282.  We also heard that the civil service frequently does not keep track of professional qualifications or accreditation of its specialist staff. Professor David Fisk told us, with typical frankness:

I think the human resources in the Civil Service at the moment have rather lost the plot on professionalism in general. […] One or two of the human resources departments I received information from clearly did not really understand what a Chartered Engineer was. One rather extreme case, Ofcom, that works in a very technical area, did not know how many Chartered Engineers they had but they did notice that they paid the fees for three. It seemed to me when I looked at the board of a number of them—the Environment Agency was one I looked at yesterday—very often the scorecards given to the board do not measure the internal competence of the organisation. They will measure how well the outside world is performing as it is being regulated but there is not a track. As you will see from my evidence, at the time I asked the question the Financial Services Agency did not know how many Chartered Accountants it had.[342]

283.  Failure to promote and monitor engineering professionalism in the Civil Service is problematic. Not only does it mean that managers do not have a firm grasp on what professional expertise exists across the Service, but it also misses an opportunity to promote professionalism in engineering and promote the role of engineers to the public.

284.  The Government could promote the importance of professional accreditation in engineering by insisting that staff and consultants in technical roles are chartered. Additionally, the Government should keep proper records of the professional qualifications of its staff so as to improve its human resources information and continuing professional development.


i.  The senior civil service

285.  At the top of the civil service, Professor Beddington was satisfied that there is a good number of scientists and engineers. "There are 180 scientists and engineers in the senior civil service and that is a greater number than economists and a greater number than a number of the other professions."[343] In fact, according to the Government's own data,[344] there are 168 engineers and scientists in the senior civil service. But as we discussed above, engineers and scientists usually bring different skills sets to policy advice—as do, for example, economists and accountants, the former being more theoretical and the latter being more practical; for our purposes they could be taken as analogous to scientists and engineers—so we should take these figures separately: 76 engineers and 92 scientists. These figures compare to 160 economists, 194 accountants, 408 lawyers, 431 'operational delivery' specialists, and 749 'policy delivery' specialists; the grand total of senior civil servants is 4,212 (see Figure 3). But it gets worse. Of those 76 engineers and 92 scientists, 30 engineers and 65 scientists are doing jobs that require specialist knowledge of engineering and science. In other words, 95 of this group have to be engineers and scientists. Therefore, of the 1,399 jobs in policy delivery (845) and operational delivery (554) there are, probably at most, 46 engineers and 27 scientists. That compares to 94 economist jobs and 174 accountant jobs in the senior civil service, which leaves 66 economists and 20 accountants doing other jobs in the senior civil service. So in the generalist senior civil service, scientists and engineers are almost certainly outnumbered by economists and accountants, which is the opposite of what Professor Beddington's rehearsal of the data implied.

Figure 3. Senior Civil Service by profession of post and by profession of person, April 2008. This is a selected list of professions. See Ev 364-365 for full tables.

Non-SCS grades

286.  The Science and Engineering Fast Stream (SEFS) was set up to ensure that there are generalist civil servants who have a background in science and engineering: it is run to recruit individuals with science or engineering degrees who go on to be trained as generalists. According to the Government, "engineers are valued for their generic problem-solving skills and their ability to produce practical solutions to problems and drive delivery through project management skills".[345] It is therefore surprising that only four departments recruit from the SEFS: MoD, DIUS, BERR and DECC. Further, the number available to departments is low: last year only 9 out of 249 successful candidates for the general fast stream, which includes the Science and Engineering Fast Stream, had engineering degrees.[346] This is an issue on which the Government Chief Scientific Adviser agrees that more needs to be done: "This is one of the areas where I really have to engage with the departments".[347]

287.  The Government claims that the Science and Engineering Fast Stream is highly valued, yet only four departments recruit from it. We ask the Government to explain why this situation has arisen and what steps it plans to take to ensure that all Departments recruit from the Science and Engineering Fast Stream.

288.  A separate, but related issue, is what happens to SEFS recruits after they enter the civil service: they immediately begin training as a generalist and within their first few years will usually work in areas that are not related to science or engineering. While it is clearly important that there is a residual engineering expertise across the generalist service, the Royal Academy of Engineering, among others, has additionally called for science and engineering fast streamers to be given opportunities for progression while retaining their specialisms.[348] This would not only ensure that there was a good supply of specialists in those policy areas in which engineers are most useful—for example energy, building, transport and so on—but also improve the standing of specialists in the civil service and make the prospect of pursuing a career in policy attractive to people with an engineering training, who do not necessarily want to be a generalist.

289.  We note that Professor Beddington has taken steps to improve the recognition and community of scientists and engineers in the civil service:

When I came into government, […] I said who are the professions that I am heading, where are they and how do I find them because I want to engage with them as that is part of my job. As you know, that proved to be much more difficult than I had expected. What I did was I said let us have a community who genuinely recognises that they are scientists and engineers. That was done by circulating an email, and so on, which said "We are doing this. Would you like to be part of that community?" A little under 1,600 people elected that they would like to be considered as scientists and engineers and that was in the first flush of this. Yesterday we had a conference with about 310 of them and one of the things we said was "Is this helpful and how do you want to take it forward?" 97 per cent of the responses said this was helpful and they did want to take it forward. I made a commitment at that conference to say we will engage you but you have to go away and tell us what you need as a community of civil servants who are scientists and engineers […] We went through a number of key issues: career development, whether you should be moving into policy or can you be rewarded if you remain dealing with your expertise, all very important questions.[349]

290.  This effort by the GCSA to make the title 'Head of Profession for Science and Engineering' a more tangible role is encouraging. It is noteworthy that the emphasis of the work thus far is to look at career development and whether scientists and engineers can work as policy specialists. This indicates the Government recognises the lack of scientific and engineering expertise in the generalist civil service as a weakness.

291.  There should be more trained and experienced engineers in the civil service at all levels. One way of helping to achieve this would be to expand and adapt the Science and Engineering Fast Stream (SEFS) so that more scientists and engineers are recruited, more departments recruit from this cohort and SEFS recruits have the option to pursue careers as policy specialists. We also recommend that the Government prioritise training in the civil service to improve the ability of generalist civil servants to identify issues where engineering advice will be critical to the viability of a policy.


292.  Another way of getting more engineers into the civil service is to improve the flexibility between the public and private sectors. Both Professor Fisk and the Royal Academy of the Engineering looked to the USA as a model that the UK could potentially follow. Professor Fisk noted that:

The US has a much more flexible career relationship between private and public sectors at Federal and State level. The US National Academy of Engineering (NAE) records that 7% of its members as in the 'government and not-for-profit' sector, in contrast to around 3% (my estimate of the NAE equivalent) in the Royal Academy of Engineering.[350]

293.  Such flexibility already exists in the UK between industry and universities:

Universities [engineering departments] are not a bad example […]. We as academics spend only a small amount of time in industry, so we have visiting professors who spend most of their time in industry and who come and teach our students and help the design classes. We have developed a personal HR policy that works with them in a very flexible way.[351]

There is no reason to presume that a similar culture of exchange could not be developed between industry and the civil service. First, secondments between the two already happen.[352] Secondly, there is much to gain for both parties:

I can see the advantage to both sides if major firms like Arups or WS Atkins were to second one of their engineers for a period of two or three years at a pretty senior level. The reason is that they will bring the outside experience in, but also they can go back to their parent organisation as the person with the experience of working within government.[353]

294.  Third, the current economic climate makes engagement between the Government and engineers in the private sector more advantageous and pressing.

295.  The Government should seek ways to improve the career flexibility between industry and the public sector. Both sides would benefit: engineers from the private sector would improve their understanding of Government, and civil servants would improve their understanding of industry; additionally, the public sector would benefit from using the skills of engineers who have managed major projects in the private sector.


296.  The Treasury is a stand-out Government department. It has a trans-departmental role, controlling the money that goes to each department, and through its budgetary leverage it can play a formative role in shaping policy. But it is the only department that does not have a Chief Scientific Adviser. Professor David Fisk raised specific concerns:

While acknowledging the undoubted skill set of public sector economists, there is no reason to expect that they have much experience in either the risk management issues or the modality of operation of real world engineering enterprises. The Treasury Green Book used as the basis for policy appraisal does not distinguish engineering innovation issues at all.[354]

297.  He recalled:

I had an opportunity to interview the [Treasury] team that designed rail privatisation. It turned out it had never occurred to them that the track and the wheels that rest on it are a coupled spring system. They were not all mechanical engineers. They had in their mind the sort of model you would get owning a train set when you are a boy. So they thought them quite independent and very easy to divide the market in that way. They may still have been right to stratify the market for rail privatisation as they did but what they did not realise was that there would be an engineering cost for making the break where they did.[355]

And Bob Dover, the former Chairman and Chief Executive of Jaguar Land Rover, had a similar concern:

Mr Dover: Personally I have had meetings with the Treasury which have been a complete waste of time. […] I obviously presented my case very badly, but it was just ignored, it was a waste of both our time.

Chairman: Is this because they did not understand the engineering case?

Mr Dover: You have got to have an intelligent [… q]uestioner and you have to ask the right questions […] Often an adviser can help in understanding what is important and what questions to ask. If you do not ask the right questions, you can just go completely wrong. One example of that would be generation one biofuels where because no-one asked whether the numbers stood up we went down completely the wrong path.[356]

298.  The former Science and Technology Committee recognised the problem of science advice in the Treasury, and suggested that the GCSA should have a seat on the board of the Treasury, and that the Treasury should have a Chief Scientific Adviser.[357]

299.  We share our predecessor Committee's concern that the Treasury does not have scientific or engineering advice at the highest level. The Treasury should appoint both a Chief Scientific Adviser and a Chief Engineering Adviser.

300.  Case study conclusion: the need for Chief Engineering Advisers

301.  When the Government talks about evidence-based policy or the STEM agenda, we have observed that 'science' always comes before 'engineering' and usually to the exclusion of it. This is not a banal pecking-order dispute. It is an observation about the Government's attitude towards science and engineering. Or is it engineering and science? According to a new Government campaign, it is neither: the name of the campaign is 'Science: So What? So Everything'! As Professor Wendy Hall put it:

David King and John Beddington both use science to mean science and engineering but to me—and you will understand this—it is very like when people say, "Well, 'he' means he and she" but when people say "he" then mean he, particularly "he's" [men] when they say "he". When scientists say "science" they mean science.[358]

302.  And Professor the Lord Broers, who plainly told us that he considers himself both an engineer and a scientist, had the following exchange with the Chairman:

Chairman: You have just heard, Lord Broers […] an impassioned plea for engineers to be recognised as, if you like, a chief engineer within departments alongside Chief Scientific Advisers, but you seem to be saying that these are opposite sides of the same coin and that therefore we do not need to make that distinction.

Lord Broers: I think that is the case but I would have approached this problem from a different point of view. I would have asked the question: is it necessary to have a Chief Scientist alongside the Chief Engineer?

Chairman: What is your answer?

Lord Broers: Probably not in many instances.

Chairman: So you would have a Chief Engineer?

Lord Broers: Yes.

Chairman: Would you settle for a Chief Scientific and Engineering Adviser?

Lord Broers: I would settle for a Chief Engineering and Scientific Adviser.[359]

303.  We have already discussed at length the fact that engineers have a different set of skills to scientists and that Government could benefit from more engineering advice. This leads to a natural question, raised in the discussion between the Chairman and Lord Broers: should there be a Government Chief Engineering Adviser?

304.  The engineering community certainly thinks that there should be. The strength of feeling was at times palpable. Bob Dover, former Chairman and CEO of Jaguar Land Rover, when asked if the Government would benefit from having a Chief Engineer, replied: "Yes, much more important than a Chief Scientist".[360] We heard several reasons:

  • Because engineering advice is distinct from other kinds of advice: We have argued this above (Paragraph 248). Additionally, the Royal Academy of Engineering pointed out that:

There is growing support for the appointment of a Chief Engineer, distinct from the Government Chief Scientist. Engineers have particular skill in the deployment of resources to meet national goals and measures; the management of risk and the assessment of technological solutions to problems like climate change and security of energy supply—all of which are essential to good policy making. Such an appointment would also go a substantial way to ensure that engineering is appropriately represented in Government and that the needs and contributions of engineering are dealt with by Government in a strategic manner.[361]

  • Because engineers are best qualified to set best practice in engineering advice: Professor Wendy Hall noted in her impassioned call for a Chief Engineering Adviser that "just as Chief Scientific Advisers set best practice for science policy in a department, you need the engineering expertise to set best practice for engineering policy".[362]
  • Because the Government should recognise the importance of engineers: The professional engineering community submitted in a joint statement that "As currently happens with Science (through the Chief Scientist [i.e., Government Chief Scientific Adviser]), appropriate recognition should also be given to Engineering and Technology in the policy making process".[363]
  • Because it has proved successful elsewhere: Professor Snowden told us that having a Chief Scientific Adviser and a Chief Engineering Adviser could "work very well", at the same time putting pay to the fear over putting the two disciplines in 'silos':

I would like to add that I have been in a company in the United States, I was a chief scientist there, and I actually worked in parallel with their chief engineer and, I have to say, we did not see the differences there. Similarly, in my own companies, I have had similar roles, so I do not see them as competitive, I see them as complementary.[364]

305.  We would add to this list:

  • Because Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs) would be able to take an overview of a Department's engineering advice needs and ensure that sufficient capacity existed to meet those needs. We have already demonstrated that engineering capacity in the civil service is currently insufficient (see Paragraph 257).
  • Because Chief Engineering Advisers would provide useful points of contact between departments trying to co-ordinate overlapping engineering programmes.
  • Because Chief Engineering Advisers would provide useful points of contact to the outside world—particularly the engineering community. We were alerted about the need for this when Lord Broers, who has more experience than most in engineering-related policy, through his work as the former President of the Royal Academy of Engineering and the former Chairman of the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, admitted:

Yes, well, I am afraid, Chairman, even I am ignorant of quite where these [Government policy] decisions are made. My experience, having chaired the Science and Technology Committee, is that we are always trying to bring back decisions that were made somewhere, but I was never quite sure where, to bring sanity back to the case. In fact, as you know in your Committee, my Committee, when I chaired it, was quite effective in many instances in bringing things back by taking the right evidence from the right people and establishing what is the sensible strategy, but I am not sure where these strategies originate. They are made somewhere deep inside departments, I suppose.[365]

  • Because the Government already recognises other specialist expertise that it also puts under the broad heading of 'science'.

306.  The Government could easily support its claim to recognise the importance of engineering and engineers by appointing Chief Engineering Advisers, at a minimum in positions where existing Chief Scientific Advisers act as Chief Engineering Advisers.

307.  The Government has argued on several occasions that 'science' includes engineering, and therefore there is no need for a Chief Engineer. But it also argues that 'science' includes social science and statistics, yet there is a Chief Social Scientist and a National Statistician. The Government's position is illogical.

308.  Some departments should have Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), and some should have both. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser should liaise with Departments to determine which arrangement is most appropriate.

309.  One further issue that was raised regarding the role of DCEAs and DCSAs is the role that they play in the senior management of a department and whether they should sit on the boards of departments.[366] We note that some departments do have their DCSA on the board, for example Defra and DIUS, but most do not. We shall return to this issue during our inquiry on 'Putting science and engineering at the heart of Government policy'.

310.  We agree with Professor Beddington that there should be one person to head up the research and engineering strand of advice across Government.[367] Currently, that person is the GCSA, Professor Beddington. For reasons that follow, we are proposing an enhanced role as head of scientific, social science and engineering advice across Government. A job title that would be more befitting this role—and in line with the GCSA's current role as Head of the Science and Engineering Professions—would be Government Chief Scientific and Engineering Adviser (GCSEA).

311.  The civil service currently has a Chief Social Scientist and a National Statistician, and in the past there has been a Chief Economic Adviser. We take the view that there should also be a cross-departmental head of engineering, whose job it would be to ensure that engineering advice across Government was adequate and engineering programmes across Government were co-ordinated. Since the departmental engineering heads will be called Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers, and not to confuse with the GCSEA, this individual could simply be called the Government Chief Engineer. Additionally there should be a Government Chief Scientist, Government Chief Social Scientist and a Government Chief Statistician. These would make up a cross-departmental advice and co-ordination team, and would be responsible for keeping the GCSEA briefed. The GCSEA would take on a more prominent role, with more regular meetings with the Prime Minster and Cabinet Office Officials and Advisers.

312.  In order to maximise the benefits of this new arrangement, there needs to be a location change. Currently, the GCSA is based in DIUS but answers to the Prime Minister. We agree with the former Science and Technology Committee, which recommended in 2006 that the GCSA and the office of the GCSA should be relocated to the Cabinet Office to reflect and better enable its cross-departmental remit.[368]

313.  These proposals would be easy for the Government to implement, would put down a marker of the Government's commitment to evidence-based policy, and would lay the structural and cultural foundations for a more evidence-focused civil service. To summarise (also see Figure 4):

314.  The role of the GCSA should be altered. We suggest that the GCSA should be renamed the Government Chief Scientific and Engineering Adviser (GCSEA). This person would be the head of profession for science, engineering, social science and statistics and should have a more senior role in the Government with direct access to the Prime Minister. The GCSEA would head up the Government Office for Science and Engineering, which should be placed in the Cabinet Office. Beneath the GCSEA should be a Government Chief Engineer, a Government Chief Scientist and a Government Chief Social Scientist. We recommend that the Government implement these changes as a priority.Figure 4. Organogram of our recommendations for the organisation of science advisory structures in Government

273   Q 543 [Ev 80] Back

274   Q 532 [Ev 78] Back

275   Q 523 [Ev 76]; Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making, HM Government, October 2005 Back

276   Science and Technology Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, HC 900-I, para 25 Back

277 Back

278 Back

279   Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee on Monday 26 January 2009, HC (2008-09) 168-i, Q 2 Back

280   Q 523 [Ev 76] Back

281   Q 522 [Ev 76] Back

282   Q 523 [Ev 76] Back

283   Q 539 [Ev 80] Back

284   Q 522 [Ev 76] Back

285   Q 539 [Ev 80] Back

286   Ev 722 [Professor Fisk] Back

287   Q 49 [Ev 729] [Lord Broers] Back

288   Q 538 [Ev 80] Back

289   Q 528 [Ev 77] Back

290   Q 529 [Ev 77] Back

291   Q 540 [Ev 80] Back

292   Ev 758 Back

293   Q 54 [Ev 730] Back

294   Q 47 [Ev 729] Back

295   Q 2 [Ev 721] Back

296   Ev 738-741 Back

297   Ev 740 Back

298 Back

299   Ev 759 [Royal Academy of Engineering and the engineering institutions] Back

300   Q 18 [Ev 723] [Professor Kelly] Back

301   Ev 759 [Royal Academy of Engineering and the engineering institutions] Back

302   Q 59 [Ev 731] [Lord Broers] Back

303   Ev 759 [Royal Academy of Engineering and the engineering institutions] Back

304   Q 62 [Ev 731] [Professor Snowden] Back

305   Q 62 [Ev 731] [Lord Broers] Back

306   Ev 759 [Royal Academy of Engineering and the engineering institutions] Back

307   Q 530 [Ev 78] Back

308   Ev 740 Back

309   Ev 757 Back

310   Ev 752-753 Back

311   Ev 753 Back

312   Qq 66-67 [Ev 732] Back

313   Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making, HM Government, October 2005 Back

314   Q 531 [Ev 78] Back

315   Q 540 [Ev 80] Back

316   Ev 759 Back

317   As above. Back

318   Q 4 [Ev 721] [Professor Hall] Back

319   Q 65 [Ev 732] [Professor Snowden] Back

320   Q 14 [Ev 722-723] [Professor Kelly] Back

321   Q 530 [Ev 78] Back

322   Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, para 81 Back

323   Q 550 [Ev 82] Back

324   Science and Technology Committee, First Special Report of Session 2006-07, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, HC 307, p 16 Back

325   Q 79 [Ev 735] Back

326   Q 78 [Ev 735] Back

327   Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, p 16 Back

328   Q 80 [Ev 735] Back

329   Q 70 [Ev 733] Back

330   Signatories for this proposal were: the British Computer Society; the British Nuclear Engineering Society ; the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ; the Engineering and Technology Board; the Energy Institute; Engineering Council UK; the Institute of Acoustics; the Institute of Healthcare Engineering and Estate Management; the Institute of Highway Incorporated Engineers; the Institute of Marine Engineering Science and Technology; the Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining; the Institute of Measurement and Control; the Institution of Civil Engineers; the Institution of Chemical Engineers; the Institution of Engineering and Technology; the Institution of Engineering Designers; the Institution of Lighting Engineers; the Institution of Mechanical Engineers; the Institution of Nuclear Engineers; the Institution of Railway Signal Engineers; the Institution of Royal Engineers; the Institution of Structural Engineers; the Institution of Water Officers; the Royal Academy of Engineering; the Royal Aeronautical Society; the Royal Institution of Naval Architects; the Society of Environmental Engineers; and the Welding Institute. Back

331   Ev 757 Back

332   Oral evidence taken before the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee on Wednesday 5 November 2008, HC (2007-08) 999-iii, Q 245 Back

333   Oral evidence taken before the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee on Wednesday 5 November 2008, HC (2007-08) 999-iii, Qq 247-248 Back

334   Ev 751 Back

335   Ev 751 Back

336   Ev 752 Back

337   Ev 788-790 Back

338   Ev 788-790. 650 people may be an underestimate. Back

339   Ev 788-791 Back

340   Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, para 45 Back

341   Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, p 11 Back

342   Q 27 [Ev 725] Back

343   Q 562 [Ev 85] Back

344   SCS Database 2008, Cabinet Office Back

345   Ev 744 Back

346   Ev 779 [CaSE] Back

347   Q 564 [Ev 85] Back

348   Ev 757 Back

349   Q 559 [Ev 84] Back

350   Ev 753 Back

351   Q 44 [Ev 728] [Professor Fisk] Back

352   Q 28 [Ev 725] [Professor Kelly] Back

353   As above. Back

354   Ev 753 Back

355   Q 20 [Ev 724] Back

356   Qq 461-464 [Ev 65] Back

357   Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, para 25 Back

358   Q 4 [Ev 721] Back

359   Qq 50-53 [Ev 730] Back

360   Q 469 [Ev 66] Back

361   Ev 246 Back

362   Q 13 [Ev 722] Back

363   Ev 186 Back

364   Q 56 [Ev 730] Back

365   Q 60 [Ev 731] Back

366   Qq 30-32 [Ev 726] Back

367   Qq 538-541 [Ev 80-81] Back

368   Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, para 25 Back

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