Conclusions and recommendations
The profession
1. The
engineering community's approach to this inquiry has been coherent
and co-ordinated, with the institutions working together to communicate
a common message with and through the Royal Academy of Engineering.
The Academy must take forward and formalise its leadership role,
so that the engineering community can communicate—and co-ordinate—more
effectively. (Paragraph 10)
Nuclear engineering: skills
2. The
Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process is important and requires
highly skilled inspectors. The Government should make available
sufficient resources to the Health and Safety Executive and the
Environment Agency so that they can recruit enough staff to complete
the GDA process in a timely fashion and to the high standards
required. A clear timetable should be published by the end of
2009. (Paragraph 33)
3. We note the Government's
optimism that delivering new nuclear power stations within ten
years is possible. However, we are not convinced that the skills
shortage in nuclear engineering can be bridged quite as easily
as some have suggested. In particular, the General Design Assessment,
which kick-starts the whole process, is already running slower
than expected, and the remaining workforce is ageing. The Government
must continue its investment in engineering and nuclear engineering
skills and produce a clear skills plan by the end of 2009 (see
Paragraph 33), to ensure its nuclear new build ambitions can be
met. (Paragraph 41)
4. We welcome the
formation of the National Skills Academy for Nuclear: employer-led
training is the best way to ensure that industry gets the skills
it requires. However, we also believe that there should be greater
clarity from industry and Government about which institutions
do what in terms of skills provision. (Paragraph 47)
5. The design of fourth
generation nuclear reactors will go ahead with or without UK participation,
and it is likely that the UK will want to start building fourth
generation power stations in the future. The UK should avoid positioning
itself so that it has little expertise in the very nuclear systems
it needs in the future. In a post-oil economy, nuclear power will
be a major player in the energy market and the UK should grasp
enthusiastically the opportunity to take a lead role in the international
nuclear industry. (Paragraph 50)
6. The Government
should consider which research programmes—including the
Generation IV programme, EURATOM, and IAEA and OECD research programmes—are
required to support its nuclear activities. We strongly recommend
that the Government commission the National Nuclear Laboratory
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on what international R&D
offers the UK in relation to maintaining UK nuclear engineering
capability and ensuring future UK energy policy is supported.
(Paragraph 52)
7. We support the
formation of the Office for Nuclear Development, but remain concerned
about the lack of a clear and detailed plan for delivering the
next generation of nuclear power stations. There should be a master
roadmap for all major engineering projects, including nuclear
new build. The Office for Nuclear Development should take ownership
of the roadmap for nuclear. The roadmap should include consideration
of: what skills are required over time and what will be needed
to deliver the skills capacity ahead of time; other general engineering
programmes and nuclear engineering programmes, both national and
international; potential bottlenecks in the supply chain; and
who is responsible for the delivery of each part of the roadmap.
There should be six-monthly progress reports against the roadmap.
The roadmap should be in place by the end of 2009. (Paragraph
57)
Plastic electronics engineering: innovation and
commercialisation
8. The
UK is well placed to capitalise on the economic potential of the
growing plastic electronics industry. However, we are concerned
that without a clear understanding of how best to build on and
market the UK's strengths in this sector this opportunity might
not be fully realised. We urge BERR to engage with the Technology
Strategy Board, UK Trade and Investment, UK Displays and Lighting
Knowledge Transfer Network and the plastic electronics community
to develop a technology roadmap. In constructing this roadmap
it is essential that stakeholders across the sector be consulted,
from spin-out companies to multinationals. (Paragraph 72)
9. We welcome the
support for plastic electronics research and development provided
by EPSRC and the Technology Strategy Board, and believe sustained
support by these organisations is vital to the growth of the industry.
(Paragraph 80)
10. We do not believe
that the Technology Strategy Board's grant schemes and the Managed
Programme proposed by UKDL KTN and the former-DTI are mutually
exclusive forms of support. UKDL KTN champions the needs of the
plastic electronic community, and as such we urge BERR and the
Technology Strategy Board to engage with it, and to reconsider
the deployment of a Managed Programme in this area. (Paragraph
89)
11. The future success
of the UK plastic electronics industry not only lies in its ability
to lever public and private finance, but also in the co-ordination
of funding sources. We recommend that BERR, the Technology Strategy
Board and UKDL KTN take immediate steps to increase the understanding
of technological risk in the private sector, and to review the
funding landscape. (Paragraph 95)
12. PETeC's location
is a function of the fact that it was established as a regional
initiative. It is an open question whether PETeC would have been
sited elsewhere had it been founded as a national resource, something
that it undeniably is. However, we do not see further discussion
on this issue as constructive or worthwhile, and wish to see a
line drawn under the debate. (Paragraph 100)
13. We are sympathetic
to PETeC's need to generate income in order both to assure its
future survival and to allow it to participate in UK grant competitions.
The Technology Strategy Board and OneNorthEast should review whether
the requirement for self-sustainability within five years is realistic.
(Paragraph 104)
14. We urge PETeC
to continue developing its relationships with other Research Centres,
and to liaise with these Centres to ensure national capability
in facilitating R&D across the spectrum of plastic electronic
technologies. (Paragraph 106)
15. The plastic electronics
industry is likely to grow substantially over the next few years.
Although the UK's research base puts it in a unique position to
capitalise on this growth, we must not be complacent as countries
such as Germany and the USA are becoming increasingly competitive.
We recommend that the Research Centres supporting UK plastic electronics
R&D engage with the academic research base to ensure state-of-the-art
facilities are accessible to the academic community. (Paragraph
112)
16. The UK academic
research base should be applauded for its strong record in 'spinning
out' start-up companies. Focused support, however, is needed to
ensure these businesses grow into world-class enterprises. We
recommend that the Technology Strategy Board, BERR and UKTI consult
with UK business, from start-ups to multinationals, to identify
how best to support the growth of innovative businesses in emerging
industries. (Paragraph 120)
17. We encourage the
Technology Strategy Board to engage with multinational companies
across Europe to determine whether pan-European consortia could
be established to progress the development of emerging industries
with the potential for high economic returns. (Paragraph 128)
18. The manufacture
of plastic electronics devices is not destined to occur outside
of the UK. However, we are extremely concerned that without urgent
action by the Government this will be the reality. As in our previous
recommendation (Paragraph 72), we urge the Government to engage
with the plastic electronics community, and to articulate a strategic
vision for the development of this innovative industry. (Paragraph
130)
19. Support for innovative
businesses as they transition from being primarily R&D focused
to launching pilot manufacturing lines is imperative. We recommend
that the Government consider whether there is merit in establishing
an open access fabrication facility for the manufacture of Plastics
Electronic devices by UK SMEs. (Paragraph 133)
20. The economic opportunities
provided by this growing industry do not only lie in the manufacture
of devices, but also in the development of enabling technologies.
It is imperative that any national strategy for this industry
must embrace the materials supply chain, particularly as this
sector holds huge potential for UK industry participation. (Paragraph
138)
21. Public procurement
has the potential to be a valuable tool in driving innovation.
We welcome the Government's efforts to develop innovative procurement
mechanisms, and recommend it supports pilot projects in the area
of plastic electronics in order to stimulate product development
and manufacture. (Paragraph 148)
22. The Small Business
Research Initiative (SBRI) is potentially a valuable source of
funding for innovative companies in the UK. Our concern is that
unless this support mechanism is re-launched in a format accessible
to SMEs developing future technologies, UK companies will refocus
their business models to engage with the lucrative procurement
opportunities offered by the US under its Small Business Innovation
Research programme. We ask that DIUS keep us updated on progress
made in rolling-out the revised SBRI. (Paragraph 155)
Geo-engineering: a new policy area
23. At
this stage, we do not consider a narrow definition of geo-engineering
technologies to be helpful. Technologies to reduce solar insolation
and to increase carbon sequestration should both be considered
as geo-engineering options. (Paragraph 182)
24. Like the Minister
of State for Science and Innovation, we believe that Government
should give the full range of policy options for managing climate
change due consideration, and we share the view of the Tyndall
Centre that geo-engineering technologies should be evaluated as
part of a portfolio of responses to climate change, alongside
mainstream mitigation and adaptation efforts. (Paragraph 185)
25. Given the need
for urgent action in addressing the challenge of climate change,
we can see no reason for not considering geo-engineering technologies
as a 'plan B'. Quite the opposite, the decision not to consider
any initiative other than 'plan A' could be considered negligent
particularly, for example, if 'plan A' fails to act as planned
or climate sensitivity is greater than expected. (Paragraph 187)
26. We find the divergent
views of DECC and DIUS, as outlined by Lord Drayson and Joan Ruddock,
as to the future potential of geo-engineering research to be confusing,
and urge the Government to establish a clear view on the matter.
(Paragraph 190)
27. Further, we conclude
that it would not be appropriate or sensible for opinion-leaders
or the public to see any policy on the potential use of geo-engineering
schemes as implying a lack of ongoing commitment to the development
of conventional emission mitigation strategies or adaptation responses.
We urge the Government to be proactive in communication efforts
to dispel any incorrect perceptions. (Paragraph 191)
28. In order 'to sort
the wheat from the chaff' and identify those geo-engineering options
it may be feasible to deploy safely in the future, it is essential
that a detailed assessment of individual technologies be conducted.
This assessment must consider the costs and benefits of geo-engineering
options including their full life-cycle environmental impact and
whether they are reversible. We welcome the efforts of the Royal
Society to review the geo-engineering sector, and urge it to engage
with the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Science and Engineering
Academies of other nations in this regard. (Paragraph 197)
29. Support for detailed
modelling studies will be essential for the development of future
geo-engineering options, and to the construction of a credible
cost-benefit analysis of technological feasibility. We urge the
Research Councils to support research in this area. (Paragraph
203)
30. The Tyndall Centre
for Climate Change is well-placed to co-ordinate geo-engineering
research, and we would welcome the conduct of geo-engineering-related
work as an additional work-stream. Further, we recommend that
the Government engage with organisations including the Tyndall
Centre, Hadley Centre, Research Councils UK and the Carbon Trust
to develop a publicly-funded programme of geo-engineering research.
Research grants should be awarded on the basis of excellence after
a process of competitive peer review. (Paragraph 217)
31. Before deploying
any technology with the capacity to geo-engineer the climate,
it is essential that a rational debate on the ethics of geo-engineering
be conducted. We urge the Department for Energy and Climate Change
to lead this debate, and to consult on the full-range of geo-engineering
options with representatives of the science, social science, and
engineering communities and implementing agencies e.g. national
Governments, international bodies or private sector organisations.
(Paragraph 226)
32. It is essential
that the Government support socio-economic research with regard
to geo-engineering technologies in order that the UK can engage
in informed, international discussions to develop a framework
for any future legislation relating to technological deployment
by nation states or industry. (Paragraph 229)
Engineering in Government
33. We
conclude that engineering advice and scientific advice offer different
things to the policy formulation process and that the benefits
of both should be recognised. Further, it should not be assumed
that a scientific adviser can offer competent engineering advice
or even know when it is needed. (Paragraph 248)
34. We conclude that
the Government, in several policy areas of several departments,
does not have sufficient in-house engineering expertise to act
as an intelligent customer. (Paragraph 257)
35. The Guidelines
on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making should explicitly include
engineering advice. We are pleased that Professor Beddington has
already agreed to review these guidelines, and suggest that the
research and engineering community be consulted on the content
of the guidelines. (Paragraph 260)
36. Engineering advice
should be sought early in policy formulation and before policy
is agreed, not just in project delivery. We recommend that the
Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills and
the Minister for Science and Innovation act as champions in cabinet
for the early engagement of engineers in policy making. Further,
this issue should also be central to discussions in the Science
and Innovation Cabinet Sub-Committee. (Paragraph 265)
37. For engineering
advice, the Government should consider the Royal Academy of Engineering
as its first port of call. The Academy can then bring together
the relevant experts, including representation from the relevant
professional institutions, to provide impartial, expert and timely
input to policy formulation. (Paragraph 272)
38. The Government
should set up a Working Group with the Royal Society, the Royal
Academy of Engineering, the British Academy and the Academy of
Medical Sciences to explore how and whether the relationship between
Government and the Academies could be formalised so as to improve
policy making. We reiterate the 2006 Science and Technology Committee
recommendation that strong consideration should be given to the
US model. (Paragraph 273)
39. We reiterate the
2006 Science and Technology Committee's previous recommendation
that: "the Government implement the 2002 recommendation of
the Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research to maintain records
on specialist staff in order to identify their qualities and experience".
(Paragraph 281)
40. The Government
could promote the importance of professional accreditation in
engineering by insisting that staff and consultants in technical
roles are chartered. Additionally, the Government should keep
proper records of the professional qualifications of its staff
so as to improve its human resources information and continuing
professional development. (Paragraph 284)
41. The Government
claims that the Science and Engineering Fast Stream is highly
valued, yet only four departments recruit from it. We ask the
Government to explain why this situation has arisen and what steps
it plans to take to ensure that all Departments recruit from the
Science and Engineering Fast Stream. (Paragraph 287)
42. There should be
more trained and experienced engineers in the civil service at
all levels. One way of helping to achieve this would be to expand
and adapt the Science and Engineering Fast Stream (SEFS) so that
more scientists and engineers are recruited, more departments
recruit from this cohort and SEFS recruits have the option to
pursue careers as policy specialists. We also recommend that the
Government prioritise training in the civil service to improve
the ability of generalist civil servants to identify issues where
engineering advice will be critical to the viability of a policy.
(Paragraph 291)
43. The Government
should seek ways to improve the career flexibility between industry
and the public sector. Both sides would benefit: engineers from
the private sector would improve their understanding of Government,
and civil servants would improve their understanding of industry;
additionally, the public sector would benefit from using the skills
of engineers who have managed major projects in the private sector.
(Paragraph 295)
44. We share our predecessor
Committee's concern that the Treasury does not have scientific
or engineering advice at the highest level. The Treasury should
appoint both a Chief Scientific Adviser and a Chief Engineering
Adviser. (Paragraph 299)
45. The Government
could easily support its claim to recognise the importance of
engineering and engineers by appointing Chief Engineering Advisers,
at a minimum in positions where existing Chief Scientific Advisers
act as Chief Engineering Advisers. (Paragraph 305)
46. The Government
has argued on several occasions that 'science' includes engineering,
and therefore there is no need for a Chief Engineer. But it also
argues that 'science' includes social science and statistics,
yet there is a Chief Social Scientist and a National Statistician.
The Government's position is illogical. (Paragraph 306)
47. Some departments
should have Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some
Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), and some should
have both. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser should liaise
with Departments to determine which arrangement is most appropriate.
(Paragraph 307)
48. The role of the
GCSA should be altered. We suggest that the GCSA should be renamed
the Government Chief Scientific and Engineering Adviser (GCSEA).
This person would be the head of profession for science, engineering,
social science and statistics and should have a more senior role
in the Government with direct access to the Prime Minister. The
GCSEA would head up the Government Office for Science and Engineering,
which should be placed in the Cabinet Office. Beneath the GCSEA
should be a Government Chief Engineer, a Government Chief Scientist
and a Government Chief Social Scientist. We recommend that the
Government implement these changes as a priority. (Paragraph 313)
Overview and general conclusions
49. We
were greatly impressed by the high quality and wide-ranging work
to give young people experience of engineering. We are supportive
of all efforts to make young people aware of the rewarding and
challenging nature of a career in engineering. While we would
not advocate that geo-engineering be championed as a research
field above any other, we believe that it might have the 'X-factor'
when it comes to alerting young people to global engineering challenges
and we welcome its inclusion in engineering events. We are concerned,
however, that engineering is not always promoted as a worthwhile,
challenging and exciting career option, and advocate that it feature
more prominently in the provision of careers advice at schools.
(Paragraph 323)
50. The key to solving
sector-specific shortages of engineers will ultimately lie in
the UK's ability to train the next generation of generalist engineers,
who will then specialise after university. Plastics electronics
is one example of an industry that would benefit from the introduction
of post-graduate programmes that offered generalist engineers
specialised training. We recommend that EPSRC engage with industry
to assess the potential for establishing a range of conversion
courses according to need across the engineering sector to upskill
generalist engineers. (Paragraph 331)
51. We believe there
to be value in incorporating management skills in post-graduate
masters and doctoral programmes. We recommend that HEFCE, EPSRC,
the Royal Academy of Engineering and the professional institutions
co-ordinate to advise on best-practice in the delivery of this
training by higher and further education institutes. (Paragraph
336)
52. We support the
Government's efforts to promote diversity in engineering. Its
financial support for STEMNET and the Science and Engineering
Ambassadors programme, WISE, the Computer Club for Girls, and
the work of the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Engineering
Development Trust is welcome and should continue. (Paragraph
344)
53. We are concerned
that evidence is lacking on the factors that affect the career
choices of women and other under-represented groups. We recommend
that DIUS commission research to examine these factors. This evidence
should then be used as a platform from which to develop and target
widening participation initiatives. (Paragraph 345)
54. We suggest that
the engineering institutions, Engineering Council UK and the Government
(see Paragraph 284, Chapter 5) should do a better job of promoting
Chartered Engineer status (CEng), Incorporated Engineer status
(IEng) and Engineering Technician status (EngTech). In the same
way the general public respects academic qualifications such as
PhDs, Masters and Honours Degrees, or professional qualifications
in law and medicine, so should it be possible to inform the public
about the professional status of CEng, IEng and EngTech. (Paragraph
357)
55. There is a need
for better trans-departmental management of engineering policy.
The Government should adopt a practice of formulating and following
roadmaps for each major engineering programme, including skills
provision (see Chapter 2) with co-ordination between each of them.
The Government should also be more strategic in its support for
emerging industries and policy areas (see Chapters 3 and 4). Finally,
Government would benefit from having senior officials tasked to
oversee engineering roadmaps and strategic plans, and to manage
engineering advice in a Civil Service with more residual and specialised
engineering expertise. There should be two people responsible
for this challenging body of work: a Government Chief Scientific
and Engineering Adviser and a Government Chief Engineer (see Chapter
5). (Paragraph 360)
56. We are convinced
that the considerable strength of the UK's engineering base makes
it both this nation's responsibility and in its economic interest
to play a major part, through our engineering base, in solving
global problems such as climate change, food and water supply,
energy security and economic instability. The recent economic
crisis has presented the Government with a once-in-generation
opportunity to restructure the economy by building on the existing
substantial strengths of UK engineering. (Paragraph 362)
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