Memorandum 167
Submission from Professor Steve Rayner[34]
ENGINEERING INQUIRY
(Geoengineering Case Study)
1. The politics of geoengineering is complex.
2. It can be understood within the broader
discourse about climate change in which two parallel agendas co-exist.
3. One is the utilitarian agenda focused
specifically on efficiently preventing increased damage to human
and natural systems from anthropogenic climate change.
4. The other is an egalitarian agenda for
which the threats posed by disruption of the existing climate
represent a natural sanction against otherwise boundless consumerism
and industrial development.
5. These two goals converge in the conventional
emissions mitigation agenda. However, for those whose primary
motivation is social reform and behavioural change, both adaptation
and geoengineering are viewed as a moral hazard that threatens
to weaken the political consensus behind greenhouse gas emissions
reductions achieved by behavioural change.
6. In the case of adaptation, this has led
to more than a decade of delay in the world coming to grips with
the challenges and, as a result, very large numbers of poor people
living in marginal conditions, mostly in the less-developed world,
are in greater danger from climate impacts than would otherwise
have been the case.
7. Climate change is par excellence a field
in which political disagreements have continually found their
expression in surrogate disputes about science. Therefore it is
imperative to understand, especially in these early stages of
the geoengineering discourse, where both systems uncertainty and
decision stakes are high, that the positions taken by scientists
and policy analysts (including me. inextricably interweave
political as well as technical judgements.
8. This is the case with respect for positions
either "for" or "against" geoengineering in
principle as well as for or against specific options.
9. For example, NASA's Jim Hansen recently
dismissed air capture technology on the basis that it would be
unacceptably expensive at $20 trillion per 50ppm of carbon removed
from the atmosphere. Roger Pielke Jr of the University of Colorado
points out that this translates into a carbon price of $190/ton
or $52/ton CO, which by 2030 would amount to about 1.5% cumulative
global GDP. This places it at the low end of the 1-5% of GDP that
the Stern Report regards as a reasonable cost for society to pay
for conventional mitigation, of which Hansen is a longstanding
advocate. Clearly the argument here is not really about costs.
10. There are at least three distinctive
viewpoints on climate geoengineering in general.
11. One view sees geoengineering as offering
potentially cheap solutions to climate change which also have
the added advantage that many options could be implemented unilaterally
by countries, or even wealthy individuals, thus circumventing
the delays in achieving atmospheric carbon stabilization that
result from trying to achieve a universal intergovernmental consensus
on mitigation and/or waiting for the emergence of an effective
and efficient carbon market.
12. A second view regards geoengineering
options as potentially dangerous manipulation of earth systems,
relying on the kind of technological hubris that got us into the
current predicament. The potential for unilateral action that
exists with geoengineering is seen as a threat to global solidarity
rather than an advantage. In turn, this leads to calls for international
regulation to limit even field scale experiments with such technologies.
The moral hazard argument against geoengineering is also emphasized
in this view.
13. The third position calls for research
and development of geoengineering, not for immediate implementation
but as insurance against failure to meet atmospheric stabilization
goals or the eventuality that we have underestimated the sensitivity
of the climate system and urgent further action proves necessary.
14. In the interests of full disclosure,
the third is probably closest to my own view, although I prefer
an analogy to the value of options rather than an insurance metaphor.
15. I am also aware that this view tends
to overlook the possibility that at least some options may offer
the possibility of stabilizing atmospheric carbon concentrations
at lower costs than conventional mitigation, in which case one
has to wonder why they should only be implemented in extremis.
From the standpoint of carbon removal, there seems to be no reason
to regard mechanical trees as inferior to biological ones. In
fact their ability to achieve long term sequestration may even
be much better.
16. A finer grained approach becomes necessary
as soon as we move from discussing geoengineering in the abstract
and begin to focus on particular technology options. The various
options have quite different characteristics and raise distinctive
challenges for sound governance. Each may have quite different
institutional prerequisites and socio-political, economic, and
legal implications.
17. In a short discussion it is not possible
to delve into the diverse policy-relevant features of all of the
options in detail, but it may be helpful to characterise some
broad brush differences.
18. Defra, in its submission to the committee
follows the common convention that distinguishes two kinds of
geoengineering technologies based on whether they aim to remove
and sequester carbon from the atmosphere or to alter the earth's
radiative balance by reflecting energy from the before it hits
the atmosphere, in the stratosphere or on the earth's surface.
For example, iron fertilization of the ocean is one way to achieve
carbon removal while injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere
seeks to increase the reflectivity of the upper atmosphere.
19. This is one useful dimension. However,
another axis along which such technologies can be differentiated
is according to whether they seek to achieve either of these goals
by tuning or tinkering with ecosystems on one hand, or the development
and application of hard engineering technologies, ie, nifty gadgets,
on the other. Air capture, sometimes referred to as "mechanical
trees" shares with iron fertilization the objective of carbon
removal, while orbiting sunlight deflectors, such as space mirrors,
represent a hard engineering approach to changing the earth's
radiative balance.
20. Combining these ways of looking at geoengineering
yields the fourfold typology in figure 1.
21. Ecosystem tinkering, either for carbon
removal or changing radiative balance, promises to be cheap and
relatively simple to implement. This could make them attractive
to nations, or even wealthy individuals, who become impatient
with internationally coordinated efforts to achieve conventional
mitigation. Companies have already been formed with a view to
implementing this technology.
22. However, unilateral action would not
be universally welcomed as it would raise issues about sovereignty
and national hegemony in international relations.
23. There are also concerns that ecosystems
tinkering will have unwelcome unanticipated side effects. At least
some instances of this kind of approach could raise issues of
international law. For example, iron fertilization could be interpreted
as a violation of the London Dumping Convention and/or the Biodiversity
Convention
24. The costs of hard engineering approaches
range from figures which are potentially competitive with those
of conventional mitigation, as in the case of air capture, to
quite costly options such as space deflectors which would require
launch and heavy lifting capacity to put equipment into orbit
and maintain it there.
25. Air capture could be pursued by private
companies, provided that a price is established for carbon through
either cap-and-trade or a carbon tax. However, it seems likely
that heavy engineering in space would be implemented by nation
states possessing the necessary technology and financial resources.
There are no obviously viable mechanisms for relating measures
designed to increase radiative balance to a carbon price.
26. Increasing radiative reflectivity, whether
through ecosystems tinkering or hard engineering, is subject to
a hazard not present with carbon removal, which is that cessation
of the intervention, either through technical failure or change
of political commitment would almost certainly result in a very
sudden temperature spike due to the high concentration of carbon
dioxide that would have accumulated in the atmosphere but without
affecting the temperature while the intervention was in progress.
27. Some commentators see this as a potential
advantage in that it could discourage parties to such an intervention
from defecting. Others worry more about the power that the threat
of defection might give to certain parties.
28. Concerns have also been raised about
the possible military misuse of hard-engineered capabilities to
alter radiative balance. Could space mirrors be used for aggressive
purposes?
29. All of the options identified would
raise potential issues of public acceptability. One design for
mechanical trees involves building structures over 30 metres high
for filtering carbon from the air, thus raising issues analogous
to the public acceptability of wind farms. On the other hand,
these could be located far from populations, close to carbon sequestration
sites, such as spent oil and gas wells, offering advantages over
carbon capture at the point of electrical generation. The public
is likely to be concerned about the potential unintended environmental
impacts of any ecosystems tinkering approach.
30. The central problem is that while we
can identify potential issues with all types of geoengineering,
we can only resolve those through research, development, and demonstration.
The key issue is how to move forward with appropriate safeguards.
31. There have been calls for a moratorium
on geoengineering, and even on geoengineering research, such as
recent moves in Europe to ban field trials with iron fertilization
except in coastal waters (of which there is no clear legal definition
and where in any case it will not work. .
32. As American political scientist David
Victor points out, a moratorium on geoengineering is likely to
deter only those countries, firms, and individuals who would be
most likely to develop the technology in a socially responsible
fashion while encouraging potentially dangerous experimentation
by less-responsible parties.
33. He suggests encouraging an international
consortium designed to explore the safest and most effective options
while also socializing a community of responsible geoengineers
along the lines of other international scientific collaborations
that have had potentially hazardous side effects, such as CERN
and the Human Genome Project.
34. Given that we do not yet know the shape
of geoengineering options, it is difficult for social scientists
to make specific recommendations for its effective governance.
It is almost certainly too early to propose any kind of international
treaty or protocol for research and development in the field.
35. However, given past experience with
novel technologies that either tinker with open biological systems
(think GM crops here) or large scale engineered systems (think
nuclear energy), it would be prudent to involve social scientists
closely in the research and development process to reflect in
real time on the institutional implications of any options under
consideration.
36. Ultimately, geoengineering research
is an issue of risk management. Therefore the classic considerations
of TLC-trust, liability, and consent-will likely shape the outcome.
Who can be trusted to manage geoengineering research and implementation?
What will be the mechanisms for making good in the event of unintended
adverse consequences? And what mechanisms of consultation and
consent will be used to shape any programme.
Figure 1
FOUR APPROACHES TO CLIMATE GEOENGINEERING
|
| Carbon removal
| Alter radiative balance |
|
| Ecosystem tinkering | Iron fertilization of oceans
| Stratospheric sulphate aerosols
|
| Hard engineering | Mechanical air capture
| Space deflectors |
|
October 2008
34
James Martin Professor of Science and Civilization, University
of Oxford; Honorary Professor of Climate Change and Society, University
of Copenhagen; Member of the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution. Back
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