Memorandum submitted by Dr Andre Stochniol,
Founder, International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, London
This note discusses options for reducing CO2
emissions from fuels used in international maritime transport,
particularly using a market-based approach.
The memorandum has been prepared for the
UK's Environmental Audit Inquiry, entitled Reducing CO2 and other
emissions from shipping.
SUMMARY
A. The UK's share of maritime emissions is estimated
at 4% by import data, seven times higher than the share estimates
based on fuel sold in the UK.
B. Maritime emissions should be excluded from
national CO2 targets, and addressed globally instead.
C. International agreement for maritime emissions
can be achieved in 2009, providing it differentiates responsibilities.
D. The UK can lead the creation of the scheme
to reduce maritime emissions by 20% by 2020, that provides $4
billion+ for adaptation, and $2 billion+ for technology.
E. A traditional cap-and-trade regime is inappropriate
for complex maritime emissions in the short-term, but a cap with
emission charges (cap-and-charge) would work.
MEMORANDUM FOCUS
1. It is widely accepted that shipping should
contribute to climate stabilization and significant overall reductions
of greenhouse gases (GHG). However, reducing CO2 emissions from
fuels used in international maritime transport (maritime emissions
or ME) is one of the most methodologically complex and politically
difficult issues facing the international community.
2. Industry experts and stakeholders agree that
efficiency improvementsfrom technical and operational measureswill
probably only slow down the growth of ME in the short-term. Therefore,
this memorandum focuses on market-based instruments to bring absolute
emissions reductions and stimulate technological transformation,
including technical and operational improvements.
3. Addressing the growing level of ME and unlocking
the deadlock in negotiations is also a major diplomatic and public
good opportunity for the UK Government.
A. The UK's share of maritime emissions is estimated
at 4% by import data
4. Maritime emissions are driven by the level
of international trade. It is consumer/end-user demand that results
in transport, and thus emissions. Therefore, on an equity basis,
a country's share of ME should be related to the quantity of emissions
from transporting goods into the country.
5. However, ships often transport goods to many
countries during the same voyage. This is especially true for
container ships. Therefore, making a direct calculation of emissions
attributable to different goods is administratively complex and
prohibitive at this stage.
6. Instead, I estimate the UK's share of ME
as approximately 4% based on:
The UK's share of maritime import
freight costs, calculated as 3.9%;[4]
The UK's share of imported goods
unloaded by weight, calculated as 3.6%;[5]
The UK's share of merchandise imports
by value of 4.7%.[6]
7. The precise quantity of ME is unknown. Estimates
vary significantly, most ranging from 0.7 to 1.1 billion tonnes
of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2005. I use 1 GtCO2 as a working estimate.
8. Therefore, the UK's share of ME is estimated
as 40 MtCO2 in absolute terms.[7]
This is:
Nearly seven times more than ME currently
reported based on fuel sold (6 MtCO2);[8]
More than emissions from international
aviation.[9]
9. Such quantity of emissions would add an extra
6% to the UK's carbon budget,[10]
and more with time. The quantity of ME attributable to the UK
will most likely increase by more than a third (1/3) by 2020,
growing annually at a rate of 2%+.
B. Maritime emissions should be excluded from
national CO2 targets
10. After extended deliberation, some EU experts
have concluded that including ME in national totals is not feasible
due to data problems, evasion possibilities, competitiveness issues,
fairness and the polluter pays principle.[11]
The difficulty in calculating the UK's share of ME has illustrated
these problems to a degree.
11. A global solution to reduce ME is preferred
in the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Shipping is
a global industry with the majority of CO2 emissions occurring
outside national jurisdictions. The structure of shipping does
not correlate well with any division between developed and developing
countries.
12. Industry stakeholders prefer global regulations
over local ones. The worst-case scenario for them is a patchwork
of different regulations in different parts of the world that
would inevitably lead to competitive distortions and increased
end-user prices.
13. Local regulations aimed at reducing global
ME will be ineffective as ships can easily avoid them by registering
under a different flag, or tanking up large amounts of fuel in
countries along their route which do not participate in the emission
regime.
14. Therefore, ME should be excluded from national
CO2 targets, including in the UK. Instead, ME should be addressed
globally through one or more maritime emission bubbles. In this
global approach emissions would not be allocated to countries
or flag states.
C. International agreement can be achieved
in 2009
15. The current challenge in negotiations can
be defined as the following: providing global uniform rules (typical
for shipping), while delivering on the differentiated approach
embodied in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Without differentiation
of responsibilities, political agreement on and participation
in international agreement for ME, particularly from developing
countries, it is unlikely to be secured.
16. The possibility of using emission charges
to address global ME has been largely discounted, at least until
very recently. Charges have been seen to be too similar to unpopular
taxes. The possibility was conspicuously absent from the work
done in Europe in the last 5 years or so.
17. In mid 2007 Norway submitted a proposal
to the IMO for a scheme based on implementing a CO2 charge.[12]
The scheme proposed to raise funds to reduce and mitigate maritime
emissions, and to provide some funding for adaptation to
climate change in developing countries. The proposal was developed
and initiated by the author of this memorandum. Prior to the submission
by Norway, a similar proposal was also discussed with the UK Department
of Transport but due to coordination difficulties with other departments
it was not taken further.
18. The Norway proposal has initiated multilateral
discussions and follow-on submissions to the IMO in 2007 and 2008,
including two follow-on proposals from Norway, and a proposal
from Denmark for a global fuel levy. The proposal has also been
discussed within the UNFCCC, during formal negotiations and side
events at the Bali conference, and thereafter.
19. The recent submissions and discussions within
the IMO have confirmed that a global market-based scheme based
on charges or levies is feasible, without requiring the allocation
of emissions to countries.
20. At the same time it has been recognised
that current financial mechanisms for adaptation to climate change,
aimed at helping the world's poor deal with the consequences of
global warming, are inadequate in both design and scale. The adaptation
needs of developing countries are estimated at tens of $billions
per annum; the funding gap is currently about 100 times higher
than all anticipated contributions.
21. The first Intersessional Meeting of the
IMO Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) from Ships
took place in Oslo in June 2008. All the delegations that spoke
on the issue supported the notion that revenues aggregated through
any economic instrument should mainly be used for mitigation and
adaptation measures in developing countries, together with transfer
of technology and capacity-building.
22. Within the UNFCCC and the IMO, developing
countries argue strongly that a uniform maritime scheme would
not fulfil the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities. Allocating significant funding for
adaptation to climate change is not seen as solving the issue
entirely. The need for differentiation should be familiar to the
UK; within the EU, different member states have different emission
reduction commitments.
23. Contradictory to first perception, differentiating
obligations for ME can be implemented but doing so requires new
thinking. In the proposed scheme emission charges are based on
fuel sold. To achieve differentiation on certain routes, emissions
could be exempted from charges or subject to an agreed multiplier.
This could be based on point of origin, destination point, or
both. These emissions charges can be differentiated by exempting
certain countries or by using a country-specific multiplier.
24. In its simplest form, differentiation may
follow the division between Annex-I and non-Annex I parties to
the UNFCCC. Even if after negotiation non-Annex I countries were
totally exempt from emission charges, the scheme would still cover
60% of total emissions;[13]
a big step up from existing zero coverage under the Kyoto Protocol.
Importantly, such a scheme could be legally enforced through ports
in Annex I countries.
25. This binary differentiation may even be
replaced with country-specific obligation factors, which could
be used to scale (upwards or downwards) the basic emission charges
calculated under an emission reduction scheme. This provides further
flexibility to adjust the scheme participation in the future.
26. The above approach would allow the proposed
scheme to be fully compliant with the UNFCCC principles of common
but differentiated responsibilities, and allow flexibility to
negotiate the goal and country obligations. The participation
principles could be negotiated and agreed by parties in Copenhagen
in 2009.
27. An effort to incorporate differentiated
responsibilities further is urgently needed if a deal for ME is
to be agreed by 2009.
D. The UK can lead the creation of the scheme
to reduce maritime emissions by 20% by 2020
28. In multilateral negotiations, progress can
be slow until a concrete submission from a party is put forward.
This requires a proactive approach from officials, openness to
consider new approaches, and a joint search for a solution.
29. The UK has not submitted or co-sponsored
any proposals for ME reduction to the IMO in the last two years.
However, very recently a high level proposal to develop a new
international convention to address GHG emissions from shipping
was submitted. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a gap between
statements on the need to address climate change and action on
ME. In other environmental areas addressed by the IMO, such as
air pollution (SOx, NOx), ballast water, and ship recycling, the
UK has been quite active. This may reflect lower coordination
barriers between departments in these topics.
30. Development, ratification, and entry into
force of a new maritime convention may take a decade or longer.
A significant amount of work has already been done, including
building momentum for action in the IMO. The proposed scheme below
has been further developed through discussions with representatives
of more than 30 different countries, half of which are from developing
countries.
31. The International Maritime Emission Reduction
Scheme (IMERS) is a hybrid scheme that combines emission mitigation,
adaptation to climate change and technology action in one scheme.
It is novel, ambitious but affordable, and legally feasible. Over
the last year the scheme has gained significant traction[14]
and has been discussed within the climate change community. It
is seen as one of the most promising proposals to fill the adaptation
gap.[15]
32. The instrument is based on an emission charge
to be applied to the entire international shipping community,
or part of it. The charge is calculated based on the prevailing
forward market price for CO2 and a negotiated emission reduction
goal. This makes it an alternative to cap-and-trade. The emission
charge is not a levy or a tax set at some arbitrary level. The
goal (cap) together with the market (via the market price for
carbon) dictates the level of emission charge, rather than any
single body that may be subject to outside influence.
33. A long-term emission reduction goal is the
key measure employed in the scheme, which will enable the shipping
industry to equitably and effectively contribute to the reduction
of total GHG emissions. To calculate the charge for emissions,
IMERS uses a long-term notional emission reduction goal for CO2
for the ships under the scheme. The goal allows the unrealised
reductions to be purchased from other sectors and projects, by
acquiring emission credits.
34. The setting of such a goal for international
maritime transport is within the domain of the UNFCCC. The goal
could be established and subsequently adjusted with the changing
climate change framework. It could be agreed in Copenhagen in
2009.
35. It is anticipated that the impact of the
scheme for a 20% emission reduction goal by 2020 would be about
0.1% increase in prices of imported goods. This is equivalent
to $1 for the price of $1,000. The charges paid by fuel buyers
are anticipated as equivalent to 5% of fuel price. The level of
charge would be announced one year in advance, thus providing
enough time for the shipping industry to pass it on to end customers.
36. Therefore, shipping could contribute to
climate stabilisation through an ambitious yet achievable goal.
Furthermore, the aggregation of demand for emission credits, which
are required to offset any emissions above the emission goal in
a given year, would provide access to cheaper emission credits
on primary markets, or through government forestry schemes. This
would generate gains which could be utilised to address adaptation
issues.
37. The contribution of the shipping industry
to climate change action will be substantial: the scheme aggregates
small emission charges into approximately 10 billion dollars annually,
of which $4 billion is for mitigation of ME, $4 billion for adaptation
to climate change in developing countries, $2 billion for maritime
technology development and transfer.
38. There is an opportunity for the global maritime
solution to be created and operated in the UK. The IMO, the only
UN organization in the UK, is in London. London is also the pre-eminent
financial centre in Europe and vies to become the centre for carbon
markets.
39. Addressing ME globally is also a major diplomatic
and public good opportunity. The risk of inaction is twofold:
repeat Kyoto's failure to address ME, and fail to provide financing
for adaptation to climate change crucially needed for the most
vulnerable.
E. A cap with emission charges (cap-and-charge)
would work for ME
40. The proposed hybrid scheme can be called
cap-and-charge. It sets a cap on the ME and delivers it through
charges. It is an alternative to a cap-and-trade scheme.
41. It totally eliminates the three central
barriers associated with the cap-and trade-system:
Emissions baseline: In the proposed
scheme an emissions baseline is not required, removing the need
for reliable emissions data as a pre-requisite for scheme operation.
Allocation of emissions: There is
no requirement to allocate emissions between countries, which
has been a stumbling block in maritime negotiations.
Distribution of allowances: No allowances
need to be distributed to participating ship owners and charterers.
42. The proposed hybrid method reduces the impact
of several key implementation issues.
Impact on competition: The impact
on competition of the hybrid scheme will be very low, as it is
based on a harmonized emission charge, which secures a level playing
field to all participants transporting goods to a country, small
or large.
Cost: The costs to participants,
including the set-up and transactional costs are anticipated to
be lower under the cap-and-charge scheme than a standard cap-and-trade
scheme. The charges in the proposed hybrid method are set only
to have enough funding to purchase the relevant number of emission
credits, plus additional contributions for technology. o Set up
time: Compared to cap-and-trade, the set up time is reduced from
approximately 5-6 years to 2 years; as implementation barriers
are eliminated and data requirements lowered.
43. Furthermore, in addition to removing barriers
and reducing costs, the proposed cap-and-charge scheme delivers
greater value in terms of effectiveness, flexibility and scale.
Effectiveness: Due to the compliance
mechanisms, the coverage of a cap-and-charge scheme can be extended
to smaller ships, including ships covered by different registration
authorities. This would be difficult and highly costly under a
cap-and-trade scheme.
Flexibility: The proposed cap-and-charge
scheme is flexible enough to incorporate new ships, and changing
accountability of charterers for emissions. Furthermore, it allows
differentiating charges to reflect differentiated responsibilities
and capacities.
Scale: The proposed solution can
be extended to a global scale, superceding the regional basis
of a potential extension of the EU ETS to shipping.
44. The critical component of the proposed approach
is that resources saved on barriers eliminated, and implementation
issues reduced can be redeployed to raise and create value elsewhere.
The proposed approach moves beyond delivering only emission mitigation
benefits to:
Technology benefits, namely near
and long-term improvements.
Adaptation benefits, mainly from
contributions to the Adaptation Fund.
45. The short-term and long-term technology
improvements are essential to dramatically reduce the rapidly
growing emissions from transport. Additionally, the reduction
of the huge gap in financing of adaptation to climate change in
developing countries is essential; as the most vulnerable countries
are likely to be hit hardest by the impact of a changing climate.
A new global scheme could deliver on these in an affordable manner.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
46. The deadlock to address CO2 emissions from
international maritime transport can be resolved through the proposed
global scheme, balancing the interests of all parties. The cap-and-charge
instrument described is flexible and avoids emission allocation
issues. It is politically compelling, providing both a quantitative
emission reduction goal and a differentiation of responsibilities.
It combines mitigation of emissions, adaptation to climate change
and technology development in a single maritime scheme. By being
global, the scheme is efficient and cheaper than proposed alternatives.
Additional effort will however be required to generate the necessary
momentum to achieve the deal in time for the Copenhagen climate
change negotiations in 2009. The UK has an opportunity to take
a lead here and make a lasting contribution to the resolution
of the emission problem from international maritime transport.
15 September 2008
4 For 2005; based on data from IMF DOTS, and UNCTAD
RMT 2006. Back
5
For 2005, imports unloaded in the UK 257 Mt, imports unloaded
world-wide 7,122 Mt, sources: UK Maritime Statistics 2005, UNCTAD
RMT 2006. Back
6
WTO, for 2005. This metric is likely less well correlated with
the UK's share of ME than the other measures, but is readily available. Back
7
This value seems realistic when compared with the domestic shipping
emissions of 4.6 MtCO2 in 2005 for two reasons. The foreign import
traffic is nearly three (3) times higher than domestic inwards
traffic (in tonnes unloaded). Second, international voyages are
on average much longer than the domestic ones. Back
8
Emissions from fuels for international transport are reported
based on fuel sold in the UK. On this basis, the UK's ME are 5.9
MtCO2. The current approach significantly underestimates the ME
that should be attributed to the UK. The main reason is that many
ships buy their fuel outside the UK. Back
9
UK's emissions from international aviation bunkers: 35.4 MtCO2,
source UK statistics. Back
10
Based on 2005 UK's GHG emissions of 654 MtCO2e; or CO2 emissions
of 554 MtCO2. Back
11
http://unfccc.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/AWG_08/downl/0403_1000_p2/EU%20GHGs.pdf,
Graichen (2008); a relevant webcast is also available Back
12
IMO MEPC 56/4/9, by Norway, Elements of a possible market-based
CO2 emission reduction scheme, 2007. Back
13
The Annex I 60% share of emissions has been estimated as for the
UK. The estimate calculated from the import costs is 59%. The
other estimate based on the share of goods unloaded in Annex I
countries, by weight, is 58%. Data sources: IMF DOTS, UNCTAD 2006. Back
14
See: www.imers.org/buyin/achieve Back
15
See: Grubb, Michael et al., (2008), Climate Strategies,
Energy and Climate: Opportunities for the G-8, http://www.climate-strategies.org/uploads/2_ClimateStrategiesG8report.pdf Back
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