The Draft Flood and Water Management Bill - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 129-139)

PROFESSOR MARTIN CAVE AND MR ALEX SKINNER

3 JUNE 2009

  Q129 CHAIRMAN: Could I formally welcome Professor Martin Cave, who is obviously the man in charge of the Cave Review on competition and innovation in the water market, supported by Alex Skinner, the Head of the Secretariat of the Cave Review. You are both very welcome. I feel I know you already, Professor Cave. I woke up this morning listening to your dulcet tones on the Today programme. I always think that is the most difficult bit because they have very little time and they try to pack an awful lot in, so you have to give very succinct answers. I was very interested in what you had to say. You made an interesting point about Ofwat and you said, "The basic problem is that Ofwat, like any regulator of monopolies, has to rely a great deal on what the companies tell it. Then that means there is a risk that they will slightly exaggerate their costs and we will end up with price controls that are too lax." That is a very interesting observation. Did that comment arise from a bit of ex post analysis of what happened at the last Price Review?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: It was not inconsistent with that, but it is something which applies to regulators of monopolies everywhere. It is a generic problem rather than one peculiar to Ofwat.

  Q130  CHAIRMAN: I suppose it would be too difficult a question to ask, but if it is a bit lax from the consumers' point of view how much is it up or down of what is the optimum result?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: I was trying to move on to make the point that at the moment we rely on the regulator to protect consumers but in an ideal world you would rely much more on competition to protect consumers so that you give people a choice and the regulator would not have to take all the strain, as he does at the moment.

  Q131  CHAIRMAN: That, I suppose, takes us really into the work and your understanding. The reason we asked you to come and talk to us is that we spoke to Anna Walker and you, if you like, are the other half of a potentially missing chunk from the bill. We are trying to wrap our minds around the fact that obviously if the Government was to try in the remaining time in this Parliament to get the bill through it might be quite difficult to do everything. Obviously the work that Anna Walker is to do, and your work, is still at a formative stage and it is not translated into a legislative form. Would you think, just as a general approach, that given the complexity of the task which you have tried to articulate it might be better to move at a slightly slower pace, given the constraints on parliamentary timing, and get competition right rather than rush all the fences?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: I think there are some things which are fairly straightforward which I believe could be drafted fairly simply and could be implemented with a very high degree of competence and would benefit consumers. So I would be very enthusiastic for those bits to be included in the bill rather than wait until the next Parliament.

  Q132  PADDY TIPPING: Such as what?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: I think the most obvious thing would be the introduction of retail competition in England and Wales. That would be essentially following on the lines pioneered by Scotland in April of last year.

  Q133  PADDY TIPPING: Retail competition?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: Yes, that would be one example. There are various things relating to abstraction which I think are important, namely changing the price of abstraction so that we have abstraction prices reflecting different degrees of scarcity of water.

  Q134  CHAIRMAN: Just before we all plunge into asking lots of questions, I would be less than honest if I did not say I struggled a bit to really understand how competition in water operates. I listened to you with considerable interest this morning hoping that I might get a ray or two of enlightenment. I suppose it was when you said that it is very difficult, because water is sort of heavy stuff, to move it around, as opposed to electricity, a nice homogenous commodity, you can connect up a wire, move the stuff around, you can have separate billing arrangements, cross-charging, everything. It is wonderful and simple compared with water. So just give us, please, now we have got you in front of us, a few moments of overview as to how does competition actually work. What do we mean by competition in water, both from the domestic and business customer standpoint?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: If you think of the water value chain, there is the retail end, the business of getting and billing customers, and it is easy to see how that could be made competitive because you would do what they have done in Scotland, which is allow people to come in and buy wholesale water from the incumbent and then just sell it together with other services perhaps, to customers. Initially it will be business customers, but who knows, in the future it might also be household customers. Then we move up the value chain the next bit might very well be the pipes and there is very little prospect of competition in pipes, except possibly in particular areas associated with inset appointments.

  Q135  CHAIRMAN: Sorry, what are inset appointments?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: At the moment they are basically new housing estates which do not already have pipes provided to them. Then the question might arise as to whether those pipes should actually be installed by the incumbent or by the developer, or some other third party. Then finally, moving up, there is the treatment works. Now, if you had hypothetically within a particular locality a number of different owners of treatment works then they could put their water, treated water, or obviously mutatis mutandis dealing with waste water, they could put that into the pipes, get themselves a bunch of consumers and then they would in a sense be directly supplying their consumers. Therefore, that would mean that somebody who built an efficient treatment works might be able to get a cost advantage over another potential competitor and therefore there would be competition in those circumstances for the customers.

  Q136  CHAIRMAN: Just let me try to understand from the domestic water consumption side what that meant. I live in the north west of England. I have my water services delivered to me by United Utilities. You just enunciated that somebody could come along and buy water wholesale. The message I am getting out of that is that if there was the Fylde Coast Water Company, they could go along to United Utilities and try and do a deal with them and say, "We'd like to buy X million cubic litres of water from you," and if United Utilities had got a bit to sell it would then be up to the Fylde Water Company to come along and say, "Mr Jack, we've got this cracking offer here. We can do you water for X," and X might be X minus from United Utilities. Is that basically what you are saying?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: It would not work quite like that because in essence what the Fylde Water Company would do would be to go along to you and say, "We're going to make you a better offer than they the competitor, United Utilities are making". If you agreed, then you would be registered thenceforward as being a customer of Fylde Water Company rather than United Utilities. You get a bill from them and then Fylde Water would pay United Utilities for the water which you use at a wholesale price. Now, obviously for there to be a business in there for Fylde Water Company there has to be a big enough margin between the retail price which United Utilities is offering and the wholesale price at which it acquires the water from United Utilities. The problem with the 2003 Act was that the margin that was created was too small to sustain any kind of competitive business, but the other point I would have to make is that you probably have a water and sewerage bill of around £300-£400, of which the retail component might be, say £30 or £40, and in fact the kinds of saving that Fylde could offer you as a domestic consumer probably would not be enough to attract your notice unless you had a particular down on United Utilities, which I am sure you do not. As a consequence, it would not really be worthwhile doing that. The costs of setting up the system for domestic customers at the moment seem to exceed the benefits which they get, so that is why in the report the recommendation which is made is that it is only business customers who would be eligible for this form of retail competition in the first instance.

  Q137  MISS MCINTOSH: A very quick question. You say competition works in Scotland?

  PROFESSOR CAVE: Yes.

  Q138  MISS MCINTOSH: My understanding is that the only company providing competition has gone bust. Where is the competition? There is no competition at all.

  PROFESSOR CAVE: I think there are three or four companies providing services.

  Q139  MISS MCINTOSH: Could you tell us who they are?

  MR SKINNER: Osprey is another company. Scottish Water Business Stream is the one which is associated with the incumbent. There is Osprey and then AquaVitae, which I think is the one you referred to, did get into difficulty.


 
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