European Scrutiny Committee Contents


1 Financial services


(30168)

15661/08

+ ADDs 1-2

COM(08) 704

Draft Regulation on credit rating agencies

Legal baseArticle 95 EC; co-decision; QMV
Document originated12 November 2008
Deposited in Parliament18 November 2008
DepartmentHM Treasury
Basis of considerationEM of 1 December 2008
Previous Committee ReportNone
To be discussed in CouncilNot known
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionFor debate in European Committee B

Background

1.1 Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are private sector organisations that provide independent opinions on the creditworthiness of a particular issuer or financial instrument — they assess the likelihood that an issuer will default, either on its financial obligations generally (issuer rating) or on a particular debt or fixed income security (instrument rating). These opinions, or ratings, may be based on information relating to the income, expenditure and balance sheet (with particular focus on the debt) of the rated entity. Ratings provide an indication as to the situation at a given time and, therefore, need to be periodically confirmed or updated. The ratings effectively categorise issuers into grades, depending on the CRA's opinion of their risk of default. CRAs employ creditworthiness scales, which vary between agencies, with a generally key borderline running between investment grade (low-risk) and speculative grade (high-risk) opinions of the likelihood of default. Investors, borrowers, issuers and governments may all use credit ratings, which thereby play an important role in financial markets.

1.2 In April 2002 at an informal ECOFIN Council the Commission made a commitment to analyse the issue of CRAs in the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy. In February 2004 the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on CRAs calling on the Commission to produce an assessment of the need, if any, for legislative intervention in this field. In December 2004 the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a voluntary Code of Conduct, Fundamentals for CRAs. The Code, while voluntary, was intended to be applied by CRAs of all sizes and business models, and in all jurisdictions worldwide. In the Community, CRAs are expected to give full effect to the provisions of the IOSCO Code — by incorporating the standards in their own procedures, as long as these provisions are consistent with the relevant Directives.

1.3 In March 2006 the Commission published a Communication on Credit Rating Agencies reviewing issues of concern and recent relevant Community legislation, including the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).[1] The Commission said:

  • concern centred on the quality of credit ratings provided by CRAs;
  • ratings should be based on diligent analysis of available information derived from sources whose integrity is continuously controlled;
  • ratings must be regularly updated as necessary and CRAs must be more open about the way in which their ratings are produced;
  • CRAs must be independent and entirely objective in their approach, avoiding compromise from the relationships that they have with issuers;
  • CRAs should be prevented from using inside information, to which they had access as part of the rating process, for other activities;
  • the European Parliament expressed concern about the degree of concentration in the ratings industry and its possible anti-competitive effects;
  • the MAD sought to tackle issues of insider dealing and market manipulation, including conflicts of interest and fair presentation of investment recommendations, while recognising the difference between credit ratings and investment recommendations;
  • the CRD provided for the use of external credit assessments in the determination of risk weights (and consequential capital requirements) applied to a bank or investment firm's exposures and only the use of assessments provided by recognised External Credit Assessment Institutions, mainly CRAs, were to be acceptable to the competent authorities; and
  • the MiFID required CRAs that also provide investment services to become authorised. An authorised firm then needed to comply with other aspects of the Directive, including provisions on conflicts of interest.

The Commission concluded that, at that time, no new legislative initiatives were needed. However, it also undertook to continue to monitor developments and to consider introducing legislative proposals in the light of new circumstances or serious problems of market failure.

The document

1.4 In introducing this draft Regulation the Commission recapitulates developments on CRAs since its Communication. It recalls that:

  • in October 2007 the ECOFIN Council agreed conclusions, the "Ecofin Roadmap", which included a proposal to assess the role played by CRAs and to address any relevant deficiencies. Specifically, the Commission was asked to examine possible conflicts of interest in the rating process, transparency of rating methods, delays in rating reassessments and regulatory approval processes;[2]
  • to clarify the role of CRAs and assess the need for regulatory measures, in autumn 2007 the Commission requested the advice of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)[3] and the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME),[4] who consulted with other stakeholders before providing their advice. Meanwhile, IOSCO revised its Code in May 2008;
  • on 8 July 2008 the ECOFIN Council welcomed the IOSCO revisions and the CESR and ESME reports, but considered it to be of high importance to address the concerns concerning the transparency of rating processes, the risk of conflicts of interest related to the remuneration models of the rating agencies, accountability and the quality of ratings;
  • the Council shared the Commission view that the current initiatives did not fully address the challenges posed, that further steps were needed and that regulatory changes might be necessary. The Council supported without prejudice to consideration of its practical application, the principle that the rating agencies should be subject to a Community registration system;[5] and
  • the Commission then conducted an internet consultation on CRAs before proposing the draft Regulation.[6]

The Commission also notes that in the USA, where most of the CRAs with significant Community activities have their parent companies, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 entered into force on 27 June 2007, establishing a legal framework for the registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations.

1.5 The draft Regulation would:

  • apply to credit ratings used by credit institutions (as defined in other Directives);
  • permit those institutions to trade in rated securities only if those ratings have been issued by a CRA registered in accordance with the Regulation;
  • make registration of a CRA dependent on its compliance with standards and procedures to avoid conflicts of interest, including those created by the "issuer pays" business model, ensure its employees are appropriately knowledgeable and experienced, make transparent to the public its methodologies, models and assumptions, provide an annual transparency report and disclose, withdraw or update a rating in a timely manner;
  • require a CRA to be a legal person established in the Community in order for it to be able to apply for registration;
  • place responsibility for the decision on the registration of a CRA with the competent authority of a member state — the relevant supervisory body of the member state in which the CRA has its registered office;
  • allow a group of CRAs, either a parent company and its subsidiaries or a number of undertakings linked by control, to apply for one registration;
  • set out how competent authorities should act as a college to consult over the registration and how, where there is no unanimity of opinion, individual authorities should make their own decisions for their jurisdiction;
  • establish a role for the CESR to advise and coordinate the actions of competent authorities; and
  • require Member States to establish penalties for infringement of the Regulation.

1.6 The Commission's impact assessment, attached to the document:

  • estimates that the proposed legislation will create for a CRA a one-off administrative cost of, on average, €313,744 (£246,887) and recurring costs of €18,417 (£14,492) annually;
  • assesses that there would be no additional cost from the proposed Regulation for the Community; and
  • has not assessed a cost to Member States of the additional work required of their competent authorities.

The Government's view

1.7 The Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Myners) tells us that the Government, in discussions with the Commission during the preparation of the draft Regulation, has consistently supported:

  • introduction of a strengthened oversight regime for CRAs, as agreed at the July 2008 ECOFIN Council;
  • the principle that CRAs should be subject to a Community registration system, subject to resolving practical considerations, and
  • that such a system should be proportionate, principled and risk based.

The Minister adds that:

  • in response to the Commission's consultation the Government said that it does not support the formation of a centralised Community supervisory structure, because it does not believe that such a structure is necessary or proportionate; and
  • at the first Council working group on this proposal the Commission confirmed that the proposal does not include the establishment of a new Community Agency, as the cost would not be proportionate, nor does it give the CESR decision-making powers, due to legal constraints.

1.8 The Minister says that the Government remains concerned at:

  • the scope of the proposals for Community regulation for an industry that operates globally, including the requirement for CRAs to establish one or more operationally independent subsidiaries in the Community;
  • the administrative burden of the current proposal; and
  • the efficiency and effectiveness of operation of the proposed procedures, including the advisory and coordinating role of the CESR.

The Government will continue to seek proportionate solutions, currently through the Council Working Group negotiations.

1.9 The Minister also tells us of a Government concern, which too will need to be addressed in the negotiations, that the draft Regulation is not fully compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Particular issues that have been identified are:

  • the draft provisions (Articles 15, 17, 21 and 22) on competent authorities exercising powers regarding registration, withdrawal of registration and permission to issue credit ratings — exercise of these powers will determine the civil rights of CRAs for the purpose of Article 6 of the ECHR and, as there is no right of appeal set out on the face of the draft Regulation, compliance with Article 6 will depend on the administrative law of the Member States themselves;
  • the draft provision (Article 20(3)) on enforcement powers for competent authorities — there are insufficient safeguards to ensure full compliance with Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR; and
  • the draft provisions (Articles 23, 24, 29 and 30) on cooperation between competent authorities — to the extent that this involves the exchange and disclosure of information relating to CRAs, this may raise issues under Article 8 of the ECHR. Some strengthening of the safeguards may therefore bring more certainty to the position.

1.10 The Minister says, in relation to the Commission's impact assessment, that the Government:

  • supports, in principle, the conclusion of the Commission that a legislative solution would be a proportionate measure to fulfil its objectives, subject to practical considerations;
  • supports the conclusion that registration, and efficient and effective monitoring of compliance, should be carried out using existing competent authorities of Member States, with advice and guidance provided by the Lamfalussy Level 3 Committee, comprising representatives of those authorities, the CESR;
  • believes the assessment to be conservative in the scale of impact on industry, and therefore of potential cost implications to issuers; and
  • estimates that the additional cost for the UK competent authority, recoverable through fees charged to the registered and supervised CRAs but not included in the Commission figures, to lie between zero and £0.8 million annually, depending on the form of the final Regulation and on operational decisions that the CRAs may make as a result of its implementation.

1.11 The Minister adds that the short timescale has not allowed preparation of a UK impact assessment to accompany his Explanatory Memorandum and that such an assessment presently under preparation will be provided to us, together with an updated Explanatory Memorandum, as soon as possible. Equally, a formal domestic consultation has not been possible. So, in the time available, key industry groups and large CRAs have been contacted and informed of the proposal. Those wishing to submit comments on it have been invited to do so. Those comments have been considered in relation to the working group negotiations and will continue to be so considered.

Conclusion

1.12 We note that this important measure is being carried forward hurriedly. Nevertheless, we think time should be found to debate the document in European Committee before the Council reaches a decision on the draft Regulation. So we recommend such a debate. And, amongst other matters, we suggest that Members in that debate might wish to explore:

  • developments on the Government's concerns about the scope of the legislation, especially the requirement for CRAs to establish subsidiaries in the Community, the administrative burden of the proposal and the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed procedures, including the role of the CESR;
  • developments on the Government's ECHR concerns; and
  • progress on the impact assessment.







1   See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:059:0002:0006:EN:PDF. Back

2   See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/96375.pdf Back

3   A Level 3 Lamfalussy committee; see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm#review  Back

4   See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/esme/index_en.htm  Back

5   See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/101742.pdf . Back

6   This consultation ran between 31 July 2008 and 5 September 2008. The Commission received 98 responses from across the Community, categorised as 22 responses from authorities, 15 from registered organisations, and the remainder from individuals (although this category appears to comprise organisations that have not registered). Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 2 January 2009