4 Safety of nuclear installations
| (a)
(24577)
8990/03
COM(03) 32
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Draft Council Directive (Euratom) setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations
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| (b)
(25951)
12386/04
COM(04) 526
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Amended Draft Council Directive (Euratom) setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations
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| (c)
(30232)
16537/08
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(08) 790
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Draft Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety
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| Legal base | Articles 31 and 32 Euratom; consultation; QMV
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| Document originated | 26 November 2008
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| Deposited in Parliament | 3 December 2008
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| Department | Energy and Climate Change
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 12 December2008
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| Previous Committee Report | (a): HC 63-xxix (2002-03), chapter 8 (10 July 2003), HC 42-iii (2003-04), chapter 3 (17 December 2003) and HC 42-xxiii (2003-04), chapter 4 (16 June 2004)
(b): HC 42-xxxiii (2003-04), chapter 7 (20 October 2004)
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| To be discussed in Council | No date set
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| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
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| Committee's decision | (a) and (b): Cleared
(c): Not cleared; further information awaited
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Background
4.1 In January 2003, the Commission produced two legislative
proposals on nuclear safety, one concerned with the management
of radioactive waste, and the other with the safety of nuclear
installations. The latter proposal (document (a)), which would
have applied to all civil nuclear installations, was based on
the Nuclear Safety Convention (NSC) of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), and addressed three aspects of nuclear safety
— the
setting of minimum standards, independent verification of the
actions of Member States in this area, and the continuing need
for radiological protection after the active life of a nuclear
installation. It would have placed a number of specific requirements
on Member States to take the measures necessary to establish and
maintain effective arrangements against potential radiological
hazards and nuclear accidents, and to ensure the long-term management
of all materials, including radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel, produced in the course of decommissioning. This was to be
backed up by a verification system operated by the Commission,
which would be able to call upon nominated national experts, and
would send a report to the Member State concerned (which would
then have three months to indicate how it intends to remedy any
shortcoming). At the same time, Member States themselves would
have to submit an annual report to the Commission on the measures
taken to implement the Directive.
4.2 In their Report of 10 July 2003, our predecessors
noted that the Government had a number of concerns about the proposal,
relating to the Commission's competence; to the proposed legal
base; to the need to clarify the way in which certain of the obligations
imposed by the proposal would apply in the UK; and to subsidiarity.
The Government also doubted whether there was any benefit in taking
further legislative action, but said that the possibility of a
non-binding instrument had found favour with a number of Member
States, including the UK.
4.3 After various inconclusive discussions had
taken place in Brussels, our predecessors were told that Council
Conclusions were being drawn up which were likely to reaffirm
the importance attached to nuclear safety, but to restrict, for
the time being, the Commission's ability to come back with further
legislative proposals in this area. Despite this, the Commission
produced in September 2004 a further legislative proposal (document
(b)), which it said took into account the views expressed by the
European Parliament and the discussions within the Council.
4.4 As our predecessors noted in their Report
of 20 October 2004, the Government believed that the new proposal
"completely ignored" the Council's conclusions. It also
pointed out that, whilst overall national responsibility for nuclear
safety was now explicitly recognised in the proposal, some of
its provisions were ambiguous and still appeared to give the Commission
scope to interfere with national regulatory decisions, whilst
others covered areas where existing arrangements were well established
and where a new regulatory requirement was thus inappropriate.
More generally, the Government continued to have serious doubts
whether the proposal would add any value to the existing nuclear
safety regime, and was also concerned that, since the Commission
lacked the technical expertise in this field, it would have to
rely on experts from the Member States, thereby undermining work
within the IAEA to raise nuclear safety standards world-wide.
4.5 It was also clear that a significant number
of Member States remained opposed to Community legislation in
this field, and it appeared unlikely the then Presidency would
wish to pursue the proposal. In noting this, our predecessors
nevertheless felt that, in reporting this latest development to
the House, it would be prudent at that stage — as with the
proposal put forward in January 2003 — to hold it under
scrutiny, whilst awaiting further information.
The current proposal
4.6 The Commission points out that, since nuclear
energy is the Community's
main low-carbon energy source (accounting more than one third
of its electricity), and has been shown to provide a stable and
reliable supply, a number of Member States have shown a renewed
interest in it, either through extending the life of existing
plans, or constructing new plants. It therefore suggests that
this is an appropriate time to withdraw its earlier proposals,
and to replace them with this new proposal,
which it says would incorporate within Community
law internationally endorsed nuclear safety principles, thus providing
legal certainty, and ensuring an additional guarantee for the
public in the Community
at large. The proposal also builds upon the technical work of
the Western European
Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), and enshrines in Community
legislation the principles of the NCS and the safety work carried
out by the IAEA.
4.7 The Commission adds that its basic aim is
to establish a common set of nuclear safety principles which are
regulated at Community level, and based on the principle that
only strong and independent regulators can ensure the continued
safe operation of nuclear power plants within the Community. More
specifically, the proposal would provide that:
(i) Member States must establish a regulatory
body to grant licences to those designing, locating, constructing,
maintaining, operating and decommissioning nuclear installations,
and to monitor their operation: they must also ensure that any
such body is effectively independent, and free from any influence
which might affect nuclear safety, has the necessary authority
and resources to discharge its functions, and submits itself every
ten years to an international peer review;
(ii) the prime responsibility for the safety
of a nuclear installation throughout its lifetime rests with the
holder of the operating licence issued by the regulatory body;
(iii) Member States should inform the public
about the results of nuclear surveillance activities, and ensure
that national regulatory bodies do so as well;
(iv) Member States must respect the safety fundamentals
laid down by the IAEA, including the obligations and requirements
set out in the Convention on Nuclear Safety; and
(v) in the case of new nuclear reactors, Member
States must aim to develop additional requirements, in line with
the safety levels developed by WENRA and in close collaboration
with the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste
Management (which it believes should become the focal point for
cooperation between the relevant regulatory bodies in the various
Member States).
The Government's view
4.8 In his Explanatory Memorandum
of 12 December 2008, the Minister of State at the Department of
Energy and Climate Change (Mr Mike O'Brien) comments that much
of the content of the proposal
reflects safety requirements and principles already agreed at
international level, and developed by WENRA, and he adds that
that the current UK regime, established under the Nuclear Installations
Act 1965 and operated through the Health and Safety Executive's
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, seeks to comply with these
requirements. He does not therefore expect that significant legislative
action would be needed to implement this proposal,
and he also says that, as drafted, it does not give rise to any
subsidiarity issues.
4.9 However, the Minister adds that the Government
is looking closely at the proposal's policy implications. He says
that, having blocked a proposal over a number of years, it now
recognises that, without a blocking minority, there is a need
to engage closely in the negotiating process, and that the UK
has been directly involved in the work of the High Level Group
and the Working Party on Atomic Questions. This has given it the
opportunity to influence the proposal's direction, and, as a result,
it is closer to the UK's expectations than the text put forward
in 2004.
Conclusion
4.10 Since the Commission
has said it is withdrawing its earlier proposals (documents (a)
and (b)), we are now clearing these. However, although it would
appear from the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum
that the current proposal (document (c)) would not in practical
terms make any significant change to the current nuclear safety
arrangements within the UK, it does nevertheless raise issues
about the Community's
competence in this area. We would therefore be glad to hear further
from the Minister when the Government
has looked more closely at the policy implications. In particular,
we would like to know the extent to which earlier concerns over
a possible extension of Community
competence have been removed, and the changes which have been
made to the earlier proposals which have led the Government
to the conclusion that the current document does not raise any
subsidairity issues. In the meantime, we are holding this document
under scrutiny.
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