8 Further breach of Cotonou Agreement
by Republic of Guinea
| (30446)
6543/09
COM(09) 76
| Commission Communication on opening consultations with Guinea under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement
|
| Legal base | Articles 9 and 96 of the Cotonou Agreement; QMV
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 4 March 2009
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08: HC 19-x (2008-09), chapter 7 (11 March 2009)
|
| Discussed in Council | 31 January 2005 and 14 April 2008 General Affairs and External Relations Councils
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
8.1 The Cotonou Agreement[37]
provides the framework for relations between the EU and 77 countries
of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). It is based on
five interdependent pillars:
— a
comprehensive political dimension;
— participatory approaches;
— a strengthened focus on poverty reduction;
— a new framework for economic and trade
cooperation; and
— a reform of financial cooperation.
8.2 Article 96 provides for consultations between
the EU and an ACP State if the ACP State is considered to be in
breach of an "essential element" of the agreement (respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set out in Article
9 of the Agreement). If no remedy is found, "appropriate
measures" may be taken including, as a last resort, total
or partial suspension of the Agreement.
8.3 On 30 March 2004 the EU decided to open Article
96 consultations with the Government of Guinea (GOG). This decision
(which our predecessors cleared on 17 December 2003) was taken
because of the deterioration of democracy and the rule of law,
failure to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
lack of good economic governance, culminating in the December
2003 presidential elections, held in contentious conditions and
without real electoral competition — so much so that the
regional African body, ECOWAS, refused to monitor them in order
to avoid giving them legitimacy.
8.4 Subsequent developments are set out in our consideration
of two subsequent Council Decisions, which in 2005 began and in
2008 further extended a process of extended political dialogue
and progress monitoring. At the beginning of this process, the
GOG gave certain undertakings including:
i) a return to democracy through resumption of
dialogue with the traditional opposition and civil society, including
revision of the electoral arrangements; and holding local and
parliamentary elections based on the new electoral arrangements
in June 2005 and June 2007 respectively;
ii) upholding the Constitution and the law, so
guaranteeing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the rights of political parties to organise, meet, demonstrate
and speak in public; launching discussion on a legal framework
for liberalisation of the airwaves;
iii) promoting decentralisation; and
iv) enhancing macroeconomic management and implementing
sectoral reforms.
8.5 The 12-month extension resulted from decidedly
mixed political progress in the intervening years. Then, last
December, the Minister for Europe reported that the
reform agenda continued to be stalled, particularly with regard
to fulfilling the key undertaking given by the Guinea authorities
— to arrange free and fair parliamentary elections —
and noted that the next monitoring mission would be in February
2009.[38]
The Commission Communication
8.6 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 4 March 2009,
the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Caroline Flint) explains that the Communication concerns opening
consultations with the Republic of Guinea under Article 96 of
the Cotonou Agreement following the military coup d'état
of 23 December 2008.
8.7 The Minister says that:
— a
bloodless military coup took place then following the death of
President Conté after a long illness, when a military junta
calling itself the National Council for Democracy and Development
(CNDD) seized power and its leader, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara,
declared himself President of Guinea;
— the CNDD has suspended the Constitution,
dissolved the National Assembly and banned all political and trade
union activity;
— the coup has received widespread popular
support in Guinea. Following 24 years of President Conte's rule
many sought change. In justifying its actions the CNDD has promised
to root out corruption, update the Constitution and manage elections
before the end of 2010;
— the coup has however been strongly condemned
by the majority of the international community;
— the EU Presidency issued a statement
on 23 December immediately calling on all parties to respect the
Guinean Constitution in the interests of the people and country
in order to ensure a peaceful transition and the rapid organisation
of free and transparent elections;
— on 31 December the UK supported a further
EU Presidency statement which condemned all seizure of power by
force and called for:
- presidential and legislative
elections in Guinea by June 2009;
- a civilian interim government to be set up and
led by a civilian Prime Minister exercising full executive power;
- the CNDD to become more representative of society,
acting as an advisory body only, and to disband at the elections;
- CNDD members not to stand in elections; and
- teams already in place at the Ministry and National
Independent Electoral Committee responsible for arranging elections
to remain in their positions.
— the
EU also expressed its support for the positions of the African
Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
both of whom have suspended Guinea from their memberships.
8.8 The Communication outlines the results of the
14-16 January 2009 EU Monitoring Mission. It recalls that, before
the coup, the EU had been monitoring Guinea's progress against
a number of benchmarks agreed by the previous regime during Article
96 consultations concluded in 2005. The 14-16 January mission
met with senior figures in the interim government and CNDD, including
the self-declared President, as well as with members of political
parties, trade unions, civil society, and the Independent National
Electoral Commission. It reported mixed progress on the EU's calls
of 31 December: an end-June date for elections did not look promising
but the prospects for elections by the end of 2009 were better;
the junta had appointed Mr Kabiné Komara, a civilian international
banker, as the new interim Prime Minister on 30 December; however,
as Mr Komara's selection of Ministers for the transitional government
comprised one third military personnel, many in key dossiers and
members of the CNDD, the CNDD continued to hold the reins of power.
The Mission reported its belief that international engagement
could result in changes. However, the Prime Minister seemed weak
and lacking influence on many of the "transition parameters".
The slow registration of voters was worrying and reflected a lack
of capacity. Political parties and unions remained banned.
8.9 The monitoring mission recommended:
— opening
new Article 96 consultations with Guinea before the end March
2009
— pressing for a roadmap for elections
during continued reinforced dialogue
— incorporating in the consultations certain
consensual benchmarks such as:
- creating an international contact
group on Guinea including the EU, AU, ECOWAS and UN;
- reinforcing EU and member states' technical and
financial assistance to the electoral process and to evaluate
the Independent Electoral Commission's capacities;
- ensuring macroeconomics respect the good governance
criteria and coherence with the benchmarks of the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility.
8.10 The Commission is now proposing that the Commission
and the Council send a joint letter inviting the Republic of Guinea
to hold consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement,
and asks the Council to agree a draft letter attached in an Annex.
The Government's view
8.11 In her Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister
describes the military coup as a serious breach of the essential
elements of the Cotonou Agreement:
"Cotonou had Article 96 put in it to deal with
just these sorts of cases and there is no alternative for the
EU other than to open new Article 96 consultations as a matter
of urgency if it wants the Cotonou provisions to be taken seriously."
8.12 The Minister says that:
— the
draft letter has been discussed by partners at the African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) Working Group in Brussels and amendments agreed;
— the letter will now be jointly addressed
to the President of the CNDD as well as to the Prime Minister
of the Transitional Government; and
— the UK asked that language on elections
is put at the forefront of the list for the transition road map,
which needs to be detailed and specific, and that language is
also included pointing out that updating the legal framework should
not delay elections.
8.13 The Minister expects the Communication "to
go to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 16
March." She supports the recommended response:
"Article 96 consultations will allow the EU
to put pressure on the Guinean leadership to restore constitutional
order and ensure a peaceful democratic transition. The EU has
made its position clear, which we support, that elections should
take place this year. Notwithstanding the Article 96 talks the
EU should make it clear that it stands ready to help fund the
elections to a significant degree."
8.14 Looking ahead, the Minister says that the EU
is a member of the International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G)
which was set up during the AU Summit in February and includes,
among others, members from the AU, ECOWAS, EU and UN; and the
transition road map the Commission proposes to discuss with the
Guinean authorities during Article 96 consultations reflects the
position of the ICG-G.
Conclusion
8.15 The Committee has taken a particular interest
in the Article 96 process in Guinea Bisseau because the undertakings
given by the GOG were all in areas in which success, or failure,
might well have much wider lessons, or repercussions, not just
for the Cotonou Process but also European Security and Defence
Policy; a number of other countries in the region are similarly
challenged, against a background in which the inter-relationship
between development, security and good governance was now widely
acknowledged.
8.16 As we have noted elsewhere, the Cotonou Agreement
is clear: respect for human rights, democratic principles and
the rule of law are essential elements of the partnership, with
the Commission characterising the revision of the political components
in 2005 as "strengthening the political dimension by placing
greater emphasis on effective dialogue and results"; against
the yardstick set out in those last four words, it is difficult
to find much persuasive evidence that the Article 96 process has,
to use the Ministers words, led to the Cotonou provisions being
taken seriously — after over 5 years of Article 96 engagement,
Guinea would seem to be no nearer than it was then to a functioning
democratic and law-based society.[39]
8.17 Time alone will tell whether the apparently
wider process now being established will be any more successful.
In the fullness of time, we assume that, as before, a Council
Decision will be forthcoming on concluding these consultations,
with the adoption of further benchmarks and monitoring. However,
before then, we should like a report from the Minister, before
the summer recess, on what has been agreed and what progress has
been made; we should particularly like to know if elections are
put at the forefront of a detailed and specific transition road
map (and pointing out that updating the legal framework should
not delay elections) and how many of the mission's recommendations
have been implemented.
8.18 We now clear the document.
37 See http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm
for full information on the Cotonou Agreement. Back
38
See headnote: (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08, at chapter
7 of this Report. Back
39
See (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08 at chapter 7 of this
Report. Back
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