1 The EU Eastern
Partnership
| (a)
(30248)
16940/08
COM(08) 823
(b)
(30249)
16941/08
SEC(08) 2974
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Commission Communication: Eastern Partnership
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission Communication Eastern Partnership
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| Legal base | — |
| Document originated | 3 December 2008
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| Deposited in Parliament | 10 December 2008
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 30 March
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| Previous Committee Report | HC19-xi (2008-09), chapter 5 (18 March 2009) and HC19-ii (2008-09), chapter 7 (17 December 2008)
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| Discussed in Council | 11-12 December European Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; for debate in European Committee B
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Background
1.1 The June 2008 European Council initially discussed the
idea of an Eastern Partnership (EaP), based on a Polish/Swedish
proposal. It envisaged "enhancing EU policy towards eastern
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)[1]
partners in bilateral and multilateral formats", and agreed
on:
"the need to further promote regional cooperation among the
EU's eastern neighbours and between the EU and the region, as
well as bilateral cooperation between the EU and each of these
countries respectively, on the basis of differentiation and an
individual approach, respecting the character of the ENP as a
single and coherent policy framework."
1.2 It said that such cooperation "should
bring added value and be complementary to the already existing
and planned multilateral cooperation under and related to the
ENP, in particular the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension",
and invited the Commission to take the work forward and present
to the Council in Spring 2009 "a proposal for modalities
of the "Eastern Partnership", on the basis of relevant
initiatives."[2]
1.3 The Extraordinary Council on 1 September,
which met to discuss the crisis in Georgia, noted with concern
the impact of the crisis on the whole of the region, and considered
that it was "more necessary than ever to support regional
cooperation and step up its relations with its eastern neighbours,
in particular through its neighbourhood policy, the development
of the "Black Sea Synergy" initiative and an "Eastern
Partnership". The Council indicated that it now wished to
adopt this partnership in March 2009 and, to this end, invited
the Commission to submit its proposals sooner, in December 2008.[3]
The Commission Communication
1.4 The Committee considered this Commission
Communication (with the Commission Staff Working Document) last
December. It outlines proposals for a "step change"
within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in relations with
the six Eastern neighbours — Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus,
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan — "without prejudice
to individual countries' aspirations for their future relationship
with the EU." The Eastern Partnership (EaP) "should
bring a lasting political message of EU solidarity, alongside
additional, tangible support for their democratic and market-oriented
reforms and the consolidation of their statehood and territorial
integrity". The EaP will serve "the stability, security
and prosperity of the EU, partners and indeed the entire continent",
and "will be pursued in parallel with the EU's strategic
partnership with Russia". The main proposals are set out
in our previous Reports; in sum they are:
— new
Association Agreements (AAs) between the EU and each partner country,
to encourage these countries to adopt EU norms and standards,
both in terms of democracy and governance as well as technical
standards for trade, energy and other sectors, and advance cooperation
on CFSP and ESDP;
— a Comprehensive Institution Building
programme (CIB) to help build partners' administrative capacity
to meet commitments and conditions arising from the AAs;
— a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement
between each EaP country, with a longer term vision of creating
a neighbourhood economic community;
— individual country mobility and security
pacts: encompassing both labour mobility and cooperation on tackling
illegal migration, border management aligned to EU standards,
and enhanced efforts to fight organised crime and corruption;
— talks on visa facilitation with partners:
improved consular coverage; roadmaps to waiving visa fees from
Schengen countries and increased EU support for national strategies
to tackle organised crime, trafficking etc (with non-Schengen
countries such as the UK invited to take parallel steps);
— policies to promote energy security;
— a new multilateral forum to allow EU
member states to share information with the Eastern Partners to
help these countries to modernise, with an annual meeting of Foreign
Ministers and a biennial meeting of Heads of State and Government;
and
— third countries (eg other Black Sea Synergy
partners like Russia and Turkey) could be involved in various
projects if all the partners agreed.
1.5 The proposal was strongly supported by the
Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Caroline
Flint). But, as the Commission itself pointed out, significant
additional resources would be needed. With "significant pressures
on the ENP Instrument due to reallocation of funding for the Georgia
crisis and on-going support to the Palestinian Territories",
the Commission estimated it would need €600 million extra
in this budget to support the implementation of the EaP; €250
million had been found from the existing ENPI envelope (2010-2013),
mainly through re-prioritisation of funds from the Regional East
Programme; but an additional €350 million of new money would
be required. Detailed Commission proposals were awaited: "further
re-prioritisation in the framework of the budget mid-term review
[would] need to be carefully balanced with the needs, expectations
and current initiatives (such as the Union for the Mediterranean)
for the Southern neighbours."
1.6 The Committee recognised that the EaP "business
case" was well made. But in addition to the immediate challenge
of adequate funding, the Committee noted that success would require
the sort of commitment by all concerned that has so far eluded
the most well-established precursor, the moribund Barcelona Process,
which the Union is in the process of endeavouring to reinvigorate:
could the Union do both successfully when success with one had
so far been limited? We also wondered what Russia's reaction was
likely to be. The Committee therefore indicated that it was minded
to recommend the Communication for debate in the fullness of time,
but first asked the Minister to write, in good time ahead of the
Spring European Council (when the December European Council envisaged
"this ambitious initiative being approved") with details
of the Commission's eventual financial proposals and other aspects
of its response to the Council's invitation to study [the proposals
in the Communication] and report back prior to that Council.
1.7 In the meantime we retained the document
under scrutiny.
The Minister's letter of 12 March 2009
1.8 The Minister said that, since her Explanatory
Memorandum of November 2008, there had been "some progress
in discussions on the issues" she mentioned. Member States
were "broadly content" with the proposed aims, principles
and framework for the Eastern Partnership: a bilateral and a multilateral
dimension, regular meetings at Head of government level and at
foreign minister level, thematic platforms taking forward work
on agreed areas including energy, economic integration and convergence
with EU policies, people-to-people contacts and democracy, good
governance and stability. Following official level discussions
covering trade, JHA issues, energy, migration and development,
the February General Affairs and External Relations Council gave
broad approval to the plans at a conceptual level; the 19-20 March
Spring European Council was expected to endorse short conclusions,
with a declaration annexed to them; and the Presidency would host
a Summit to launch the Eastern Partnership on 7 May in Prague,
which would include a joint statement.
1.9 But there had been "some more difficult
aspects":
Financing:
the Commission had found €250 million from the regional East
envelope within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI). It was now proposing to find the other €350 million
for 2010-13 from the budget set aside for crises and to accommodate
unforeseen expenditure. The Minister was concerned that sufficient
money should be left to cover other priorities that may arise,
e.g. Kosovo and Palestine; she was reassured to the extent that
the Commission would need Council approval for allocations to
Eastern partner countries on an annual basis, which would enable
other claims on the margins and other external relations priorities
to be considered. She now expected more detailed discussions in
the run-up to the 7 May Summit through the EU's annual budgetary
process; although Member States had acknowledged the need for
adequate financing to enable the Partnership to achieve its political
goals, some were concerned that the funding would affect the informal
agreement to split ENPI funding by one third for the East and
two thirds for the South, even though the Commission had given
an assurance that funding for EaP would not come at the expense
of resources for the South.
Mobility: the Minister
was broadly content that the Eastern Partnership proposals should
promote the mobility of citizens as long as important conditionality
remained built in — for example, that steps towards any
visa liberalisation took place gradually, as a long-term aim and
on a case-by-case basis, and provided that conditions on improved
migration management were in place; the UKBA wanted to guard against
any decisions that could increase migratory pressures from any
of the six into the UK, and were keen that the UK's position outside
of the Schengen region was recognised and that the UK's independent
mechanisms for managing migration, such as the visa waiver test,
were not threatened.
Third country involvement:
The Minister was content with the February GAERC decision that
third countries such as Russia and Turkey should be invited to
participate in Eastern Partnership projects on a case by case
basis, but not in the launch summit on 7 May itself; and professed
herself keen that communication with Russia on the Eastern Partnership
should be fully transparent, to make clear that it was not conceived
as an anti-Russian initiative.
Belarusian participation:
a decision on the level of Belarusian participation at the Launch
Summit would be taken in April, nearer the time; Belarusian recognition
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would make their participation in
a Summit with Georgia very difficult.
1.10 Finally, looking ahead to the substance
of the Summit, the Minister wanted to see a substantive agenda,
for example including a discussion of cooperation on energy and
economic issues, to reinforce this focus and to help emphasise
that the EU was not just considering solutions for Member States
but was "reaching out to support Eastern neighbours too."
1.11 We doubted that information seven days before
was "in good time before" the European Council, since
it made impossible what was our clear intention: that this proposal
be debated before then. Nonetheless, the Minister's comments made
it clear that there were still sufficient ambiguities —
particularly over finance, movement controls, the views of Russia
and the involvement of Belarus, with whom the EU has had major
difficulties over governance issues — for a debate to be
warranted. That debate is now to take place in European Committee
B on 27 April.
The Minister's letter of 30 March 2009
1.12 The Minister writes to update the committee
following discussion at the Spring European Council:
"The Spring European Council's endorsement was
an important step forward. The Council also gave the go-ahead
for preparation of the Eastern Partnership launch Summit on 7
May. The adopted Conclusions, which included a detailed Declaration
setting out the aims, principles and process involved for the
Eastern Partnership, were helpful and broadly reflect our objectives.[4]
We were pleased that the Declaration set a high level of political
ambition in line with the Commission's Communication of 3 December
2008. The Eastern Partnership has the goals of significantly strengthening
EU policy with regard to the Eastern partners, including supporting
reforms and facilitating approximation with EU law and convergence
with EU standards. We were also pleased that the Declaration contained
a reference to partners' participation being without prejudice
to their aspirations for their future relationship with the EU;
this safeguards our concern that the EU should keep the door open
to potential membership for those partners who have such aspirations
and who might meet the membership criteria in the future.
"We will continue to support the Presidency
in its preparations for the Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May.
The Summit gives us the opportunity to highlight the contribution
that the Eastern Partnership will make in offering support for
the political and economic reforms that will help partners in
the current economic difficulties. It may be possible to prioritise
practical support through fast-track projects. We should also
highlight the medium term benefits to partners of closer economic
integration with the EU.
"The full details of the Commission's financing
proposals have yet to be discussed. Our approach will be to balance
our political support for the Partnership with our wish for budget
discipline and improvements in the delivery of EU assistance including
better resource allocation based on needs and absorption capacities.
My officials will be exploring with HMT, DFID and the Commission
what scope there might be for further redeployment of financing
from the existing ENPI envelope and for ensuring that adequate
budget margins are maintained, in line with the Council's conclusions.
"We have concerns about human rights and democracy
in a number of the partners. Belarus has been the focus of particular
concern (my letter to you of 20 March refers). The issue of whether
to invite President Lukashenko to the Summit will be given further
consideration by the Presidency and EU partners in the coming
weeks. More broadly, the Summit will provide an opportunity to
encourage governance and human rights reform in the region through
engagement."
Conclusion
1.13 The Minister concludes her letter by
looking forward to the debate, as do we, and consider this chapter
of our Report relevant to it.
1 According to its website, the ENP was developed in
2004 "with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new
dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and
instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security
of all concerned." See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
2
Paragraphs 68-70; see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/101346.pdf
for the full Council Conclusions. Back
3
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf
for the full Council Conclusions Back
4
The Declaration is at the Annex to this chapter of our Report,
and the conclusions are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/106809.pdf. Back
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