1 Barcelona Process:
Union for the Mediterranean
| (29704)
9865/08
COM(08) 319
| Commission Communication: Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean
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| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 22 April 2009
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008) and HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008); also see (29029) —: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 2 (7 November 2007)
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| Discussed in Council | 16 June 2008 General Affairs and External Relations Council and 20 June 2008 European Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
1.1 The March 2008 European Council "approved the principle
of a Union for the Mediterranean which will include the Member
States of the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean coastal states"
and "invited the Commission to present to the Council the
necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be
called "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean"
with a view to the Summit which will take place in Paris on 13
July 2008."
1.2 The Barcelona Process (a.k.a. the Euro-Med Process)
was launched during the 1995 Spanish Presidency between the EU
and its Mediterranean partners — Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia
and Turkey (Libya has observer status since 1999) — with
the aim of building "a space of dialogue, peace, security
and shared prosperity". At the outset, now nearly 14 years
ago, the Commission described this as "a turning point in
Euro-Mediterranean relations". On examining the most recent
Commission Communication on the Process in November 2007, the
Committee concluded that, in reality, it had become impossible
to judge the extent to which the Process was merely processing,
rather than achieving concrete outcomes; and that, with approximately
€4.7 billion committed in 2000-06 and a further €1.3
billion earmarked for 2007-10, it was time to examine the Process
more closely, via a debate on the Communication in the European
Standing Committee.[1]
That debate took place on 22 January 2008.[2]
1.3 During that debate, there was some, perforce
limited, discussion of President Sarkozy's idea of a "Union
of the Mediterranean", which would apparently have been restricted
to Mediterranean EU Member States and the Mediterranean partners.
However, Chancellor Merkel opposed the notion that EU funds should
be used in this way for the benefit of only some Member States
— hence the compromise embodied in the European Council
Conclusions, which includes all 27 Member States and all 700 million
people on both sides (now including Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro and Monaco).
The Commission Communication
1.4 The Communication (which we considered on 18
June 2008)[3] sets out
the rationale for the Process and a vision for enhanced cooperation.
The intention would be to build on the existing process, but add
a number of higher-profile projects to give added impetus and
visibility. Funding arrangements were somewhat imprecise. The
Commission noted that the EU and its Member States already provided
significant funding in the Mediterranean region (at Annex 1 of
the relevant chapter of our previous Report), but that "to
bring added value to existing arrangements, the "Barcelona
Process: Union for the Mediterranean" should be designed
to mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through
regional projects", and that "its added value will very
much depend on its capacity to attract more financial resources
for regional projects." While saying that there could be
no prior earmarking of EU funds, the Commission said that "certain
projects which fit with the objectives of EU regional programmes
can be considered for funding" (ditto, Annex 2), and also
that additional funding for regional projects and activities should
come mainly from the following sources:
— private
sector participation;
— bilateral cooperation from Member States;
— contributions from Mediterranean partners;
— international financial institutions,
regional banks and other bilateral funds;
— the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and
Partnership Facility (FEMIP), which was created in 2002 as a tool
to foster private sector development in the Mediterranean region
and combines EIB loans with EU-budget resources to provide technical
assistance, risk capital and interest rate subsidies;
— the ENPI, as well as the other instruments
applicable to the countries covered by the existing Euro-Med Process.
1.5 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the
then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Mr Jim Murphy) welcomed the Communication. He shared the concerns
of other Member States that the Barcelona Process, "though
useful, needed a strategic refresh." The Union for the Mediterranean
would "upgrade this important relationship." The Communication
offered "a realistic assessment of what has been achieved,
and the areas for further development." While the European
Neighbourhood Policy had primarily been an instrument of bilateral
cooperation between the EU and each partner country, it had been
less successful at promoting regional integration and cohesion.
The projects identified by the Commission were "potentially
promising" and would help "fill that gap." He would
explore the specific proposals the Commission had made on governance
arrangements with EU and Mediterranean partners, before detailed
modalities were submitted for approval in November 2008, when
EuroMed Foreign Ministers would meet. Hitherto, he "tended
to favour a light Secretariat (with Commission involvement) which
would help to coordinate the Process effectively." He would
"update the Committee in the autumn as this debate unfolds."
More immediately, he anticipated that the 16 June GAERC and 19-20
June European Council might discuss next steps on the Union for
the Mediterranean, in advance of the formal French Presidency
launch in Paris on 13 July.
1.6 We asked the then Minister to write to us after
the July Summit to let us know of the outcomes, and at the same
time to take the opportunity to enlighten us about the recent
Polish-Swedish proposals for an Eastern partnership to which he
referred, but with which we were not familiar.
1.7 We also noted a number of questions that came
to mind. The Commission talked of the need for additional funding.
But a great deal of money had been spent so far, with only limited
outcomes. We wondered if more money was the answer; where would
it come from; and what would ensure that it was spent effectively.
1.8 We also asked to know in due course the arrangements
envisaged for the proposed secretariat — in particular,
how it would fit in with the existing modalities of the Barcelona
Process; how those modalities would be changed; and how those
changes would lead to better outcomes, more visibility and more
real ownership by the Mediterranean partners than had been the
case hitherto under the Barcelona Process.
1.9 In the meantime, we retained the Communication
under scrutiny.[4]
The then Minister's letter of 21 July 2008
1.10 The then Minister for Europe noted that the
Summit was attended by the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary
attended a pre-meeting with Foreign Ministers which helped to
finalise the Summit Declaration, which sets out the purpose of
the Union for the Mediterranean and the areas for action reinforcing
the Barcelona process (see Annex 1 of this chapter of our Report).
Some useful work had been conducted on energy, environment, and
political dialogue". The Summit itself was "also a valuable
occasion to bring political leaders from the EU and the Mediterranean
together", with "a number of highly symbolic moments:
a meeting between Presidents Asad and Sleiman, which agreed on
the opening of embassies in Beirut and Damascus following the
formation of a new Lebanese government just before the summit;
a meeting between Presidents Sarkozy and Asad, confirming an end
to Syria's pariah status; and a highly publicised trilateral meeting
with President Sarkozy, President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert."
1.11 Looking ahead, the Minister said that he would
write to the Committee during the autumn about "discussions
around the governance and funding of the Union for the Mediterranean,
which will need to be resolved in advance of the November Foreign
Ministers' meeting." For his own part, the then Minister
said that
— he
would "continue to argue for a light secretariat with well-defined
objectives", and "would have concerns about any EC Budget
funds being called on to finance the administrative structures
proposed";
— projects that were to be supported by
the EC Budget should come from existing rather than additional
resources; and
— there should there be no diversion of
funding within the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
framework.
1.12 We thanked the then Minister for this comprehensive
update, and looked forward to hearing more from him as discussions
continued (including, at some stage before proposals were finalised
for discussion in November, the answer to our earlier questions).
We also asked to know what aspects of the Declaration he considered
to be of particular value. In the meantime, we continued to retain
the document under scrutiny.
The Minister's letter of 22 April 2009
1.13 A response finally appeared on 22 April 2009,
in a letter of that date from his successor, the Minister for
Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Caroline Flint).
The Minister says that "the creation of UMed remains an important
political issue to the United Kingdom", and continues as
follows:
"In particular, we see it is a potentially useful
tool to promote dialogue on security, the environment, confidence
building and business and to implement projects along these lines.
We want to ensure that the good work carried out under the European
Neighbourhood Partners[hip] Instrument and the EU's Association
Agreements in the region continues unaffected. We want to keep
its funding light, shared between all partners and focused on
delivering tangible projects in the region. Our key objectives
are inclusivity and to create a true partnership between the EU
and the Mediterranean countries."
1.14 The Minister then turns to the 3-4 November
2008 Marseilles Summit:
"Foreign Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary,
met again on 3 and 4 November 2008 in Marseille and were mandated
to resolve the outstanding institutional issues and deal with
the role of the Arab League in UMed which had led to a suspension
of meetings following the Paris summit. Not all of these were
resolved but the Marseille summit did agree:
— Barcelona
as the seat for the Secretariat. Tunisia and Malta also bid to
host the Secretariat but following negotiations amongst the candidates,
Barcelona emerged as the only candidate. No details were developed
for the Secretariat other than, at UK instance, language was inserted
into the declaration that the EU's share of the funding should
come from existing European Neighbourhood Partners Instrument
allocations;
— That the Secretariat would have a Secretary
General from a Southern Mediterranean Partner country and five
confirmed Deputy Secretary General slots: tacitly agreed to go
to Malta, Italy, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Greece.
There continues to be disagreement over a sixth position which
Turkey could hold. France, as UMed Co-Presidency, is talking directly
to Turkey and Cyprus in an attempt to resolve this problem. The
Secretary General and each of the deputy Secretary Generals would
be given a specific area of competence;
— That the development of the Secretariat's
Statutes, funding and mandate would be taken forward at working
level;
— Arab League inclusion in UMed. Israel
dropped its concerns over Arab League involvement allowing the
League to participate in all UMed meetings, ending the suspension
of UMed meetings.
1.15 The Minister then considers the matter of Suspensions
"Progress following the Paris and the Marseille
summits has been limited due to the two suspensions of UMed meetings
at the Arab Group's insistence. The first suspension was over
the inclusion of the Arab League, the second and ongoing suspension
is over the Gaza conflict of December and January. The suspension
of meetings has prevented much of the detail around governance
and funding, especially the planned Secretariat, being fully defined
and discussed."
1.16 She then outlines the matter of the UMed
Co-Presidency
"At the Paris summit in July 2008, it was agreed
that there would be two co-presidents of UMed, one from the Southern
Partners rotating every two years and one from the EU, held by
the EU Presidency of the time. It was suggested that France could
remain as UMed co-presidency for two years so as to add consistency
to the process. The matter was resolved with the French and Czech
Governments agreeing that France would remain as Co-President
of UMed working alongside the current Czech EU Presidency. We
continue to emphasise the importance of adhering to existing rules
on external EU representation."
1.17 Finally, the Minister outlines the state of
play on the Secretariat:
"Despite the current suspension, some negotiations
within the EU have continued. These have been specifically focused
on preparing the Secretariat's Statutes which will establish the
secretariat and govern its operations. The intention has been
to prepare a text for discussion at a drafting group in Barcelona,
although the date for this meeting has yet to be scheduled. We
have provided comments on the draft Statutes. We want to ensure
that there is Council oversight and approval of the draft texts
and that procedures are put in place to ensure effective coordination
within the EU in relation to the future activities of the Secretariat.
We have also asked for greater discussion on how UMed ties in
with existing EU work in the Mediterranean region and an agreed
EU position before we discuss this outside of the EU.
"In particular we are pushing for:
— Clear
text in the Statutes, clarity on their status and an agreed EU
position before any wider discussions with the non-EU UMed members
take place;
— Normal EU coordination procedures to
apply for the creation of an EU position on the work of the Secretariat
once it is established; and
— Ensuring that the prerogatives of the
European Parliament are respected, particularly on monitoring
the budget.
"The basis for the establishment of the UMed
Secretariat flows from the Ministerial declarations and UMed has
always been a fluid and informal process. However, we expect further
discussion in the EU regarding the Secretariat Statutes along
the lines set out above, although at this stage we do not expect
a Council Decision. I will of course update you in due course
as negotiations progress."
Conclusion
1.18 The contrast between the aspirations set
out in the Minister's opening remarks — particularly "inclusivity"
and "a true partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean
countries" — and everything that follows is striking,
and gives little comfort to those who struggled to see how this
initiative was likely to lead to any improvement on the Barcelona
Process. At the practical level, politics and horse-trading is
already prevalent: otherwise, why create five confirmed Deputy
Secretary General slots before working out what they are going
to do? On all other aspects of the Secretariat and funding, it
would seem that everything is still to be determined.
1.19 We shall therefore continue to retain the
Communication under scrutiny, pending further information from
the Minister — including answers to our questions concerning
how more money is likely to be the answer, when €6 billion
has been spent or committed thus far on the existing Process;
where it would come from; and what would ensure that it is spent
effectively. When that is forthcoming, we should also like the
Minister to explain what the "existing rules on external
EU representation", to which she refers, are, and how they
have been protected; and also to explain how the statutes could
properly be adopted other than by a Council Decision. We also
take this opportunity to remind her that we asked her predecessor
to tell us what aspects in particular of the lengthy Paris Summit
Declaration are considered to be of particular value.
Annex 1: A strategic ambition
for the Mediterranean
1. "Europe and the Mediterranean countries
are bound by history, geography and culture. More importantly,
they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future
of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural
understanding. To achieve these common objectives participants
agree to continue with renewed dynamism the quest for peace and
cooperation, to explore their joint problems and transform these
good intentions into actions in a renewed partnership for progress.
2. "Heads of State and Government underline
the important role played by the Barcelona Process since 1995.
The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean
relations. Representing a partnership of 39 governments and over
700 million people, it has provided a framework for continued
engagement and development. The Barcelona Process is the only
forum within which all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views
and engage in constructive dialogue. It represents a strong commitment
to peace, democracy, regional stability and security through regional
cooperation and integration. The Barcelona Process: Union for
the Mediterranean aims to build on that consensus to pursue cooperation,
political and socio-economic reform and modernisation on the basis
of equality and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty.
3. "Heads of State and Government underscore
the importance of the active participation of civil society, local
and regional authorities and the private sector in the implementation
of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.
4. "To
take advantage of the opportunities offered by an enhanced framework
of multilateral cooperation, Heads of State and Government decide
to launch a reinforced partnership — The Barcelona Process:
Union for the Mediterranean.
5. "This initiative is also the expression
of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security
according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which, inter alia,
promotes regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical
and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance
with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation
regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT,
CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free
zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling
in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament
and non-proliferation conventions.
The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively
verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction,
nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.
Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms; refrain
from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence
requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve
the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest
possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW; promote
conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among
themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security,
prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation; consider
any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken
between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area
of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the
long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact
to that end.
6. "It shows the determination to favour
human resource development and employment in line with the Millennium
Development Goals, including alleviating poverty. Heads of State
and Government underline their commitment to strengthen democracy
and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political
life and the embracing of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
They also affirm their ambition to build a common future based
on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in international human rights
law, such as the promotion of economic, social, cultural, civil
and political rights, strengthening the role of women in society,
the respect of minorities, the fight against racism and xenophobia
and the advancement of cultural dialogue and mutual understanding.
7. "Heads of State and Government reaffirm
their support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, as referred
to in the Lisbon Euromed Ministerial Meeting (November 2007) and
according to the Annapolis process. They recall that peace in
the Middle East requires a comprehensive solution and in this
regard welcome the announcement that Syria and Israel have initiated
indirect peace talks under the auspices of Turkey, in accordance
with the Madrid conference terms of reference for peace.
8. "Heads of State and Government reiterate
their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
and their determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors
and they reaffirm their commitment to fully implement the Code
of Conduct on Countering Terrorism in order to enhance the security
of all citizens within a framework that ensures respect of the
rule of law and human rights, particularly through more effective
counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation to dismantle
all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets and to
manage the consequences of attacks. They emphasise the need to
address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations without qualification, committed
by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.
"They also reiterate the complete rejection
of attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism
and confirm their commitment to do their utmost effort with a
view to resolving conflict, ending occupation, confronting oppression,
reducing poverty, promoting human rights and good governance,
improving intercultural understanding and ensuring respect for
all religions and beliefs. Such actions serve directly the interests
of the people of the Euro-Med region and work against the interests
of the terrorists and the networks.
"Scope and main objectives
9. "Heads of State and Government agree
that the challenge of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean
is to enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of
the process, set governance on the basis of equal footing and
translate it into concrete projects, more visible to citizens.
Now is the time to inject a new and continuing momentum into the
Barcelona Process. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed
to translate the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into
tangible results.
10. "The Euro-Mediterranean partnership
continues to be an inclusive process driven in all its aspects
by the principle of consensus, for which the modalities in terms
of projects will be decided by the next Foreign Affairs Ministerial
meeting in November 2008.
11. "The Barcelona Process: Union for the
Mediterranean will build on the acquis and reinforce the achievements
and successful elements of the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona
Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid
and its three chapters of cooperation (Political Dialogue, Economic
Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue)
will continue to remain central in Euro-Mediterranean relations.
The Five-Year Work Programme adopted by the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean
Summit held in Barcelona in 2005 (including the fourth chapter
of cooperation on "Migration, Social Integration, Justice
and Security" introduced at that stage) and the conclusions
of all ministerial meetings will remain in force. Heads of State
and Government acknowledge the progress and economic benefits
of the creation of a deep Free Trade Area in the Euromed region
by 2010 and beyond, and the strengthening of regional economic
integration in all its dimensions. They support the main lines
of the Euromed Trade Roadmap till 2010 and beyond, and, in particular,
to study the establishment of a smooth, efficient and business-friendly
trade facilitation mechanism which would bring further transparency
and trade and investment opportunities.
12. "Heads of State and Government underline
that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean aims to
achieve a future of peace and shared prosperity in the entire
region by implementing projects that will enhance the flow of
exchanges among the people of the whole region. In this regard
they acknowledge the human and cultural dimension of this initiative.
They underline the commitment to facilitate legal movement of
individuals. They stress that promoting orderly managed legal
migration in the interest of all parties concerned, fighting illegal
migration and fostering links between migration and development
are issues of common interest which should be addressed through
a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach.
13. "The Barcelona Process: Union for the
Mediterranean will be complementary to EU bilateral relations
with these countries[5]
which will continue under existing policy frameworks such
as the Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy
action plans, and, in the case of Mauritania, the African Caribbean
Pacific framework. It will also be coherent and complementary
with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. While complementing activities
concerning its regional dimension, the Barcelona Process: Union
for the Mediterranean will be independent from the EU enlargement
policy, accession negotiations and the pre-accession process.
14. "The Barcelona Process: Union for the
Mediterranean gives a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in
at least three very important ways:
— "by
upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its
Mediterranean partners;
— "by providing for further co-ownership
to our multilateral relations; and
— "by making these relations more
concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional
projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.
"Upgrading of relations
15. "Heads of State and Government agree
to hold biennial summits. The summits should result in a political
declaration and a short list of concrete regional projects to
be set in motion. The conclusions should endorse a broad two-year
work programme for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.
Annual Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will review progress
in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the
next summit meetings and, if necessary, approve new projects.
16. "The summit meetings should take place
alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries.
The host country should be selected by consensus. All countries
party to the initiative will be invited to Summits, Ministerials
and other plenary meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for
the Mediterranean.
17. "The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary
Assembly will be the legitimate parliamentary expression of the
Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Heads of State
and Government strongly support the strengthening of the role
of the EMPA in its relations with Mediterranean partners.
"The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation
for the Dialogue between Cultures as a Euro-Mediterranean institution
will contribute in an effective manner to the cultural dimension
of the initiative in cooperation with the UN Alliance of Civilizations."
1 See headnote: (29029) -: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter
2 (7 November 2007). Back
2
See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmgeneral/euro/080122/80122s01.htm. Back
3
See headnote: HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008). Back
4
See headnote: HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008). Back
5
The countries concerned are: Algeria; Egypt; Israel; Jordan; Lebanon;
Mauritania; Monaco; Morocco; Palestinian Authority; Syria; Tunisia.
Croatia and Turkey, negotiating candidate countries to the EU.
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, potential candidates
to the EU. Libya, invited by the Presidency since the Euromed
Stuttgart ministerial meeting of 1999. Back
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