2 Nuclear non-proliferation
| (30525)
8182/09
COM(09) 143
| Commission Communication: Nuclear non-proliferation
|
| Legal base | — |
| Document originated | 26 March 2009
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 3 April 2009
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 21 April 2009
|
| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (29718) 10049/08: HC16-xxvi (2007-08), chapter 3 (2 July 2008)
|
| To be discussed in Council | To be determined
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
|
Background
2.1 The Commission notes that given the political context in recent
years, with a growing number of countries looking into possibilities
to engage a civil nuclear energy programme, there is an even clearer
need to strengthen international guarantees of non-proliferation.
2.2 The Commission recalls that:
— the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[6]
sets out the general framework to address the non-proliferation
challenge and entrusts the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to play a key role in this area; and which acknowledges
the right of all NPT Parties to develop and use nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes;
— the UN Security Council acts as authority
of last resort to address the cases of major breaches to non-proliferation
commitments;
— the European Union, the Community and
their Member States act "within their respective competences,
in multiple ways in this area, comprising actions in the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as those
founded on the Community Treaties." In this way, the Commission
says, "the EU can provide a considerable contribution to
addressing the non-proliferation challenge also at global level,
based on its extensive experience in dealing with nuclear power
and the range of instruments at its disposal."
2.3 The Commission also recalls that, in its Communication
10049/08 on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear
safety and security",[7]
it announced that it would address to the Council and the Parliament
a specific Communication on the various EU instruments available
in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, in particular under
the Euratom Treaty.
The Commission Communication
2.4 The Commission says that the purpose of this
Communication is therefore:
"to set out the global context highlighting
the need for strengthened international guarantees of non-proliferation
(Section 2), to present the main available EU instruments in this
field, in particular those under the Euratom Treaty, (Section
3), and the possible ways these instruments could be used to develop
— in close coordination with the IAEA — stronger international
guarantees of non-proliferation (Section 4)."
2.5 It notes that the proliferation risk from the
use of nuclear energy arises from two specific nuclear activities,
namely enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel — activities that "require very complex and costly
technologies which can only be economically justified if a market
demand exists from a large number of nuclear power plants"
— and that, in this context of growing interest for nuclear
energy, "the international community must do everything possible
to minimize the risks of nuclear security incidents and/or diversion
of either nuclear materials or technology to non-peaceful uses
[and] ensure that conditions continue to be met regarding nuclear
non-proliferation, including the norms of the NPT and of the IAEA.",
which it sees as the key international actor in preventing nuclear
proliferation, deriving from the NPT and the enhanced safeguards
regime based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional
Protocols, and the right to possess fissile nuclear materials.
2.6 The Commission then reviews the main EU instruments
in the non-proliferation area, beginning with Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP). The Commission notes that, beginning
in 2003 with the European Security Strategy[8]
and, within it, the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), non-proliferation has been a key policy
objective, and that the EU's concern has been reinforced by the
report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy
approved in December 2008,[9]
leading to the New Lines for Action in combating WMD proliferation
endorsed by the 8-9 December 2008 GAERC. The Commission sees an
important place for itself in implementing these New Lines for
Action through different Community instruments and policies, and
notes both that the EU has provided its full backing to the UN
Security Council Resolution 1540[10]
and that Council Joint Actions are on-going in support of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) actions.
2.7 The Commission sees a particular role in non-proliferation
cooperation with third countries for the Instrument for Nuclear
Safety Cooperation,[11]
the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)[12]
and the Instrument for Stability (IfS)[13]
— where this last-named will broaden its focus, which has
hitherto been on training and assistance in the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) fields in the former Soviet Union,
to encompass new regions of concern, including South-East Asia,
the Middle East and parts of Africa, in particular in the nuclear
and biological fields, drawing on a budget of €300 million
in 2007-2013.
2.8 The Commission then reviews the role of the Euratom
Treaty, whose main objective is the peaceful development of
nuclear energy, and where "many provisions of the Treaty
cover activities and institutions which contribute to non-proliferation
of nuclear materials, including at international level, where
the Community may negotiate and enter into agreements with third
States and international organizations (Chapter 10 Euratom)".
The main Euratom related activities linked to the non-proliferation
listed are:
— Safeguard
activities, where the
Commission has the responsibility to verify that fissile nuclear
materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared
by Community users, and where basic safeguards agreements have
been concluded between Member States, Euratom and the IAEA; close
co-operation with the IAEA extends beyond inspection to the implementation
in the Community of the Additional Protocols to the safeguards
agreements with the IAEA, which complement the IAEA safeguards
system, enabling it to detect, beyond diversion of declared materials,
undeclared nuclear activities; the Commission also supports the
transfer of methodologies for safeguards through the implementation
of various Community instruments (such as the TACIS programme
with the Commonwealth of Independent States).
— Health and safety, physical protection,
illicit trafficking and export controls, which provide for
licensing, authorisation and notification procedures which aim
to guarantee that radioactive materials are not possessed, used
or transported without appropriate regulatory control. Council
Regulation 1334/2000 is the Community instrument that enables
Member States to implement their commitments to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, where the Commission participates as an observer and chairs
the committee set up by the regulation which addresses all implementation
issues.
— The Euratom Supply Agency, whose
contribution to non-proliferation is mainly:
- Authorising the conclusion
of supply contracts, when nuclear materials are physically imported
into the Community or exported from the Community;
- Checking that supply contracts are concluded
only for peaceful end-uses and that all supply contracts include
a safeguards clause;
- Export authorisation procedures for nuclear materials
produced in the Community.
— Research
and the Joint Research Centre (JRC):
The JRC has been entrusted with the development of methodologies
and technologies for the implementation of safeguards, the training
of both Commission and IAEA inspectors and the implementation
of the European support programme to the IAEA; assisting in the
transfer of the "acquis communautaire" to new Member
States by training their authorities and experts during the enlargement
process; and implementation of the TACIS Programme on nuclear
security, including significant support to the Science and Technology
Centres in Moscow[14]
and Kiev,[15]
which aims at limiting the
proliferation of sensitive knowledge obtained by scientists in
the framework of WMD programmes; continued support to programmes
for the redirection of weapons scientists in CIS countries and
other regions is being provided by the Instrument for Stability.
2.9 The Commission then examines The Possible
Way Forward, proposing the following "key actions":
— Strengthening
support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its safeguards and the
Additional Protocol;
— Extending cooperation with key nuclear
countries through bilateral Euratom agreements, in coordination
with measures taken on the basis of the May 2008 Communication
on "Addressing the international challenge on nuclear safety
and security";
— Contributing to the development of an
international system of guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for
countries willing to develop nuclear energy without having their
own nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
2.10 With regard to the last of these, the Commission
draws attention to the 8 December 2008 decision by the Council
in principle to support the establishment of a nuclear fuel
bank under the control of the IAEA, to which the European
Union could contribute up to €25 million, once the conditions
and modalities for the bank have been defined and approved by
the IAEA Board of Governors. The Commission says that "at
the same time, the Council welcomed the readiness of the Commission
to contribute to this project through relevant Community instruments",
and suggests that "in order to speed up the decision making
process, a mandate could be given to the Commission to contribute
to the definition of the conditions and modalities for establishing
the fuel bank." It sees "one of the main advantages
of a multilateral approach" as being "to encourage new
market entrants to voluntarily abstain from making complex and
costly investments which are disproportionate to their needs,
while bringing additional guarantees to fuel supply security."
By "actively contributing to the development of such an initiative",
the EU could "make full use of available Euratom
and other Community instruments
such as the Instrument for Stability and the Instrument for Nuclear
Safety and should take into account both the provisions of international
agreements, the Euratom Treaty and the good functioning of the
European nuclear market.". With "the security of supply
for nuclear fuels" being "essential for guaranteeing
non-proliferation, in particular to prevent the spread of sensitive
technologies, such as enrichment, the Commission says that the
Euratom Supply Agency "should become a key actor in this
process."
The Government's view
2.11 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 21 April 2009,
the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with
responsibility for non-proliferation (Bill Rammell MP) comments
as follows:
"Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The European Union is active in championing the NPT at a political
level. It played a central role in achieving a successful outcome
to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee and promotes a balanced
approach to reinvigorating the three pillars — non-proliferation,
disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — upon
which the NPT is founded. The Communication sets out a menu of
practical options for the EU to strengthen the non-proliferation
pillar, which are complementary to the UK's priorities.
"The Prime Minister in his speech of 17 March,
as well as supporting states who wish to develop civil nuclear
power, emphasised the importance of ensuring certainty of detection
and certainty of serious consequences for any party breaching
its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The UK shares the EU
view that the IAEA safeguards regime needs to be strengthened
and is pursuing several tracks to this end, including ensuring
that the IAEA has the resources, powers and leadership it needs
to discharge its duties.
"We are pushing hard for universal adoption
of the IAEA Additional Protocol and are committed to looking at
the development of next generation safeguards to provide even
greater levels of assurance. The UK will publish later this year
a 'Road to 2010' plan in advance of next year's key NPT Review
Conference that will include proposals to make automatic both
the referral of cases of material non-compliance to the United
Nations Security Council and, except in the most minor cases,
the adoption of sanctions.
"Extending Euratom Agreements. This Communication is
an accurate portrayal of the various international/Community instruments
and initiatives that contribute to the security of nuclear material.
The proposed completion of further bilateral Euratom cooperation
agreements should have nil impact on the UK — as these should contain
identical physical protection provisions to those to which
the UK is already bound. These obligations include compliance
with the physical protection requirements of the NSG guidelines insofar
as the UK is a recipient of nuclear material under these
agreements.
"The UK welcomes extending Euratom cooperation
with key nuclear countries, however we must ensure that a structured
approach is taken to determine which states are 'key' and that
any agreements are consistent with existing obligations.
"Nuclear fuel cycle. States have 'an
inalienable right' under the NPT to develop and use nuclear technologies
for peaceful purposes.
"It is, however, commercially unviable to set
up an enrichment facility unless it is able to serve a number
of nuclear power plants, and this is unlikely for most states
thinking about embarking on a new nuclear programme. Hence there
have been a number of proposals over recent years that seek to
provide assurance that nuclear fuel supplies will not be interrupted
for political reasons, thereby supporting states rights to civil
nuclear power, while reducing the potential for the diversion
of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.
"Among these proposals is the UK concept of
a Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NFA — formerly called Enrichment
Bond); using export licensing systems; and a number based on the
idea of a physical bank of, or facility providing, nuclear fuel.
The proposals can be complementary. The UK is finalising details
on the proposed NFA and will consult with EU partners.
"We welcome the Commission's recognition of
the importance of a nuclear fuel bank. We therefore welcome EU
support for the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) suggested fuel
bank under IAEA supervision, and welcome the efforts made by our
partners to further the Multilateral Nuclear Approaches agenda.
The proposals however remain incomplete and further detail is
required. Some key issues are still outstanding such as where
to locate the fuel bank and who will have access. We continue
to discuss how we can develop both ideas (the fuel bank and NFA)
with the Commission, our EU partners and with other interested
parties (including the IAEA).
2.12 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister supports an EU contribution to the IAEA Fuel Bank
of up to €25 million through the Instrument for Stability
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy Budget. He says that
resources to initiate that bank have now been committed and, in
the coming months, a framework will be taken to the IAEA Board
of Governors to outline how this might work; the IAEA would have
physical custody of low enriched uranium available to all those
member states that need fuel on the basis of criteria agreed in
advance.
2.13 Finally, looking ahead, the Minister says that
the Communication will be discussed by the nuclear counter-proliferation
group CONOP on 24 April and the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) on
29 April.
Conclusion
2.14 As the Minister makes clear, the proposals
in this Communication are somewhat of a work-in-progress. He also
makes clear that he is not entirely content with all of them.
He draws attention to the need for a structured approach to determine
which states are "key" when it comes to extending Euratom
cooperation, and for any agreements to be consistent with existing
obligations. He also suggests that there are a number of ideas
in play about how best to persuade non-nuclear states who want
to use nuclear power not to develop their own enrichment facilities,
and seems not to be entirely clear as to whether the UK's favoured
concept — the Nuclear Fuel Assurance, or NFA, formerly called
the Enrichment Bond — and the Commission's proposal for
a nuclear fuel bank are complementary or not. He also does not
comment on the Commission's proposal that "in order to speed
up the decision making process, a mandate could be given to the
Commission to contribute to the definition of the conditions and
modalities for establishing the fuel bank", or that the Euratom
Supply Agency "should become a key actor" in the process
of preventing the spread of sensitive technologies, such as enrichment.
These are questions that will no doubt be discussed in the working
groups to which the Minister refers.
2.15 Nor does the Minister explain who or what
the "Nuclear Threat Initiative" is; what the efforts
made by our partners to further the Multilateral Nuclear Approaches
agenda consist of; who those partners are; what the Multilateral
Nuclear Approaches agenda is; what "the proposals" are;
or in what ways they remain incomplete.
2.16 We should accordingly be grateful if, in
due course, he would clarify the matters to which he and we have
drawn attention. In the meantime, we shall retain the Communication
under scrutiny.
6 Opened for signature in July 1968, the Treaty entered
into force on 5 March 1970. A total of 189 parties have joined
the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. Back
7
Which we considered on 2 July 2008; see headnote. Back
8
"A Secure Europe in a Better World", adopted by the
European Council on 12 December 2003. Back
9
Council document 15708/03 of 12 December 2003. Back
10
In April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR
1540, establishing for the first time obligations under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter for all UN Member States to develop and
enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the
proliferation of WMD. The significance of Chapter VII is its binding
nature on all UN Member States as a result of finding a threat
to international peace and security. The full text is available
at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement.
Further information on UNSCR 1540 is also available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm
. Back
11
Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing
an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, OJ No. L 81, 22.3.07,
p.1. Back
12
Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing
an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, OJ No. L 210, 31.7.06.
p.82. Back
13
Council Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament
and the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument
for Stability, OJ No. L 327, 24.11.06, p.1. Back
14
The International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow
deals with the employment and redirection of former weapons scientists
from Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. It is operated jointly with the beneficiary states
and the EU, US, Canada, Japan, Korea and Norway. Back
15
The Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev deals
with the employment and redirection of former weapons scientists
from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan. It
is operated jointly with the beneficiary states and the EU, US
and Canada. Back
| 
