12 European Security and Defence Policy
and Guinea-Bissau
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| Council Joint Action amending Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU)
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| Legal base | Article 14 EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 22 April 2009
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (29349) — : HC 16-ix (2007-08), chapter 12 (23 January 2008)
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| To be discussed in Council | 18 May 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
12.1 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office website paints a troubled
and unhappy picture of Guinea-Bissau's move to independence, via
a protracted guerrilla war and then Portugal's own 1974 "carnation
revolution": firstly, one-party rule, then a coup in 1980
which "began a pattern of military coups and instability,
which has persisted until quite recently". That coup was
led by Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, who became the first
directly-elected President in 1994, after the acceptance of multi-party
democracy in 1991 (a presidential democracy which allows for multiparty
politics and an elected national assembly).
12.2 The period from 1998 to 2004 was notable for
a further coup attempt; protracted stalemate between loyalist
and rebel forces; the intervention of troops from neighbouring
Senegal and Guinea, as well as from the regional peacekeeping
force, ECOMOG; elections in December 1999 and January 2000; and
the eventual election of opposition leader Kumba Yala in February
2000.
12.3 The first half of this present decade then consisted
of further manifestations of unresolved tensions between the government
and the military hierarchy: a further attempted military rebellion;
subsequent rule by President Yala "characterised by chronic
political instability"; his eventual deposition in a bloodless
coup in September 2003 supported by all political parties, including
Yala's own; the installation of a businessman as interim President;
and legislative elections in March 2004 in which no party came
out with an overall majority.
12.4 A further period of political turmoil followed
the June 2005 presidential elections, following which ex-President
Vieira eventually emerged as the winner in a close finish, and
was sworn in as President on 1 October; including ex-president
Yala's return from exile in late 2006; and culminating in the
collapse of the government coalition in March 2007. After a stand-off,
the opposition leader Martinho N'Dafa Kabi became Prime Minister
in April, and the political situation in the country steadied.
The mandate of the legislature ended on April 21st 2008. The President
then passed a temporary constitutional amendment allowing the
continuation of the legislature until further elections could
take place. These occurred on 16 November 2008 and resulted in
a new Prime Minister, Carlos Gomez Junior, being appointed in
January 2009. The entry closes as follows:
"In recent months several media reports have
brought to public attention a growing problem of drug trafficking
via Guinea Bissau. Drugs coming from Latin America are being smuggled
to Europe via the country, taking advantage of the mangrove swamps
and jagged coastline, and the poor capacity of the government
to deal with the problem."[56]
12.5 Oddly, there is no mention of the assassination
in early March of President Vieira and the army chief of staff,
General Batista Tagme Na Waie, and that the country is now being
led by Interim President Raimundo Pereira.[57]
Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP
12.6 The preamble set out the context for the proposal
therein:
— the
promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe
is a key strategic priority of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted
by the EU-Africa Summit on 9 December 2007;
— security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau
is essential for the stability and sustainable development of
the country;
— in November 2006, the Government of Guinea-Bissau
presented a National Security Strategy underlining its commitment
to implement security sector reform;
— the Council and the Commission carried
out an initial joint information gathering mission in May 2007
in Guinea Bissau, in cooperation with the Bissauan authorities,
to develop an overall EU approach to support for the national
security sector reform process;
— an Action Plan for the Restructuring
and Modernisation of the Security and Defence Sectors was presented
by the Government of Guinea-Bissau in September 2007, and the
institutional framework for the implementation of this Action
Plan was established;
— in order to combat the increasing threat
posed by organised criminal networks operating in the country,
the Government of Guinea-Bissau, with the assistance of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), also announced an Emergency
Plan to Fight Drug Trafficking in September 2007;
— a report by the UN Secretary-General
of 28 September 2007 (S/2007/576), whilst commending the Government
of Guinea-Bissau for the positive measures taken so far to implement
the security sector reform programme, also underlined the country's
inability to combat drug trafficking by itself and called for
technical and financial support from regional and international
partners;
— on 19 November 2007, the Council considered
that an ESDP action in the field of security sector reform in
Guinea Bissau would be appropriate, in coherence with and complementary
to European Development Fund and other Community activity; and
— following a second EU fact-finding mission
deployed in October 2007, the Council approved on 10 December
2007 the General Concept for potential ESDP action in support
of Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform.
12.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 January
2008, the then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Mr Jim Murphy) explained that the Joint Action —
to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) security
sector reform (SSR) Mission in Guinea Bissau (EUSSR Guinea Bissau)
— followed a visit in 2007 by the Ministry of Defence's
Security Sector Defence Advisory Team, and would provide advice
and assistance to the local authorities in Guinea Bissau on reform
of the security sector, within the initial framework of the National
Security Sector Reform Strategy, which now needed to be implemented.
The Mission's tasks would include:
— advising
and contributing to the development of detailed resizing/restructuring
plans for the armed forces;
— assisting in the development of an underpinning
doctrine for employment of the Armed Forces, including the areas
of command, control and logistic support, and mainstreaming the
counter narcotics effort;
— supporting the development of detailed
plans for the restructuring of police bodies into four services;
— advising on the planning and development
of an effective criminal investigations capacity.
12.8 The Mission was to comprise approximately 15
experts in the various fields of the security sector; consist
of a preparatory phase beginning in mid February, and an implementation
phase beginning no later than 1 May 2008; and last for 12 months,
with a review six months after the beginning of the implementation
phase. Funding for common costs (in-country transport, office
equipment etc) would be met from the Common Foreign and Security
Policy Budget, to which the UK currently contributed approximately
17%; with an estimated cost of €5.75 million, the cost to
the UK would be approximately £739,000.
12.9 The Minister explained that, with the country
still dealing with the aftermath of civil war, and in the lead
up to November 2008 elections, there was now a good opportunity
to assist SSR in Guinea Bissau, and help to address its use as
a transit point for drugs being trafficked from Latin America
to Europe; there was strong support for the EU's proposals from
the authorities, who lacked the capacity and structures to deal
with the problems caused directly and indirectly by the influx
of drugs and organised crime to the country, and from all political
parties in the country, which meant that the outcome of the elections
should not affect the reform process. He said that, although Guinea
Bissau's problems were large, the country was small,[58]
and enough political will existed to instigate reform.
12.10 We felt that the justification was clear, the
Mission had been well-prepared and the costs were relatively modest,
and accordingly cleared the document at our meeting on 23 January
2008; the Joint Action was then agreed at the 28 January General
Affairs and External Relations Council.
12.11 We also said that only time would tell if,
as we all wished, the Minister's hopes came to fruition. We noted
that the mission was due to last for a year; that there would
be a mid-point review; and that moves were afoot within the Council
to develop formal assessment mechanisms for such ESDP missions.
We therefore asked, when the mission ended, the Minister to let
us have either the mission assessment and his views thereon or,
if it had not yet been formally assessed, his own assessment of
its outcomes and effectiveness (to include the conclusions of
the mid-point review and steps taken to address them).
The further Joint Action
12.12 This Joint Action extends the current mandate
for a further 6 months until 30 November 2009.
The Government's view
12.13 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 22 April
2009, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Caroline Flint) comments as follows on the situation thus
far:
"The EUSSR Mission has, so far, carried out
important work under difficult circumstances, in particular in
the police and prosecution services. However, overall progress
on SSR has been slower than expected and the Mission has not yet
accomplished its mandate. Political instability in the country
has hampered the mission's progress; the high profile assassination
of Guinea Bissau's Chief of the Armed Forces, General Tagme, and
President Vieira in March, combined with the difficulties involved
by working with three different governments since June 2008 and
the staging of legislative elections last November all distracted
attention from the SSR process. Guinea Bissau's limited access
to SSR expertise and basic infrastructure, such as office space
and equipment, has also contributed to delays.
"There is no doubt that Guinea Bissau continues
to depend on international assistance to succeed in their SSR
process and EU SSR Guinea Bissau is a crucial part in creating
stability. Despite the recent assassinations and resulting political
fragility, the new government continues to provide a window of
opportunity to implement meaningful reform, expressing a clear
request for continued ESDP engagement beyond 31 May 2009 and underlining
its commitment to the reform process. This has been demonstrated
by their appointment of a Special Counselor for the Prime Minister
for SSR and the fight against drug trafficking, and their re-animation
of the national SSR structures.
"Other partners from the International Community
also continue to express their willingness to step up their SSR
related activities in Guinea Bissau and to cooperate with the
ESDP mission including the United Nations, who are currently considering
transferring its various actors in Bissau, including SSR work
streams into a single 'integrated mission' from June 2009, ECOWAS
and the European Commission."
12.14 The Minister then explains that this would
be a "no cost extension": the Mission will use money
left unspent from the €5.65m allocation under the existing
mandate to pay for mission activities until 30 November 2009.
She supports its continuation:
"The no-cost extension will provide the Mission
a further 6 months to fully accomplish its current mandate. It
is also an opportunity to test the commitment and capability of
the new Government of Guinea Bissau to implement SSR, particularly
in light of the Presidential elections planned for June."
12.15 The Minister concludes by saying that the Joint
Action is expected to be agreed at the General Affairs and External
Relations Council on 18 May 2009.
Conclusion
12.16 We now clear the document, which we are
again reporting to the House because of the widespread interest
in European Security and Defence Policy and its growing involvement
in security sector reform in troubled areas of Africa.
12.17 In so doing, we draw the Minister's attention
to our request of her predecessor (c.f. paragraph 12.10 above).
We note that what the Minister describes as "Other partners
from the International Community", including the United Nations,
ECOWAS and the European Commission, have expressed willingness
to step up their SSR-related activities in Guinea Bissau and to
cooperate with the ESDP mission, and ask her to ensure that the
review includes an assessment of the extent to which this happens
and of its overall effectiveness.[59]
56 See FCO Country Profile at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/guinea-bissau?profile=politics&pg=7
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57
For further information, see http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30427&Cr=bissau&Cr1=
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58
Area: 36,120 sq km; Population: 1.5 million (2005 United Nations
estimate). Back
59
c.f the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html
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