3 EU police, rule of law and civilian
administration mission to Iraq
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| Council Joint Action on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law mission for Iraq
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| Legal base | Articles 14 EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 8 May 2009
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (26356) — : HC 38-ix (2004-05), chapter 9 (23 February 2005) and (27480) —: HC 34-xxix (2005-06), chapter 9 (17 May 2006)
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| To be discussed in Council | To be determined
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
3.1 At the General Affairs and External Relations Council
on 2 November 2004, EU Foreign Ministers agreed a package of assistance
for Iraq (consistent with the EU medium-term strategy for Iraq
agreed at the European Council in June 2004). One element was
an agreement, based on the findings of an earlier EU fact-finding
mission, to send an expert team to Iraq (before the end of November)
to work with the interim Iraqi government with a view to a possible
EU integrated police and rule of law mission for Iraq, starting
after the January 2005 elections. The expert team was tasked to
continue the dialogue with the Iraqi authorities, to start initial
planning for a possible integrated police and rule of law mission
and, in particular, to assess the security needs and conditions
for such a mission. We cleared the Joint Action setting out its
terms of reference on 1 December.[8]
3.2 The expert team was sent on 30 November and worked in
Iraq and Jordan. Meetings were also conducted in Geneva, Berlin,
Kuwait and Dubai. Preparatory work and security training was conducted
in Brussels. In all, over 140 Iraqi and international interlocutors
were consulted, including the Chairman of the Iraqi Council of
Judges, Iraqi police generals and prison governors. Its report
in January set out detailed options for such a mission, supported
by detailed analysis of both the feasibility of the options, their
added value in terms of existing and planned national and international
initiatives in this field and the security constraints. The expert
team's recommendations included:
- the provision of integrated training in Europe or the region
for 520 mid to senior officials across the criminal justice system
and 250 investigating magistrates and police;
- a coordination office in Brussels;
- a liaison office in Baghdad where a small team (4-5) would
liaise with the Council of Judges and the Iraqi Ministries of
Justice and Interior;
- an incremental approach to assess whether the mission could
train in Iraq should the security situation and availability of
infrastructure allow for such activities in the future;
- the planning team to be established immediately so that training
could start as soon as practicable after agreement was reached
with the Iraqi government; and
- completion of the mission within one year from the start of
the first course.
3.3 The Joint Action that we cleared on 23 February 2005 provided
for the establishment of an integrated rule of law mission for
Iraq on these lines, to become operational no later than 1 July
2005. It would address what the then Minister described as "the
urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system" through
integrated training for high and mid-level officials in senior
management and criminal investigation. Its aim was "to improve
the capacity, coordination and collaboration of the different
components of the Iraqi criminal justice system." An "effective
strategic and technical partnership with Iraqi counterparts"
would be developed throughout the mission, particularly in relation
to the design of the curricula". There would be 13 senior
management courses (for 520 mid to senior officials across the
criminal justice system) and seven criminal investigation courses
(for 250 investigating magistrates and police).
3.4 The structure of the mission was to consist of a Head
of Mission, a coordination office in Brussels, a liaison office
in Baghdad, and training facilities and trainers provided by Member
States and coordinated by the Mission. The Joint Action also "reflects
the Expert Team's recommendation that the best means to achieve
an independent and secure ESDP mission is by conducting training
outside Iraq, either in the EU or the region. However the preference
of Iraqis is that this training is delivered in Iraq. If the security
situation allows and infrastructure becomes available the Council
will review whether training could be delivered in Iraq".
3.5 On the financial and staffing aspects, the then Minister
explained that costs would be divided between the CFSP budget
— an estimated total of €10.9 million — and Member
States, who would bear the costs of any training they provided
and of any seconded staff they contributed, including salaries,
medical coverage, allowance and other per diems and travel
expenses. The UK had offered to provide three courses (at an estimated
total cost of £720,000) and hoped to contribute two or three
secondees to the planning team or mission staff. The British Embassy
would host the Baghdad Liaison Office and provide office space
and accommodation for its staff; the CFSP budget would cover the
running costs, including security, up to €2.3 million (included
in the total budget outlined above) The Commission would sign
a contract with the Head of Mission, who would report fully to,
and be supervised by, the Commission on the budgetary aspects
of the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
3.6 The then Minister explained that the Iraqi authorities
wanted the European Union to engage in Iraq so that their formerly
isolated criminal justice mechanisms were exposed to modern international
and European practice. In the short term, the challenges of the
current operating environment, the nature of the expertise required
and the urgency of the intervention needed were such that an ESDP
crisis management operation was justified. At a certain stage,
significant complementarity could be achieved through Community-supported
institution building, good governance and rule of law programmes
as a follow up to the proposed training. The Government believed
that the response to the crisis in the Iraqi criminal justice
system needed to be swift, effective and as safe as possible;
and that the proposed training intervention fulfilled these criteria.
Its success would depend on an effective strategic and technical
partnership with the Iraqis, including course design, quality
control, selection of participants and follow-up to training.
For these reasons, the mission should have a Liaison Office in
Baghdad where a small team (4-5) could conduct technical liaison
with the Council of Judges and the Iraqi Ministries of Justice
and Interior. The team could also facilitate assistance for Member
States' ongoing bilateral efforts. The Government believed that
a planning team should be established immediately, so that training
could start as soon as practicable after agreement was reached
with the Iraqi government, and that the intervention, as proposed,
should be executed through a Joint Action falling under ESDP.
3.7 For our part, we noted that the Expert Team's approach
had been commendably thorough, and its recommendations were sensible.
We noted that, with the security situation plainly remaining dangerous,
if human life in a civilian mission was not to be jeopardized,
a cautious, testing-the-water approach was right; despite pressure
from the Iraqi authorities for in-country training, we thought
it right that the EU had maintained its position. It was gratifying
that the UK was to play a leading role in this mission, which
was important not just in its own right but also as only the second
such Rule of Law Mission. We felt that it would also be good to
see widespread participation by other Member States, not only
to spread the burden but also, we hoped, to begin to reduce the
then strains in US/EU relations stemming from the war in Iraq.[9]
3.8 In June 2006, the Council of Ministers adopted Council
Joint Action 2006/708/CFSP. This extended the mission's mandate
for a further 18 months, until 31 December 2007, and authorised
the provision of more specialised courses as well as secondments
in EU Member States for senior Iraqi police officers and prison
governors. Although no questions arose, we reported this to the
House because of Iran's unique political importance at the time
and the central role being played by the UK, which now included
a British head of mission.[10]
At the time at which the draft Joint Action was submitted for
scrutiny, the additional cost was yet to be worked out; the financial
reference amount was subsequently increased by € 11.2 million.
3.9 Then, in November 2007, the Council decided on a further
extension, until 30 April 2008. The UK was to continue to contribute
by providing specialised courses and offering a work-experience
prisons secondment for a senior Iraqi official, as well as continuing
to support the Baghdad Liaison Office with office and living accommodation.
This further extension would be at no additional cost. Looking
ahead, the then Minister for Europe (Mr Jim Murphy) said that,
with the arrival of an EC Delegation in Baghdad, there was potential
for the eventual development of Community-supported institution-building
and rule of law programmes to carry forward EUJUST LEX's work,
which was expected to end in 2009.
3.10 In April 2008 the then Minister for Europe submitted
the draft of a further Council Joint Action, which extended the
mandate, at no additional cost, until 30 June 2008. He supported
the continuation of the mission, which had facilitated training
for over 1400 Iraqis from the police force, the judiciary and
the penitentiary system; as of January 2008, the Mission had received
commitments for over 40 training interventions by Member States
until June 2009 and would therefore be able to maintain its level
of activities.
3.11 Finally, a further "no cost" extension was
submitted for scrutiny by the then Minister on 12 June 2008, which
we cleared on 18 June 2008. This authorised continuation of the
mission until June 2009.
3.12 We judged that none of these straightforward, "no
cost", extensions warranted a substantive Report to the House,
and were cleared accordingly.
The draft Joint Action
3.13 This Joint Action extends the current mandate for the
European Security & Defence Policy (ESDP) rule of law mission
to Iraq (EUJUST LEX) for a further 12 months, until 30 June
2010.
3.14 It says that, during the period from 1 July 2009 until
30 June 2010, EUJUST LEX shall start a pilot phase of activities
in Iraq, including providing strategic advice, follow-up mentoring
and training activities, as and where security conditions and
resources allow; and that, taking into account further developments
in the security conditions in Iraq and the availability of appropriate
infrastructure, the Council shall examine the results of the pilot
phase and shall decide on the future of the Mission after 30 June
2010.
3.15 It also says that "EUJUST LEX shall be secure, independent
and distinct but shall be complementary and bring added value
to the efforts of the Government of Iraq and the international
community, in particular those of the United Nations and the US",
and also "develop synergies with relevant activities of the
Community and Member States.", in which context, EUJUST LEX
"shall liaise with the relevant Iraqi authorities and the
Member States which presently conduct training projects."
The Government's view
3.16 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 9 May 2009, the Minister
for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Caroline Flint)
says that, in addition to its existing activities, the Mission
will introduce a pilot phase in which up to 18 activities are
undertaken in Iraq, specifically in Baghdad, Sulamanayah and Talil
regions:
"These activities will include further training courses,
providing strategic advice on the ground and follow up mentoring
sessions for previous course participants. Planning for these
activities is ongoing but by engaging in country EU Just Lex will
be able to be more visible, proactive and better placed to aid
the Iraqi authorities when needed."
3.17 The Minister says that, though the courses are currently
run and hosted by Member States, "this may change when the
mission begins undertaking activities in country." She notes
that, so far, the mission has provided 88 training courses and
17 work experience secondments for over 1,900 Iraqis since summer
2005; the UK has provided 17 courses and 3 secondments; and "the
mission's success was recognised in 2008 when the Head of Mission
Stephen Wright won the prestigious Webber-Seavey Award for "excellence
in law enforcement and leadership". She continues as follows:
"In the past four years EUJUST LEX has had significant achievements
in training senior Iraqi officials through letting them experience
best practice by hosting the courses in Europe. The participants
are then able to take back their experience and use it to help
with rule of law reform in country. EU Member States continue
to demonstrate an increased willingness to engage in Iraq, and
the Government of Iraq remains highly supportive of the mission.
This can be seen by the Iraqi Chief Justice and Acting Minister
of Justice who have both recently been on EUJUST LEX courses in
Europe.
"The UK has judged that the EU's original strategic objectives
for an ESDP mission for Iraq remain valid. An EU contribution
to the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq through
addressing the needs of the Iraqi criminal justice system is still
required and will help to improve Iraqi stability and security.
"The UK has been a strong advocate of EUJUST LEX moving in
country, which will allow the mission to further assist the Iraqi
government in strengthening the rule law through the provision
of follow up programs with past course participants. The move
in-country should increase the impact of the EU's intervention
by building on the mission's activities so far, improving evaluation
of the mission's activities, and improving local ownership, including
through increased contact and participation.
"Other EU Member States continue to demonstrate an increased
willingness to engage in Iraq, and in January 2008, the Mission
received commitments for over 40 training interventions by Member
States until June 2009. The Government of Iraq also remains highly
supportive of the mission with the Iraqi Chief Justice and Acting
Minister of Justice both visiting EUJUST LEX courses in Europe
in the last few months."
Financial Aspects
3.18 The Minister says that the mission is operating within
budget and continues to deliver a full training schedule; has
cost €28.4 million since 2005; and will require a further
€11.5million to cover the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June
2010.
Conclusion
3.19 We note that the Minister's predecessor envisaged
that the Mission was likely to end in 2009, and that the Commission
would thereafter be left to pursue Community-supported institution-building
and rule of law programmes. Neither from her Explanatory Memorandum
nor the draft Joint Action is it clear to us why this has not
happened, or why, as she asserts, "an EU contribution to
the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq through
addressing the needs of the Iraqi criminal justice system is still
required."
3.20 Nor are we entirely clear as to what she means when
she says that, though the courses are currently run and hosted
by Member States, "this may change when the mission begins
undertaking activities in country." The draft Joint Action
refers to a review in 2010 and a further decision on the mission's
future, suggesting at least the possibility of a further extension.
3.21 In sum, we would like the Minister to explain more
fully what the rationale is for continuing with the Mission for
a further year when, last April, her predecessor said that he
expected it to end in 2009, and the basis of her thinking about
its longer-term future.
3.22 We also now see that, when what became Council Joint
Action 2008/190/CFSP was adopted on 23 June 2008, it contained
a provision authorising a new financial reference amount to cover
the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009; and that, from the draft
text, this amounted to a further €7.2 million. Yet we were
told by the Minister's predecessor that this was to be a "no
cost" extension. We ask the Minister to explain this discrepancy.
3.23 In addition to the UK share of the overall CFSP expenditure,
we would also like to know the cost of the UK's direct and indirect
contributions to EUJUST LEX so far.
3.24 In the meantime we shall retain the document under
scrutiny.
8 HC 38-i (2004-05), chapter 22 (1 December 2004). Back
9
See headnote: see (26356) - : HC 38-ix (2004-05), chapter 9 (23
February 2005). Back
10
(27480) -: HC34-xxix (2005-06), chapter 9 (17 May 2006) Back
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