2 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy
(30556)
8977/09
COM(09) 163
| Commission Green Paper: Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy
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Legal base | |
Document originated | 22 April 2009
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Deposited in Parliament | 24 April 2009
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Department | Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
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Basis of consideration | EM of 6 May 2009
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Previous Committee Report | None, but see footnotes
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To be discussed in Council | No date set
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Committee's assessment | Politically important
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Committee's decision | For debate in European Committee A
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Background
2.1 The conservation aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
came into operation in 1983, and sought to maintain stock levels
by setting annual total allowable catches (TACs) apportioned between
Member States according to a fixed key. These were accompanied
by so-called technical conservation provisions (dealing with such
issues as mesh sizes, and minimum landing sizes), as well as by
structural measures seeking to bring the catching capacity of
the fleet into line with the fishing opportunities available to
it.
2.2 However, despite various changes made over the
years, including the reforms introduced in 2002, there is general
agreement that, for a variety of reasons (see below), the Policy
has not achieved its objectives, and that, as a result, many of
the Community's fish stocks are in a parlous state. The Commission
believes that, in order to bring about the dramatic change needed
to reverse the current situation, and so achieve its "vision"
for European fisheries by 2020, a whole-scale and fundamental
reform is now required, rather than the piecemeal incremental
reforms made earlier. It has therefore sought in this Green Paper
to stimulate a public debate on the future of the CFP, its ultimate
aim being to put forward a new basic regulation in the context
of the new Financial Framework after 2013.
The current document
THE CURRENT POLICY AND ITS FAILINGS
2.3 The Commission takes as its starting point the
reforms agreed in 2002, which it says sought to move towards a
longer-term fisheries management perspective, integrating environmental
concerns; to increase stakeholder involvement through the establishment
of Regional Advisory Councils
(RACs); to replace compulsory capacity reduction targets with
national ceilings, leaving Member States free to choose their
own fleet policy; to introduce fishing effort as a fundamental
management tool; to use public funds more selectively, notably
by discontinuing aid for new vessel construction; and to develop
fisheries partnerships with third countries.
2.4 However, it says that the aim agreed in 2002
of achieving sustainable fisheries has not been achieved, with
the great majority of stocks having been fished beyond their maximum
sustainable yield and, in some cases, outside safe biological
limits resulting in high dependence on young fish which
are caught before they can reproduce. It adds that most of the
European fishing fleet is either running at a loss or returning
low profits, as a result of chronic over-capacity, of which over-fishing
is both a cause and a consequence. In particular, it notes that
recent capacity reductions have been offset by technological progress,
and have thus been insufficient to break this vicious circle,
with one consequence having been strong political pressure to
increase short-term fishing opportunities at the expense of future
sustainability. It also points out that this has in turn led to
numerous derogations, exceptions and specific measures, resulting
in ever more detailed measures, making European fisheries increasingly
complex and costly to manage and control. Finally, it observes
that excess fishing capacity has been artificially maintained
by heavy public financial support from the Community and nationally,
either by direct subsidy or indirectly (for example, through exemption
from fuel taxes), and that the industry benefits both from free
access to the resources it exploits and from not having to contribute
to the management costs associated with its activities (notably
control and safety at sea).
OVERCOMING THE POLICY'S STRUCTURAL FAILINGS
2.5 The Commission identifies five main structural
failings, and considers each if these in turn.
Fleet over-capacity
2.6 The Commission describes this as the fundamental
problem facing the CFP, and says that there is a need for a built-in
mechanism to ensure that the size of the European
fishing fleets is proportionate to the available fish stocks.
It notes that over-capacity has previously been addressed by various
means, such as permanent vessel scrapping schemes, which have
not achieved their objective (though it believes that more targeted
one-off schemes can be more efficient): and it suggests that market
instruments, such as transferable fishing rights, may be a more
efficient and less expensive approach, and one which would require
the industry itself to take more responsibility, adding that,
where individual Member States have tried such as approach, it
has generally led to more rational investment decisions.
Policy objectives
2.7 The Commission notes that, whilst the basic Council
Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 requires the CFP to ensure sustainable,
economic, environmental and social conditions, these aims are
not prioritised: and it says that, whilst there should be no conflict
between them in the long term, they can
and do
clash in the short term. As a result, social objectives such as
employment are frequently invoked to advocate more generous fishing
opportunities, further jeopardising the stocks and the future
of those making a living from them. It says that it is therefore
crucial that any such decisions to cushion immediate economic
and social impacts should be compatible with long-term sustainability,
including fishing within maximum sustainable yields and eliminating
discards.
Focussing decisions on core long-term principles
2.8 The Commission notes that all decisions on the
CFP, whether relating to principles or operational matters, are
taken by the Council, thus
adding to the focus on short-term political considerations, leaving
very little flexibility in their implementation, and increasing
the impression of a policy which is centrally-driven without regard
for stakeholder interests. It also points out that the Lisbon
Treaty would introduce co-decision in this area, making it all
the more necessary to remove micro-management from the highest
political levels, with the introduction of a clear hierarchy between
fundamental principles and technical implementation.
2.9 It suggests that one option would be to delegate
more of the current detailed management to the Commission through
the comitology procedure, whilst another would be to rely wherever
possible on specific regional management solutions implemented
by Member States, subject to Community standards and control.
It also points out that in most cases any such delegation would
need to be regionally based because the stocks concerned are shared
between different Member States. At the same time, the Commission
believes that the role of bodies such as the Advisory Committee
for Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) and the RACs should be assessed.
Encouraging greater industry responsibility for
implementation
2.10 The Commission suggests that very little can
be achieved by way of reform unless the catching sector, the processing
and seafood chain, and consumers support the steps taken and take
responsibility for implementing them, requiring them to understand
the need for reform and to have a genuine stake in its successful
outcome. It observes that the mostly top-down approach under the
present CFP provides few incentives for the industry to behave
in this way, and that this should be addressed by co-management
arrangements, involving both responsibilities and rights. Thus,
the first of these might involve rules focussing, not on how to
fish, but on outcomes, leaving more detailed implementation decisions
to the industry within the limits laid down, with the onus being
on the industry to demonstrate its ability to operate on this
basis. As regards the industry's rights, the Commission says that
consideration should be given to whether it should share the costs
of fisheries management.
Developing a compliance culture
2.11 The Commission recalls earlier criticisms, notably
by the European
Court of Auditors,[2] that
fisheries control has generally been weak, with inadequate penalties
and insufficiently frequent inspections to encourage compliance,
leading to a general feeling that enforcement has not been applied
in a uniform manner. It points out that, in response to these
criticisms, it put forward in November 2008 a draft Council Regulation
establishing new Community control system for enforcing the rules
of the CFP.[3]
FURTHER IMPROVING MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY FISHERIES
2.12 The Commission then identifies a number of areas
where management improvements might be made:
Protection of small-scale coastal fisheries
The Commission observes that the fishing plays an
important role in many of Europe's coastal regions, with communities
having limited potential for economic diversification being heavily
dependent on it for their income. It therefore considers it essential
to secure a future for small-scale coastal and recreational fisheries,
and suggests that, in attempting to bring capacity into line with
catching opportunities, it is a legitimate social objective to
protect the most fragile coastal communities, whilst not preventing
larger fleets from undergoing the necessary adaptation. It suggests
that one approach would be differentiated management regimes,
with economic incentives for fleet adaptation being applied to
larger vessels, whilst small-scale coastal fisheries would be
managed through direct allocation of quotas or effort, or through
collective schemes. It also says that this might be accompanied
by different approaches to public funding, with the large-scale
fleet having to be economically self-sufficient, but with assistance
being given to the small-scale segment to adapt to changing conditions.
At the same time, the Commission cautions that small-scale fishing
can be harmful to sensitive coastal habitats, and that, since
it often targets the same stocks as large-scale fleets, a differentiated
regime would need to be carefully designed to ensure ecological
sustainability, with specific decisions affecting small-scale
fleets being taken as close as possible to the coastal community.
Achieving maximum return from fisheries
The Commission says that the concept of achieving
maximum sustainable yields by 2015 was accepted by all Member
States at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD),
and should now be enshrined as a principle of stock management
in the future CFP. It observes that the setting of TACs and national
quotas applicable to most Community fisheries outside the Mediterranean
appears to be relatively simple, but has proved to be sub-optimal
in a number of ways, in particular by creating unwanted by-catches
in mixed fisheries when the quota for one species is exhausted,
so leading to discards. It says that the future CFP should ensure
that discarding no longer takes place, and that, although management
by fishing effort would achieve this, it may not be sufficient
to realise the objectives of the CFP.
Relative stability and access to coastal fisheries
The Commission notes that relative stability, providing
each Member State with a constant share of each Community quota,
was established as a principle of the CFP in 1983, and has had
the merit of enabling fishing opportunities to be distributed
among Member States. However, it suggests that this approach has
become very complex due to quotas swaps, and that the picture
has been blurred further by the addition of effort management
controls, leading to a situation where there is now a considerable
discrepancy between the quotas allocated and the actual needs
of Member States' fleets. In addition, it believes that the approach
has reduced the flexibility of fleets to make efficient use of
its resources through adaptation, and has had an inflationary
effect on catch levels, since a Member State wishing a higher
quota currently has no option but to press for a higher TAC for
the Community as a whole. In view of this, it suggests that consideration
should be given to replacing relative stability with a more flexible
system, such as allocating fishing rights, though it also believes
that it would be possible to retain the principle, but introduce
flexible arrangements to align Member States' quotas with the
real needs of national fleets. On the other hand, the Commission
considers that another historical restriction, reserving inshore
waters out to 12 miles for national fleets (subject to certain
historical rights for other vessels) has generally worked well,
and could even be stepped up if a specific regime is adopted for
coastal small-scale fisheries.
Trade and markets
The Commission notes that the fishing industry generally
receives a small share of the price paid by consumers for fish,
and that overall first sale prices have been stagnating, which
it says has encouraged fishermen to catch higher quantities, and
increased their dependence on public funds. It suggests that the
reasons for these low prices include the fragmentation of the
catching sector, an increasing consumer emphasis on processed
or frozen products, and the high proportion of imported produce
on the Community market. In the latter case, the Commission says
that the Community should ensure that such imports come from sustainably
managed fisheries to ensure a level playing field, whilst it notes
that the intervention system applicable within the Community when
fish prices for a range of species fall below their established
targets does not reflect the changing balance between supply and
demand, has become increasingly complex to manage, and is now
of diminished importance due to the high dependence on imports.
Consequently, it suggests that much stronger emphasis should be
put in future on improving the way in which producers organise
themselves, with producer organisations playing an increased role
in marketing their products, not least in addressing the growing
consumer demand for produce from fisheries of sustainable origin.
Integrating fisheries into broader maritime policy
The Commission notes that the Integrated Maritime
Policy (IMP)[4] deals with
all Community policies relating to maritime affairs, and that
this approach must be reflected in the future CFP. In particular,
it says that, as set out in its Communication of 11 April 2008,[5]
this will involve supporting the ecosystem approach to marine
management being implemented through the Marine Strategy Framework
Directive (which it points out will benefit the industry by addressing
the impact of other sectors on it); helping to facilitate adaptation
to the effects of climate change on the marine environment by
ensuring that fishing is reduced to sustainable levels; integrating
the CFP into wider measures for planning the use of marine space;
using the IMP's strong focus on sustainable development in coastal
regions to alleviate the socio-economic impact on capacity reductions
in the catching sector; and making use of the strong synergy between
the various marine sectors in terms of surveillance, data, knowledge
and research.
The knowledge base
The Commission points out that scientific knowledge
and data are of vital importance to the CFP because decisions
must be based on a robust assessment of the level of exploitation
which the stocks can sustain, of the effects of fishing on ecosystems,
and of the impacts of climate change; and it notes that the resources
available to provide this advice are increasingly limited at a
time when the issues involved have become increasingly numerous
and complex. It suggests that future long-term CFP-oriented research
must tackle new challenges, such as promoting synergies at European,
national and regional levels, and integrating fisheries policy
with other maritime issues, and it notes that its recent Communication
on a European Strategy for Marine and Maritime Research[6]
is a first step towards addressing this. In the meantime, it says
that improving communication between scientists, policy makers
and stakeholders and securing their full commitment should remain
a priority.
Structural policy and public financial support
The Commission observes that, although public financial
support for fisheries at both Community and national levels is
substantial, this can conflict with the objectives of the CFP,
particularly in terms of reducing over-capacity. It also says
that, although the reforms adopted in 2002 removed financial support
which directly contributed to over-investment, there is still
very little conditionality about the way in which Member States
can spend their fisheries funds; that the current system is not
designed to address new challenges or rapidly changing circumstances;
and that the distribution of the European Fisheries Fund is based
on regional convergence criteria rather than the composition of
the European fleet and its structural deficiencies. The Commission
therefore believes that there needs to be a much closer link between
public funding and the objectives of the policy, and that the
next reform will have to ensure that structural deficiencies are
addressed in a way which improves the industry's long-term economic
viability.
The external dimension
The Commission says that, with the large and increasing
volume of imports into the Community, the main aim of the external
dimension of the CFP should no longer be to ensure the presence
of a Community fleet internationally able to supply that market,
but to extend the principles of sustainable and responsible fisheries,
in line with its development and environment policies. It suggests
that this might be achieved through fora such as the FAO, through
strengthened regional fisheries management organisations, and
by agreements with third countries which seek to help the capacity
of partner countries to strengthen sustainable fishing in their
own waters. However, it comments that such agreements can be hindered
by slow uptake by partner countries, and that alternative arrangements,
including regional forms of cooperation, should be explored.
Aquaculture
The Commission observes that aquaculture makes a
growing contribution to aquatic food production worldwide, and
is an important economic activity in many coastal regions. It
points out that the specific short and medium term problems of
the industry have been addressed recently in a separate Communication.[7]
THE NEXT STEPS
2.13 The Commission says that this Green Paper
in which it poses a number of strategic questions under the various
headings detailed above should form the basis of a public
debate on the future of the CFP, involving stakeholders from within
the Community and in third countries, as well as those not directly
involved with the industry. It adds that, taking into account
the outcome of the Budget Review, and without pre-empting future
discussion on the next Financial Framework, it will sum up the
debate in the first half of 2010, and produce conclusions on the
direction of CFP reform. At that stage, an impact assessment will
be prepared, and, after further consultations, it will draft a
new basic regulation, which will be presented to the Council and
European Parliament in the context of the new Financial Framework
after 2013.
The Government's view
2.14 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 6 May 2009,
the Minister for the Natural and Marine Environment, Wildlife
and Rural Affairs at the Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (Mr Huw Irranca-Davies) says that the UK welcomes
the Green Paper and the opportunity it provides to pursue a genuinely
radical reform of the CFP. He notes that, despite recognising
the need for a more integrated maritime policy, the Paper remains
largely focused on fish and fishing, and that the Government will
consider how best to urge the Commission to be clearer how a reformed
CFP can support broader maritime policy. In particular, he says
that consideration should be given to how fisheries policy can
reflect the international commitments on the marine environment
into which the Community and Member States have entered.
2.15 So far as the CFP itself is concerned, he says
that the UK agrees:
- that fleet overcapacity is
one of the fundamental problems at Community level, and that,
since permanent support for scrapping has failed, targeted decommissioning
in association with appropriate measures should be considered;
- that the use of market instruments may be a more
efficient way to support capacity adjustments, and that it will
urge the Commission to be more forthcoming in its thoughts on
how transferable rights and other principles would meet this aim;
- that there is a need to reflect the WSSD objective
of achieving maximum sustainable yield wherever possible by 2015:
he adds that the UK will press for an examination of how scientific
evidence is developed in order to achieve this target, pointing
out that current advice from the International Council for the
Exploration of the Seas (ICES) is based on short term, single-species
analysis and takes no account of wider factors such as stock interactions,
and that a better approach would be to improve co-operation with
the fishing sector and to enable the Council to focus on setting
longer term targets rather than on the annual setting of TACs;
- that technical decision making should be devolved,
with the industry itself should be invited to propose its own
initiatives to give public authorities confidence in the reliability
of the quota and effort management measures adopted;
- that, since fisheries play an important role
in the social fabric and the cultural identity of some of Europe's
coastal regions consideration should be given to how these roles
can be supported, subject to the provisos that the objectives
for making the large-scale fleet efficient and prosperous should
not be undermined, and that social and cultural concerns should
be confined strictly to those communities where fishing plays
a determining role which cannot be achieved by normal market means;
- that the principle of relative stability should
be reviewed as part of a broader review of access to fisheries
arrangements, but he says that the UK would only be prepared to
consider changes in the context of a framework which genuinely
secures sustainable fishing, wider environmental protection and
a satisfactory balance between the proposed objectives for the
large-scale and small-scale fleets.
Conclusion
2.16 Although the Commission makes it clear that
it will be several years before it will be able to propose a new
basic regulation, this Green Paper represents a potentially important
first step towards achieving a more substantial reform of the
Common Fisheries Policy than has proved possible up to now. In
particular, although the Commission's diagnosis of the problems
which have arisen is a familiar one from the previous Communications
which have also sought to address this issue, the Commission has
on this occasion, in an attempt to stimulate fresh debate, shown
a welcome willingness albeit still in fairly general terms
to put forward a number of more radical suggestions, relating
(among other things) to an enhanced role for the industry in managing
fisheries, the position of small-scale coastal fisheries, the
interplay between total allowable catches and the principle of
relative stability, and the need to align fisheries policy with
the wider Integrated Maritime Policy. As such, it gives rise to
a number of important issues which we think it would be timely
for the House to debate in European Committee.
2 Special Report No 7/2007. (29229) 16071/07: see HC
16-viii (2007-08), chapter 1 (16 January 2008). Back
3
(30182) 15869/08: see HC 19-xi (2008-09), chapter 2 (18 March
2009). Back
4
(29068) 14631/07: see HC 16-viii (2007-08), chapter 2 (16 January
2008). Back
5
COM(08) 187. Back
6
COM((08) 534. Back
7
(30545) 8677/09: see HC 19-xvii (2008-09), chapter 6 (13 May 2009) Back
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