8 The EU and Serbia
| (a) (29213) 15616/07 + ADDs 1-2 COM(07) 743
(b) (29214) 15690/07 + ADDs 1-2 COM(07) 744
(c) (29427) —
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| Draft Council Decisions on the signing and on the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of Serbia
Draft Council Decision concerning the signing and conclusion of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community and the Republic of Serbia
Interim Political Agreement on Co-operation between the European Union and its Member States and the Republic of Serbia
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| Legal base | (a) and (b) Articles 300 and 310 EC; unanimity
(c) —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 30 June 2008
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 19-ix (2008-09), chapter 11 (4 March 2009); HC 19-v (2008-09), chapter 16 (28 January 2009); HC 19-i (2008-09), chapter 17 (10 December 2008); HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 15 (18 June 2008), HC 16-xxi (2007-08), chapter 17 (14 May 2008), HC 16-xii (2007-08), chapter 1 (20 February 2008) HC 16-x (2007-08), chapter 4 (30 January 2008) and HC 16-viii (2007-08), chapter 5 (16 January 2008); also see (26575) 8884/05: HC 34-i (2005-06), chapter 48 (4 July 2005); and (29103): 14999/07; (29104):15001/07; (29100):14995/07; (29099): 14993/07; (29101):14996/07; (29102):14997/07: HC 16-v (2007-08), chapter 1 (5 December 2007)
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| Discussed in Council | 29 April 2008 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared (debate on 29 April 2008); further information provided and requested
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Background
8.1 The Stabilisation and Association Process is the process devised
by the EU to bring the countries of the Western Balkans closer
to the EU and to help prepare them for eventual membership. The
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) is a key step on
the path to EU membership. It establishes a far-reaching legal
relationship between the EU and the country concerned, entailing
mutual rights and obligations; the gradual implementation of a
free trade area; reforms designed to achieve the adoption of EU
standards in areas such as justice, freedom and security, accompanied
by formalised political dialogue; enhanced regional cooperation;
and a Stabilisation and Association Council to supervise implementation.
8.2 The Commission completed negotiations for an
SAA with Serbia on 10 September 2007. On 7 November 2007 Serbia
and the Commission initialled the text of the Agreement.
The Council Decisions
8.3 The purpose of the first Council Decision is
obtain Council approval to the text of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement and "to engage the procedures for the signature
and final conclusion" of the Agreement.
8.4 The purpose of the second Council Decision is
to authorise signature of an Interim Agreement (IA), comprising
the Community competence elements (trade, agriculture, industrial
and competition provisions of the SAA) at the same time as the
SAA, to come into force as soon as possible after signature, to
take account of the fact that ratification of the SAA may take
up to a year following signature.
Previous consideration
8.5 Our previous consideration is detailed in our
previous Reports. In brief, the Committee has been engaged in
prolonged discussion with successive Ministers for Europe since
January 2008 about signature of these Council Decisions and, given
differences then obtaining among Member States on the signing
of the Interim Agreement, an Interim Political Agreement. In the
event, they were resolved among Member States in such a way that
the 29 April 2008 GAERC approved the Council Decisions, whereupon
the two agreements were signed. On the same day, European Committee
B debated these documents and a collection of annual progress
reports on the Western Balkan EU aspirants.[34]
8.6 As we have noted, we have had no concerns over
the nature of the SAA or of its conclusion with Serbia per
se: on the contrary; however, what had bedevilled this process
all along was the behaviour of the Serbian authorities with respect
to the International Criminal Tribunal for (former) Yugoslavia
(ICTY). Although the ICTY had been prepared to indicate to the
Commission and Council that cooperation had improved sufficiently
to warrant continued negotiation and, latterly, initialling of
a text, it was plainly not yet able to certify that "full
cooperation" had been obtained. The Committee's concern has
thus revolved around this associated ICTY Conditionality.
8.7 Our two most recent Reports summarise our discussion
with the previous Minister for Europe (Caroline Flint), and in
particular her letters of 4 December 2008 and of 16 and 18 February
2009 . In essence, the Committee sought to understand the process
whereby the Government shifted its position — first abandoning
the requirement for full cooperation prior to signature of the
SAA, and then abandoning it prior to implementation of the IA
— and the then Minister sought to explain how this had happened.
Following the 23 February 2009 GAERC meeting, the then Minister
said that:
"There was an inconclusive discussion on the
possibility of implementing Serbia's "Interim Agreement"
with the EU. I confirmed that, while the UK would be ready for
the EU to recognise Serbia's significantly improved co-operation
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague by allowing entry into force of Serbia's "Interim
Agreement", full co-operation with ICTY remains the condition
set by the EU for ratification of Serbia's Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with the EU."
8.8 The Government's position on this matter now
being finally made clear, we looked forward to hearing more from
the Minister as and when the situation changed — either
within the confines of the Council or in the degree of cooperation
by the Serbian authorities — and, in the meantime, given
the degree of interest in the House in the western Balkans and
in the degree of cooperation with the ICTY on the part of both
prospective and aspiring Candidate countries there, we reported
these further exchanges to the House.[35]
The Minister's letter of 30 June 2009
8.9 The Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead) writes about the discussions
on Serbia's cooperation with ICTY at the General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) on 15/16 June, as follows:
"Following his visit to Belgrade on 11/12 May
2009 and formal presentation of the ICTY completion strategy to
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 4 June 2009, ICTY
Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz was invited to the GAERC on 15
June to discuss Serbia's co-operation with ICTY. I attach a copy
of the relevant section of Brammertz's report to the UNSC for
your information.[36]
Following Brammertz' presentation, there was a debate amongst
EU Member States on the implications of Brammertz' report for
implementation of Serbia's Interim Agreement and ratification
of her Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
"As my predecessor informed the Committee, the
Government's existing policy is that the UK would be content to
implement now Serbia's Interim Agreement on the basis of Serbia's
significantly improved co-operation with the ICTY, while keeping
ratification of the SAA conditional on Serbia's full co-operation
with the ICTY. In our view, 'full co-operation' would mean
committed and sustained activity from the Serbian Government,
demonstrating 100 percent effort and political will. Co-operation
with the Tribunal covers efforts in a range of areas including:
tackling support networks; meeting requests for documents; allowing
access to archives; ensuring protection of witnesses; as well
as locating and transferring remaining indictees.
"However, discussion at the 15/16 June GAERC
confirmed that there was no consensus amongst EU Member States
on implementation of the Interim Agreement and the EU will therefore
not at this stage proceed to unblock it. In the event that consensus
on this issue be reached in subsequent EU discussion, we envisage
that the IA will be unblocked in due course by revisiting
the existing GAERC conclusions on ICTY conditionality, rather
than by a Council Decision (the Minister's emphasis). However,
like my predecessor, I will keep the Committees updated of any
future progress on this issue."
Conclusion
8.10 In her letter of 4 December last, the then
Minister said that "Implementation of the Interim Agreement
involves a further Council Decision, and is therefore subject
to Parliamentary scrutiny". We therefore ask the Minister
to explain why, and on what basis, it has now been decided that
"revisiting the existing GAERC conclusions" is an appropriate
way to "unblock it". And why the Minister has underlined
this sentence. The impression given is that, contrary to the assurances
that we have received hitherto, the Government is seeking to move
to the next stage and then announce the fact, so as to avoid having
to explain the decision to do so ahead of time.
8.11 Given that the interim SAA contains all the
Community competence elements (i.e., trade, agriculture, industrial
and competition provisions) of the SAA, we should also like the
Minister to explain what Serbia would gain from the full SAA,
i.e., what incentives would the Serbian authorities then have
to make them move with greater determination — exercising
"100 percent effort and political will" — towards
full cooperation, as defined above, including locating and transferring
remaining indictees, and in particular Ratko Mladic.
Annex 1
"Report of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
— May 2009
"Cooperation of Serbia
"30. Serbia has made additional progress in
its cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor.
"31. In the past six months, Serbia's assistance
in terms of access to archives and the provision of documents
continued to improve. Serbia provided timely responses to the
large majority of requests for assistance from the Office of the
Prosecutor and has addressed nearly all important outstanding
requests. Serbia's National Council for Cooperation with the Tribunal
successfully led these efforts. The Office of the Prosecutor encourages
Serbian authorities to ensure that this trend remains stable and
irreversible. Their assistance in this regard will remain of paramount
importance during the upcoming senior leadership trials, including
the Karadžiæ
case.
"32. The Serbian authorities have responded
adequately and in a timely manner to specific requests for assistance,
particularly in facilitating the appearance of witnesses before
the Tribunal. In specific cases, the Office of the Serbian War
Crimes Prosecutor and Serbian security agencies promptly responded
to requests to secure the safety of threatened witnesses by taking
certain measures. As witness interference remains a serious problem
and a matter of serious concern to the Office of the Prosecutor,
it will continue to work closely with and rely upon the Serbian
authorities when such cases are identified.
"33. The most critical area of concern regarding
cooperation from Serbia remains the apprehension
of fugitives Ratko Mladiæ and Goran Hadžiæ. Based
on currently available information, the Office of the Prosecutor
believes that both fugitives are within the reach of Serbian authorities.
"34. In this regard, the Office of the Prosecutor
continues to follow closely the efforts of Serbian authorities
to locate these fugitives and is regularly represented in coordination
meetings of the Action Team in charge of tracking fugitives. During
the Prosecutor's visits to Belgrade in April and May 2009, Serbian
authorities fully briefed him on the security services' tracking
efforts.
"35. Since the arrest of Radovan Karadžiæ,
further progress has been made at the operational level. Serbia's
National Security Council and the Action Team have taken steps
to ameliorate the efficacy of ongoing operations and coordination
between the different government services. These services
appear determined and capable to locate and arrest the remaining
fugitives. Complex and widespread search operations against fugitives
and their support networks are taking place. Notwithstanding certain
deficiencies in recent search and seizure operations, the professionalism
of the government services in charge of tracking has generally
improved. Along with ground operations, a thorough review and
analysis of available information is now under way. Under the
previous leadership of the security and intelligence services,
crucial information that could have led to the apprehension of
fugitives was not acted upon. As a result, the authorities are
re-analysing all information previously available and verifying
all possible leads.
"36. In order to achieve additional concrete
positive results in the near future, the Serbian authorities must
continue to provide all necessary support to the professional
work done at the operational level. Therefore, the Government,
its members and key officials should foster an atmosphere conducive
to improved cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor. Negative
and unjustified statements calling into question the integrity
of the International Tribunal are in this regard counterproductive
and could have an adverse impact on Serbia's cooperation with
the Tribunal."
34 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmgeneral/euro/080429/80429s01.htm.
for the record of that debate. Back
35
HC 19-ix (2008-09), chapter 11 (4 March 2009); see headnote. Back
36
Reproduced at Annex 1 to this chapter of our Report. Back
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