10 EU and Georgia: EU Special Representative
and the independent international fact-finding mission on the
conflict
| (a)
(30755)
—
--
(b)
(30756)
—
--
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Council Joint Action extending the mandate of the European Union's Special Representatives for the crisis in Georgia
Council Decision amending and extending Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP concerning the independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia
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| Legal base
| (a) Articles 14, 18(5) and 23(2) EU; QMV
(b) Articles 13(3) and 23(1) EU; QMV
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| Department
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration
| EMs of 9 July 2009
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| Previous Committee Report
| (a) None; but see (30377) —: HC 19-vi (2008-09), chapter 14 (4 February 2009)
(b) None; but see (30270) —: HC 19-iii (2008-09), chapter 16 (14 January 2009)
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| To be discussed in Council
| 27 July 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
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| Committee's decision
| Cleared, but further information requested
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Background
10.1 The background is set out in chapter
9 of our report, where we consider a separate draft Joint Action
extending the mandate of the EU civilian ESDP monitoring mission,
EUMM Georgia, which was set up in the aftermath of the conflict
that erupted in Georgia in August 2008.[31]
Joint Action 2008/760/CFSP
10.2 Against this background, this Joint
Action established a Special Representative for the Crisis in
Georgia, in September 2008, to ensure coordination and consistency
of external EU actions in the region. The mandate for EUSR for
the Crisis in Georgia is renewable every 6 months, rather than
the standard 12, to reflect the exceptional circumstances in Georgia.
The incumbent, Ambassador Pierre Morel, already held, and still
holds, a concurrent mandate as EUSR for Central Asia.
10.3 The EUSR's mandate is based on
the objectives established by the conclusions of the extraordinary
European Council meeting in Brussels on 1 September 2008 and the
Council conclusions of 15 September on Georgia. The EUSR's role
is to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of the EU in helping
to resolve the conflict in Georgia.
The draft Joint Action
10.4 We cleared the last extension on
4 February, along with those of five other EUSRs, including Ambassador
Morel's mandate in his other capacity. At the time, the
then Minister for Europe (Caroline Flint) reported that Ambassador
Morel had worked well with the
other EUSRs, relevant partners and international organisations
(e.g. the OSCE, UNOMIG) in the region; had promoted good
governance and respect for human rights in an unpromising situation;
had proposed an Incident Resolution Mechanism; had demonstrated
his support for and personal commitment to the Geneva Talks as
a long-term process; and enjoyed good relations with Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Karasin.
The Government's view
10.5 In
her first Explanatory Memorandum of 9 July 2009, the
Minister for Europe at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Baroness
Kinnock of Holyhead) says that she supports Ambassador Morel's
reappointment, and continues as follows:
"he continues to play a key
role in support of the Geneva talks, and maintains strong relations
with the other international organisations working on the region
(particularly OSCE and UN). EUSR Morel has continued to maintain
access to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and has been instrumental in establishing an Incident Prevention
and Resolution Mechanism for the separatist regions. We wish him
to remain beyond September 2009 to signal the EU's continued serious
commitment to these issues.
"Not renewing Morel's mandate
would risk causing uncertainty about EU commitment to Georgia
when the Geneva process continues to face difficulties, and when
the EU is the only major international presence in Georgia, with
the OSCE and UN mandate renewals having been vetoed by Russia."
10.6 The Minister then recalls the background
of tensions between Russia and Georgia, dating back to the post-independence
conflicts in the early 1990s, which in 2008 "rose significantly over
Russian declarations of support for the separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russian shooting down
a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle over Abkhazia". She describes
the immediate aftermath as follows:
"In the days preceding 7 August,
clashes in South Ossetia between Georgian troops and South
Ossetian irregulars increased in intensity. On 7 August, the Georgian
Armed Forces attempted to take and hold Tskhinvali, significantly
compounding successive breaches by all parties of international
arrangements for the region. Russian armed forces reacted with
massive force. This was widely condemned as disproportionate,
including by the EU, NATO and G7 Foreign Ministers. Fighting raged
between 8 and 12 August between Russian and Georgian troops leaving
large numbers dead and over 100,000 people displaced. During the
fighting, Russian forces encroached deep into Georgian territory
beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and threatened Tbilisi itself.
"The EU, led by the French
Presidency, brokered a ceasefire between Presidents Medvedev and
Saakashvili on 12 August, which was reinforced by an implementing
agreement on 8 September. As part of these agreements, the EU
committed to provide a 200-strong monitoring mission to oversee
the implementation of the ceasefire by all parties. This was fully
deployed by 1 October. The internationally chaired Geneva talks
were also established. The presence of three international monitoring
missions, from the UN, OSCE and EU, has helped to defuse tensions
and prevent a return to large scale conflict. Russia recognised
the 'independence' of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 26 August
2008, and has subsequently pursued a strategy of presenting
the situation in the two separatist regions as 'post conflict'.
Russia vetoed the continuation of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions
in June 2009."
10.7 Finally, the Minister says that
approximately 50% of the current budget agreed for the year has
been spent, and that the Council Secretariat assesses that the
remaining funds will be sufficient for planned expenditure.
Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP
10.8 The mandate of the Independent
International Fact Finding Mission on the conflict in Georgia
is defined by the Council's Decision of 2 December 2008 (2008/901/CFSP).
The aim of the fact-finding mission is to investigate the origins
and the course of the conflict in Georgia, including with regard
to international law, humanitarian law and human rights, and the
accusations made in that context. The geographical scope and time
span of the investigation were made sufficiently broad to determine
all the possible causes of the conflict.
10.9 Also on 2 December 2008, the EU
appointed Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, who served as the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative in Georgia from 2002 to 2006,
to head the Mission.
10.10 At the time of the Mission's
establishment, the then Minister said that the
budget to 31 July 2009 would be €1.6 million (then £1.2
million), which would be met from the CFSP budget, to which the
UK currently contributes approximately 17%.
The draft Council Decision
10.11 This
Decision extends the duration of the Mission for a further two
months until 30 September 2009.
The Government's view
10.12 In her second Explanatory Memorandum
of 9 July 2008, the Minister
for Europe rehearses the same background to Ambassador Tagliavini's
appointment. She recalls that the
Government welcomed the establishment of the Mission, and says
that it has offered our full support to Ambassador Tagliavini
and her team. The Minister says that the Government "believe
that the Mission's final report will provide useful clarity on
the origins of the conflict and the attitudes of the respective
parties to international law during the conflict" and "agrees
with the no-cost extension of the Mission in order that it can
have sufficient time to prepare its report, considering all the
evidence available to it."
Conclusion
10.13 The extension of these
mandates raises no questions per se. We accordingly clear
the documents.
10.14 But we think that the House
would have benefited, not from a rehearsal, twice over, of a well-known
analysis of the events of last summer, but from an assessment
of where matters presently stand on the Geneva process that went
beyond noting that it "continues to face difficulties".
10.15 We accordingly ask the Minister
to write to us with such an assessment and to outline how she
sees matters developing between now and September, and particularly
her expectations as to how fully the Mission is likely to be able
to fulfil the extensive mandate given to it last December (c.f.
paragraph 10.7 above).
31 See (30749) - at chapter 9 of this Report. Back
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