European Scrutiny Committee Contents


7 Financial services

(30788) 11873/09 + ADDS 1-2 COM(09) 332 Commission Communication: Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets

Legal base
Document originated3 July 2009
Deposited in Parliament14 July 2009
DepartmentHM Treasury
Basis of considerationEM of 24 August 2009
Previous Committee ReportNone
To be discussed in CouncilNone planned
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionNot cleared; further information requested

Background

7.1 Following the financial and economic crisis the Commission has, at the behest of the European Council, been examining the need for and presenting various proposals relating to the financial services sector. We last reported on these activities, in relation to a Draft Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, in July 2009.[20]

The document

7.2 The Commission has published this Communication to launch a public consultation on ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives[21] markets. It calls for responses by 31 August 2009 and plans a public hearing on 25 September 2009. It will, on the basis of the consultation, present proposals, if justified legislative, by the end of the year.

7.3 In the Communication, which is accompanied by two detailed staff working documents, the Commission outlines the uses of derivatives and an interpretation of how derivatives have contributed to the current economic climate. It looks towards possible solutions for improving financial stability and reducing systemic risk, in particular counterparty risk, that is the risk that one side of a transaction will not honour its obligations). The Commission suggests that the objectives to achieve these aims are:

  • allowing regulators and supervisors to have full knowledge about the transactions that take place in over the counter derivatives markets (that is off-exchange trading, where prices remain private), as well as the positions that are building in those markets;
  • increasing the transparency of over the counter derivatives markets in relation to their users — in particular more and better information about prices and volumes should be available;
  • strengthening the operational efficiency of derivatives markets so as to ensure over the counter derivatives do not harm financial stability; and
  • mitigating counterparty risks and promoting centralised structures.

7.4 The Commission proposes these objectives can be achieved by:

  • promoting further standardisation to increase efficiency and reduce operational risks — issues are the degree to which standardisation of contracts should be obligatory, how to measure standardisation and the impact on a firm's ability to hedge risk with standardised contracts;
  • enhancing the use of central data repositories, which provide aggregate information of firms' positions and improve operational efficiency of over the counter markets by facilitating payment and settlement instructions and improve market transparency, especially for the market segments not covered by central counterparties[22] — the Commission discusses the possibility of extending central data repositories beyond credit default swaps;[23]
  • moving clearing of standardised over the counter derivatives to central counterparties, which reduces counterparty risk within the financial system and provides greater transparency to the market and regulators — the Commission discusses methods of encouraging the use of central counterparties and greater standardisation of contracts, for example business incentives, that is incentives brought about by using a central counterparty, such as improved risk management and position valuation of its users, and regulatory capital incentives, as a zero risk weighting is attributed to counterparty credit risk exposures cleared through a central counterparty; and
  • moving part or all of trading to public trading venues, for example an exchange, which would improve transparency and strengthen risk management in the market — the Commission discusses this point on the premise that an organised trading venue is the next logical step after standardised contracts have been put onto central counterparties, but acknowledges that the type of standardised contracts that are typically traded on public venues may not cater for the full range of derivative users' risk management needs.

The Government's view

7.5 The Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Myners) tells us that the Government:

  • welcomes the Commission proposals for enhancing the resilience of over the counter derivatives markets;
  • agrees that some aspects of over the counter derivatives markets have exhibited weaknesses during the crisis, specifically in terms of counterparty risk management and market transparency and that steps need to be taken to strengthen these aspects in order to safeguard financial stability; but
  • is of the view that appropriately risk managed and transparent over the counter derivatives markets have a valid role to play in today's global financial markets and careful consideration is needed to ensure that market participants are not deterred from using the financial instruments which most effectively manage the risks of their business.

7.6 The Minister continues that the Government agrees with the broad aims of the Commission's proposals, saying that the principal objectives of regulatory reform should be designed to reduce risk within the financial system, to improve overall transparency and to maintain financial stability. He says that in order to achieve these objectives the Government considers that four key issues need to be addressed:

  • increased standardisation of contract and economic terms, where the Government supports the Commission's drive for progress in this area, is of the view that there are a range of benefits that would accrue from the standardisation of contract and economic terms, including reducing complexity and operational risk and promoting transparency and liquidity, and shares the view that greater standardisation should therefore be pursued whilst maintaining the ability, where necessary, to adapt contract design, to enable market participants, including end users, to tailor risks to suit their individual needs;
  • greater use of central counterparty clearing for clearing-eligible products, where the Government supports the greater use of central counterparty clearing for clearing-eligible products, sees this as an effective means of reducing counterparty risk, supports, given good progress has been made with regards to central counterparty clearing for credit default swaps, efforts to extend this to other product areas and is of the view that greater use of central counterparty clearing not only reduces exposure to counterparty risk, but can ultimately aid market liquidity and efficiency;
  • strengthened risk management for non-central counterparty-cleared products, where, given that for market participants unable to directly access central counterparty clearers, or for non-clearing eligible contracts used to hedge specific risks, bilateral clearing arrangements will remain important, the Government is of the view that such arrangements must be subject to robust risk management, which includes regular valuation and collateralisation processes, strong legal and operational frameworks and appropriate capital requirements, therefore supports moves for improvements in this area and welcomes the progress which has been made through the co-operation of supervisors and market participants; and
  • increased transparency to the market and to regulators, where the Government shares the Commission's view that some market participants do not have adequate access to trade information, supports moves to address this imbalance, is of the view that here are a range of efficiency and risk benefits from increased trade and position transparency (specifically greater trade transparency can help to promote robust liquidity and market functioning), holds that improved position transparency can help market participants and authorities assess risks, including risks to the financial system and the broader economy, thinks the market has made good progress in improving position transparency in the credit default swaps market and supports extension of these efforts to other markets, when supported by a robust cost benefit analysis.

7.7 The Minister then sets out three key methods that the Government thinks that public authorities can use to help ensure that these objectives are met:

  • application of risk-appropriate capital requirements substantial international work within the Basel framework[24] is already being undertaken to reassess current capital levels and the Government expects this to deliver the desired outcome;
  • authorities must continue to work with market participants to analyse shortcomings in existing arrangements, explore specific options for reform, and ensure that reforms are made — through these efforts a range of improvements have already been made to the legal, operational and risk management processes underpinning over the counter derivatives markets, these efforts should be continued and outcomes should be carefully monitored, rather than being prejudged; and
  • if, following analysis by the authorities, market-led initiatives are found not to have achieved the public policy objective, well-targeted regulatory and legislative measures should be taken — these measures, which should be supported by a thorough cost benefit analysis, could include imposing minimum risk management standards, transparency and reporting requirements and complementary legislative changes that can support broad market functioning.

7.8 Finally, the Minister tells us that the Treasury and the Financial Services Authority are producing a joint response to the Commission Communication.

Conclusion

7.9 Clearly, whilst some measures will emerge from the Commission's consultation process, they will need to be carefully calibrated and fully justified by cost benefit analysis. We shall, in due course, consider any such measures that require Community legislation with that need in view.

7.10 Meanwhile, before considering the present document further, we should like to see the Government's response to the Commission Communication and to have an account of the Commission's public hearing of 25 September 2009. The document, of course, remains under scrutiny.





20   (30624) 9494/09 + ADDs 1-2: see HC 19-xxii (2008-09), chapter 3 (1 July 2009). Back

21   Derivatives are financial contracts that trade and redistribute risks - their value is "derived" from an underlying financial instrument, commodity, market variable, service etc. Back

22   A central counterparty is an entity that interposes itself between the counterparties to the contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. Back

23   A credit default swap is a contract between two counterparties under which the protection buyer will pay an annual fee (on a quarterly basis) to the protection seller until the maturity date of the contract or until a credit event, for example failure to pay interest due or bankruptcy occurs on the reference entity. In the latter case, the protection buyer must deliver bonds or loans of that reference entity for the amount of the protection (notional value of the contract) to the protection seller and receives the par value in return. Back

24   That is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/.  Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2009
Prepared 23 September 2009