Documents considered by the Committee on 28 October 2009, including the following recommendation for debate: Dairy market situation - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


10  RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST UZBEKISTAN

(30048)
— 
Council Common Position amending and extending Common Position 2007/734/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Uzbekistan


Legal baseArticle 15 EU; unanimity:
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 26 October 2009
Previous Committee ReportHC16-xxxiii (2007-08), chapter 4 (29 October 2008); also see (29615) —: HC16-xx (2007-08), chapter 14 (30 April 2008) and HC16-xix (2007-08), chapter 3 (23 April 2008); also see (29024) —: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 19 (7 November 2007), HC 16-iv (2007-08), chapter 29 (28 November 2007); (28644) —: HC 41-xxiii (2006-07), chapter 18 (6 June 2007); (28053) —: HC 41-ii (2006-07), chapter 14 (29 November 2006); and (26927) — and (26928) —: HC 34-vii (2005-06), chapter 18 (26 October 2005)
Discussed in Council26 October 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared; evidence session requested with Minister (reported to the House on 29 October 2008); further information now provided

Background

10.1 Our previous reports have detailed the events took place in Andizhan in Uzbekistan on 12-13 May 2005 that led to the large-scale loss of life at the hands of the Uzbek authorities. The 23 May 2005 GAERC both condemned the reported excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by the Uzbek security forces and expressed their deep regret at the failure of the Uzbek authorities to respond adequately to the UN's call for an independent international inquiry.

10.2 In the light of the continuing failure by the Uzbek authorities to respond to further repeated requests of the same nature, the GAERC then decided to introduce a 12 month arms embargo and a visa ban aimed at a number of listed individuals directly responsible for the excessive, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andizhan, and to suspend discussions under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA); and to review these measures in the light of any significant changes to the situation, in particular with regard to:

—  the conduct and outcome of the ongoing trials of those accused of precipitating and participating in the disturbances in Andizhan;

—  the situation regarding the detention and harassment of those who had questioned the Uzbek authorities' version of events;

—  Uzbek co-operation with any independent, international Rapporteur appointed to investigate the disturbances in Andizhan;

—  the outcome of any independent, international inquiry;

—  any action that demonstrated the willingness of the Uzbek authorities to adhere to the principles of respect for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms.

10.3 In view of the widespread concern at these events, the Committee reported its clearance of the Council Decision to the House on 26 October 2005.[32]

Our consideration thereafter

10.4 When the Common Position was due for renewal in November 2006, signs of differences of view began to emerge, and were maintained during the German Presidency, with the majority favouring a six month suspension of the travel ban. The then Minister for Europe said at the time that he had been opposed to this, but had agreed it because otherwise the EU's policy would have collapsed, and noted that the visa ban would automatically be re-imposed in May unless all agreed on its continued suspension. In reporting this to the House, the Committee drew attention to the October 2007 GAERC Conclusions, which stated that the Council:

    "… urges Uzbekistan to implement fully its international obligations relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as rule of law and, in particular, to allow full unimpeded access by relevant international bodies to prisoners; to engage effectively with the UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan; to let all NGOs, including Human Rights Watch operate without constraints in Uzbekistan; to release human rights defenders from detention and cease their harassment; to engage positively on human rights issues in the context of the forthcoming EU-Uzbekistan Cooperation Committee. The reform of judiciary, law enforcement and police law should be pursued. Progress towards these goals will be evaluated on the basis of a report by the Head of Missions, which will include an assessment of the upcoming presidential elections."

10.5 These, the then Minister said, were the objectives against which the EU would review the Uzbek authorities' progress when deciding what action to take the following May.

10.6 We thanked the then Minister for these further clarifications, which showed the Uzbek authorities clearly where there would need to be significant, measurable progress between then and May 2008 if the suspension of the visa ban was to be prolonged; and noted that, without it, it would be hard for those who were so inclined to continue to argue for further such "rewards" to the Uzbek authorities, or pressure others to join in such a consensus, for fear of the whole policy collapsing.

10.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 April 2008, the then Minister for Europe outlined revisions to the Common Position so as to renew the suspension of the travel ban for a further six months. He said that since the suspension of the travel ban in November 2007 there had been "more progress on the human rights situation than in any other six month period since the sanctions were imposed", which he said could "arguably … be attributed to the suspension of the visa ban". He cited:

—  "the release of four human rights defenders, including Saidjahon Zainabiddinov;

—  the resumption of prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

—  the appointment of a new Director for Human Rights Watch in Tashkent (although he had yet to be accredited);

—  the entering into force of the abolition of the death penalty; and

—  the introduction of a limited form of habeas corpus."

10.8 The then Minister also said that, during the 9-10 April EU Troika-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' meetings in Ashgabat, the EU had "urged Uzbekistan to continue the positive trend and make further progress on human rights issues", and that Uzbekistan had agreed to hold a further round of the EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue under the Slovenian Presidency. He concluded as follows:

    "Automatic re-imposition of the visa ban could put at risk further progress and constructive engagement by Uzbekistan, including on the Human Rights Dialogue. As such, the Government believes that in order to encourage continued constructive engagement, and in recognition of some progress over the last six months, the EU can justify the continued suspension of the visa ban."

10.9 In a 17 April letter accompanying his Explanatory Memorandum, the then Minister said that:

    "The Government believes that continued suspension of the visa ban, backed up by a strong Council statement on the areas in which the EU would like to see further positive progress, is the best approach to ensure continued Uzbek co-operation on human rights issues. This approach recognises the positive progress made in the six months the visa ban has been suspended. As mentioned in my Explanatory Memorandum, this progress could arguably be attributed to the suspension of the visa ban — there has been more progress in this six month period than in any other similar period since the sanctions were first imposed."

10.10 He then went on to say that, during discussions with fellow Member States, he had argued in favour of the continued suspension of the visa ban, subject to the Presidency using the 9-10 April meeting in Ashgabat "to encourage further progress". At the time of writing, there was "no consensus on the visa ban … several Members States have said that they do not consider there has been enough progress from Uzbekistan and that the visa ban should be automatically re-applied." He noted that it was therefore possible that agreement might not be reached before the 29 April General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, in which case the visa ban as set out in Common Position 2007/734/CFSP would be re-imposed; he would write again with further information following the 29 April meeting.

10.11 For our part, we felt that even though there may have been "more progress in this six month period than in any other similar period since the sanctions were first imposed", it was difficult to see this as significant in relation to the benchmarks set out in the October 2007 General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions. It did not appear to constitute "full unimpeded access by relevant international bodies to prisoners"; nor to amount to allowing all NGOs, not just Human Rights Watch, to operate without constraints in Uzbekistan; nor to constitute the release of human rights defenders from detention and the cessation of their harassment, or the authorities' effective engagement with the UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan. Nor did the abolition of the death penalty and the introduction of a limited form of habeas corpus seem to us to contribute significantly towards "reform of judiciary, law enforcement and police law".

10.12 We also noted that the then Minister had made no mention of the findings or conclusions of the report by EU Heads of Missions that was to form the basis of the EU's position.

10.13 All in all, we thought it more likely that, if the visa ban were re-imposed, the Uzbek authorities would not be able to sit on their hands and play off one group of Member States against the other when the Common Position next came up for review in November, but would instead have six months in which to show their commitment to the sort of significant improvements in respect for human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, and effective engagement with the UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan, that the EU has been seeking from the outset. Depending on their response, the EU would then have a much clearer indication of whether or not matters were moving in the right direction when the Common Position came up for review.

10.14 We therefore retained the draft Common Position under scrutiny, and awaited the then Minister's further report, which we asked to include information about the matter referred to in paragraph 10.12 above.

The then Minister's letter of 26 April 2008

10.15 The then Minister responded as follows:

—  he agreed that the benchmarks set out in the October 2007 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) Conclusions had not been fully met. He felt, however, that the progress the Uzbeks have made in the past six months had been "significant", with "positive developments in the following areas: the release of human rights defenders, access by international bodies to prisoners and the appointment of a new Director of Human Rights Watch."

—  with regard to the report by EU Heads of Mission and the assessment of the Presidential election held in December 2007, the then Minister said that EU Heads of Mission's, in January 2008, "shared the concerns expressed by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Limited Election Observation Mission that the election had generally failed to meet many OSCE commitments." But they "noted, however, that there had been some diversification of candidates: the first ever female candidate, a non-partisan candidate and an "opposition" candidate [and] some positive changes to the election legislation which enabled groups and parties to put forward candidates independently", but "concluded that improvements to the election process were still needed and that OSCE/ODIHR recommendations from the 2004 election had not been introduced."

—  he further noted that in a more recent report, EU Heads of Mission argued that re-imposing the visa ban now would have a detrimental effect: "a significant risk that Uzbekistan would react negatively and turn away from co-operating with the EU on human rights issues [which] would put in jeopardy the EU-Uzbekistan seminar on media freedom and civil society in May and risk the second round of the EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue in May/June, to which the Uzbeks have given their commitment, and therefore remove the prospect of further engagement on human rights issues."

—  in response to the Committee's view that "if the visa ban were to be re-imposed this would give the Uzbeks six months in which to show their commitment to improvements on human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, and effective engagement with UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan", the then Minister said previous experience had shown that "taking a hard-headed approach can be counter-productive". In his view, "the continued suspension of the visa ban for six months, backed up by clear Conclusions language on what the EU expects of Uzbekistan and including a commitment to review progress after three months, is the approach most likely to encourage further progress ahead of further consideration of the measures in October."

10.16 The then Minister concluded by noting that the Common Position was due to be adopted at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 29 April, and with the hope that, having further outlined his position, the Committee would understand if consensus were to be reached on the Common Position before scrutiny had been completed.

Our assessment

10.17 We found the then Minister's letter as unconvincing as its predecessor, since it added nothing to his previous argumentation.

10.18 The Council Conclusions to which the then Minister referred are at Annex 3 of this chapter of our Report. It seemed to us that, as he put it, "clear Conclusions language on what the EU expects of Uzbekistan" was likely to have but limited effect, since in large part they reiterated the benchmarks produced last October — benchmarks which had not merely (as he put it) not been fully met, but had been missed by a considerable margin, as we had pointed out in our previous Report.

10.19 Moreover, as the EU Heads of Mission reports indicated, key recommendations on the electoral process, of four years standing, had still not been introduced.

10.20 Taken as a whole, the measures now being applied seemed to us to bear little relation to the position taken by the EU in 2005; nor did the response of the Uzbek authorities begin to measure up to what was asked of them.

10.21 We noted that there was to be a progress review in 3 months time. Even then, the Council Conclusions recorded only that the Council would "present its recommendations to the Uzbek government on possible further steps to be taken in order to improve the respect of human rights and rule of law in Uzbekistan" , which was no more than the Council had been doing since 2005. We looked forward to hearing from him with details of the outcome of the review, and of the Uzbek authorities' response.

10.22 All in all, we were deeply disappointed that the then Minister should have joined in a consensus to continue suspension of the travel ban. Although we cleared the document, we did so with reluctance.

10.23 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 23 October 2008, the subsequent Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Caroline Flint) said that this new Common Position renewed the arms embargo imposed on Uzbekistan under Common Position 2007/734/CFSP, whilst lifting the travel ban on eight named individuals.

10.24 The then Minister commented as follows:

    "The human rights situation in Uzbekistan has seen significant improvement since the suspension of the travel ban in November 2007.

    "While it is true that the Uzbeks have made limited progress on the areas set by the European Council, there has been more positive progress on the human rights situation than at any time since the sanctions were imposed. This can be, at least partly, attributed to the suspension of the visa ban. The relatively positive trend has included:

—  "the release of five human rights defenders, including Tojibayeva, the most egregious of the Uzbek human rights cases of concern to the EU;

—  "the resumption of prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

—  "the entering into force of the abolition of the death penalty;

—  "the introduction of a limited form of habeas corpus;

—  "the ratification of a series of conventions combating child labour;

—  "the holding of a second EU-Uzbekistan human rights dialogue on 5 June 2008; and

—  "the holding of an EU-sponsored seminar on media freedom in Tashkent on 2-3 October."

10.25 The then Minister remained concerned about a number of negative developments including:

—  "two current trials against human rights defenders;

—  "the refusal of the Uzbek Ministry of Justice to accredit the Human Rights Watch; and

—  "the lack of substantial change in the registration and operation of NGOs in Uzbekistan."

10.26 The then Minister agreed with EU Heads of Mission that "isolating Uzbekistan would not be the way to promote further positive progress", but said that:

    "We should, however, continue to follow a path of critical engagement including through the EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogues. The UK supports lifting the travel ban in order to persuade the Uzbeks to work with the EU on reforms to improve human rights, democratisation and the rule of law.

    "In our judgment the renewal of the travel ban could have had a negative effect in Uzbekistan and could have risked losing even the small but positive progress of the past year. The UK therefore supported the EU consensus in favour of lifting the visa ban and renewing the arms embargo for a further 12 months, backed up by strong Council Conclusions language, as the approach most likely to encourage the Uzbeks to make further progress on human rights issues."

10.27 The then Minister concluded by saying that the Council:

    "… has called on Uzbekistan to fulfil its international obligations on human rights and welcomes Uzbekistan's willingness to work with the EU on a range of human rights issues. This includes an effective, result-oriented human rights dialogue, in line with Uzbekistan's reform programme."

Our assessment

10.28 The relevant Council Conclusions (at Annex 2 of this chapter of our Report), indicated to us that there had in fact been little progress over the past six months. From what the then Minister for Europe said, we found it difficult to gauge the nature of "Uzbekistan's reform programme." All the positive features to which the then Minister referred were in place in April, save for the release of Mrs Tojibayeva; and even here it seemed that her continued freedom was in doubt. There might have been two meetings: but the then Minister gave no indication of the extent to which, if at all, they had been either "effective" or "result-oriented". There had certainly been no results with regard to the calls for effective investigation of the events, now 3½ years ago, that led to the imposition of these restrictions in the first place.

10.29 We were also concerned about the way in which this latest change to the Common Position had been handled. As noted above, we had expected to have had a report from the then Minister about the mid-period progress report. Instead, we were effectively presented, not with a proposal to be scrutinised, but with a fait accompli — a decision announced in the 13 October GAERC Conclusions, followed by changes to the Common Position to give it effect.

10.30 We therefore asked the then Minister to appear before us to explain the position she had taken, as well as how these lapses in the scrutiny process came to pass and what she proposed to do to remedy them. That evidence session took place on 4 February 2009.[33]

10.31 With regard to the discussion on the approach taken with regard to the sanctions, the Minister said that:

    "… on the Uzbekistan situation we had to balance the need to remain rigorous over their human rights performance, but with a high risk that these sanctions would lapse in October in the absence of a consensus among all 27 EU Member States, which was actually a possibility. Therefore, we felt that if we allowed that to happen, then that would really undermine the credibility of the EU sanctions policy. This is also about dealing with the circumstances of these other Member States and wanting to keep, in relation to Uzbekistan, a package together, but recognising that to do that we had to get consensus round the table. If it was a choice between no package and a package that might not be as hard as people might want, I think the latter was important. …

    All of this is a work in progress and it is not a black and white situation. I think the levers that the EU has in working with countries such as these and others is constantly about reiterating the gains for these countries in a close relationship with the EU, but that is not unconditional, and we do expect significant improvements in their human rights performance. I do think that sanctions have proven to be instrumental in assisting that process. It is not perfect, I have to say, but it is also the case that, from previous experience taking too inflexible an approach can also be counter-productive. We have to, as I say, be mindful about what we are trying to achieve, but also trying to get a consensus around the table as well. Since the suspension of the visa ban in November 2007, in relation to Uzbekistan, there has been, in the EU's judgment, more progress on the human rights situation than at any time since the sanctions were imposed, but there is more we need to do, and this is something that we constantly grapple with in different ways."

10.32 On the question of an independent investigation into the events in Andijan, the Minister said:

    "The UK has proposed on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and with EU partners, to the Government of Uzbekistan that there should be an independent international investigation. That has been rejected by the Uzbek authorities … there has not been progress in that area. What I was trying to draw attention to is progress in some other areas. I think I did make it clear in my earlier comments that this is not a perfect situation that we are dealing with here. Part of it is about how we can encourage progress to be made. It may not be as much as we would want, but certainly I think the sanctions process and other opportunities within the EU have demonstrated, with a number of countries, the progress on human rights which is achieved. This is why, I have to say — and I go back to the question about Uzbekistan — we wanted to make sure there continued to be a sanctions package for that particular country, but there were others who felt that we had to give some acknowledgement of some progress. If it is a choice between no package being renewed, that is the urgency of the situation, and having something that we could all go forward on that still retained a good sanctions package, I think that is what is important and that is the type of decision we had to make at the time.

The Minister's letter of 26 October 2009

10.33 In his letter, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris Bryant) writes about the recent Uzbekistan sanctions negotiations. The Minister recalls the origins of the sanctions and the " increasing pressure within the EU to relax measures by those Member States that favour engagement over sanctions", which led last year "despite there being less progress than hoped … a further relaxation of measures to secure consensus within the EU to retain some sanctions." He continues as follows:

    "In October, when the latest negotiations began, it became clear that several Member States felt strongly that continued sanctions were unlikely to have any benefits, and indeed might be counterproductive in terms of our ability to have a constructive dialogue with Uzbekistan including on human rights issues. The belief was that lifting sanctions with renewed engagement would better serve the EU's desire for further progress. We would have liked to see sanctions remain in place until further progress had been made, but without unanimity within the EU the sanctions would have lapsed by default.

    "With this in mind we worked for the strongest possible outcome that retained EU unity. Our priorities were to ensure that a strong message was sent to Uzbekistan making clear that the EU remains seriously concerned by the human rights situation in Uzbekistan; underlining that the extent of future EU-Uzbek cooperation will depend on progress in this field; and ensuring the issue remains high on the agenda by committing EU ministers to holding a further discussion and assessment of the situation within a year. The agreed GAERC Conclusions (which I attach) do all of these things.

    "We believe this is the best outcome for two main reasons. First, the practical elements of the measures in place are already replicated elsewhere. Even with the lifting of the arms embargo, strategic exports to Uzbekistan, including equipment that might be used for internal repression, will be controlled by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Second, this ensures the EU move forward with a common purpose to secure human rights improvements in Uzbekistan. The GAERC Conclusions and future review send a clear message to the Uzbek authorities whilst we look to see if engagement will deliver further progress in this matter.

    "We will continue to monitor the human rights situation and to raise our concerns with the Uzbek authorities, both bilaterally and with our EU and other international partners, including through the dialogue on human rights that exists as part of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. We continue to fund small projects which support good governance, human rights and the development of civil society."

Conclusion

10.34 As the saying goes, "reality bites". According to the BBC country profile, Uzbekistan is the most populous Central Asian country; has the largest armed forces; has no real internal opposition and media that is tightly controlled by the state; has been described in a UN report as making "systematic" use of torture: but is one of the world's biggest producers of cotton, and is rich in natural resources, including oil, gas and gold.[34]

10.35 Thus, as the latest Council Conclusions make clear, though the Minister makes no mention of it, there has been a quantum shift in the EU's relationship with not only Uzbekistan but also with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan via the launch this Spring of the EU Central Asia Partnership.

10.36 Having now come to a conclusion, we leave others to judge the effectiveness of the policy pursued by the EU over the past four years. Our concern has been to scrutinise a process that has much wider application and to highlight the possible implications for other areas — such as the enlargement process and the Cotonou Article 96 process — where conditionality and good governance come into conflict with other considerations.

10.37 Given these broader considerations, we are now making this final Report to the House.



32   See headnote. Back

33   See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmeuleg/231/9020401.htm for the record of this evidence session. Back

34   See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1238242.stm for full country profile. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2009
Prepared 6 November 2009