10 RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST
UZBEKISTAN
(30048)
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| Council Common Position amending and extending Common Position 2007/734/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Uzbekistan
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| Legal base | Article 15 EU; unanimity:
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 26 October 2009
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| Previous Committee Report | HC16-xxxiii (2007-08), chapter 4 (29 October 2008); also see (29615) —: HC16-xx (2007-08), chapter 14 (30 April 2008) and HC16-xix (2007-08), chapter 3 (23 April 2008); also see (29024) —: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 19 (7 November 2007), HC 16-iv (2007-08), chapter 29 (28 November 2007); (28644) —: HC 41-xxiii (2006-07), chapter 18 (6 June 2007); (28053) —: HC 41-ii (2006-07), chapter 14 (29 November 2006); and (26927) — and (26928) —: HC 34-vii (2005-06), chapter 18 (26 October 2005)
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| Discussed in Council | 26 October 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; evidence session requested with Minister (reported to the House on 29 October 2008); further information now provided
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Background
10.1 Our previous reports have detailed the events
took place in Andizhan in Uzbekistan on 12-13 May 2005 that led
to the large-scale loss of life at the hands of the Uzbek authorities.
The 23 May 2005 GAERC both condemned the reported excessive, disproportionate
and indiscriminate use of force by the Uzbek security forces and
expressed their deep regret at the failure of the Uzbek authorities
to respond adequately to the UN's call for an independent international
inquiry.
10.2 In the light of the continuing failure by the
Uzbek authorities to respond to further repeated requests of the
same nature, the GAERC then decided to introduce a 12 month arms
embargo and a visa ban aimed at a number of listed individuals
directly responsible for the excessive, indiscriminate and disproportionate
use of force in Andizhan, and to suspend discussions under the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA); and to review these
measures in the light of any significant changes to the situation,
in particular with regard to:
— the conduct and outcome of the ongoing
trials of those accused of precipitating and participating in
the disturbances in Andizhan;
— the situation regarding the detention
and harassment of those who had questioned the Uzbek authorities'
version of events;
— Uzbek co-operation with any independent,
international Rapporteur appointed to investigate the disturbances
in Andizhan;
— the outcome of any independent, international
inquiry;
— any action that demonstrated the willingness
of the Uzbek authorities to adhere to the principles of respect
for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms.
10.3 In view of the widespread concern at these events,
the Committee reported its clearance of the Council Decision to
the House on 26 October 2005.[32]
Our consideration thereafter
10.4 When the Common Position was due for renewal
in November 2006, signs of differences of view began to emerge,
and were maintained during the German Presidency, with the majority
favouring a six month suspension of the travel ban. The then Minister
for Europe said at the time that he had been opposed to this,
but had agreed it because otherwise the EU's policy would have
collapsed, and noted that the visa ban would automatically be
re-imposed in May unless all agreed on its continued suspension.
In reporting this to the House, the Committee drew attention to
the October 2007 GAERC Conclusions, which stated that the Council:
"… urges Uzbekistan to implement fully
its international obligations relating to human rights and fundamental
freedoms as well as rule of law and, in particular, to allow full
unimpeded access by relevant international bodies to prisoners;
to engage effectively with the UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan;
to let all NGOs, including Human Rights Watch operate without
constraints in Uzbekistan; to release human rights defenders from
detention and cease their harassment; to engage positively on
human rights issues in the context of the forthcoming EU-Uzbekistan
Cooperation Committee. The reform of judiciary, law enforcement
and police law should be pursued. Progress towards these goals
will be evaluated on the basis of a report by the Head of Missions,
which will include an assessment of the upcoming presidential
elections."
10.5 These, the then Minister said, were the objectives
against which the EU would review the Uzbek authorities' progress
when deciding what action to take the following May.
10.6 We thanked the then Minister for these further
clarifications, which showed the Uzbek authorities clearly where
there would need to be significant, measurable progress between
then and May 2008 if the suspension of the visa ban was to be
prolonged; and noted that, without it, it would be hard for those
who were so inclined to continue to argue for further such "rewards"
to the Uzbek authorities, or pressure others to join in such a
consensus, for fear of the whole policy collapsing.
10.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 April 2008,
the then Minister for Europe outlined revisions to the Common
Position so as to renew the suspension of the travel ban for a
further six months. He said that since the suspension of the travel
ban in November 2007 there had been "more progress on the
human rights situation than in any other six month period since
the sanctions were imposed", which he said could "arguably
… be attributed to the suspension of the visa ban".
He cited:
— "the release of four human rights
defenders, including Saidjahon Zainabiddinov;
— the resumption of prison visits by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
— the appointment of a new Director for
Human Rights Watch in Tashkent (although he had yet to be accredited);
— the entering into force of the abolition
of the death penalty; and
— the introduction of a limited form of
habeas corpus."
10.8 The then Minister also said that, during the
9-10 April EU Troika-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' meetings
in Ashgabat, the EU had "urged Uzbekistan to continue the
positive trend and make further progress on human rights issues",
and that Uzbekistan had agreed to hold a further round of the
EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue under the Slovenian Presidency.
He concluded as follows:
"Automatic re-imposition of the visa ban
could put at risk further progress and constructive engagement
by Uzbekistan, including on the Human Rights Dialogue. As such,
the Government believes that in order to encourage continued constructive
engagement, and in recognition of some progress over the last
six months, the EU can justify the continued suspension of the
visa ban."
10.9 In a 17 April letter accompanying his Explanatory
Memorandum, the then Minister said that:
"The Government believes that continued
suspension of the visa ban, backed up by a strong Council statement
on the areas in which the EU would like to see further positive
progress, is the best approach to ensure continued Uzbek co-operation
on human rights issues. This approach recognises the positive
progress made in the six months the visa ban has been suspended.
As mentioned in my Explanatory Memorandum, this progress could
arguably be attributed to the suspension of the visa ban —
there has been more progress in this six month period than in
any other similar period since the sanctions were first imposed."
10.10 He then went on to say that, during discussions
with fellow Member States, he had argued in favour of the continued
suspension of the visa ban, subject to the Presidency using the
9-10 April meeting in Ashgabat "to encourage further progress".
At the time of writing, there was "no consensus on the visa
ban … several Members States have said that they do not consider
there has been enough progress from Uzbekistan and that the visa
ban should be automatically re-applied." He noted that it
was therefore possible that agreement might not be reached before
the 29 April General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting,
in which case the visa ban as set out in Common Position 2007/734/CFSP
would be re-imposed; he would write again with further information
following the 29 April meeting.
10.11 For our part, we felt that even though there
may have been "more progress in this six month period than
in any other similar period since the sanctions were first imposed",
it was difficult to see this as significant in relation to the
benchmarks set out in the October 2007 General Affairs and External
Relations Council Conclusions. It did not appear to constitute
"full unimpeded access by relevant international bodies to
prisoners"; nor to amount to allowing all NGOs, not just
Human Rights Watch, to operate without constraints in Uzbekistan;
nor to constitute the release of human rights defenders from detention
and the cessation of their harassment, or the authorities' effective
engagement with the UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan. Nor
did the abolition of the death penalty and the introduction of
a limited form of habeas corpus seem to us to contribute significantly
towards "reform of judiciary, law enforcement and police
law".
10.12 We also noted that the then Minister had made
no mention of the findings or conclusions of the report by EU
Heads of Missions that was to form the basis of the EU's position.
10.13 All in all, we thought it more likely that,
if the visa ban were re-imposed, the Uzbek authorities would not
be able to sit on their hands and play off one group of Member
States against the other when the Common Position next came up
for review in November, but would instead have six months in which
to show their commitment to the sort of significant improvements
in respect for human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms,
and effective engagement with the UN Special Rapporteurs to Uzbekistan,
that the EU has been seeking from the outset. Depending on their
response, the EU would then have a much clearer indication of
whether or not matters were moving in the right direction when
the Common Position came up for review.
10.14 We therefore retained the draft Common Position
under scrutiny, and awaited the then Minister's further report,
which we asked to include information about the matter referred
to in paragraph 10.12 above.
The then Minister's letter of 26 April 2008
10.15 The then Minister responded as follows:
— he agreed that the benchmarks set out
in the October 2007 General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) Conclusions had not been fully met. He felt, however,
that the progress the Uzbeks have made in the past six months
had been "significant", with "positive developments
in the following areas: the release of human rights defenders,
access by international bodies to prisoners and the appointment
of a new Director of Human Rights Watch."
— with regard to the
report by EU Heads of Mission and the assessment of the Presidential
election held in December 2007, the then Minister said that EU
Heads of Mission's, in January 2008, "shared the concerns
expressed by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) Limited Election Observation Mission that the election
had generally failed to meet many OSCE commitments." But
they "noted, however, that there had been some diversification
of candidates: the first ever female candidate, a non-partisan
candidate and an "opposition" candidate [and] some positive
changes to the election legislation which enabled groups and parties
to put forward candidates independently", but "concluded
that improvements to the election process were still needed and
that OSCE/ODIHR recommendations from the 2004 election had not
been introduced."
— he further noted
that in a more recent report, EU Heads of Mission argued that
re-imposing the visa ban now would have a detrimental effect:
"a significant risk that Uzbekistan would react negatively
and turn away from co-operating with the EU on human rights issues
[which] would put in jeopardy the EU-Uzbekistan seminar on media
freedom and civil society in May and risk the second round of
the EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue in May/June, to which
the Uzbeks have given their commitment, and therefore remove the
prospect of further engagement on human rights issues."
— in response to the
Committee's view that "if the visa ban were to be re-imposed
this would give the Uzbeks six months in which to show their commitment
to improvements on human rights, the rule of law and fundamental
freedoms, and effective engagement with UN Special Rapporteurs
to Uzbekistan", the then Minister said previous experience
had shown that "taking a hard-headed approach can be counter-productive".
In his view, "the continued suspension of the visa ban for
six months, backed up by clear Conclusions language on what the
EU expects of Uzbekistan and including a commitment to review
progress after three months, is the approach most likely to encourage
further progress ahead of further consideration of the measures
in October."
10.16 The then Minister concluded by noting that
the Common Position was due to be adopted at the General Affairs
and External Relations Council on 29 April, and with the hope
that, having further outlined his position, the Committee would
understand if consensus were to be reached on the Common Position
before scrutiny had been completed.
Our assessment
10.17 We found the then Minister's letter as unconvincing
as its predecessor, since it added nothing to his previous argumentation.
10.18 The Council Conclusions to which the then Minister
referred are at Annex 3 of this chapter of our Report. It seemed
to us that, as he put it, "clear Conclusions language on
what the EU expects of Uzbekistan" was likely to have but
limited effect, since in large part they reiterated the benchmarks
produced last October — benchmarks which had not merely
(as he put it) not been fully met, but had been missed by a considerable
margin, as we had pointed out in our previous Report.
10.19 Moreover, as the EU Heads of Mission reports
indicated, key recommendations on the electoral process, of four
years standing, had still not been introduced.
10.20 Taken as a whole, the measures now being applied
seemed to us to bear little relation to the position taken by
the EU in 2005; nor did the response of the Uzbek authorities
begin to measure up to what was asked of them.
10.21 We noted that there was to be a progress review
in 3 months time. Even then, the Council Conclusions recorded
only that the Council would "present its recommendations
to the Uzbek government on possible further steps to be taken
in order to improve the respect of human rights and rule of law
in Uzbekistan" , which was no more than the Council had been
doing since 2005. We looked forward to hearing from him with details
of the outcome of the review, and of the Uzbek authorities' response.
10.22 All in all, we were deeply disappointed that
the then Minister should have joined in a consensus to continue
suspension of the travel ban. Although we cleared the document,
we did so with reluctance.
10.23 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 23 October
2008, the subsequent Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Caroline Flint) said that this new Common Position renewed
the arms embargo imposed on Uzbekistan under Common Position 2007/734/CFSP,
whilst lifting the travel ban on eight named individuals.
10.24 The then Minister commented as follows:
"The human rights situation in Uzbekistan
has seen significant improvement since the suspension of the travel
ban in November 2007.
"While it is true that the Uzbeks have made
limited progress on the areas set by the European Council, there
has been more positive progress on the human rights situation
than at any time since the sanctions were imposed. This can be,
at least partly, attributed to the suspension of the visa ban.
The relatively positive trend has included:
— "the release of five human rights
defenders, including Tojibayeva, the most egregious of the Uzbek
human rights cases of concern to the EU;
— "the resumption of prison visits
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
— "the entering into force of the
abolition of the death penalty;
— "the introduction of a limited form
of habeas corpus;
— "the ratification of a series of
conventions combating child labour;
— "the holding of a second EU-Uzbekistan
human rights dialogue on 5 June 2008; and
— "the holding of an EU-sponsored
seminar on media freedom in Tashkent on 2-3 October."
10.25 The then Minister remained concerned about
a number of negative developments including:
— "two current trials against human
rights defenders;
— "the refusal of the Uzbek Ministry
of Justice to accredit the Human Rights Watch; and
— "the lack of substantial change
in the registration and operation of NGOs in Uzbekistan."
10.26 The then Minister agreed with EU Heads of Mission
that "isolating Uzbekistan would not be the way to promote
further positive progress", but said that:
"We should, however, continue to follow
a path of critical engagement including through the EU-Uzbekistan
Human Rights Dialogues. The UK supports lifting the travel ban
in order to persuade the Uzbeks to work with the EU on reforms
to improve human rights, democratisation and the rule of law.
"In our judgment the renewal of the travel
ban could have had a negative effect in Uzbekistan and could have
risked losing even the small but positive progress of the past
year. The UK therefore supported the EU consensus in favour of
lifting the visa ban and renewing the arms embargo for a further
12 months, backed up by strong Council Conclusions language, as
the approach most likely to encourage the Uzbeks to make further
progress on human rights issues."
10.27 The then Minister concluded by saying that
the Council:
"… has called on Uzbekistan to fulfil
its international obligations on human rights and welcomes Uzbekistan's
willingness to work with the EU on a range of human rights issues.
This includes an effective, result-oriented human rights dialogue,
in line with Uzbekistan's reform programme."
Our assessment
10.28 The relevant Council Conclusions (at Annex
2 of this chapter of our Report), indicated to us that there had
in fact been little progress over the past six months. From what
the then Minister for Europe said, we found it difficult to gauge
the nature of "Uzbekistan's reform programme." All the
positive features to which the then Minister referred were in
place in April, save for the release of Mrs Tojibayeva; and even
here it seemed that her continued freedom was in doubt. There
might have been two meetings: but the then Minister gave no indication
of the extent to which, if at all, they had been either "effective"
or "result-oriented". There had certainly been no results
with regard to the calls for effective investigation of the events,
now 3½ years ago, that led to the imposition of these restrictions
in the first place.
10.29 We were also concerned about the way in which
this latest change to the Common Position had been handled. As
noted above, we had expected to have had a report from the then
Minister about the mid-period progress report. Instead, we were
effectively presented, not with a proposal to be scrutinised,
but with a fait accompli — a decision announced in
the 13 October GAERC Conclusions, followed by changes to the Common
Position to give it effect.
10.30 We therefore asked the then Minister to appear
before us to explain the position she had taken, as well as how
these lapses in the scrutiny process came to pass and what she
proposed to do to remedy them. That evidence session took place
on 4 February 2009.[33]
10.31 With regard to the discussion on the approach
taken with regard to the sanctions, the Minister said that:
"… on the Uzbekistan situation we had
to balance the need to remain rigorous over their human rights
performance, but with a high risk that these sanctions would lapse
in October in the absence of a consensus among all 27 EU Member
States, which was actually a possibility. Therefore, we felt that
if we allowed that to happen, then that would really undermine
the credibility of the EU sanctions policy. This is also about
dealing with the circumstances of these other Member States and
wanting to keep, in relation to Uzbekistan, a package together,
but recognising that to do that we had to get consensus round
the table. If it was a choice between no package and a package
that might not be as hard as people might want, I think the latter
was important. …
All of this is a work in progress and it is not
a black and white situation. I think the levers that the EU has
in working with countries such as these and others is constantly
about reiterating the gains for these countries in a close relationship
with the EU, but that is not unconditional, and we do expect significant
improvements in their human rights performance. I do think that
sanctions have proven to be instrumental in assisting that process.
It is not perfect, I have to say, but it is also the case that,
from previous experience taking too inflexible an approach can
also be counter-productive. We have to, as I say, be mindful about
what we are trying to achieve, but also trying to get a consensus
around the table as well. Since the suspension of the visa ban
in November 2007, in relation to Uzbekistan, there has been, in
the EU's judgment, more progress on the human rights situation
than at any time since the sanctions were imposed, but there is
more we need to do, and this is something that we constantly grapple
with in different ways."
10.32 On the question of an independent investigation
into the events in Andijan, the Minister said:
"The UK has proposed on numerous occasions,
both bilaterally and with EU partners, to the Government of Uzbekistan
that there should be an independent international investigation.
That has been rejected by the Uzbek authorities … there has
not been progress in that area. What I was trying to draw attention
to is progress in some other areas. I think I did make it clear
in my earlier comments that this is not a perfect situation that
we are dealing with here. Part of it is about how we can encourage
progress to be made. It may not be as much as we would want, but
certainly I think the sanctions process and other opportunities
within the EU have demonstrated, with a number of countries, the
progress on human rights which is achieved. This is why, I have
to say — and I go back to the question about Uzbekistan
— we wanted to make sure there continued to be a sanctions
package for that particular country, but there were others who
felt that we had to give some acknowledgement of some progress.
If it is a choice between no package being renewed, that is the
urgency of the situation, and having something that we could all
go forward on that still retained a good sanctions package, I
think that is what is important and that is the type of decision
we had to make at the time.
The Minister's letter of 26 October 2009
10.33 In his letter, the Minister for Europe at the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris Bryant) writes about the
recent Uzbekistan sanctions negotiations. The Minister recalls
the origins of the sanctions and the " increasing pressure
within the EU to relax measures by those Member States that favour
engagement over sanctions", which led last year "despite
there being less progress than hoped … a further relaxation
of measures to secure consensus within the EU to retain some sanctions."
He continues as follows:
"In October, when the latest negotiations
began, it became clear that several Member States felt strongly
that continued sanctions were unlikely to have any benefits, and
indeed might be counterproductive in terms of our ability to have
a constructive dialogue with Uzbekistan including on human rights
issues. The belief was that lifting sanctions with renewed engagement
would better serve the EU's desire for further progress. We would
have liked to see sanctions remain in place until further progress
had been made, but without unanimity within the EU the sanctions
would have lapsed by default.
"With this in mind we worked for the strongest
possible outcome that retained EU unity. Our priorities were to
ensure that a strong message was sent to Uzbekistan making clear
that the EU remains seriously concerned by the human rights situation
in Uzbekistan; underlining that the extent of future EU-Uzbek
cooperation will depend on progress in this field; and ensuring
the issue remains high on the agenda by committing EU ministers
to holding a further discussion and assessment of the situation
within a year. The agreed GAERC Conclusions (which I attach) do
all of these things.
"We believe this is the best outcome for
two main reasons. First, the practical elements of the measures
in place are already replicated elsewhere. Even with the lifting
of the arms embargo, strategic exports to Uzbekistan, including
equipment that might be used for internal repression, will be
controlled by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria. Second, this ensures the EU move forward with a common
purpose to secure human rights improvements in Uzbekistan. The
GAERC Conclusions and future review send a clear message to the
Uzbek authorities whilst we look to see if engagement will deliver
further progress in this matter.
"We will continue to monitor the human rights
situation and to raise our concerns with the Uzbek authorities,
both bilaterally and with our EU and other international partners,
including through the dialogue on human rights that exists as
part of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. We continue
to fund small projects which support good governance, human rights
and the development of civil society."
Conclusion
10.34 As the saying goes, "reality bites".
According to the BBC country profile, Uzbekistan is the most populous
Central Asian country; has the largest armed forces; has no real
internal opposition and media that is tightly controlled by the
state; has been described in a UN report as making "systematic"
use of torture: but is one of the world's biggest producers of
cotton, and is rich in natural resources, including oil, gas and
gold.[34]
10.35 Thus, as the latest Council Conclusions
make clear, though the Minister makes no mention of it, there
has been a quantum shift in the EU's relationship with not only
Uzbekistan but also with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan via the launch this Spring of the EU Central
Asia Partnership.
10.36 Having now come to a conclusion, we leave
others to judge the effectiveness of the policy pursued by the
EU over the past four years. Our concern has been to scrutinise
a process that has much wider application and to highlight the
possible implications for other areas — such as the enlargement
process and the Cotonou Article 96 process — where conditionality
and good governance come into conflict with other considerations.
10.37 Given these broader considerations, we are
now making this final Report to the House.
32 See headnote. Back
33
See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmeuleg/231/9020401.htm
for the record of this evidence session. Back
34
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1238242.stm
for full country profile. Back
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