7 BARCELONA PROCESS: UNION
FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN
(29704)
9865/08
COM(08) 319
| Commission Communication: Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean
|
| Legal base | —
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration |
Minister's letter of 20 July 2009 |
| Previous Committee Report |
HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 1 (29 April 2009); HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008) and HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008); also see (29029) —: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 2 (7 November 2007)
|
| Discussed in Council | 16 June 2008 General Affairs and External Relations Council and 20 June 2008 European Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
|
Background
7.1 The March 2008 European Council "approved the principle
of a Union for the Mediterranean which will include the Member
States of the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean coastal states"
and "invited the Commission to present to the Council the
necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be
called "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean"
with a view to the Summit which will take place in Paris on 13
July 2008."
7.2 The Barcelona Process (a.k.a. the Euro-Med Process)
was launched during the 1995 Spanish Presidency between the EU
and its Mediterranean partners — Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia
and Turkey (Libya has observer status since 1999) — with
the aim of building "a space of dialogue, peace, security
and shared prosperity". At the outset, now nearly 14 years
ago, the Commission described this as "a turning point in
Euro-Mediterranean relations". On examining the most recent
Commission Communication on the Process in November 2007, the
Committee concluded that, in reality, it had become impossible
to judge the extent to which the Process was merely processing,
rather than achieving concrete outcomes; and that, with approximately
€4.7 billion committed in 2000-06 and a further €1.3
billion earmarked for 2007-10, it was time to examine the Process
more closely, via a debate on the Communication in the European
Standing Committee.[26]
That debate took place on 22 January 2008.[27]
7.3 During that debate, there was some, perforce
limited, discussion of President Sarkozy's idea of a "Union
of the Mediterranean", which would apparently have been restricted
to Mediterranean EU Member States and the Mediterranean partners.
However, Chancellor Merkel opposed the notion that EU funds should
be used in this way for the benefit of only some Member States
— hence the compromise embodied in the European Council
Conclusions, which includes all 27 Member States and all 700 million
people on both sides (now including Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro and Monaco).
The Commission Communication
7.4 The Communication (which we considered on 18
June 2008)[28] sets out
the rationale for the Process and a vision for enhanced co-operation.
The intention would be to build on the existing process, but add
a number of higher-profile projects to give added impetus and
visibility. Funding arrangements were somewhat imprecise. The
Commission noted that the EU and its Member States already provided
significant funding in the Mediterranean region (at Annex 1 of
the relevant chapter of our previous but one Report), but that
"to bring added value to existing arrangements, the "Barcelona
Process: Union for the Mediterranean" should be designed
to mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through
regional projects", and that "its added value will very
much depend on its capacity to attract more financial resources
for regional projects." While saying that there could be
no prior earmarking of EU funds, the Commission said that "certain
projects which fit with the objectives of EU regional programmes
can be considered for funding" (ditto, Annex 2), and also
that additional funding for regional projects and activities should
come mainly from the following sources:
— private
sector participation;
— bilateral cooperation from Member States;
— contributions from Mediterranean partners;
— international financial institutions,
regional banks and other bilateral funds;
— the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and
Partnership Facility (FEMIP), which was created in 2002 as a tool
to foster private sector development in the Mediterranean region
and combines EIB loans with EU-budget resources to provide technical
assistance, risk capital and interest rate subsidies;
— the ENPI, as well as the other instruments
applicable to the countries covered by the existing Euro-Med Process.
7.5 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the
then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Mr Jim Murphy) shared the concerns of other Member States that
the Barcelona Process, "though useful, needed a strategic
refresh." The Union for the Mediterranean would "upgrade
this important relationship." The Communication offered "a
realistic assessment of what has been achieved, and the areas
for further development." The European Neighbourhood Policy
had primarily been an instrument of bilateral cooperation between
the EU and each partner country; it had been less successful at
promoting regional integration and cohesion; the projects identified
by the Commission were "potentially promising" and would
help "fill that gap." He would explore the specific
proposals the Commission had made on governance arrangements with
EU and Mediterranean partners, before detailed modalities were
submitted for approval in November 2008, when EuroMed Foreign
Ministers would meet. He "tended to favour a light Secretariat
(with Commission involvement) which would help to coordinate the
Process effectively." He would "update the Committee
in the autumn as this debate unfolds", after the formal French
Presidency launch in Paris on 13 July.
7.6 We asked the then Minister to write to us after
the July Summit to let us know of the outcomes. We also noted
a number of questions that came to mind. The Commission talked
of the need for additional funding. But a great deal of money
had been spent so far, with only limited outcomes. We wondered
if more money was the answer; where would it come from; and what
would ensure that it was spent effectively.
7.7 We also asked to know in due course the arrangements
envisaged for the proposed secretariat — in particular,
how it would fit in with the existing modalities of the Barcelona
Process; how those modalities would be changed; and how those
changes would lead to better outcomes, more visibility and more
real ownership by the Mediterranean partners than had been the
case hitherto under the Barcelona Process.
7.8 In the meantime, we retained the Communication
under scrutiny.[29]
The then Minister's letter of 21 July 2008
7.9 The then Minister for Europe noted that the Summit
was attended by the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary
attended a pre-meeting with Foreign Ministers which helped to
finalise the Summit Declaration, which sets out the purpose of
the Union for the Mediterranean and the areas for action reinforcing
the Barcelona process (see Annex 1 of the relevant chapter of
our previous Report). Some useful work had been conducted on energy,
environment, and political dialogue". The Summit itself was
"also a valuable occasion to bring political leaders from
the EU and the Mediterranean together", with "a number
of highly symbolic moments". Looking ahead, the Minister
said that he would write to the Committee during the autumn about
"discussions around the governance and funding of the Union
for the Mediterranean, which will need to be resolved in advance
of the November Foreign Ministers' meeting." For his own
part, the then Minister said that
— he
would "continue to argue for a light secretariat with well-defined
objectives", and "would have concerns about any EC Budget
funds being called on to finance the administrative structures
proposed";
— projects that were to be supported by
the EC Budget should come from existing rather than additional
resources; and
— there should there be no diversion of
funding within the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
framework.
7.10 We thanked the then Minister for this comprehensive
update, and looked forward to hearing more from him as discussions
continued (including, at some stage before proposals were finalised
for discussion in November, the answer to our earlier questions).
We also asked to know what aspects of the Declaration he considered
to be of particular value. In the meantime, we continued to retain
the document under scrutiny.
The Minister's letter of 22 April 2009
7.11 A response finally appeared in a letter of 22
April 2009 from his successor, the then Minister for Europe at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Caroline Flint). The Minister
says that "the creation of UMed remains an important political
issue to the United Kingdom", and was "a potentially
useful tool to promote dialogue on security, the environment,
confidence building and business and to implement projects along
these lines." The Government wanted to ensure that "the
good work" carried out under the European Neighbourhood Partnership
Instrument and the EU's Association Agreements in the region continued
unaffected; to keep its funding light, shared between all partners
and focused on delivering tangible projects in the region; and
with "key objectives" of "inclusivity and to create
a true partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean countries."
7.12 The Minister then reported that the 3-4 November
2008 Marseilles Summit had agreed:
— Barcelona
as the seat for the Secretariat. No details were developed for
the Secretariat other than, at UK insistance, language was inserted
into the declaration that the EU's share of the funding should
come from existing European Neighbourhood Partners Instrument
allocations;
— the Secretariat would have a Secretary
General from a Southern Mediterranean Partner country and five
confirmed Deputy Secretary General slots: tacitly agreed to go
to Malta, Italy, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Greece
(there was disagreement over a sixth position which Turkey could
hold, which France, as UMed Co-Presidency, was attempting to resolve
by talking to Turkey and Cyprus). The Secretary General and each
of the deputy Secretary Generals would be given a specific area
of competence;
— the development of the Secretariat's
Statutes, funding and mandate would be taken forward at working
level;
— Israel had dropped its concerns over
Arab League involvement, ending the suspension of UMed meetings,
which had "prevented much of the detail around governance
and funding, especially the planned Secretariat, being fully defined
and discussed."
7.13 The then Minister also outlined the matter of
the UMed Co-Presidency: the Paris summit in July 2008 had
agreed that there would be two co-presidents of UMed, one from
the Southern Partners rotating every two years and one from the
EU, held by the EU Presidency of the time. It was suggested that
France could remain as UMed co-presidency for two years so as
to add consistency to the process. The matter was resolved with
the French and Czech Governments agreeing that France would remain
as Co-President of UMed working alongside the current Czech EU
Presidency. The Government had continued "to emphasise the
importance of adhering to existing rules on external EU representation."
7.14 Finally, the Minister outlines the state of
play on the Secretariat: despite the suspension, negotiations
within the EU focused on preparing the Statutes to establish the
secretariat and govern its operations. The then Minister wanted
to ensure that there was Council oversight and approval of the
draft texts and that procedures were put in place to ensure effective
coordination within the EU in relation to the future activities
of the Secretariat, and had asked for greater discussion on how
UMed would tie in with existing EU work in the Mediterranean region
and an agreed EU position before further discussion of this outside
the EU. The then Minister was in particular "pushing for:
— Clear
text in the Statutes, clarity on their status and an agreed EU
position before any wider discussions with the non-EU UMed members
take place;
— Normal
EU coordination procedures to apply for the creation of an EU
position on the work of the Secretariat once it is established;
and
— Ensuring that the prerogatives of the
European Parliament are respected, particularly on monitoring
the budget."
7.15 Noting that "the basis for the establishment
of the UMed Secretariat flows from the Ministerial declarations
and UMed has always been a fluid and informal process", the
then Minister said that she expected further discussion in the
EU regarding the Secretariat Statutes along the lines set out
above, "although at this stage we do not expect a Council
Decision", and undertook to update the Committee "as
negotiations progress."
Our assessment
7.16 The contrast between the aspirations set out
in the Minister's opening remarks — particularly "inclusivity"
and "a true partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean
countries" — and everything that followed was, we felt,
striking, and gave little comfort to those who struggled to see
how this initiative was likely to lead to any improvement on the
Barcelona Process. At the practical level, politics and horse-trading
was already prevalent: otherwise, why create five confirmed Deputy
Secretary General slots before working out what they were going
to do? On all other aspects of the Secretariat and funding, it
seemed that everything was still to be determined.
7.17 We therefore continued to retain the Communication
under scrutiny, pending further information from the Minister
— including answers to our questions concerning how more
money was likely to be the answer, when €6 billion had been
spent or committed thus far on the existing Process; where it
would come from; and what would ensure that it was spent effectively.
When that was forthcoming, we also asked the Minister to explain
what the "existing rules on external EU representation",
to which she referred, were, and how they had been protected;
and also to explain how the statutes could properly be adopted
other than by a Council Decision. We also take the opportunity
to remind her that we had asked her predecessor to tell us what
aspects in particular of the lengthy Paris Summit Declaration
were considered to be of particular value.[30]
The Minister's letter of 20 July 2009
7.18 The
then Minister for Europe at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness
Kinnock of Holyhead) says that the Government
"shares a number of your concerns about the Union for the
Mediterranean (UMed) process, in particular the current uncertainty
about its funding and the EU's relationship with the body",
and is "working hard to tackle these issues and seek greater
clarity as we move forward." However, "the actual process
is still in its infancy with progress badly affected by two lengthy
suspensions of discussions". Meetings have now resumed and
"we will be playing an active role to shape the process and
address our concerns."
The Minister then seeks to address "each area
of your concerns in turn", as follows:
DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERALS
"Keeping the Secretariat light and functional
remains a key priority for the United Kingdom. You raised in this
respect the creation of several Deputy Secretary General (DSG)
posts. The number of DSGs was instigated by the French co-presidency
at the Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Marseille in November 2008
in order to gain political agreement from several partners who
were threatening to block the process. We would like to keep the
number and roles of the DSGs under review and subject to a revision
at the end of their first three-year term.
FUNDING
"You raised several points on funding, asking
"how more money is likely to be the answer, when €6
billion has been spent or committed thus far on the existing Process;
where it would come from; and what would ensure that it is spent
effectively". UMed is made up of several different elements:
the Secretariat which will oversee a variety of projects (yet
to be implemented) and sectoral processes continuing from the
Barcelona Process, e.g. on migration and water, including at Ministerial
level. This means that funding for the whole process comes from
a variety of sources.
"So far, UMed's costs have been limited
as there is no Secretariat and few activities: only the circulation
of documents and support to some countries to attend meetings.
Once a permanent Secretariat is established, most of its core
activities, such as local staff and administration, will be funded
from the European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument's
(ENPI) regional funding streams administered by the European Commission
(EC). EC funding should be kept within existing resources, respecting
the Financial Framework, consistent with what the UK secured in
the Paris and Marseille declarations. The actual building will
be provided free of charge by the Spanish authorities. The core
budget and local staffing costs will be supplemented by those
Member States who wish to provide additional voluntary contributions.
At this stage we do not envisage additional UK funding.
"The Barcelona Process (EuroMed) has been
funded by the Commission since it was founded in 1995. This funding,
which has gone on largely successful programmes such as migration,
should not be confused with UMed funding. The ENPI budget for
the Southern Partners is about 1 billion Euros per year and is
kept under constant review. Only a very small percentage of this
goes to UMed. EC funding will be monitored and agreed in the same
way as all ENPI funding and the normal rules will apply. The draft
Statutes of the Secretariat require the Secretary General to submit
annual accounts and work plans to the Senior Officials to ensure
oversight of spending and impact.
"It is too early to establish what percentage
of overall budget will be met by the European Commission but there
is agreement through the Marseille declaration to keep costs as
light as possible. There was also agreement in Paris and Marseille
that funding needs to be shared between the North and South shores
of the Mediterranean. But some EU member states and some partner
countries see the Secretariat being a larger entity. We will resist
this approach.
PROJECTS
"UMed is neither a donor organisation nor
a funding body. We expect UMed projects to be funded from a wide
variety of sources including by member states, the private sector
and bodies such as the World Bank, European Investment Bank and
European Commission. Project bids can come, and are coming, from
groups of states or the funding bodies themselves looking for
implementing partners. We expect the Secretariat to provide support
in finding project implementers and funders, and we have stressed
and secured the need for value for money.
EU EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION
"You asked what the existing rules on external
EU representation are and how they are being protected. The procedures
applicable to representation of the EU in international bodies
have largely evolved as practice rather than being founded on
Treaty provisions, although Article 300 EC Treaty is relevant
in this regard. Broadly speaking the position is as follows:
- "For matters falling within
the exclusive competence of the Community an agreed position will
be worked up in the relevant working group based on a proposal
from the Commission and will be presented by the Commission in
the body concerned;
- "For matters falling within the shared competence
of the Community and the Member States a common position may be
developed which may be presented by either the Commission or the
Presidency as appropriate;
- "For matters falling within Member States
exclusive competence, the Member States may agree to develop a
coordinated position which the Presidency may be tasked to deliver
on their behalf in the relevant body.
"We value France's ongoing role in UMed
and their leadership in pushing forward the UMed project. We were
pleased to note that the new Swedish EU Presidency's opening statement
at the last Senior Officials meeting on 6 July, stressed that
the EU will have a coordinated position on all UMed matters prior
to engaging with non-EU UMed members. We strongly support this
as it is essential that the EU speaks with one voice and in line
with existing treaty obligations.
SECRETARIAT & STATUTES
"You asked how the statutes could properly
be adopted other than by a Council Decision. The UMed Secretariat
is intended to remain responsive and flexible, with the Statutes
kept under review to ensure they are suitable for its purpose.
The Statutes will form the terms under which the Secretariat will
operate and are being discussed by an informal drafting group.
"The basis of the draft Statutes has been
drawn from the Paris Declaration, adopted by all Heads of State,
and the Marseille declaration, adopted by Foreign Ministers. We
expect the Statutes to go to the Senior Officials Group after
discussion by the informal drafting group. They should then go
to Foreign Ministers for final agreement. We do not expect this
to be easy. And partner states could attempt to renegotiate elements
with which they were not content, delaying adoption of the Statutes.
PARIS DECLARATION
"You asked what aspects of the Paris Summit
Declaration we considered to be of particular value. The Prime
Minister and Foreign Secretary agreed the Paris Declaration and
we see value and substance in the whole document in creating a
strong Union for the Mediterranean. The sections on political
commitments and reaffirmations of policy on the Middle East Peace
Process, Non-Proliferation of weapons and a strengthening of dialogue
between all parties were of paramount importance. What was most
important to us was that the document sets out the creation of
an organisation which can take forward the implementation of work
on energy security, climate change, migration and the other priorities
the Declaration mentions."
Conclusion
7.19 We are grateful to the then Minister for
this helpful response.
7.20 But, as she makes clear, the whole exercise
continues to be bedevilled by politics, leading to slow progress
and a top-heavy Secretariat with, still, no clearly-defined jobs
to do. Moreover, there is no guarantee that British views on the
nature of the Secretariat and the governing Statutes will prevail.
With a Secretary General and five (possibly six) Deputies, all
of whom will need staff , it is hard to see how the machinery
is to be "lean".
7.21 It is also difficult to grasp the legal basis
upon which it is being set up. The then Minister seems to suggest
that the Declarations issued after the meetings in Paris (heads
of government) and Marseilles (foreign ministers) will suffice.
We are not aware of any precedent whereby an organisation rooted
in the EU and spending EU money, which is (rightly) required to
submit accounts and work plans to senior officials, has been set
up on this basis. We would have thought that, instead, it would
have been necessary for there to be a Council Decision in order
to adopt the Statutes, once they have been agreed. We ask her
successor as Minister of Europe either to agree with this analysis
or explain why he does not.
7.22 In the meantime, we shall continue to retain
the document under scrutiny.
26 See headnote: (29029) -: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter
2 (7 November 2007). Back
27
See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmgeneral/euro/080122/80122s01.htm. Back
28
See headnote: HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008). Back
29
See headnote: HC 16-xxxii (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008). Back
30
See headnote: HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 1 (29 April 2009). Back
|
