28 EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY
OPERATION IN CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
(30973)
13528/09
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| Council Joint Action repealing Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic
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| Legal base | Article 14 EU; unanimity
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| Deposited in Parliament |
5 October 2009 |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration |
Minister's letter of 28 September 2009 and EM of 6 October 2009
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| Previous Committee Reports
| None; but see (29396) —, (29397) —, (29398) —: HC 16-xi (2007-08), chapter 12 (6 February 2008) and HC 16-xxxiv (2007-08), chapter 12 (5 November 2008) also see (28946) —: HC 41-xxxiv (2006-07), chapter 18 (10 October 2007) and HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 17 (7 November 2007)
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| Discussed in Council | 19 October 2009 Agriculture and Fisheries Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
28.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 authorized
the deployment of a 26,000-strong joint UN-AU force, in an attempt
to quell the violence in Sudan's western Darfur region, where
fighting between pro-Government militias and rebel guerrillas
had killed more than 250,000 people since 2003. To be known as
UNAMID, it was to have up to 19,555 military personnel, including
360 military observers and liaison officers, and a civilian component
including up to 3,772 international police and 19 special
police units with up to 2,660 officers. An offer of EU supporting
action emanated from the July GAERC.
28.2 The Committee cleared the relevant authorising
Joint Action on 10 October. In his accompanying EM, the then Minister
for Europe explained that, following a UN report on the situation
in neighbouring Chad — which indicated that the humanitarian
situation had shown no signs of improving since February, with
more than 400,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
as a result of the fighting and an estimated 700,000 others in
host communities also affected — and a UN Security Council
Presidential Statement supporting the proposed EU mission, on
25 September UNSCR 1778 authorised deployment of a "multidimensional
presence" — This was to be a new UN policing-focused
mission in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic
in these two areas, to be known as MINURCAT, and a military force
to protect and support the personnel of the UN mission for one
year.
28.3 The then Minister said that, although the UK
had confirmed publicly its strong support for this operation and
although a small number of UK personnel were likely to participate
in the mission, "other heavy operational commitments"
would rule out deploying ground forces; France was likely to provide
the largest single contribution to the mission; other likely contributors
included Sweden, Belgium and Poland. Financing arrangements would
be standard for ESDP operations, with the UK likely to be paying
£10-15 million towards the common costs (i.e., in line with
its standard 17.5% contribution). The EU and UN were keen to deploy
the missions as soon as possible: once the rainy season had ended,
from mid-October onwards. In the circumstances, the Committee
considered this sufficient information to clear the Joint Action,
which it reported to the House, given the interest in ESDP and
the Darfur crisis.[106]
28.4 In a subsequent response to a request by the
Committee for clarification, the then Minister said that the EU
military planning documents, which continued to be developed,
focussed on the key functions of contributing to: protecting civilians
in danger; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the
free movement of humanitarian personnel through improved security;
protecting UN and associated personnel — all of which were
authorised by UNSCR 1778. The EU mission would therefore be multi-tasked,
and prepared and resourced to meet this challenge, which potentially
required a wider area of operations than would be necessary just
to contribute to protecting UN personnel. On size and composition,
it would consist of 3-4000 predominantly French troops. On the
financial aspects, the current UK contribution would be £9.9
million, but it would also be called upon at some stage to contribute
an estimated additional £4-5 million towards the costs of
intelligence/surveillance assets. The Committee reported this
additional information on 7 November, and asked the Minister to
report in a year's time (i.e., when the mission's term ends) with
information on its final size, composition and cost, and his assessment
of its effectiveness.[107]
28.5 In further correspondence with the then Minister,
the Committee also agreed on 12 December 2007 that, with the Christmas
recess imminent and given the overall situation in the region,
it would not object were the Minister to agree the consequential
Council Decisions (which were all standard for such operations,
and based on already-cleared templates) ahead of scrutiny. In
subsequent EMs, the then Minister explained that, following approval
of the operation plan, rules of engagement and the standard Status
of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with host countries and countries
through which the troops would travel (Cameroon), the Council
Decisions were adopted at the 28 January GAERC (the SOFA with
the Central African Republic was not yet ready, but the Central
African Republic had made a unilateral declaration on status of
EU-led forces, to cover the interim); this allowed EUFOR to be
launched, with the expectation of reaching Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) by mid-March and Full Operational Capability
in May 2008.
28.6 Though no questions arose, the Committee considered
that a further Report was warranted for two reasons. Firstly,
developments at the time in Chad appeared to be casting further
doubt over when the mission would actually be launched. Secondly,
when we reported the original Joint Action to the House, we asked
the then Minister to write again at the end of the mission's one-year
term with information on its final size, composition and cost,
and his assessment of its effectiveness; however, he now said
that the Joint Action gave EUFOR an end-date of 12 months from
the point that it reached IOC, with a review after six months
to consider UN or other follow up requirements. We therefore asked
him, in the first instance, to write at that point, to let us
know what that review had concluded and what his views were on
those conclusions.[108]
28.7 In her letter of 30 October 2008, the
then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Caroline Flint) said that the mid-mandate
review of EUFOR was published on 7 July. The review described
the political security and socio-economic situation in both Chad
and Central African Republic then as remaining "fragile"
and noted that "the attack on N'Djamena in February coincided
with the launch of EUFOR and delayed the start of the operation,
though deployment recommenced almost immediately."
28.8 She then referred to the highlighting in the
review of the signing of the Dakar Agreement between Chad and
Sudan as a significant political development during EUFOR's deployment.
Signed on 13 March, the Dakar Agreement committed Chad and Sudan
to respecting previous peace agreements, normalising relations
and putting a definitive end to disputes between the two countries.
The resumption of work on the 13 August Accord, an EU facilitated
agreement between the Chadian Government and the Chadian political
opposition which had been delayed due to the events in February,
was also significant progress. The then Minister supported continued
efforts by the EU, on behalf of the Member States, to increase
political dialogue in Chad in parallel with the ongoing ESDP military
mission.
28.9 The Minister then said that the review concluded
that governments and international actors, including humanitarian
organisations, recognised that EUFOR had delivered improvements
to the general security and perception of security of eastern
Chad and north eastern Central African Republic. The local population
were positive towards EUFOR's presence and had high expectations
of what MINURCAT, the UN policing mission in Chad, could deliver
in terms of improved human security in camps and surrounding areas.
The then Minister had urged continuing close co-operation between
EUFOR and MINURCAT to ensure that the operation was a success.
28.10 Finally, the Minister explained that despite
sporadic rebel activity, the overall security situation during
the period has remained relatively calm. The Secretary General
of the Council/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Mr Javier Solana, had identified the principal threats
to a safe and secure environment as rebel activity, criminality
and banditry, which primarily impacted on the civilian population
and humanitarian efforts. The then Minister support his assessment
of the need for a follow on UN force in Chad to address these
threats, to avoid the possibility of a security vacuum when EUFOR
leaves, to promote long term security and to address the humanitarian
situation. The High Representative had identified that the mid-term
evaluation of the EU-UN multidimensional presence in Chad was,
at that stage, difficult, given the limited deployment of MINURCAT.
The Government, along with the EU, urged the UN to increase the
rate of deployment of MINURCAT. President Deby of Chad had now
signed a presidential decree authorising the deployment of MINURCAT-trained
gendarmes, which the then Minister said should allow the force
to deploy. She supported this analysis and the main recommendations
in Mr Solana's assessment and was "working closely with our
EU partners to take a more disciplined and strategic approach
to peacekeeping missions."
28.11 The then Minister concluded by saying that,
since the EUFOR mid-mandate review, the UNSC had renewed the mandate
for MINURCAT and expressed its intention to mandate a UN operation
to replace EUFOR in Chad and Central African Republic. The UK
had raised concerns about the feasibility of and need for the
UN military presence in Central African Republic and about the
UN's ability to generate sufficient forces for the new UN follow-on
operation, and continued to work with the UN Department for Peacekeeping
Operations and partners on the Security Council to ensure these
concerns were addressed.
Our assessment
28.12 We reported this information to the House because
of the high level of interest in developments in central Africa
and in actual and potential further EU involvement in the region.
28.13 We noted that, because of the limited deployment
of MINURCAT thus far, the Secretary General/High Representative
had not been able properly to evaluate EUFOR'S impact and effectiveness
so far, beyond the generalities set out in paragraph 28.8 above.
We also noted the Minister's somewhat Delphic remarks about "working
closely with our EU partners to take a more disciplined and strategic
approach to peacekeeping missions", which suggested an absence
of such an approach thus far, and her further suggestion that
the necessary close co-operation between EUFOR and MINURCAT had
also been somewhat lacking hitherto.
28.14 We looked to the Minister to expand upon these
issues more fully at the end of the EUFOR operation, when reporting
on the final evaluation of the mission's cost, effectiveness and
lessons to be learned.[109]
The Minister's letter of 28 September 2009
28.15 In
her letter, the Minister
for Europe at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Baroness
Kinnock) says that, having
been launched on 28 January 2008, EUFOR Chad/ Central African
Republic formally concluded its mission on 15 March 2009, one
year after announcing initial operating capacity. She continues
as follows:
"EUFOR worked in close coordination with
the multi-dimensional UN presence in the East of Chad, MINURCAT.
EUFOR undertook duties aimed at facilitating the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, increasing security for the civilian population, and
creating favourable conditions for reconstruction and development
efforts and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs). EUFOR also worked to create favourable conditions
for the deployment of MINURCAT-trained Chadian police (DIS —
Détachment Intégré de Securité), whose
role is to establish rule of law in and around refugee and IDP
camps. As provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 1861,
MINURCAT was then expanded on 15 March 2009 to include a military
element, which replaced EUFOR. Throughout its mandate, EUFOR made
a tangible contribution towards facilitating the activities of
humanitarian workers and protecting civilians in danger, in particular
refugees and displaced persons affected by the neighbouring crisis
in Darfur."
28.16 The Minister then outlines her views on EUFOR's
impact as follows:
"Ultimately, EUFOR has provided a positive
influence on regional security. The instability in Eastern Chad
coupled with the absence of State apparatus to provide rule of
law created all the necessary conditions for criminality and banditry;
it is therefore to EUFOR's credit that its presence in the region
directly prevented a serious deterioration of the security situation.
The deterrent effect of EUFOR troops and the force's protection
of humanitarian organisations also greatly contributed to the
stabilisation of the humanitarian situation. The humanitarian
situation in Chad is beginning to move from the emergency phase
towards early recovery, which is in part due to EUFOR's efforts.
Cooperation between military and humanitarian stakeholders has
also been a success of the operation. EUFOR's achievements are
particularly significant given the serious logistical challenge
of operating in such a remote and difficult environment.
"Nevertheless, there is still work to be
done in Chad. Despite returns of a small number of IDPs, it remains
to be seen whether those returns are sustainable, or whether returns
could take place on a larger scale. Bandits and rebel movements
continue to operate in border regions. A lasting political settlement
in Chad remains some way off. EUFOR's achievements in creating
favourable conditions for development and its contribution to
the security and humanitarian situations could be lost if its
hard won progress is not cemented."
28.17 The Minister then judges that "coordination
between the European Union and the United Nations has been sound",
and that "early planning for a follow-on force allowed for
a smooth transition from EUFOR to a UN operation, which was crucial
in preventing a security vacuum. MINURCAT and EUFOR communicated
well on operational issues, force protection, and information
sharing during the transfer of authority."
28.18 Looking ahead, the Minister says that it is
nevertheless prudent to look at ways to further improve working
methods to shape successful future operations:
"One such suggestion is the need to reach
very early in the planning process a common understanding of the
problem and expectations of personnel and equipment commitments
from respective organisations. The UK will continue to work alongside
EU Member States to identify and implement agreed lessons that
will benefit future European Security Defence Policy operations."
The draft Council Decision
28.19 The document
is a Council Joint Action repealing Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP
on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad
and in the Central African Republic.
The Government's view
28.20 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 6 October
2008, the Minister for Europe explains that on 15 March 2009 a
UN military element was added to MINURCAT, which took over from
EUFOR, and that the entire mission is now under UN control —
the EU mission having always been defined as a "bridging
operation" that would hand over to a follow on force 12 months
after reaching IOC.
28.21 With regard to the financial aspects, the Minister
notes that the original Joint Action set an estimated ceiling
of €99.2 million for the entire operation, and that under
the standard ATHENA mechanism, where the UK's contribution to
the common costs of EUFOR is 17.5%, the cost to the UK was £21
million (c.f the original estimate of c. £15 million).
Conclusion
28.22 We are accordingly grateful to the Minister
for her helpful assessment, which we think warrants reporting
to the House. With European Security and Defence Policy entering
its second decade, it is likely that there will be more such operations,
with EU forces operating in hazardous and uncertain circumstances
and requiring good cooperation with other international entities.
As the Minister suggests, perhaps the most important lesson to
be learned is "the need to reach very early in the planning
process a common understanding of the problem and expectations
of personnel and equipment commitments from respective organisations."
28.23 We now clear the document.
106 See headnote: (28946) -: HC 41-xxxiv (2006-07),
chapter 18 (10 October 2007). Back
107
Ditto: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 17 (7 November 2007). Back
108
Ditto: HC16-xi (2007-08), chapter 12 (6 February 2008). Back
109
See headnote: (29396) -, (29397) -, (29398) -: HC 16-xxxiv (2007-08),
chapter 12 (5 November 2008) Back
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