6 European Security and Defence Policy
and Guinea-Bissau
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| Council Joint Action amending and extending Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EUSSR GUINEA-BISSAU)
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| Legal base | Article 14 EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 2 November 2009
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (30551) — HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 12 (29 April 2009); and (29349) — : HC 16-ix (2007-08), chapter 12 (23 January 2008)
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| To be discussed in Council | 10 November 2009 Economic and Financial Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared, but further information requested
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Background
6.1 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office website paints a troubled
and unhappy picture of Guinea-Bissau's move to independence, via
a protracted guerrilla war and then Portugal's own 1974 "carnation
revolution": firstly, one-party rule, then a coup in 1980
which "began a pattern of military coups and instability,
which has persisted until quite recently". That coup was
led by Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, who became the first
directly-elected President in 1994, after the acceptance of multi-party
democracy in 1991 (a presidential democracy which allows for multiparty
politics and an elected national assembly).
6.2 The period from 1998 to 2004 was notable for
a further coup attempt; protracted stalemate between loyalist
and rebel forces; the intervention of troops from neighbouring
Senegal and Guinea, as well as from the regional peacekeeping
force, ECOMOG; elections in December 1999 and January 2000; and
the eventual election of opposition leader Kumba Yala in February
2000.
6.3 The first half of this present decade then consisted
of further manifestations of unresolved tensions between the government
and the military hierarchy: a further attempted military rebellion;
subsequent rule by President Yala "characterised by chronic
political instability"; his eventual deposition in a bloodless
coup in September 2003 supported by all political parties, including
Yala's own; the installation of a businessman as interim President;
and legislative elections in March 2004 in which no party came
out with an overall majority.
6.4 A further period of political turmoil followed
the June 2005 presidential elections, following which ex-President
Vieira eventually emerged as the winner in a close finish, and
was sworn in as President on 1 October; including ex-president
Yala's return from exile in late 2006; and culminating in the
collapse of the government coalition in March 2007. After a stand-off
the opposition leader Martinho N'Dafa Kabi became Prime Minister
in April, and the political situation in the country steadied.
The mandate of the legislature ended on April 21st 2008. The President
then passed a temporary constitutional amendment allowing the
continuation of the legislature until further elections could
take place. These occurred on 16 November 2008 and resulted in
a new Prime Minister, Carlos Gomez Junior, being appointed in
January 2009.
6.5 It then notes that, following the March 2009
assassination of President Viera, the interim Head of State is
the parliamentary speaker Raimundo Pereira; and that elections
were due to occur in June 2009. The entry (which was last reviewed
on 4 June 2009) closes as follows:
"In recent months several media reports
have bought to public attention a growing problem of drug trafficking
via Guinea-Bissau. Drugs coming from Latin America are being smuggled
to Europe via the country, taking advantage of the mangrove swamps
and jagged coastline, and the poor capacity of the government
to deal with the problem."[30]
Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP
6.6 The preamble set out the context for the proposal
therein:
— the
promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe
is a key strategic priority of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted
by the EU-Africa Summit on 9 December 2007;
— security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau
is essential for the stability and sustainable development of
the country;
— in November 2006, the Government of Guinea-Bissau
presented a National Security Strategy underlining its commitment
to implement security sector reform;
— the Council and the Commission carried
out an initial joint information gathering mission in May 2007
in Guinea-Bissau, in cooperation with the Bissauan authorities,
to develop an overall EU approach to support for the national
security sector reform process;
— an Action Plan for the Restructuring
and Modernisation of the Security and Defence Sectors was presented
by the Government of Guinea-Bissau in September 2007, and the
institutional framework for the implementation of this Action
Plan was established;
— in order to combat the increasing threat
posed by organised criminal networks operating in the country,
the Government of Guinea-Bissau, with the assistance of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), also announced an Emergency
Plan to Fight Drug Trafficking in September 2007;
— a report by the UN Secretary-General
of 28 September 2007(S/2007/576), whilst commending the Government
of Guinea-Bissau for the positive measures taken so far to implement
the security sector reform programme, also underlined the country's
inability to combat drug trafficking by itself and called for
technical and financial support from regional and international
partners;
— on 19 November 2007, the Council considered
that an ESDP action in the field of security sector reform in
Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate, in coherence with and complementary
to European Development Fund and other Community activity; and
— following a second EU fact-finding mission
deployed in October 2007, the Council approved on 10 December
2007 the General Concept for potential ESDP action in support
of Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform.
6.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 January 2008,
the then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Mr Jim Murphy) explained that the Joint Action — to establish
a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) security sector
reform (SSR) Mission in Guinea-Bissau (EUSSR Guinea-Bissau) —
followed a visit in 2007 by the Ministry of Defence's Security
Sector Defence Advisory Team, and would provide advice and assistance
to the local authorities in Guinea-Bissau on reform of the security
sector, within the initial framework of the National Security
Sector Reform Strategy, which now needed to be implemented. The
Mission's tasks would include:
— advising
and contributing to the development of detailed resizing/restructuring
plans for the armed forces;
— assisting in the development of an underpinning
doctrine for employment of the Armed Forces, including the areas
of command, control and logistic support, and mainstreaming the
counter narcotics effort;
— supporting the development of detailed
plans for the restructuring of police bodies into four services;
— advising on the planning and development
of an effective criminal investigations capacity.
6.8 The Mission was to comprise approximately 15
experts in the various fields of the security sector; consist
of a preparatory phase beginning in mid February, and an implementation
phase beginning no later than 1 May 2008; and last for 12 months,
with a review six months after the beginning of the implementation
phase. Funding for common costs (in-country transport, office
equipment etc) would be met from the Common Foreign and Security
Policy Budget, to which the UK currently contributed approximately
17%; with an estimated cost of €5.75 million, the cost to
the UK would be approximately £739,000.
6.9 The Minister explained that, with the country
still dealing with the aftermath of civil war, and in the lead
up to November 2008 elections, there was now a good opportunity
to assist SSR in Guinea-Bissau, and help to address its use as
a transit point for drugs being trafficked from Latin America
to Europe; there was strong support for the EU's proposals from
the authorities, who lacked the capacity and structures to deal
with the problems caused directly and indirectly by the influx
of drugs and organised crime to the country, and from all political
parties in the country, which meant that the outcome of the elections
should not affect the reform process. He said that, although Guinea-Bissau's
problems were large, the country was small,[31]
and enough political will existed to instigate reform.
6.10 We felt that the justification was clear, the
Mission had been well-prepared and the costs were relatively modest,
and accordingly cleared the document at our meeting on 23 January
2008; the Joint Action was then agreed at the 28 January General
Affairs and External Relations Council.
6.11 We also said that only time would tell if, as
we all wished, the Minister's hopes came to fruition. We noted
that the mission was due to last for a year; that there would
be a mid-point review; and that moves were afoot within the Council
to develop formal assessment mechanisms for such ESDP missions.
We therefore asked, when the mission ended, that the Minister
let us have either the mission assessment and his views thereon
or, if it had not yet been formally assessed, his own assessment
of its outcomes and effectiveness (to include the conclusions
of the mid-point review and steps taken to address them).
6.12 On 29 April 2009 we considered an extension
of the current mandate for a further 6 months until 30 November
2009.
6.13 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 22 April 2009,
the then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Caroline Flint) said that the EUSSR Mission had, so far, carried
out important work under difficult circumstances, in particular
in the police and prosecution services. However, overall progress
on SSR had been slower than expected and the Mission had not yet
accomplished its mandate. Political instability in the country
had hampered the mission's progress; the high profile assassination
of Guinea-Bissau's Chief of the Armed Forces, General Tagme, along
with President Vieira in March, combined with the difficulties
involved by working with three different governments since June
2008 and the staging of legislative elections last November, had
all distracted attention from the SSR process. Guinea-Bissau's
limited access to SSR expertise and basic infrastructure, such
as office space and equipment, had also contributed to delays.
6.14 However, the then Minister said, there was no
doubt that Guinea-Bissau continued to depend on international
assistance to succeed in their SSR process and EUSSR Guinea-Bissau
was a crucial part in creating stability. Despite the recent assassinations
and resulting political fragility, the new government continued
"to provide a window of opportunity to implement meaningful
reform, expressing a clear request for continued ESDP engagement
beyond 31 May 2009 and underlining its commitment to the reform
process"; this had been demonstrated by their appointment
of a Special Counselor for the Prime Minister for SSR and the
fight against drug trafficking, and their re-animation of the
national SSR structures.
6.15 The then Minister also noted that other partners
from the International Community, including the United Nations,
ECOWAS and the European Commission, "also continued to express
their willingness to step up their SSR related activities in Guinea
Bissau and to cooperate with the ESDP mission", and were
considering "transferring its various actors in Bissau, including
SSR work streams into a single 'integrated mission' from June
2009."
6.16 For now, the then Minister then explained that
this would be a "no cost extension": the Mission would
use money left unspent from the €5.65 million allocation
under the existing mandate to pay for mission activities until
30 November 2009; it would provide the Mission a further six months
to fully accomplish its current mandate, and an opportunity "to
test the commitment and capability of the new Government of Guinea
Bissau to implement SSR, particularly in light of the Presidential
elections planned for June."
Our assessment
6.17 We cleared the document, again reporting it
to the House because of the widespread interest in European Security
and Defence Policy and its growing involvement in security sector
reform in troubled areas of Africa.
6.18 In so doing, we drew the Minister's attention
to our request of her predecessor (see paragraph 6.11 above).
We noted that what the then Minister described as "Other
partners from the International Community", including the
United Nations, ECOWAS and the European Commission, had expressed
willingness to step up their SSR-related activities in Guinea-Bissau
and to cooperate with the ESDP mission, and asked her to ensure
that the review included an assessment of the extent to which
this happened and of its overall effectiveness.[32]
The draft Joint Action
6.19 The draft Joint Action extends the current mandate
for a further six months until 31 May 2010, with the majority
of the costs covered by outstanding funding from the mission's
budget for the period up to 30 November 2009.
The Government's view
6.20 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 2 November
2009, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) comments in much the same terms as his ante-predecessor
six months ago:
"The overall progress on SSR in Guinea Bissau
has been slower than expected over the past six months due to
the assassinations of the President and Chief of Defence in March
2009 and Minister of Defence and a former President in June 2009
which distracted the Guinea Bissau government's attention away
from the SSR process. Guinea Bissau officials were often unavailable
to attend pre planned meetings with the Mission to discuss SSR
and there were a number of delays with getting Government approval
for the proposed restructuring plans for the Armed Forces. Therefore,
the Mission has therefore not been able to fully achieve its mandate."
6.21 The Minister then notes that a new President,
Malam Bacai Sanha, was recently elected and sworn in on 8 September
2009, and says that:
"The new government of Guinea Bissau has
since expressed its intent to re-engage in the SSR process through
a letter sent from the Prime Minister to the Secretary General
of the EU on 9 October 2009. We take this letter as a sign that
the Mission will receive the necessary political support over
the next six months to complete the tasks set out in its current
mandate."
6.22 The Minister then goes on to say that:
"… as part of any extension there will
be a strategic review on the future of EU engagement in Guinea
Bissau that will be submitted to the Political and Security Committee
(PSC) by the end of January 2010. The review will focus on where,
amongst other International Community interventions, the EU can
add most value to stabilisation efforts in Guinea Bissau in the
future. This review will then form the basis for making an informed
judgement about any subsequent EU engagement in Guinea Bissau
after the end of the mandate of the Mission."
6.23 Turning to the review recent six-month extension,
the Minister says that the report recommended that the Mission
was extended for six months in order to:
- "Reach a better understanding
of plans by the wider International Community (notably the Economic
Community of West African States and the UN) to increase their
presence in Guinea Bissau;
- "To conclude the mission's existing work;
and
- "To build bridges towards further implementation
in the future."
6.24 Finally, on the Financial Implications, the
Minister says that:
"Due to the political instability in Guinea
Bissau over the previous eight months and slow progress on SSR
so far the UK has pushed hard for any extension to be of minimal
cost and would not support another extension of the Mission, in
its current form, beyond the end of the proposed six month period.
The extension should be used by the Mission to complete the tasks
of its current mandate (without taking on any additional ones)
and to prepare the conditions for engagement by another SSR actor
in the future."
6.25 The Minister explains that the proposed budget
for the six month extension is €1.53 million:
"The estimated amount that will be left
unspent from the current Mission budget at the end of November
is €1.192 million. Therefore the net cost to the EU for extending
the mission is estimated to be €338,000. This total includes
€290,000 to fund the costs of terminating the Mission should
it close in six months time. The additional funding provided for
the Mission's running costs is €48,000.
"The UK contributes 17% to the CFSP budget meaning
that the total cost to the UK for the proposed extension, including
termination costs, will be €57,460/£52,250."
Conclusion
6.26 We draw this latest extension to the attention
of the House for the same reasons as hitherto.
6.27 Three years after the first commitment by
the then Guinea-Bissau government to security sector reform, there
is a strong sense of disillusionment running through the Minister's
comments, and of this being the last chance for the latest President
and government. But the EU has yet to lose patience with an ESDP
mission and cut its losses.
6.28 We now clear the document. In so doing, however,
we ask the Minister to write with information about the outcome
of the review and the PSC's assessment and recommendations, ahead
of any final determination about what form any further EU involvement
may or may not take.
30 See FCO Country Profile at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/guinea-bissau?profile=politics&pg=7
Back
31
Area: 36,120 sq km; Population: 1.5 million (2005 United Nations
estimate). Back
32
See headnote: (30551) - HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 12 (29 April
2009). Back
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