Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
1-19)
RT HON
CAROLINE FLINT
MP, MR MATTHEW
RYCROFT AND
MR MICHAEL
DAVIDSON
4 FEBRUARY 2009
Chairman: Let us get started. Minister,
you might want first to introduce the people who are with you
so that their names are on the record and we know their roles
in all of this.
Caroline Flint: Michael Davidson,
who has just joined us I am very pleased to see, heads up European
Scrutiny, and Matthew Rycroft is Head of our Europe Division,
and of course myself; I am Caroline Flint.
Q1 Chairman: Thank you very much
and welcome. You will realise that this session is mainly about
the scrutiny process. There are times at which questions will
cross over into what we see are the implications in terms of us
doing our work and also touch slightly on the effects of certain
policies as we go along. The main purpose is that the Committee
have been, I am sorry to say, continually concerned for some time
about the way in which the Foreign Office has been replying to
requests for information and the way, it would appear, that matters
have been dealt with with quite a bit of disregard for the scrutiny
reserve, which is a statute of this Parliament only to be broken
in extreme emergency circumstances. We have a number of areas
on which we are going to be questioning you, and the first one
is on the changes to the sanctions regimes applying to Uzbekistan
and Belarus, and the scrutiny processes in these cases. The second
will be the Solana Review on the European Security Strategy and
the Stabilisation and Association agreement with Serbia, with
particular reference to scrutiny lapses in these areas. The third
one will be the December European Council in relation to the "Irish
Protocol", as it has been called, and the Lisbon Treaty.
Firstly, on the question of Uzbekistan, why was the Committee
not sent the agenda of the General Affairs Council on 13 October,
together with an indication of the line that the Government planned
to take, as was promised by the Foreign Secretary's letter of
17 May 2008 to the Committee?
Caroline Flint: I will definitely
answer your questions, Chairman, but could I just say that being
in the job for coming up to four months, I think that there is
some good evidence of some of the work which the Department does
with the Committee, and also other committees connected with work
in the European Union, but I think there is always room for improvement.
In the course of our discussions, whilst I hope I can reassure
you on some counts (and I may not be able to do on others) I think
there is an opportunity to work better in the future, and I know
that Michael and his team have been in touch about working together
with the clerks and others as to identifying some of the gaps.
I really wanted to start out with that. On the situation in terms
of Uzbekistan and Belarus, clearly there is an issue that I want
to look into as to where there are letters (and obviously some
of this is before my time as Europe Minister) where there is an
indication that something would happen, to make sure that they
do not get lost in the system, and they are followed through.
In terms of the position we took ultimately on sanctions in relation
to these two countries, I would say that the Common Positions,
which are important because they are legally binding, on these
two countries and the sanctions being applied to them, were submitted
to the Committee for scrutiny, I have to say, in good time for
the scrutiny to be performed. The Explanatory Memorandum on Belarus
was deposited on 28 October for the 10 November GAERC. The one
on Uzbekistan was deposited on 23 October for the 10 November
GAERC. I would have been very happy to come before the Committee,
or to have a debate in the intervening time, had that been requested,
but the Committee, I have to say, did choose not to assign political
or economic importance to these documents, ie they were not flagged
up for us to offer a view by the deadline. As I said, for the
operational reasons outlined in my letter, because these sanctions
were coming up to expiry date, a decision had to be made, otherwise
we could be left with no sanctions package at all. I have thought
about this, particularly where we have sanctions regimes affecting
different countries, and one of the things I want to look into
is how we might, at some point during the period, whether it is
a 12-month sanction or a six-month sanction, have correspondence
or even a conversation with the Committee about where we are,
say, halfway through and what we think has happened. I have to
say that I do not think that there was a lapse in this case because
the Common Position was deposited and that is what is legally
binding, and that is the area on which the scrutiny process takes
place, as far as I understand.
Chairman: I have to disagree with you.
We would not be asking the question if we did not think that there
had been a breach. It is quite clear what the Government has said.
It said in the letter of 17 May to the Committee: "| the
Government has agreed to provide the Committee with the draft
annotated agendas of European Council meetings in advance | I
support Government Departments being as open as possible regarding
the context of the Conclusions and the general position that the
UK will be taking in Council." Clearly at the General Affairs
Council on 13 October, we were not sent the agenda in advance,
so we did not know what was the proposal, and we received an Explanatory
Memorandum on 28 October about a Common Position that had been
reached on 13 October. I do not see where the scrutiny could possibly
come in of something that we did not know about was on the agenda
and we did not know the decision until it had been taken. No change
was made to the Common Position after 13 October, so the UK participated
in an agreement without this Committee having scrutinised the
position that the Government was going to take.
Caroline Flint: Again, I would
beg to differ. The Common Positions flowed from an agreement by
ministers at the 13 October General Affairs and External Relations
Council to address this issue, which was summarised in the Council
Conclusions. Council Conclusions are not legally binding. They
are a political direction in which ministers have indicated they
want a Common Position or a Joint Action or a Council Decision
to be developed. The Common Positions on these two countries and
their sanctions were deposited and submitted to the Committee
for scrutiny and, as I said, the EM on Belarus was deposited on
28 October, and the EM on Uzbekistan was deposited on 23 October
for the 10 November GAERC. I understand that is still in relatively
good time in order for the Committee to receive those, discuss
those, and indicate a view, and neither of these EMs were flagged
as politically or economically important, which I understand is
one of the ways in which the Committee publicly demonstrates its
view. I was not asked—and if I had been asked I would have
come—to come before a Committee or a debate in the House,
if that was appropriate as well. As I have said, that is my view
in terms of what we were legally bound to do, in order to get
a legally binding decision on the extension of the sanctions packages
for these particular countries. Having said that, I am wanting
to look into how we can have some early discussion about how some
of these packages are going to inform the Committee and to help
the debate later on when there is a decision to be taken about
expiry dates.
Chairman: We will come to that; you are
leaping ahead.
Caroline Flint: I am sorry.
Chairman: The point is what you have
been saying is that you had a conversation that had been running
for some time, and if that conversation had not been changed then,
you are right, we would know that was the Common Position. The
question is about whether that Common Position was amended. Mr
Dobbin?
Q2 Jim Dobbin: In your letter of
4 November 2008 you say that the decision to amend the restricted
measures against Uzbekistan and Belarus was taken before this
Committee had an opportunity to consider the matter. We feel that
this decision had already been taken, in other words. Do you not
think that that is a breach of the spirit of the scrutiny reserve?
Caroline Flint: I think the problem
with this situation was that the packages for these countries
were coming up, particularly on Uzbekistan, to an expiry date,
and therefore we were in a position where we were having to reach
a decision in order that we did not lose the whole package of
sanctions. Therefore, as I said, we went through the process of
depositing the Common Position to the Committee, and having not
received anything from that in terms of coming to debate it, we
were in a position where we had to make a decision because the
options would have been this: potentially we could have ended
up with the sanctions falling and nothing in terms of Uzbekistan
in particular. We had to therefore move forward, as we wanted
to make sure that that sanctions package continued in one form
or another. I think the spirit of scrutiny is a two way-process.
I can see areas where there can be improvements on our side, but
we also need to work out whether there are some ways in which
communication between the Committee and our Department can be
improved as well.
Q3 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: You say that
there was an approaching deadline, but this is an administrative
matter for you, and you need to plan these things well in advance
so that the House can be informed and we can scrutinise it, because,
would you not agree, that things like the freezing of assets and
travel bans are very draconian; they are how authoritarian regimes
used to treat their own citizens; that is how the Iron Curtain
countries used to operate. Therefore when we use these measures—and
they may be justified in certain cases—it is very important
that it is not simply an administrative measure but is subject
to scrutiny so that we can see the process and, if necessary,
ask questions and get the policy changed. However, you have not
done that. You have admitted in your letter, and Jim Dobbin has
referred to it, that you took this political decision without
us having any time to consider the issue. A political decision
is that; it is a decision. Are you saying that that could have
been changed after this Committee raised the matter?
Caroline Flint: I think what I
have tried to explain is that we did deposit to the Committee
a Common Position which was the Government's view on what we should
do in relation to the sanctions packages for both these countries
in question. What did not happen in the intervening period between
depositing those Common Positions, one on 28 October and one on
23 October before the GAERC met on 10 November was a sense of
the need to come back to the Committee and reassure the Committee
about why we felt these sanctions, in their different forms for
the two countries, were necessary. What I have indicated, which
I am trying to be helpful on, is where we have sanctions packages
against countries, looking at having a conversation or a discussion
earlier on in the timetable before they are coming up for renewal.
In that area I think we can do so, but I have to say on these
particular packages we did do what was right under the scrutiny
procedures, I think in relatively good time, and in the intervening
period between them being deposited and the GAERC, they were not
flagged and there was a not request for a debate or for me to
come before this Committee to discuss why we felt, as you pointed
out, some of these restrictions and some of the lifting of restrictions,
in other cases, was appropriate.
Chairman: I am having problems here.
I do not know whether my calendar, Minister, is different from
yours.
Caroline Flint: Sorry?
Chairman: I do not know whether you see
the world differently to me in terms of timescales. I do not know
if you have an ability to make a decision taken on 13 October
come after a Common Position indicated to us on 23 and 28 October,
because that is when you told us in an EM what had been done,
but the decision was taken before then. We were supplied with
neither the agenda with the UK position on it nor even the fact
that there was a new Common Position being proposed, and that
there would be an amendment to the original position which was
to keep these sanctions on. They were then amended, as you say
to me in the letter of 4 November 2008, which of course I hope
you will accept is the month after October. "A political
decision was reached on 13 October General Affairs Council on
how to take forward the issue of restrictive measures against
Uzbekistan and Belarus." Those decisions were actually amendments
to the original Common Position, so you agreed to amend the Common
Positions on 13 October, and then told us about it in EMs on 23
and 28 October. That is a breach of the spirit, the law, the rule
of the scrutiny reserve. Yet you do not seem to see that at all.
I do not understand this.
Caroline Flint: Because my understanding
is that Council Conclusions are political conclusions; they are
not legally binding. It has been the system in this House, and
I think there has been discussion on this for the last two years
about Council Conclusions, that the way in which we scrutinise
is to deposit a Common Position or a Joint Action in order that
the scrutiny process can take place because that is what is legally
binding. I accept that the point, and where I am trying to be
helpful is about whether there is a way, before we have, if you
like, the legally binding part of this process, to alert the Committee
about the way things are going with particular areas, in this
case it is a sanctions package with these countries, and to alert
the Committee as to how they are going, whether they are working
well or whether they are not working well, and whether there has
been any progress, but that is different to the point at which
in the process we have to do it in a way that is legally appropriate.
I know that there have been discussions with the Committee in
the past about Council Conclusions, but it is the view of the
Government, and continues to be the view of the Government, and
my right hon friend, the Foreign Secretary, has confirmed, I understand,
in correspondence to the Committee, that there is a difference
between the legal process for us getting a Government position
and Council Conclusions. I have to say that is where we differ
because I think there has been a view in the Committee—and
that is entirely fine—that Council Conclusions should be
treated in the same way as these other legally binding scrutiny
documents.
Chairman: I am actually going to disagree
with you once again, not because of our difference over Council
Conclusions, although I do think that this does underline the
difficulty of the Government maintaining the position on draft
Conclusions, which we have always said as a Committee should come
to us, but on the position where you reach an agreement is not
about the Council Conclusion in the final European Council—but
if you as a minister or any minister goes to a Council, for which
you are responsible, and changes a position or agrees to a Common
Position change, and does not tell this Committee in advance that
it is on the agenda, it does not give us time to scrutinise it.
That is what we are talking about it. Not the eventual Council
Conclusions plea which you are making but your role in this. It
is just like previous ministers used to go and agree General Approaches
because if the substantive agreement is reached before we scrutinise
it, not the topping and tailing, but the substantive agreement
to change a common policy, that is what is of interest to this
Committee on behalf of Parliament. You gave us no chance and Parliament
no chance to discuss with you or to raise the matter in debate
on that position. It is nothing to do with the eventual conclusions
in the European Council, but your role at the General Affairs
Council. You denied this Committee and you denied Parliament the
right to scrutinise the proposal that you were going to discuss.
Caroline Flint: There was an intervening
period, as I said, where neither of these documents was flagged—I
understand the technical language is—as of political or
economic importance. I do not think there was any contact asking
me to submit to the Committee or to a debate. I think in 2008
we had 135 Explanatory Memoranda, all on fast-moving issues. 20
of these were overrides, four were on the crisis in Georgia, and
three were on the piracy missions off the coast of Somalia. I
have to say that I think the Department do their best to avoid
overrides and when we do so it is because we believe the issues
at stake are serious. We regularly use our parliamentary reserve
in Brussels so that we can hear the view of the Committee before
documents are signed off. Again, it is something that we are looking
at as to how we can improve our performance because I think sometimes,
compared to other domestic departments, some of the areas that
we are dealing with are in volume somewhat more but also the pace
at which things are happening is fast, too. I think that again
raises the issue for us, but also the committees that scrutinise
our work, how we can do that. Of course, the European Parliament
and European Commission and its work carries on throughout the
year. Parliament only sits for part of the year and obviously
the scrutiny committees do not necessarily meet in the recess.
Chairman: Yes, we do.
Caroline Flint: They do not always,
I am just saying, and the work goes on. This is what we are trying
to accommodate. I am very happy to look at how this can be improved.
Our clerks, Michael and his team, have sought to meet with your
clerks and others to talk through where there are gaps and how
we can improve it. That is the spirit I want to try and reflect
in the on-going work of the Department.
Chairman: That is very welcome. Back
to the issue and Mr Hands.
Q4 Mr Hands: I just wanted to follow
up on that because I have to say that I am, and I know a lot of
other Members of the House more broadly are extremely disappointed
to discover that the UK's position on sanctions on both of these
countries was massively watered down without the opportunity for
this to be debated in European scrutiny. It is one of the reasons
why we are here. Surely, Minister, you must have seen that Uzbekistan
and Belarus crop up all the time in this House in terms of things
like Westminster Hall debates, in OPQs they are very, very frequently
cited. I just want to take you back to your point that you did
not think that we as a Committee had attached enough significance
to it simply because we had not flagged it in the same way that
we have for Somalia, and whether you think that that is the way
that you will treat the Committee going from here and, if we do
not flag it with huge flashing lights on it, whether you will
just choose to ignore us?
Caroline Flint: Not at all. What
I would like to look at is better communication and I think some
of that can be done more informally, and rather than waiting necessarily
for conclusions of meetings to be typed up and written up, we
can get ahead of it by literally having a phone call between our
respective officials to get the ball rolling. We are happy to
look at that and I hope it can continue. Sometimes bureaucracy
can get in the way of common sense. Obviously we need to have
the right bureaucratic procedures because they are the things
that formally hold everything together and show how the process
works. Again, as I said, I just want to look at how we can better
improve this. Just on the point you made about the sanctions,
on the Uzbekistan situation we had to balance the need to remain
rigorous over their human rights performance, but with a high
risk that these sanctions would lapse in October in the absence
of a consensus among all 27 EU Member States, which was actually
a possibility. Therefore, we felt that if we allowed that to happen,
then that would really undermine the credibility of the EU sanctions
policy. This is also about dealing with the circumstances of these
other Member States and wanting to keep, in relation to Uzbekistan,
a package together, but recognising that to do that we had to
get consensus round the table. If it was a choice between no package
and a package that might not be as hard as people might want,
I think the latter was important. On Belarus, it was more of a
positive situation because we felt that Belarus had made some
significant attempts to improve the situation, although they have
still got a long way to go. They will have their sanctions package
reviewed in the next three to four months and let us, out of this,
have a conversation about that before we get to the final stage
of renewal or extension of that package.
Q5 Mr Hands: That tension has always
been there within the EU on Uzbekistan. Throughout 2006 under
Ján Kubi, who is the EU Rapporteur for Central Asia, with
whom I met, through 2007 and 2008, there is absolutely nothing
new in that tension within the EU. Previously Britain has held
firm on those sanctions in face of opposition, particularly from
Germany and to some extent from France. We in the Committee are
very interested to know why our policy position shifted so dramatically
this year prior to the Council meeting. The actual question I
wanted to ask you is about the strongly worded Council Conclusions.
You say that strongly worded Council Conclusions will encourage
further progress on human rights. Can you tell us that why, when
both Belarus and Ukraine can see that the Council has not insisted
on this in its previous strongly worded Council Conclusions, you
think this time their behaviour will be any different?
Caroline Flint: All of this is
a work in progress and it is not a black and white situation.
I think the levers that the EU has in working with countries such
as these and others is constantly about reiterating the gains
for these countries in a close relationship with the EU, but that
is not unconditional, and we do expect significant improvements
in their human rights performance. I do think that sanctions have
proven to be instrumental in assisting that process. It is not
perfect, I have to say, but it is also the case that, from previous
experience taking too inflexible an approach can also be counter-productive.
We have to, as I say, be mindful about what we are trying to achieve,
but also trying to get a consensus around the table as well. Since
the suspension of the visa ban in November 2007, in relation to
Uzbekistan, there has been, in the EU's judgment, more progress
on the human rights situation than at any time since the sanctions
were imposed, but there is more we need to do, and this is something
that we constantly grapple with in different ways. On Belarus,
for example, the lifting there was in relation to some political
prisoners, I believe, who were released. Clearly that is not the
whole picture in terms of the progress we want to see. I made
that very clear when I met representatives from Belarus last autumn.
As I think I said in answer to an Oral Question to the House just
a few weeks ago, the next three to four months are going to be
very important in terms of what happens to the package and whether
the restrictions are re-imposed, or whether they can seek to do
something in the next four months.
Chairman: That is probably quite a good
point at which to bring in Mr Bailey.
Q6 Mr Bailey: You mentioned some
improvements that have taken place. Is there effectively a measurable
checklist that you can demonstrate of improvements that have taken
place? Can you guarantee that without further "concrete progress"
in both that the sanctions will not be removed?
Caroline Flint: I mentioned already
that they have released three remaining political prisoners in
August 2008, making it the first time in a decade that the country
has no political prisoners. This met one of the 12 conditions
for engagement set out by the European Union in November 2006.
We decided to re-engage with Belarus and to suspend the ban on
ministerial contacts and partially suspend the travel ban on leading
political figures. As I said, they have had a window of six months
now to demonstrate further reforms in the areas of human rights
and democracy, which include the press having more freedom and
the opposition press having more circulation as well within the
country. We are also looking to see what further they can do to
support NGOs. There have been some steps to facilitate the registration
of NGOs but, again, we would like to see more decisive progress.
We would like to see, for example, the implementation of the OSCE's
election monitors' recommendations, following another set of unsatisfactory
parliamentary elections in September. All these will be taken
into consideration when we meet in March. They have got a couple
of months to make some more progress. We will be making our views
clear and we will be talking to other Member States about this
as well.
Q7 Mr Hands: Can I just come in on
that because I think there is a lot of doubt about whether Uzbekistan
really is making any progress. The original EU sanctions were
imposed really for two reasons: firstly, to try and find out who
was responsible for the events in Andizhan on 12 and 13 May 2005
and, secondly, to promote human rights more generally in Uzbekistan.
I am very, very doubtful, but I would be very interested to hear
your views, Minister, whether either of those has been fulfilled.
Can you say anything about whether we are any closer to finding
out who was responsible? Can I also say that Human Rights Watch
issued a report on Uzbekistan on 3 December 2008, so just a month
ago, saying: "In the three years and two months since the
massacre, the Uzbek Government has steadfastly refused to clarify
the circumstances surrounding the massacre, or to hold accountable
those responsible for the killings. Several hundred individuals,
who were convicted and sentenced in closed trials in 2005 and
2006, are believed to remain in prison serving lengthy sentences."
Human Rights Watch seems to be saying precisely the opposite,
that actually the human rights situation is as bad now as it was
in 2005. I would be grateful if you could tell us what progress
has been made on Andizhan?
Caroline Flint: The UK has proposed
on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and with EU partners,
to the Government of Uzbekistan that there should be an independent
international investigation. That has been rejected by the Uzbek
authorities.
Q8 Mr Hands: Sorry, it has been rejected.
Coming back to the original EU sanctions which were all about
finding out who was responsible for Andizhan, where is the progress?
Caroline Flint: In terms of progress,
in June, a political prisoner was conditionally released. In October,
a member of the human rights organisation Ezgulik and the political
party Birlik was released early and granted amnesty. Another person
who had been sentenced to three and a half years imprisonment
on charges of extortion was also freed.
Q9 Mr Hands: Sorry, are these people
charged as a result of Andizhan? This is all about progress on
finding the culprits of Andizhan.
Caroline Flint: I said on Andizhan
that we have said that there should be an independent investigation.
Mr Hands: But there has not been one.
Caroline Flint: As far as I am
aware, there has not been progress in that area. What I was trying
to draw attention to is progress in some other areas. I think
I did make it clear in my earlier comments that this is not a
perfect situation that we are dealing with here. Part of it is
about how we can encourage progress to be made. It may not be
as much as we would want, but certainly I think the sanctions
process and other opportunities within the EU have demonstrated,
with a number of countries, the progress on human rights which
is achieved. This is why, I have to say—and I go back to
the question about Uzbekistan—we wanted to make sure there
continued to be a sanctions package for that particular country,
but there were others who felt that we had to give some acknowledgement
of some progress. If it is a choice between no package being renewed,
that is the urgency of the situation, and having something that
we could all go forward on that still retained a good sanctions
package, I think that is what is important and that is the type
of decision we had to make at the time.
Chairman: We are deeply into policy areas.
Mr Robertson?
Q10 Angus Robertson: In light of
the fact, Minister, that we have been talking about the scrutiny
process and so on, would you be happy to review the Government's
line on the depositing of draft conclusions?
Caroline Flint: I am afraid I
would have to say that I would stick with previous recommendations
on this from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, because the
conclusions—and this is a view shared by others as well—are
not legally binding, and therefore within our system they are
not appropriate, and we believe that the way in which we deal
with Common Positions, Joint Actions or Council Decisions derived
from Council Conclusions, which are subject to scrutiny, should
be maintained and taken forward. That is the position we feel
we should stick with. It would alter the way that the Government
actually negotiates on behalf of the UK and I think, in doing
so, could diminish its effectiveness.
Q11 Angus Robertson: Do you not think
that might sound strange to people who deal with European matters
who understand that the draft Conclusions are routinely published
on the website of the Danish parliament, so it is possible for
members of the public, members of the Committee and clerks of
the Committee to go to www Danish Parliament EU Information Centre,
and we can all see the draft Conclusions? You are coming to this
Committee and telling us that you will not provide this Committee
with draft Conclusions, but it is perfectly all right to go to
the Danish parliament's website to get them? In these days of
modern technology, it really does sound very odd.
Caroline Flint: I have to say
that when I heard the way that our Danish friends do this, I made
it my business to delve a little deeper into what was happening
there. The Danes operate a parliamentary mandating system. This
means that ministers negotiating at Council must seek the approval
of their parliament for negotiated positions, so the situation
is that, whilst the Council is meeting, the Danish minister has
a hot phone to the parliament where the scrutiny committee is
sitting as they relay the discussion back and forth in order for
the minister to get agreement for an informed decision for the
minister to follow.
Q12 Angus Robertson: Sorry to interrupt,
Minister, we are aware of this, we have produced a number of reports
on the various scrutiny systems around the EU. If I could bring
you to the specific point of these draft Conclusions; why is it
that we can access this information from Denmark but you and your
Government will not share it with this Committee? It is bizarre.
Caroline Flint: And I was going
to follow on from that, the process in which the Danish ministers
engage with their scrutiny committee is based on confidentiality,
but there is an anomaly here, because you are right, the Danish
parliament publishes the Council Conclusions on its website. We
have been in contact with the Danish Embassy and colleagues and
we have been in contact with the Council Secretariat about this
matter. There is a LIMITE« classification, which mean a restriction
on these documents. I have to say I would suggest that the Danes
are actually acting—
Chairman: I hope you are not going say
that you are going to try and get the UK Government to get the
Danish Government to become less transparent.
Caroline Flint: What I am saying—
Chairman: Do not say it and save yourself
and the Government some embarrassment here.
Caroline Flint: What I am saying
is that they are a classified document and all the other Member
States, as far as we know, respect that confidentiality. It is
rather an anomaly when—
Chairman: They have a mandating system—they
have no option. The laws of their parliament do not allow them
to do otherwise.
Caroline Flint: This is something
that we are looking to get to the bottom of because it is, clearly,
an anomaly where on the one hand they are meant to be discussing
confidentially with their parliamentarians and, at the same time,
they are putting it on their website. This is a matter that clearly
has to be looked into because when all the Member States signed
up to this classification, it was agreed that that was how it
would work, and clearly it is not happening in the spirit of that
with our Danish colleagues. That is the truth!
Q13 Richard Younger-Ross: The Minister
comes to the criticism about papers not being deposited and says,
"I want to be more open, I want to come and talk to you,"
but when we give you a specific example of where you could be
more open, you say "Non". You do not only say no, you
then say that the Danish can do that but we are going to have
an inquiry and push that, knowing full well that raising that
could very well mean that there is less transparency in the Danish
parliament. Can the Minister not look at how we can work together
on these issues so that we see what is coming up ahead of the
curve rather than behind it so that there is a proper dialogue
between our Committee and your Department?
Caroline Flint: I think there
are two issues here. There are issues that are coming up and if
there is a way that we can keep the Committee better informed
about what is coming ahead, I think that is something I would
be happy to look into. As I said, where we have got sanctions
packages if at six months or 12 months we can report back on how
they are progressing, I think might be helpful as well
Q14 Richard Younger-Ross: Is a draft
Conclusion not an issue that is coming up?
Caroline Flint: My point is—
Chairman: We must move on, Bill?
Q15 Mr Cash: I just wanted to ask
a simple question. The draft Conclusions are actually hatched
out before anyone has even started talking to one another ---
Minister?
Caroline Flint: Yes, I am listening,
sorry.
Q16 Mr Cash: Would you like to repeat
what I have just said?
Caroline Flint: "Talking
about" was the last point you just said.
Q17 Mr Cash: I am just saying that
the Conclusions are actually available, as Mr Robertson has said,
but they are also agreed before anyone has sat down to discuss
anything. This is a form of political insanity, which is to produce
conclusions before anyone has discussed anything. Which of the
two would you prefer, that we should regard ourselves as being
excluded from information that goes to the Danish parliament on
the one hand or would you apply your very considerable political
skills to ensuring that the British Government at no point whatsoever
enters into agreements which have already been published when
the draft Conclusions are considered in advance of the meetings?
Caroline Flint: I am going to
ask Matthew Rycroft to explain how these are not agreed in the
way that the honourable gentleman is suggesting.
Mr Cash: They are.
Mr Rycroft: I think the most important
point to say here is that the Conclusions themselves are agreed
by ministers sitting in the Council. The drafts are produced either
by the Presidency or the Council Secretariat.
Mr Cash: Or by a bunch of bureaucrats.
Mr Rycroft: Or whoever it is,
in advance, with no level of agreement. That is why they are put
to the ministers to agree. It is those draft Conclusions, which
are always classified and restricted, which do not have any force
at all, political, legal or anything else, until they are agreed
by the ministers at the Council itself.
Caroline Flint: Of course there
are discussions that go on during the Councils between officials
which sometimes change the wording on these draft Conclusions.
That is the case; that is what happens.
Mr Cash: Ho ho!
Caroline Flint: And there is debate
and discussion about what the wording should be. Just in terms
of how we try to keep the Committee informed about Councils, as
I said, in our system Council Conclusions are not subject to scrutiny.
However, before each Council of Ministers, the UK minister responsible
writes a written ministerial statement, informing Parliament about
the business of each Council and the UK position on agenda items.
After each Council of Ministers meeting, including informal meetings,
the UK minister responsible again makes a statement setting out
the outcomes, the nature of discussion and our role in it. These
written replies normally cover the adoption of Council Conclusions,
where these are dealt with as substantive points for discussion
on the agenda. Separately, we have oral statements and obviously
there are evidence sessions as well. In many different ways we
try to do our best but, as I have said, there is always room for
improvement.
Chairman: You read that without any irony.
I was amazed because of course you just read a statement that
you would tell the Committee the agenda items in your pre-Council
statement. This is why you are here: you did not do that for the
General Affairs Council on 13 October. That is the point. Someone
has been pressing this on other senior members of this House,
when you make a mistake, just say, "I made a mistake, I am
sorry," and then we can all move on, instead of being defensive
in the way that you have been today, because we did not receive
that first statement that you mention, a pre-agenda statement
of the positions. We did not get it; that is a fact. We are going
to move on to other items. I know that you wish to be helpful
and you have tried to be helpful, and it is not necessarily the
ministers who are at fault for what is produced on their behalf.
We are quite a mature group of people who have done quite a bit
of European business and we know that the ambassadorial team at
COREPER prepare the Conclusions. Yes, there sometimes are some
amendments, but the agreements between countries are reached before
they ever get to the Council, and very, very little happens at
the Council that changes that, because we do respect the powers
and abilities of our ambassadorial teams in COREPER; we are not
stupid about that. There is a genuine non sequitur in the Government
saying that the scrutiny process must be denied the right look
at these draft Conclusions because it does take away from the
parliamentary scrutiny process a very, very vital matter. You
said, and I appreciated your argument, that in this area of Common
Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence
Policy that matters are fast-moving. Yes, we agree with that.
That is why we meet every week. That is why we receive a bundle
of documents on a Monday and a bundle on a Tuesday. We take these
matters seriously. What was said in the letter to myself by the
Secretary of State on 17 May, by the Rt Hon David Miliband, he
wrote in the third paragraph: "Our commitment to transparency
extends equally to scrutiny." I think that is a genuine offer
to us. "As you know, the Government is committed to the principle
of up-stream scrutiny. We recognise that for scrutiny to be effective
your Committee needs to be able to examine the EU policy-making
process at the earliest possible stage." I think until we
get to the point where draft Conclusions are given to this Committee
which this is a mature group of people who take this matter seriously;(
there are not a lot of people volunteering to come and do the
heavy lifting that this Committee does; we treat these matters
with respect) and until that is accepted by the Government, there
will always be the problem that someone will think that there
is something going on that is a subterfuge and not an honest policy-making
process. We do not see it as a subterfuge. We just like to be
given our position properly to look at these matters. It is a
nonsense, as has been pointed out by Mr Robertson, that they can
put it on a website and if we wanted, we could draw them down
and use them. We do not wish to do that because we do not want
to mandate; we are not talking about moving to that system. I
and most of the Committee believe that our persuasive system is
a better system than mandating. We just want to be given the information.
That would then make the words of the Foreign Secretary a reality.
I hope you accept that, and until that happens there will always
be these glitches, despite your very hard work to bridge that
gap in communication. Can we leave that at that and move on to
our second session on the Solana Review of the European Security
Strategy. On 17 December 2008, the Committee considered and end-of-Presidency
Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, and decided
to retain it under scrutiny. The main reason for this was that
it discovered that not only had the Solana Review of European
Security Strategy already been adopted, but so, too, had three
major Declarations and Statements on enhancing European Security
and Defence Policy, which is the operational component of the
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. We were obviously concerned
at that and viewed it as a major breach. Mr Dobbin?
Q18 Jim Dobbin: I think we are maybe
in danger in this discussion of going down the same line of argument
as we have just heard. Could I ask why even in your recent Explanatory
Memorandum did you not explain the failure to deposit the European
Security Strategy prior to adoption, despite the Committee's clearly
expressed request for this to be done?
Caroline Flint: I think your comments
and your recent conclusions about the need to update by letter
as things develop are right, and I think we should have been more
upfront about this. That is something I am going to take on board.
The review that was conducted and the text was drafted by Mr Solana,
and we did not have the final text until Mr Solana delivered his
review as a speech in fact at the GAERC on 8 December. I think
it was deposited in an EM on 21 January. Obviously I gave evidence
to the House of Lords on this but, as I have said, I have taken
on board your comments, and I think we should be more upfront
about how this was developing to give the Committee more information,
and that is a matter we will look into.
Q19 Chairman: Just a small comment—it
would be nice to think that you did not think going to the House
of Lords had any great relevance to the elected Chamber of this
House.
Caroline Flint: No, I appreciate
that.
Mr Cash: Can I ask a quick one. Is it
possible that one of the reasons why this happened is because,
effectively, Mr Solana, like for example when he went off to see
Hamas without authority some 18 months ago, is pretty well out
on a limb? This is an institutional problem and really, effectively,
he just charges around like Dr Strangelove in the belief that
he has got overall authority and therefore everybody else has
to more or less catch up, and we get smidgeons of this from Nicholas
Sarkozy as well. Effectively, you want to review the situation
with the Foreign Secretary so as to make quite sure that in relation
to the ESDP, it is not just a foreign policy which is running
in a parallel universe because it is one that affects the United
Kingdom, and therefore we would insist that they do actually do
what we want within the framework of the constraints of the ESDP
itself, and that he does not have a completely free hand to go
off and do whatever he likes and then we tag along behind.
Chairman: If you can answer that briefly
then please do!
Angus Robertson: Discuss!
Mr Cash: It is what has happened.
Caroline Flint: I am sure we might
get on to this later, but obviously part of the Lisbon Treaty
to is try and rationalise some of the work around external issues,
bringing together, from what I understand, the role of the High
Representative, and work of the Commission on external affairs
work into one streamlined group in which the High Representative,
if that goes forward and Lisbon is ratified, would be a Vice President
of the Commission. I am not saying that would necessarily suit
the honourable gentleman's purposes—
Mr Cash: He is unelected.
Caroline Flint: —but it
would at least help to pull this together in a better, more streamlined
way in terms of the scrutiny process.
Chairman: Thank you for that. You will
have noted the Committee's disappointment that the European Council
adopted not only the European Security Strategy without any parliamentary
scrutiny, for which I think you have almost apologised for, it
was nearly an apology—
Caroline Flint: —You can
take it as an apology.
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